00032436

NOT TO BE ISSUED
OUT OF THE LIBRARY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018

FRANCE

UNDER

LOUIS-PHILIPPE

FROM 1841 TO 1847.

32436 a

BY M. GUIZOT.

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
PUBLISHER IN ORDINARY TO HER MAJESTY.
1865.

32436

LONDON

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.

NEW-STREET SQUARE

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

ELECTIONS OF 1842.—DEATH OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS.—REGENCY BILL.

(1842.)

Page

M. Royer-Collard and General Foy.—Reasons why I endeavoured to preserve perfect Independence of Thought and Conduct in opposition to Popular Sentiments and Desires.—My Interviews with Count Siméon and M. Jouffroy a short time before their Deaths.—Their Opinion on our Policy.—Character and Results of the Elections to the Chamber of Deputies in July, 1842.—Death of the Duke of Orleans.—My Diplomatic Correspondence after his Death.—Attitude of the European Governments.—Conversation between Prince Metternich and Count de Flahault.—Obsequies of the Duke of Orleans at Paris and Dreux.—Preparation and Introduction of the Regency Bill.—Debate on this Bill in both Chambers.—The Duke de Broglie, M. Dupin, M. Thiers, M. de Lamartine, M. Berryer, and myself.—The Bill passes.—The Duke of Orleans, and his Character.—Consequences of his Death 1

CHAPTER II.

THE MARQUESAS ISLANDS AND OTAHEITE.

(1841—1846.)

Page

A Disadvantage of Representative Government. — First Navigations in the Pacific Ocean.—Discovery of the Island of Otaheite.—Different Voyagers who visited it from the 17th to the 19th Century.—New Zealand and the Nanto-Bordelaise Company. — Admiral Dupetit-Thouars and the Marquesas Islands.—Reasons for our taking possession of them.—Admiral Dupetit-Thouars at Otaheite.—English Missionaries at Otaheite.—The Protestant and Catholic Missions in the Pacific Ocean.—Debates in the Chamber of Deputies on this subject.—Captain Bruat appointed Governor of the French Establishments in the Pacific Ocean.—Return of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars to Otaheite.—He substitutes the complete Sovereignty of France for the Protectorate.—Opposition of Queen Pomare and the Otaheitans.—Ferment at Otaheite.—Intrigues of Mr. Pritchard, late English Missionary.—He takes down his Flag as English Consul, and resigns his Functions.—The French Government orders the re-establishment of the Protectorate.—Debates in the Chambers on this subject.—Arrest, Imprisonment, and Expulsion of Mr. Pritchard at Otaheite.—Effect of this Incident in London.—Language of Sir Robert Peel. —My Language.—Negotiation on this subject.—Conduct and Correspondence of Captain Bruat.—The Expulsion of Mr. Pritchard is maintained, and an Indemnity granted to him.—Reasons for this double measure.—Admirals Hamelin and Seymour, commanding the French and English Squadrons in the Pacific, are instructed to arrange the amount of this Indemnity. — Letter from King Louis-Philippe to me, offering to take the payment on himself.—The Cabinet refuses.—Debate in the Chamber of Deputies.—Attitude of the Cabinet.—It obtains only a weak Majority.—Announces its resolu-

Page
tion to retire.—Proceeding of the Conservative Party.—The Cabinet remains in office.—Estimate of this Incident 38

CHAPTER III.

ALGERIA AND MOROCCO.

(1841—1847.)

General Bugeaud Governor-General of Algeria.—His Character and two principal Ideas on his Mission.—Disagreement between those Ideas and the Dispositions of the Chambers.—The Cabinet resolves to support General Bugeaud firmly in the work of complete French rule over the whole of Algeria.—Campaigns and Success of General Bugeaud.—His Opinion of Abd-el-Kader.—His Susceptibility in his relations with the Ministry of War, the Chambers, and the Journals.—His Pamphlets.—His Private Correspondence with me.—He is made a Marshal.—Abd-el-Kader falls back on Morocco.—Dispositions of the People of Morocco and Embarrassment of the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman.—Invasion of the Territory of Algeria.—Our Remonstrances with the Emperor of Morocco.—My Instructions to the Consul-General of France at Tangier.—The Prince of Joinville is appointed Commandant of a Squadron ordered to the Coasts of Morocco.—Uneasiness of the English Government.—Suspicions of Sir Robert Peel.—Sagacity and Loyalty of Lord Aberdeen.—His Steps to induce the Emperor of Morocco to yield to our Demands.—They fail of success; War is declared.—The Prince of Joinville bombards Tangier and takes Mogadore.—Marshal Bugeaud engages and routs the Army of Morocco on the Banks of the Isly.—The Emperor of Morocco sues for Peace.—It is concluded at Tangier.—Its Conditions and Motives.—Debates in the Chambers on this subject.—Negotiations for settling the Frontiers between Algeria and Morocco.—

Page

Treaty of Lalla-Maghrania.—Marshal Bugeaud evinces an inclination to retire.—Abd-el-Kader recommences the War in Algeria.—Incident of the Grottoes of Dahra.—Marshal Bugeaud commences his plan of Military Colonization.—This plan is ill received in the Chambers, and by the Ministry of War.—Marshal Bugeaud wishes to retire.—He arrives in France.—New and general Insurrection in Algeria.—Marshal Bugeaud returns and subdues the Insurrection.—He is disposed to pursue Abd-el-Kader to Morocco.—I write to him on this subject.—He abandons his Intentions.—He urges his plan of Military Colonization.—His Letter to the King demanding it.—Presentation to the Chamber of Deputies of a Bill conformable to his views.—Unfavourable reception of this Bill.—Marshal Bugeaud foresees its ill success.—He is ill and unable to come to Paris.—The Committee of the Chamber of Deputies proposes the rejection of the Bill.—The Government withdraws it.—Marshal Bugeaud tenders his Resignation.—The Duke of Aumale is appointed Governor-General of Algeria 110

CHAPTER IV.

THE MUSSULMANS IN PARIS.—TURKEY AND GREECE.

(1842—1847.)

Mussulman Chiefs in Paris, from 1845 to 1847.—Ben-Achache, Ambassador from Morocco.—Ahmed Pacha, Bey of Tunis.—Ibrahim Pacha, Son of the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali.—Mirza Mehemmed Ali Khan, Ambassador from Persia.—Redschid Pacha, Grand Vizier.—Barrenness of Attempts at Reform in the Ottoman Empire.—There is no trusting to Appearances.—Affairs of Syria.—Progress of the Condition of the Christians in Syria from 1845 to 1848.—Affair of the Consulate of France at Jerusalem in 1843.—Question of the Rene-

Page

gades in Turkey.—Of the Situation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.—Affairs of Greece.—M. Colettis and M. Piscatory.—M. Piscatory and Sir Edmund Lyons.—King Otho.—My Instructions to M. Piscatory.—Revolution of Athens (15th of September, 1843).—Opinion of M. Colettis.—National Assembly in Greece.—Establishment of the Constitutional System.—Sentiments of the Cabinets of London, St. Petersburg, and Vienna.—Arrival of M. Colettis in Greece.—The Mavrocordato Ministry.—Its Fall.—Ministry of Colettis and Metaxa.—M. Metaxa retires.—The Colettis Ministry.—Hostility of Sir Edmund Lyons.—My Correspondence with M. Colettis.—Attitude of Sir Edmund Lyons towards M. Piscatory.—Instructions of Lord Aberdeen.—Fall of the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen.—Lord Palmerston resumes office in England.—His Attitude towards Greece and the Ministry of M. Colettis.—Firmness of M. Colettis.—Internal Troubles in Greece.—M. Colettis represses them.—Quarrel between the Courts of Athens and Constantinople.—Illness and Death of M. Colettis 220

CHAPTER V.

LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION.—THE JESUITS AND THE COURT OF ROME.

(1840—1846.)

In what Liberty of Instruction consists.—Resolution of the Cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, to maintain, in that Question, the promise of the Charter of 1830.—Various Bills presented by MM. Villemain and Salvandy.—Character of the University of France, a body essentially laical and national.—Liberty of Instruction can and ought to exist at the same time with the University.—Permanent Success of the University.—Difficulty of its situation with respect to Religious Education.—

Page

Legitimacy and necessity of Liberty of Instruction.—Contest between the University and a portion of the Clergy.—By what unfortunate combination the Jesuits became the principal representatives of Liberty of Instruction.—Of the Primitive and Historical Character of the Congregation of Jesuits.—Public Mistrust and Irritation against it.—It is demanded that the Laws of the State against the Jesuits should be put in execution.—I propose that the question of the Jesuits should be first carried to Rome, before the Spiritual Power of the Catholic Church.—The King and Council adopt my proposition.—M. Rossi is appointed Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary, per interim, at Rome.—Reasons for this selection.—Negotiations with the Court of Rome for the dissolution of the Congregation of Jesuits in France without the intervention of the Civil Power.—Embarrassment and Hesitation of the Court of Rome.—Gregory XVI. and Cardinal Lambruschini.—Success of M. Rossi.—The Holy See persuades the Society of Jesus to dissolve itself in France.—Effect of this Result of the Negotiation.—Efforts to retard or elude its execution.—These Efforts fail, and the Measures agreed on continue to be executed, but slowly.—Illness of Pope Gregory XVI.—Troubles in Romagna.—M. Rossi is appointed Ambassador in Ordinary from France to Rome.—Death of Gregory XVI.—Anticipations respecting the Conclave 347

FRANCE

UNDER

LOUIS-PHILIPPE.

CHAPTER I.

ELECTIONS OF 1842.—DEATH OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS.—REGENCY BILL (1842).

M. ROYER-COLLARD AND GENERAL FOY.—REASONS WHY I ENDEAVOURED TO PRESERVE PERFECT INDEPENDENCE OF THOUGHT AND CONDUCT IN OPPOSITION TO POPULAR SENTIMENTS AND DESIRES.—MY INTERVIEWS WITH COUNT SIMÉON AND M. JOUFFROY A SHORT TIME BEFORE THEIR DEATHS.—THEIR OPINION ON OUR POLICY.—CHARACTER AND RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IN JULY 1842.—DEATH OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS.—MY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE AFTER HIS DEATH.—ATTITUDE OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.—CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRINCE METTERNICH AND COUNT DE FLAHAULT.—OBSEQUIES OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AT PARIS AND DREUX.—PREPARATION AND INTRODUCTION OF THE REGENCY BILL.—DEBATE ON THIS BILL IN BOTH CHAMBERS.—THE DUKE DE BROGLIE, M. DUPIN, M. THIERS, M. DE LAMARTINE, M. BERRYER, AND MYSELF.—THE BILL PASSES.—THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AND HIS CHARACTER.—CONSEQUENCES OF HIS DEATH.

(1842.)

M. ROYER-COLLARD, observing General Foy one day pensive and rather downcast, after an excellent speech

which failed to obtain the popular and prompt success he desired, said to him, "My dear General, you expect too much; you wish to satisfy equally the judges and the crowd. This is impossible: you must choose between them."

M. Royer-Collard spoke as a judge rather than as a political actor. He was a man of thought rather than of deeds, and more anxious to manifest resolutely his idea than to establish his will. General Foy's ambition was more practical and complicated; he wished to control events as well as minds, to rule the million as also the select few. In our days, it forms the difficulty and honour of free governments that public men require this double success. For many ages, they had scarcely any occasion to trouble themselves as to spectators or thinkers; whether they sought their personal fortune only, or had at heart the interests of the prince and country, they pursued their object according to their own ideas, without having to account incessantly with bold publicists, exacting critics, and a whole people present at all their words and acts. Undoubtedly, it was necessary that they should triumph in the end over all their adversaries and succeed in their undertakings; but they were not compelled, at every step, to be comprehended and accepted by all degrees of the social ladder. Now, they are subjected to this harsh condition: they carry on affairs and live under the eyes of a society attentive to everything, full of ignorance and intelligence, of argument and curiosity; all prepared to manifest and sustain their interests, legitimate or illegitimate, their ideas, just

or false. Between these influences and exactions, at one time of the crowd, at another of the judges, M. Royer-Collard, who asked nothing from either, could choose with freedom; but General Foy, who aspired to power for his party and himself, was necessitated to treat with all, and pay court to all. He would have been even more compelled to this course if premature death had not arrested him in his career, and if, after the revolution of 1830, he had been actually called to govern.

I have often been reproached with not paying sufficient deference to popular sentiments and desires. No one knows how much the anticipation of this censure has affected me, even before undergoing it. I am more inclined than has been supposed to the desire of pleasing, to the spirit of conciliation; and I know the full value and charm of that general sympathy which is called popularity. Sir Robert Peel said one day to Lord Aberdeen, "M. Guizot makes many concessions to his friends; I make none but to my adversaries." It is true, I have often yielded to my friends, as much from easiness as necessity, and sometimes with regret. More than once also, I would willingly have given way to my adversaries. No matter what may have been said, I never, in government, followed up the application and triumph of a theory; neither has any violent personal feeling induced me to reject transactions and concessions universally essential to success and progress. It is from a totally different cause and disposition that I have frequently and obstinately opposed popular instincts. Before entering on public

life, I witnessed the Revolution and the Empire; I saw, as clear as day, their faults and disasters spring from their alternating prepossessions of mind and force: the Revolution gave itself up to the flood of innovations; the Empire to the torrent of conquests. Warnings were not wanting to each system; for both, sound policy was no secret tardily disclosed: it was repeatedly indicated to them by the events and sages of the time. They rejected it at all hands; the Revolution lived under the yoke of popular passions, the Emperor Napoleon under the bondage of his own. This cost the Revolution the liberties it had proclaimed, the Empire the conquests it had achieved, and France immense afflictions and sacrifices. I brought into public life the constant remembrance of these two great examples, and a resolution, instinctive rather than premeditated, to search out all occasions for sound policy, conformable to the interests and rights of the country, and to bow beneath no other control. He who does not maintain, in judgment and conduct, sufficient independence to see things as they truly are, and what they counsel or command, irrespective of the prejudices and passions of men, is neither worthy nor capable of governing. The representative system, it is true, renders this independence of mind and action more difficult to governing power, for it has precisely the object of assuring to the governed, to their ideas and sentiments as well as to their interests, a large share of influence in the conduct of affairs; but the difficulty does not suppress the necessity, and the institutions which procure the intervention of the

country in its affairs would guarantee but little good management, if they reduced the ministers to docile agents of popular ideas and wishes. The task of government is so great that it requires some greatness in those on whom the weight is imposed; and the more free the people are, the more their chiefs require unfettered minds and resolute hearts. Let them be called upon incessantly to justify the use they make of personal liberty in the exercise of power, and be held responsible for it: nothing is more just and necessary; but responsibility precisely implies liberty, and when Themistocles said to Eurybiades, irritated by his opposition, "Strike, but hear," he held the conduct and language which every man ought to hold who is worthy of serving a free country.

This has been my prevailing sentiment throughout the course of my public life; and not only mine, but that of the monarch I served, and of the political friends who supported me. King Louis-Philippe had acquired, in the progress of his complicated and adventurous career, a remarkably free spirit, while preserving a sincerely patriotic heart. Imbued from early youth with the general ideas of his time, he had viewed them through the test of facts, and had estimated their true value without abandoning them. He remained faithful to their cause while judging them; and although he sometimes humoured too complacently and even adopted popular impressions, he distinguished with firm solid sense the true interest of the country, and made it the rule of his policy, often doubtful of success, and regretting the

loss of popularity, but fully resolved to sacrifice it rather than yield to his prepossessions. With less finesse and equal constancy, the party which, after the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, formed itself round the government, and supported it in the Chambers, held the same instincts of wisdom and independence in the conduct of public affairs, and struggled honestly against certain dispositions of the country, although often inclined to partake them. It is a mere commonplace, continually repeated, to see in the conduct of men, great or little, nothing but the empire of their interests, egotistical passions, or weaknesses; and I have lived too long not to know that these moving causes exercise an important share in human life; but it is not true that they are the only motives, or always the most powerful. There is also as little intelligence as justice in not acknowledging that in resisting popular inclinations, while they scrupulously respected public liberty, King Louis-Philippe, his advisers, and their friends displayed acts of political probity and foresight very far removed from obedience to subordinate dispositions or vulgar interests.

For my own part, I was profoundly convinced of the general value, as well as of the immediate utility, of this policy; and although it did not always maintain, in its various organs, the complete dignity of attitude and perfect harmony I could have desired, I exercised it with unqualified sympathy. But I never deceived myself as to its difficulties and dangers. During the sessions of 1841 and 1842 I had to struggle, in the Egyptian question, against the

warlike reminiscences and tastes of the country; in that of the right of search, against national susceptibilities and jealousies. I saw also other questions peeping out which promised to be equally delicate, and as likely to excite popular emotions which it would be necessary to resist. We were on the verge of a compulsory dissolution, and the general election to the Chamber of Deputies. I was much preoccupied by this coming trial, and while persisting without hesitation in our line of policy, I felt the necessity of being assured that we did not hold too strongly to our own judgment. At this epoch, I had two sincere though not exactly intimate friends, the one a lawyer and administrator eminent for rectitude and self-possession; the other, a philosopher and moralist of a mind equally elevated and acute, and independent even to suspicious pride. One sat in the House of Peers, the other in the Chamber of Deputies. Both were near their end; Count Siméon under the weight of years, and M. Jouffroy from the attacks of disease. Both were beyond the arena, and looked on our contests with the impartiality and penetration of disinterested spectators. I went several times to see and discourse with them on our position. Both, with very opposite impressions, approved of our course. "You will find it difficult to succeed," said Count Siméon to me; "reason does not always triumph—often the contrary; but want of reason always ends in failure. The policy of a middle course is difficult; that of your adversaries would rapidly become impossible. Persevere: your cause is good; I hope your chance will be so also." I found M. Jouffroy in a moral disposi-

tion which affected me. "I feel," he had himself written on the 20th of December, 1841, "all the good effects of solitude. In retiring from the heart to the soul, from active exertion to intelligent reflection, we draw near the source of peace and truth, which is the centre of all things, and speedily the agitations of the surface seem to us no more than a vain sound and a senseless foam. . . . Illness is certainly a mercy which God extends to us, a sort of spiritual retreat provided by his grace, that we may learn to know and find ourselves, and open our eyes to the true aspect of things." His opinion had, after our last debates, much value. In 1839 he had been, in the Chamber of Deputies, reporter on the Egyptian question, and favourable to the Egyptian policy. "We deceived ourselves," he said to me; "we were ill informed as to facts, and miscalculated powers; we made too much noise. This is to be lamented; but when light came, there was no ground for hesitation. You performed an act of courage and good sense in arresting the country on a pernicious path. Let free government continue in France and peace in Europe; this is all we require for many years. Your policy has my warmest wishes; I regret that I can only give you the suffrage of a dying man."

Both had ceased to live when the session of 1842 reached its term; but their adhesion confirmed me in a confidence to which, even in the midst of my solicitude for the future, I was personally disposed.

The elections took place between the 9th and the 11th of July, 1842, under the most complete liberty of the press, of the electoral assemblies, of the com-

mittees, and of all the public sources of influence. Attacks against the government displayed themselves with their accustomed violence; the cabinet, it was said, "had only taken office to serve foreign interests; it sought accomplices willing to aid it in consummating the ruin and degradation of France; it exercised despotism without glory, supported by a most paltry and ignoble aristocracy of money." Some material disorders were joined to these insults, insignificant in themselves, but affording glimpses of a perspective going infinitely beyond parliamentary and electoral reforms. At the cemetery of Mont Parnasse, on the tomb of a republican physician, an orator declaimed so furiously against *infamous property*, that the *National* felt called upon to declare that it had neither mission nor desire to defend such a discourse; but while taking this precaution, it reprimanded the commissary of police who interrupted the demagogue. The danger of 1840 no longer weighed upon minds; liberal impetuosity, revolutionary passions, the taste for opposition, resumed their course—opposition, that delight of peoples who have neither entirely lost nor are in actual possession of liberty. The electoral movement was favourable to these tendencies of the day; nevertheless, in the end, after a contest free even to licence, out of 459 elections, 266 sided with the government, 193 with the opposition; and of 92 new members, 54 were friends of the cabinet, and 38 against it.

When the Chamber met, and proceeded to verify the validity of its members, the administration was, of course, accused of electoral corruption; but after

long and scrutinizing debates, which placed in full evidence the loyalty and general legality of the acts of the cabinet, three elections only seemed to present symptoms of illegitimate local manœuvres, either menaces or promises. A committee of inquiry, proposed by M. Odilon-Barrot, was appointed to examine the facts, and, after the most minute researches, the Chamber, on the report of the committee, admitted two out of the three, one of which had returned a deputy to the opposition.

We had not completely ascertained the result of the elections when, on the 13th of July, towards noon, a horse-guard brought me the news of the accident that had just happened to the Duke of Orleans while proceeding from Paris to Neuilly to take leave of the King and Queen, before his departure for St. Omer, where he was going to inspect several regiments. The injury he had received from the fall was said to be extremely serious, but the full extent was not known. The fainting prince had been carried into a shop near the Porte Maillot; the King and Queen were with him, and the ministers were summoned. I hastened to the spot. I shall not repeat here, after the lapse of twenty-two years, which seem like an age, the details of this tragic event. They were compiled and related, with as much correctness as true and striking emotion, in a small volume entitled, "Neuilly, Nôtre Dame, and Dreux," written day by day, and almost hour by hour, by M. Cuvillier-Fleury, preceptor and afterwards private secretary to the Duke of Aumale. The misfortune completed, I wrote the next day, the 14th of July, to Count de Flahault, our ambassador

at Vienna, and to all the King's representatives at the great foreign courts:—"I have nothing to tell you. The details of our calamity are in every mouth. All that you will read in the 'Journal des Débats,' I was a sad spectator of. Three hours I remained in that miserable chamber, looking on the prince dying on a mattress; his father, mother, brothers, sisters kneeling round him, preserving silence, that they might hear him breathe, and keeping every one at a distance that a little fresh air might reach him. I saw him die. I saw the King and Queen embrace their dead son. We left the house, the body of the prince on a hand-barrow, the King and Queen on foot behind; a protracted cry of 'Long live the King!' burst from the crowd, all common people, who had assembled round the door. The greater part believed that the prince was not dead, and that they were removing him to Neuilly to be taken better care of. The march lasted more than half an hour. I have just left the King. Yesterday, during that agony, he preserved admirably his courage, his presence of mind, his empire over himself and others. This morning he is wearied, more abandoned to his distress, but displaying moral and physical strength which surmounts everything. We have hastened the meeting of the Chambers by eight days; they will assemble on the 26th of this month. The obsequies will not take place until some days after. The Queen is in despair, but submissive; her grief has no intermission. The public impression is profound; anticipation mingles with emotion. All is and will continue quiet. Good conduct is indispensable, and every one feels this. I therefore

hope it will not be wanting, and will produce its effect."

I was extremely anxious that, under this appalling casualty, our agents abroad should be well instructed, and impressed with the inmost sentiments of the government and country they represented. I wrote to them again as follows, on the 25th of July, the eve of the meeting of the Chambers:—"The King and royal family begin to be accessible to sympathy. In the first moments, they saw and heard nothing; it was that mixture of agitation and shock, of confusion and stupor, caused by a stroke of lightning. The King recovered himself for the moment, when necessity absolutely demanded the exertion; but the necessity over, he returned to his family, and fell back into their desolation. The presence of that melancholy coffin in the little chapel of Neuilly, close to the Queen's apartments—the continued chant of the priests—the silence in the court of the castle, where no carriage was allowed to enter—the successive arrival of the princes—all maintained, or replunged at every moment the royal family into their deplorable anguish. Twenty times a day they visited the chapel. Each succeeding day brought with it some new and distressing interview. All this is now over. They are together, united in common in their misfortune. Next Saturday the coffin will leave Neuilly for Nôtre Dame. The chants will cease, the sentinels will depart, the carriages will roll again: then will follow the return to ordinary habits, the first alleviation under such a trial. The Queen has slept a little. Madame begins again to occupy herself exclusively

with the King, with his health, his disposition, his labours. The Duchess of Orleans endures the deep, acute, but not utterly subduing anguish of a young, strong, and lofty mind. The princes affect every one by the uniformity of their grief, and the assiduity of their attentions to their father, mother, aunt, and sisters. The King has recovered all his activity and freedom of mind. He was extremely low and distressed on Thursday last, at the mournful ceremony, when all came to see and bow to him without speaking. But that was agitation and momentary fatigue; in fact, his mind and body have both already returned to their natural state of vigour and elasticity. In a few days, when our sad funereal ceremonies are completed, all will resume its regular course, its accustomed aspect; and nothing will remain but what must endure for a very long time, a profound impression of grief in the royal family, before us all an immense void and the burden it imposes.

"All feel this. Never was impression more general and animated. All have the air of being, and really are, afflicted and uneasy on their own account. Two things manifest themselves together—much solicitude for the future, and a strong adhesion to what is, to the royal family, and to the monarchy. Storms are foreseen, but assuredly the anchors are deeply and firmly fixed.

"The Chamber opens to-morrow. I shall not close my letter until after the royal sitting. The speech from the throne, which this same courier will bring you, raises absolutely no question, and confines itself to the event. We shall act in conformity with the

speech. The leaders of the opposition, I believe, would wish to do the same on their side, and that at this moment there should be only a dynastic address and a rapid vote on the regency bill. But the passions of their party will probably draw them into some debate which we shall neither provoke nor reject. Certainly not for the interest of the cabinet, but for the dignity of the country, of the government, of the world, all contest should be adjourned to the coming winter. Of this I have many doubts.

"The regency bill is nearly adopted in the council. It is very simple—the application to the regency of all the essential principles of our constitutional monarchy, hereditary succession, the Salic law, the unity and inviolability of the royal power. The guardianship and tutelage of the minor king are confided to his mother or grandmother. The plan does not pretend to foresee and regulate every imaginable hypothesis, every possible chance; it settles the immediate questions, and provides for the necessities which circumstances have imposed on us.

"I do not expect that this opening session will last less than five or six weeks. The verification of the powers and constitution of the Chamber will occupy at least eight days. Then the address; then the regency bill; a committee, a report, a debate. The same afterwards in the Chamber of Peers. Our forms are slow. I doubt whether the prorogation can take place before the commencement of September."

"*Tuesday, July 26th, 3 o'clock.*

"I have just returned from the royal sitting and the Tuileries. A very numerous assembly; about one hundred and sixty peers and four hundred deputies. The hall crowded by the public. Everybody in mourning. A really genuine emotion; most animated acclamations, several times repeated, at the entrance of the King. The King at first discomposed, overflowing with tears, and speaking with difficulty. He recovered himself at the third sentence. The general aspect had much simplicity and seriousness."

In Europe, the impression also was very lively; truly sympathetic and general in England, of which Sir Robert Peel made himself the eloquent organ: "There cannot happen in France," he said in the House of Commons, "a misfortune which is not profoundly and sincerely deplored in this country. When a recent calamity fell on the royal family and people of France, have we not seen a unanimous sentiment of grief manifest itself with us, as if the misfortune had been our own?" In Germany, on his journey from Berlin to Vienna, the Duke of Orleans, by his personal accomplishments and the qualities of his mind, surmounted unfavourable prejudices, and left a popular impression; but the great courts of the Continent, and the chief part of the smaller ones by their example, entertained little regard for King Louis-Philippe and the whole establishment of 1830, a liberal system, the issue of a revolution. They gratified themselves by exhibiting towards him frivo-

lous coldnesses, by enumerating his embarrassments, by questioning his successes; only when uneasiness as to his stability became somewhat serious, they called back justice and good sense, and hastened then to extend to him tokens of prudential interest. As soon as they learned the death of the Duke of Orleans, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, all the sovereigns of Europe, addressed to the King his father autographic letters of condolence, some of which indicated sincere emotion. The Emperor Nicholas alone, despite the attempts of his principal advisers, and the marked desire of the society of St. Petersburg, persisted in personal silence; hurrying at the same time, with some display, to put on mourning, to countermand a court ball, and to order a despatch to be written to M. de Kisséleff by Count Nesselrode, which was communicated to me, and wherein the sympathy of the father, warmly expressed, endeavoured to overcome the obstinate hostility of the monarch. At Vienna, Prince Metternich, more liberal than Count Nesselrode at St. Petersburg, did not confine himself to official declarations; he took pleasure in the manifestation of his thoughts, and skilfully mingled frankness with premeditation. "Since the news of the fatal event which has plunged France in such profound sorrow," the Count de Flahault wrote to me on the 31st of July, "I have had long and frequent conversations with Prince Metternich. While speaking of the grief with which this cruel loss must have pierced the King's heart, he enlarged much on the regret his Majesty cannot but feel, as head of the family and founder of his dynasty. 'It

was a great task for the King,' he observed, 'to train his successor, and make him fit for the continuance of his work. The King had dedicated all his care to this, and I know that, especially within the last year, he was perfectly satisfied with the result he had obtained; he felt much tranquillity and extreme satisfaction in seeing that his son had adopted his ideas, and that he could rest without anxiety, confident that the system of order and peace he had established would not be abandoned after him. This is an irreparable loss. In my small sphere, and without trying to establish a comparison between a humble individual and the King of the French, I have experienced the same misfortune.' The prince then related to me in detail the death of his own son, and the emotions he had felt in consequence, as a father, and also as the founder of the fortune and celebrity of his family. 'But I have spoken too much of myself,' he added. 'All the King's labour must be repeated, first as regards the Duke of Nemours, if, as seems probable, the regency should devolve on him; and then with the Count of Paris, if Heaven, in mercy, prolongs the King's days until that royal infant can profit by his lessons.'"

I reopen tombs; I waken those who repose there; I make them think and speak as if still present and living, with their labours, their plans, their fears, and their hopes. Nothing of these remains; they are all dead—dead like the Duke of Orleans, from a sudden and violent fall; Prince Metternich, so long immovable in Austria, as also King Louis-Philippe, in revolutionary France. When, after the catastrophe of 1848, we were together in London, I said one day

to Prince Metternich, "Permit me to ask a question: I know why and how the revolution of February took place in Paris; but why and how it occurred at Vienna I am ignorant, and wish to learn from you." He replied, with a smile of melancholy pride, "It was because I have sometimes governed Europe, Austria never." I smiled internally at his haughty and futile explanation.

On the 30th of July, four days after the meeting of the Chambers, the coffin of the Duke of Orleans was removed from the chapel of Neuilly to the church of Notre-Dame, where his obsequies were celebrated with all the pomp the world can lavish on death—religious, civil, military, and popular pomp. The crowd was immense, and the emotion as profound as a spectacle permits. I have taken part in the two grandest funeral solemnities of my time and of many other times, the obsequies of the Emperor Napoleon and of the Duke of Orleans; the one accomplished under the empire of reminiscences, the other in the disappointment of hopes. On those two days, and before those two biers, feelings were undoubtedly very different, and very differently manifested. In December 1840, round the coffin of Napoleon, there was more curiosity than grief, and political passions attempted, at moments, to make some stir; in July 1842, uneasy regret and universal silence reigned round the coffin of the Duke of Orleans. Nevertheless, on both occasions, and above these opposite impressions, one common sentiment raised itself and governed in the bosom of those vast crowds—an instinctive respect for greatness and death. The human heart is naturally gene-

rous and sympathetic. It is to be lamented that these noble impulses are not more durable.

Five days after the display at Nôtre Dame, on the 4th of August, a less brilliant ceremony took place, in the midst of deeper and more enduring grief: the family obsequies succeeded the state funeral. The profanation of the royal tombs of St. Denis had left an impression of profound horror on the heart of King Louis-Philippe; he could not endure the thought that the mortal remains of his wife, his children, his sister, and his descendants should encounter the risk of similar indignities. He wished not that his race should rejoin his royal ancestors in the cellars into which they had been thrown; and instead of the church of St. Denis, he adopted, as burial-place for the house of Orleans, the chapel which, under the same sentiment, the Duchess of Orleans, his mother, had constructed at Dreux, on the ruins of the old castle of the Counts of Dreux; in the ancient domains of the good and popular Duke of Penthièvre. There, in the vault in which the coffin of the Duke of Orleans took its last abode, the King came to bid a final adieu to his son, and the Queen, tranquillized in her pious maternal fervour, addressed to God, for the soul of her eldest born, prayers that are still repeated.

After the return from Dreux, and in the interior of the royal family, a change became perceptible in the physiognomy and demeanour of the Queen. Grief remained imprinted on her aspect, but all agitation, all exclusive preoccupation had ceased; religious resignation replaced the bitterness of regret; that elevated soul seemed to concentrate itself in the affections and

duties that still remained to her. "At Neuilly, the Queen went often to pray by the body of her son; the presence of that body was still a tie. The entombment at Dreux severed it; the sacrifice was accomplished. The Queen wished to offer it to God, and to render it more complete by manifesting it less."

While these funereal ceremonies were in course of accomplishment, covering with their outward pomp paternal and public griefs and inquietudes, in the midst of this serious situation we were in presence of a question equally momentous: what should the regency be during the minority of the heir to the throne? Neither in 1814 nor in 1830 had the charter determined this point, which suddenly presented itself, entire and urgent. It was an object of supreme interest for the country, an imperative duty for the advisers of the Crown that it should be settled without reserve, without delay. "The King never dies in France," said the Duke de Broglie in the report which he made on this subject, on the 27th of August, to the Chamber of Peers; "it is the excellence of monarchical government that the supreme authority suffers no interruption, that the supreme rank is never disputed, that not even thought itself can surprise, between two reigns, the least interval of expectation or doubt. It is by this, above all other principles, that this form of government sways minds and restrains ambitions. Monarchy is the empire of law, of order, and of rule. All must be regulated in monarchy—all that can be reasonably foreseen; nothing in it can be left, either by design or forgetfulness, to the uncertainty of events. Under

such a government royalty is the support of the state; when this support fails all falls to the ground; all shakes when royalty seems to totter. We have recently experienced this. At the moment when the hand of God weighed heavily upon us, when that infinite wisdom, whose ways are not our ways, struck the nation in the firstborn of the royal house, and reaped in its flower our dearest hope, all hearts felt as if curdled with secret terror; public anxiety penetrated through the accents of grief; anguish was on every face, while tears flowed from every eye. Every one, in thought, calculated the number of years which henceforward divide the heir to the throne from the age when he will be able to grasp, with a firm hand, the sceptre of his grandsire, and the sword of his father; every one asked himself what would happen in the interval, if the days of the King were not measured by the wishes of his people and the wants of the state; every one interrogated the charter, and regretted its silence."

To do what the charter had left undone we had to decide between various systems, all eager to manifest themselves and to claim the right of becoming law. According to some, it was not the Chambers, but the nation that should enact such a law; a constituent power, and an assembly formally invested with that power, was alone capable of solving such a question and of electing this temporary royalty. Others, while rejecting this constituent power, wished that the regency should, on all occasions, be elective and appointed by the parliamentary authorities in virtue of a special law. Others, again, accepting the principle of

elective regency, demanded that the regency of females should also be admitted in principle, and that the Duchess of Orleans should be invested with it during the minority of the prince her son. And each of these systems invoked in support of its pretensions, not only general principles, but facts either drawn from our own history, or the history of civilized nations, and circumstantial considerations excited by the actual interests of the country and of the government it ardently desired to establish.

The question we had to solve was one much more of circumstance than of principle; it did not require us to apply or temporize with any of those great moral truths or pre-existing rights which regulate, but also complicate, the march of honest, rational power. Between the various systems in presence, political reasons—that is to say, the well understood interest of the country, and a just foresight of the future—were our only fitting guides. We were in a favourable situation to exercise this strong independence. We had not, like the English Parliament in 1788 and 1810, to appoint an immediate regency to replace a deranged king incapable of exercising his functions; we had no confusion, no gap at the head of the state; the three constitutional powers, the Monarch and the two Chambers, were perfectly healthy and active, assured of a mutually loyal concert; and it was the future alone, and probably a remote future, for which they had to provide. The two leading systems between which we were called to deliberate had, each of them, worthy and encouraging representatives. The Duke of Nemours, on whom the male regency would

devolve if that principle prevailed, was a prince devoid of all evil ambition, profoundly attached to his elder brother and his nephews. The Duke of Orleans often said of him, "Nemours is duty personified;" and the Chambers, with the whole country, could share the confidence of the royal house in this prince, for he was as strongly attached to the constitutional system as to his family ties, as full of respect for the laws of his country as for the rights of his nephews. On the other hand, if the female regency were admitted, the Duchess of Orleans offered to France, to her liberties, and national honour, all the guarantees that could be expected from a lofty intelligence, a just and noble soul. The persons themselves, therefore, gave us neither embarrassment nor uneasiness; we could choose between the systems with full security in the merits and virtues of their respective representatives.

It was in this freedom from all vexatious pressure, in this entire liberty of resolution as of thought, and in view alone of the future welfare of the state, that the bill was presented to the Chamber of Deputies on the 9th of August, 1842. It was simple, and in perfect harmony with the fundamental principles of our institutions. Our government was monarchical; the regency was monarchical also, established according to a fixed and general rule, settled beforehand. The Salic law was a permanent condition, modern as well as ancient, of the French monarchy; it was also the law of the regency. The prince nearest to the throne in the order of succession became invested with it, by right; but the guardianship and tutelage of the minor king were reserved for his mother. To the

regent fell the administration of the state, under the responsibility of his ministers; to the mother, under her own moral responsibility, the education of the king, the care of his person, the appointment of his household, and the superintendence of his domestic affairs. The elective and female authority thus separated, the regency became by law what it was in fact, a temporary royalty, formed after the image of the real monarchy, the functions of which it filled for the moment, invested with all the appertaining powers, and, at the same time, subjected to all the conditions of public liberty, of parliamentary control and co-operation, as instituted by the constitutional system.

The debate presented a true and animated reflection, with consistency and not without grandeur, of the state of minds, whether on the special question of the bill, or on the general situation of the government. All parties joined in it; all systems were canvassed. For the two sections hostile to the monarchy of July, the Republicans and the Legitimists, the difficulty was great; the public disquietude, excited by the death of the Duke of Orleans, exalted the dynastic sentiment, and at no moment since 1830 would an attack against the new royalty have shocked the country more, or have met with a more rough repulse. Exposed by M. Ledru-Rollin, with boldness not deficient in ability, the radical theory of constituent power and of the necessity of an appeal to the people to settle the regency, excited violent murmurs, and rendered lengthened refutation unnecessary. I rejected it in a few words. "If it is assumed," I said, "that there exists, or ought to exist, in the bosom

of society two powers, one ordinary, the other extraordinary; one constitutional, the other constituent; one for working days—allow me the expression—the other for holidays, the expression is insensate, full of dangers, and fatal. Constitutional government is social sovereignty organized. Beyond that there is nothing but society floating at hazard, in conflict with the chances of a revolution. We do not organize revolutions; we do not assign them a place and legal privileges in the course of national affairs. No human power can govern such events; they belong to a greater master. God alone disposes of them, and when they explode, God employs, to reconstitute tottering society, the most opposite instruments. I have seen in the course of my life three constituent powers: in year eight of the Republic, Napoleon; in 1814, Louis the Eighteenth; in 1830, the Chamber of Deputies. The truth, the reality, is this: all they talk to you of, those votes, open registries, appeals to the people, are fiction, pretence, hypocrisy. Assure yourselves, gentlemen, we, the three constitutional powers, are the sole legitimate and regular organs of national sovereignty. Beyond us, there is only usurpation or revolution." M. Thiers, who separated himself frankly from the opposition to support the bill, was even more severe against constituent power. "I have spoken of it," he said, "in my bureau with little respect, and I excuse myself for so doing; but, do you know why I have shown such little respect for constituent power? It is that, in fact, I have no respect for it. I admit the difference between the article of the charter and an article of law; but that forms no

reason why I should believe in constituent power. Constituent power has existed, I know: it has existed at several epochs of our history; but, allow me to tell you, if it were the true sovereign, if it were above constituted powers, it would have acted, nevertheless, a sad part by itself. In fact, it has been in primary assemblies, in the train of factions; under the Consulate and the Empire it was at the service of a great man; it had not then the elementary form; it had the form of a conservative senate, which, at a signal from that man, who made everything bend under the ascendancy of his genius, framed all the constitutions that he demanded. Under the Restoration it took another form: it is concealed in Article XIV. of the charter; it was the power of granting and modifying the charter. Such are the opposite parts which constituent power has played for fifty years. Do not call it the glory of our history, for the victories of Zurich, of Marengo, and of Austerlitz have nothing in common with these miserable constitutional comedies. I have, therefore, no respect for constituent power."

M. Berryer alone was found equal in this circumstance, as in so many others, to his own situation and that of his party. It is not only by the elevation and flexibility of his mind, by the attraction and charm of his eloquence, that he has so long surmounted the formidable difficulties of an ambiguous and extra-legal part in a system of legality, publicity, and liberty. He draws from other sources, also, his popular influence. Although he has lived a party man, M. Berryer feels as a patriot; he is no stranger to any of the instincts, emotions, and aspirations of

his country; not only does he comprehend but partake the national joys and sorrows. He has sustained the rights and traditions of past times, and, above all other men, he is a man of the present time, attached to the rights which modern generations have conquered; he has opposed the freest government France ever possessed; he loves and sincerely wishes for freedom. Naturally liberal, prompt, accessible, and sympathetic, he can harmonize in his mind very opposite sentiments, and preserve, throughout all political viscissitudes, unity in his life and fidelity to his cause, without inspiring in the adversaries he most vehemently opposes, the anger and hatred he feels not towards them. In opposition to the regency bill he set forth in alternate detail examples in our history of female regencies, if not fortunate, at least glorious, and acts of ancient parliaments exercising on similar questions a control more showy than effective, whether in support or invalidation of the testaments of kings. In this debate M. Berryer was more ingenious than incisive, and more brilliant than ardent; neither declaring categorically for the feminine nor elective regency, and solely applying himself to aggravate while placing in light the embarrassments and inconsistencies of the system he attacked while submitting to it. M. Villemain refuted him with equal solidity and ability, at one time establishing in their exact and complete truth the historical facts of which M. Berryer had only cited the sides favourable to his own view; at another, retorting the inconsistencies and embarrassments of the Legitimist party and their eloquent interpreter. In the Chamber of Peers, the

Marquis de Brézé repeated with more bitterness and less brilliancy the arguments of M. Berryer against the bill, when M. Villemain again replied, with his accustomed sagacity, at the same time courteous and poignant.

Against these external attacks, or, as I may call them, imprints of preconceived hostility and reserved thoughts, the struggle of the interior and legal parties of the monarchy of 1830 lasted for several days, animated without being stormy: the gravity of the situation and of the public sentiment imposed circumspection on all without affecting sincerity. The question rested distinctly between regency by right and election; between maternal regency and the Salic law as applied to that authority. M. de Lamartine stood forward as the champion of maternal regency. I have already stated in other Memoirs, with frankness and sorrow, the impression I have received and the idea I have formed of the character and life of this eminent man. I shall not return to it; I have no desire to touch painful wounds with a cold hand; but I find that even the friends of M. de Lamartine do not render him full justice as an orator and political writer. As a poet he first assumed his place in the world, and justly won the admiration of the public. Many persons, sincerely or maliciously, take advantage of this to see in him a poet only, and to admire him on this ground to the exclusion of every other. It is said that he himself sometimes frets at this, and places his political works far above his verses. Without taking part in this comparison, I am struck by the superior qualities which M. de Lamartine has

displayed as an orator and writer in prose: he has not only a glowing and seductive flow of language; he has a mind singularly rich, expanded, sagacious without subtilty, and acute with grandeur; he abounds in ideas habitually elevated, ingenious, and even profound; he paints extensively, sometimes with as much truth as brilliancy, situations, events, and men; and he excels, by instinct as much as skill, in bringing noble reasons to the aid of bad causes. He supported with effect that of the maternal regency, which he was destined at a future day to wreck so tragically. Despite the prestige of his speech, it cost me little effort to reply to him: a general sympathy attached itself to the Duchess of Orleans, but a serious deliberate sentiment, in the Chambers and with the public, was pronounced in favour of a male regent. The government of a woman may take place in the bosom of an old and firmly established monarchy; history presents no example of a new and still disputed dynasty founded by a woman in the name of a child.

An elective regency conferred, on all occasions, by the Chambers, in place of the regency by right constituted beforehand by the law, was more difficult to combat. Every one admitted that the regency was a temporary royalty, called during the minority of the heir to the throne to hold the place of the true royalty, and entitled, under constitutional conditions, to exercise all its powers. What a temptation for a political assembly to possess, in the very bosom of hereditary monarchy, the right of appointing a temporary king! M. Odilon-Barrot, who supported with eloquence equally conscientious and plausible, the

system of elective regency, felt the peril of such a situation, and endeavoured to escape from it by saying, "Do you ask us to nominate the regent by the Chamber of Deputies, in virtue of a dictatorial and revolutionary power? No. You demand from us the regular normal concurrence of the three powers of the state. Do you believe that in the appointment of regent, the initiative of the chief of the royal family, the head of the state, will not always have a necessary, irresistible, I will say, almost a legitimate influence?" M. Odilon-Barrot forgot that, in the greater number of cases of minority, the concurrence of the three powers of the state would be impossible; for it is only after the death of the king that the necessity of choosing a regent presents itself. Would every reigning king be legally bound to vote beforehand, by a testament, on this question? If he had done so, what authority would his act have, he being dead? And if he had not done so—if he had not, in this respect, taken any initiative, would not the Chambers alone have to decide? And where would then be the regular concurrence of the three powers of the state? M. Dupin, reporter of the bill in the name of a unanimous committee, had replied by anticipation to M. Odilon-Barrot, indicating, with simple and convincing brevity, the fundamental principle of the regency by right. M. Hippolite Passy, who supported the bill without reserve, showed by examples from history and presumptions from argument, the serious inconveniences attached to elective regency, either for the regent or the Chambers themselves, the hearthstone and arena of political parties; and the

Duke de Broglie, in reporting the bill to the Chamber of Peers, traced an impressive picture of the natural consequences of this system. "Why," said he, "do we prefer monarchy to a republic, hereditary to elective government? Because we think, with history in hand, that the greatest of dangers, for a great country, is to live at random—to let supreme authority float with every gust of opinion, to abandon it periodically as prey to the strife of parties, to the ambition of pretenders. If this argument is decisive in favour of hereditary monarchy, it is equally so in favour of legal regency; that is to say, of regency regulated in a settled order. Declare the regency elective: at the approach of every minority you will see parties form, increase, menace each other mutually by gesture and voice; you will see pretenders raise their heads and throw off the mask. The ministry will no longer be for citizens the last term of ambition; powerful orators, generals beloved by their soldiers, will elevate higher their looks and hopes. The royal family will run the risk of discord. Admitting that it remains united, no one will believe it; the contrary will be affirmed; every party will arrogate the right of seeking there for a leader, and of forcing his hand if he resists. When the day of election arrives, in the bosom of the Chambers what a vast focus of intrigues and cabals, what a career opened to perfidious insinuations, to outrageous personalities! The press, the tribune, public meetings will become so many arenas in which will be immolated the best established reputations. The princes of the blood royal, those princes eventually called to the throne, will be sum-

moned to the bar; their qualities, their faults, their slightest acts will then be strained through the sieve of an ardent, vindictive, unpitying discussion. If they fail against a simple subject, what will become of them? He amongst them who carries the day, if he wins only by a few votes, what will he be? What will the royal prerogative be in his weak hand? If the presumptive heir is defeated, where will he hide himself while waiting until he may become king, after having been deposed as regent? If the Chambers cannot agree in the choice of a regent, there will be no regency, no government, and the state in full dissolution."

These arguments, these just presentiments, recalled to the regency by right the spirits that at first were fluctuating; it was the general wish of the Chamber to give to the monarchy under this mournful trial a marked adhesion and a firm support. I had no doubt as to the definitive adoption of the bill. Meanwhile the Chamber was agitated: two amendments were proposed; one in favour of the female regency; the other demanded that the regency should be conferred on the eldest of the uncles of the minor king only in a special manner and for the existing case, which amounted, in fact, to an elective regency. The King, who had this question warmly at heart, regarding it as all-essential for the future of his house and policy, felt uneasy at these wavering dispositions, and at the approaching term of this short unexpected session. He wrote to me, on Friday evening, the 19th of August: "It seems most desirable to me that the vote should be taken to-morrow, for many deputies have engaged

their places for Sunday, and it is to be feared that on Monday a considerable number might be wanting when the names were called over. I have not seen Dupin. He was fatigued, but resolute against all concession, which is the main point, for what we want is the bill as unanimously adopted by the committee. An augmented number of black balls would undoubtedly be a matter of regret; but a reduced majority will not compromise the future, while an increase of white balls, at the cost of an amendment, would be an abyss. Dupin seems firm in this system. What he complains of is that they did not allow Thiers to speak, which is, in truth, to be lamented. Heaven grant that Thiers may speak to-morrow, and with effect! Take care that Dupin is allowed to shine to-morrow; it is natural that he should fear to be eclipsed. What appears to me essential is that you should strive to carry all rapidly to-morrow, for that would be success, and success is glory and security. As the sitting commences at noon, if you are in force at the opening you ought to be able to take double-quick time. The Chamber must be pressed: it is French, and will rouse itself if the charge is sounded; but the troops are sluggish when the generals are timid. Thank God you are not so, and I shall expect victory to-morrow with firm confidence. We read this morning, in our family circle, your admirable speech of yesterday; the exordium drew tears from us, and all earnestly desire me to tell you how much we were moved."

It was by accident, not in consequence of any little hidden manœuvre, that M. Thiers had not spoken at

the sitting of the 19th of August; on the following day he spoke, with the greatest and most just success, for the bill and for himself. He began by explaining with firm candour why, in this instance, he separated himself from the opposition without leaving it. "I am the adversary of the cabinet," he said: "painful recollections divide me from it, and I believe there are better causes than recollections to divide us; there are interests of the country, perhaps ill comprehended but vividly felt by me. I am therefore opposed to the cabinet. . . . . In spite of this, in spite of this most serious interest of my position, I am here to support the government to-day; I am here to combat the opposition. . . . . I am soundly monarchical. Remember what certain persons have reproached me with, and with which I shall never reproach myself. I voted for the hereditary peerage. I spoke at a time when it was difficult—I will not say dangerous, for order was maintained in the streets by a powerful minister—at a time when it was difficult to speak as I did; I spoke in favour of heirdom in the peerage. That ought to tell you the extent to which I am monarchical in my convictions. When I see this interest of the monarchy clear and distinct, I march directly towards it, happen what may; were I alone, you must understand that I should still do so. . . . . What! Because, for an instant, under the words of a man whom I have called and still call my friend—eloquent, sincere words—some convictions have wavered yesterday, some tendencies have changed, should I desert a line of conduct which has appeared to me wise, politic, honourable, and well

calculated to serve the opposition itself? . . . . . No; were I alone, I would persist in supporting the bill as it is, without modification, without amendment."

He supported it, in fact, with that fertility of views at once ingenious and practical—that natural, unstudied eloquence, easy, clear, and rapid even when diverging into long explanations—which forms the peculiar and original feature of his talent. He acted powerfully upon minds, convinced the doubtful, reassured the wavering, and gave those who had already decided, the satisfaction of confidence in their own opinion and in his success. M. Dupin closed the debate by an exact and firm recapitulation. The two amendments, for the female and elective regency, were thrown out without the necessity of a ballot, and the bill passed at that sitting, by 310 out of 404 votes. On presentation to the Chamber of Peers, two days after, it was adopted, on the report of the Duke de Broglie, by 163 out of 177.

The object was gained; the question of the regency had received the most monarchical solution, and the best adapted to the interest of the country as of the reigning family. But the blow inflicted on the royal house by the death of the Duke of Orleans remained uncured: laws cannot replace men. The Duke of Orleans was perfectly suited to the mission which the future seemed to reserve for him. He had neither the consummate experience, the inexhaustible richness of mind, nor the instinctive depth of judgment of the King his father; but his personal qualities, which perhaps would not have sufficed, in 1830, to

appreciate thoroughly the situation of the dawning monarchy, to surmount its difficulties and turn aside its dangers, were admirably adapted to that monarchy, still youthful, but emancipated from boyhood. He was himself young, handsome, elegant, of clear, quick mind, agreeable in person, of dignified, princely manners, in the midst even of a familiarity to which he lent himself without abandonment; brave, with grace and impulse; formed to be equally attractive in camps and drawing-rooms, to soldiers and ladies, to people and courtiers. In politics he had a lively sympathy for the national instincts, a warm devotion to the greatness of France, a coquettish complaisance for popular favour, sometimes even for revolutionary enthusiasm; and these sentiments might, at the first moment, have had too much influence on his resolutions and conduct; but he was capable of pausing on this declivity, of ascertaining the just measure of things, the true value of men, and of carrying into government more cool sagacity and prudence than his attitude and language would have given cause to expect. Since 1840, he had, in this sense, made notable progress; and although he humoured the opposition with care, his serious though reserved support was never wanting to the cabinet. He was not a prince exempted from faults; but he would have touched rather than fallen under them, and if he had fallen, he would, I think, have recovered himself in time. He possessed those brilliant, bold, and confident qualities which, in a day of crisis, please agitated multitudes and rally them round their chief. His death left, in the royal house and in

France, an immense void, of which the public and the individual persons to whom the imputed dispositions of the prince imparted some solicitude, had, at the moment when the event burst upon them, a sad and just presentiment.

CHAPTER II.

THE MARQUESAS ISLANDS AND OTAHEITE.

DISADVANTAGE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.—FIRST NAVIGATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.—DISCOVERY OF THE ISLAND OF OTAHEITE.—DIFFERENT VOYAGERS WHO VISITED IT FROM THE 17TH TO THE 19TH CENTURY.—NEW ZEALAND, AND THE NANTO-BORDELAISE COMPANY. — ADMIRAL DUPETIT-THOUARS AND THE MARQUESAS ISLANDS.—REASONS FOR OUR TAKING POSSESSION OF THEM.—ADMIRAL DUPETIT-THOUARS AT OTAHEITE.—ENGLISH MISSIONARIES AT OTAHEITE.—THE PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.—DEBATES IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON THIS SUBJECT.—CAPTAIN BRUAT APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.—RETURN OF ADMIRAL DUPETIT-THOUARS TO OTAHEITE.—HE SUBSTITUTES THE COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY OF FRANCE FOR THE PROTECTORATE.—OPPOSITION OF QUEEN POMARE AND THE OTAHEITANS.—FERMENT AT OTAHEITE.—INTRIGUES OF MR. PRITCHARD, LATE ENGLISH MISSIONARY.—HE TAKES DOWN HIS FLAG AS ENGLISH CONSUL AND RESIGNS HIS FUNCTIONS.—THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ORDERS THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROTECTORATE.—DEBATES IN THE CHAMBERS ON THIS SUBJECT.—ARREST, IMPRISONMENT, AND EXPULSION OF MR. PRITCHARD AT OTAHEITE.—EFFECT OF THIS INCIDENT IN LONDON.—LANGUAGE OF SIR ROBERT PEEL. — MY LANGUAGE.—NEGOTIATION ON THIS SUBJECT.—CONDUCT AND CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN BRUAT.—THE EXPULSION OF MR. PRITCHARD IS MAINTAINED, AND AN INDEMNITY GRANTED TO HIM.—REASONS FOR THIS DOUBLE MEASURE.—ADMIRALS HAMELIN AND SEYMOUR, COMMANDING THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH SQUADRONS IN THE PACIFIC, ARE INSTRUCTED TO ARRANGE THE AMOUNT OF THIS INDEMNITY.—LETTER FROM KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE TO ME, OFFERING TO TAKE THE PAYMENT ON HIMSELF.—THE CABINET

REFUSES.—DEBATE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.—ATTITUDE OF THE CABINET.—IT OBTAINS ONLY A WEAK MAJORITY.—ANNOUNCES ITS RESOLUTION TO RETIRE.—PROCEEDING OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY.—THE CABINET REMAINS IN OFFICE.—ESTIMATE OF THIS INCIDENT.

(1841—1846).

It is one of the inconveniences of parliamentary government, that events and questions, at the moment when they present themselves and fall within the realm of discussion, increase immoderately, and assume, in the eyes of the public, an importance quite out of proportion to the real state of things and the interests of the country. I hasten to declare that I much prefer this evil to the careless and improvident levity of absolute governments, who raise and undertake enormous questions and enterprises without suspecting their gravity, which they afterwards strive to conceal from the public, who have to bear the cost. The difficulties that weigh on power are less grievous than the burdens that fall on the people. Nevertheless, it is highly important for free nations to learn that they ought to mistrust their first impressions, and the energetic efforts of the opposition to magnify infinitely, in the course of public affairs and discussions, the incidents which may embarrass and compromise power. At the onset, power alone suffers from this blind exaggeration of facts and debates; but it fails not speedily to engender consequences, the mischief of which reverts on the country. The affair which bears the names of Otaheite and Pritchard is one of the most remarkable, and, we may add, one of the most ridiculous instances of these fallacies of the

parliamentary microscope, and of the dangers and errors into which they are capable of leading nations.

On the 25th of September, 1513, after wandering, as an adventurer greedy of discovery and gold, in the midst of the tribes of Central America, the audacious Spaniard, Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, of whom his companions said "he was the best head and the best lance that had ever protected a camp in the land of idolatrous savages," saw for the first time, from the summit of one of the mountains which traverse the Isthmus of Panama, the Pacific Ocean, and some of the innumerable islands scattered over its immense expanse. At this sight Balboa and his companions embraced each other, and elevated above a mass of rocks an enormous cross of wood; then they descended to the shore, and Balboa, carrying in one hand the banner of Castille, and his sword in the other, advanced a few paces into the waves, and, amidst the acclamations of his small band, took possession, in the name of the King of Spain, his master, of that unknown sea and the lands it washed. What a space and future he thus opened to imagination, cupidity, adventure, and conquest!

Maritime Europe was in no hurry to explore this new region. During two centuries it was rather towards the great continents of America and Asia than the archipelagoes of the Pacific Ocean that the enterprises of navigators and governments directed themselves. A Portuguese in the service of Spain, Pedro Fernandez de Queiros, "the last of the Spanish heroes in the New World," says a chronicler, made, almost alone, at that epoch, bold voyages and dis-

coveries in the Southern Seas, which remained for a long time without results. It was not until towards the middle of the last century, and in our own, that, whether in the name of political and commercial interests or scientific research, the Pacific Ocean, sea and lands, has been frequently and effectually visited, traversed, described, and conquered. From 1740 to 1840, the names and narratives of voyagers abound: in England, Anson, Wallis, Carteret, Byron, Cook, the most celebrated of all; in France, Bougainville, La Perouse, d'Entrecasteaux, Baudin, Freycinet, Duperrey, Dumont d'Urville, Dupetit-Thouars, Laplace, courageous and scientific mariners, whose adventures all Europe has followed with lively interest, while profiting by their labours. Colonial, commercial, and penal establishments have sprung up in the train of voyages; and Oceania is now one of the great theatres on which human civilization develops itself, and towards which European commerce and curiosity are alike directed.

A point in those vast seas—the little island of Otaheite—has been, from the first steps of navigators, the object of particular attention, or, we may say, of special favour. Queiros, the original discoverer in 1605, described it complacently, and gave it the name of *Sagittaria*, probably because arrows were the only arms of the savage inhabitants. One hundred and sixty years rolled on, during which no known voyager visited the isle or troubled himself to speak of it. In 1767 Wallis touched at it and stopped there; at first attacked, subsequently well received by the islanders, after more than a month's sojourn,

the spot appeared to him such a good naval station, and so convenient a place for revictualling, that, without official authority or instruction, he assumed possession of it for England, and on his departure gave it the name of King George the Third's Island. Bougainville landed there the year following, and the French, as favourably welcomed as the English had been, took even a greater fancy to it, responded joyfully to the advances made to them, and signified their gratitude by calling Otaheite *The New Cytheræa.* Cook, in the course of his voyages, visited Otaheite three times, praised even more warmly than his predecessors had done the utility of the station, with the gentle habits of the natives, and contributed more than any other person to spread throughout Europe the fame of this little corner of the world. Since the commencement of this century all our scientific mariners, in their voyages of circumnavigation, Captains Freycinet, Duperrey, Dumont d'Urville, Dupetit-Thouars, and Laplace, have equally visited Otaheite, and held the same language as to the attractions of the climate, the country, and the inhabitants. After all these voyages and recitals, this island obtained in Europe a kind of graceful celebrity, and the sailors christened it *The Queen of the Southern Seas.*

The convenience of securing to our navy, in those parts, a place of rest and refreshment, began to be felt more and more. Public instinct took the initiative. Towards the end of 1839, a company formed itself at Nantes and Bordeaux, to attempt, in New Zealand, a French colony; it asked and obtained from the cabinet

of that epoch a certain extent of adhesion and co-operation: but when the time for execution arrived, it was ascertained that the English had forestalled us in those large islands; that, since 1815, they had formed private establishments there, which, step by step, were assuming a national character; that in August, 1839, an English officer, Captain Hobson, had sailed for New Zealand with instructions from his government; and that in the first months of 1840, before the arrival of the French ships, the sovereignty of the Queen of England had been proclaimed there. The enterprise, supposing that on our part contest had a basis, became thus singularly grave and difficult; the demands which the Nanto-Bordelaise Company then addressed to the King's government, in virtue of promises made to them, became an object of serious inquiry, which left us convinced that if that company had, for private interests, titles to our support, we could not set up, against the anterior possession of the English government, any legitimate claims embracing the slightest chance of success. The reports of Captain Lavaud, a mariner equally intellectual and brave, who was sent at that time to those seas, in command of the corvette *L'Aube*, confirmed us in this conviction. It became necessary to seek elsewhere than in New Zealand the establishment we wanted in the Pacific Ocean. Captain Dupetit-Thouars, having returned in 1840 from his voyage round the world, in the frigate *Venus*, was the last of our sailors who had visited those regions, and on him we could rely for recent and certain information. He presented to the minister of Marine a report on the Marquesas Islands,

which he had recently examined with that object. We had a double end in view. At the same time that we wished to procure for our navy and for French commerce in those seas, a good maritime station, we had before us an important question, long inserted in the penal code — the establishment of a place of transportation beyond the continental territory of the kingdom. Repeatedly examined with this view, our various colonial possessions had presented serious objections on the score of health, security, political or commercial interest, and moral propriety. Studied with care by the ministries of Marine, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, the proposition of Captain Dupetit-Thouars seemed to meet the various exigencies we were bound to consider. The Marquesas Islands were perfectly salubrious, situated in a fine climate, limited in extent, and easy to watch or defend; they offered a good harbour to our navigation; the tribes which inhabited them were few in number, and could be easily won over or subdued. Since the commencement of the seventeenth century, when Queiros discovered and gave them the name of *Marquesas*, in honour of the Marchioness de Mendoça, wife to the Viceroy of Peru, his patron, no European power had acquired any right over them, no foreign colonists had established themselves there. If the distance of the place was a cause of delay and expense, it had, in the penal point of view, the advantage of acting on imagination without shocking humanity. Our establishment, therefore, at this point combined, at home, all the political and moral conditions of the double end we proposed to ourselves, and could not

lead, abroad, to any embarrassment. The proposition of Captain Dupetit-Thouars was accepted, and he took his departure in August, 1841, in the frigate *Queen Blanche*, invested with the rank of rear-admiral, with the command of our naval station in the South Seas, and furnished with formal instructions to take possession of the Marquesas Islands in the name of the King's government.

Amongst the proofs I could adduce of the propriety of our resolution in this instance, I here indicate only two. In 1850, under the system of the Republic, after all that had passed in France and in Oceania, and despite the debates excited on this subject, a new law put in practice the idea we had preconceived for the accomplishment of the prescription in the penal code, and *the Marquesas* are now the place assigned by French justice for the punishment of transportation.[1] The importance of a naval station and of a fixed establishment in the South Seas has been loudly proclaimed by the Imperial government; for it has not thought *the Marquesas* and *Otaheite* sufficient for that design, and has added *New Caledonia*.

Admiral Dupetit-Thouars having arrived, on the 26th of April, 1842, in the archipelago of the Marquesas, without using force and by treating with the chiefs of the tribes, took successively official possession of the various groups of islands. Catholic missionaries, of the congregation of Picpus, had been estab-

[1] Law of the 5th and 22nd of April, and of the 8th and 16th of June, 1850, Articles 4 and 5.

lished there for several years, courageously devoted to their perilous labours with the indigenous cannibals. One of these monks, Father François de Paule, came to visit the Admiral on board the *Queen Blanche*, and was very serviceable in the management of his negotiations by preserving their pacific character. In the month of August, after receiving from all the chiefs of that archipelago the formal acknowledgment of the French sovereignty, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars sailed from the Marquesas, leaving a small garrison on shore, the works of a military establishment in progress, and in the roadstead the corvette *La Boussole*, charged with their protection. The instructions of the King's government were carried out, and the mission of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars accomplished.

The Admiral thought differently. In his eyes our establishment at the Marquesas was neither sufficient nor sure if our authority did not extend over the *Society Islands*, especially Otaheite, the centre and pearl of that neighbouring archipelago. As we had been anticipated in New Zealand, it behoved us, at least, not to be so also in this little *Queen of the South Seas*. To this general consideration were joined reasons of circumstance. Although Otaheite was an independent territory, and the English government had twice refused its official possession, English Protestant missionaries prevailed there, jealous and uneasy as soon as France and Catholicism appeared on those shores. Several French merchant ships or whalers, touching at Otaheite, had been treated with vexatious ill will. In 1836, two Catholic mission-

aries, Fathers Carel and Laval, detached from the mission of the Gambier Islands, had visited Otaheite, and had been violently expelled by the influence of the English missionary, Mr. Pritchard. In 1838, Captain Dupetit-Thouars himself, touching at Otaheite, in the *Venus,* had demanded and obtained from Queen Pomare, for the two French missionaries, an indemnification of 2,000 piastres; but this reparation had not prevented, after his departure, a renewal of the same prohibitions and vexations, even more general and absolute. Private wrongs thus added themselves to maritime convenience, and the Admiral considered the occasion favourable for bringing them into play.

Towards the close of August, 1842, the frigate *Queen Blanche,* appeared before Otaheite; the Admiral renewed severely the complaints which the French, whether sailors or missionaries, had so often had occasion to urge against the proceedings of the government of the island, and summoned it to take effective measures to prevent their repetition. Queen Pomare and her advisers, English or native, felt themselves seriously embarrassed, for this was quite a different matter from a mere demand for the fulfilment of promises always nugatory. Mr. Pritchard, who, a few years before, had received from Lord Palmerston a commission as English consul at Otaheite, was not there at this juncture; he had gone on an excursion. After some days of irresolution, and probably at the suggestion of intermediaries favourable to the French demands, Queen Pomare, incapable, in fact, of resisting force, and subdued by fear, offered to place herself and her islands under the protection

of France; and on the 9th of September, 1842, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, with the sole reserve of the King's ratification, accepted the proposition by a treaty which left with to Queen Pomare the internal sovereignty and administration of her islands; but in which she resigned into the hands of the King of the French and to the care of his government, or of the person nominated by his Majesty and received by Queen Pomare, "the direction of all affairs with foreign powers, as also all that concerns foreign residents, the regulations of the port, &c., and the right of adopting such other measures as he shall consider necessary for the preservation of good harmony and peace."

The same treaty signified: "Every one will be free to exercise his form of worship and religion. The established churches will remain as they now exist, and the English missionaries will continue their functions without molestation. The same rule applies to all other faiths; no person will be interfered with or constrained in his religious creed."

Such was, at that moment, the state of minds in Otaheite, that not only Queen Pomare and the principal chiefs of the island, but the foreign residents, amongst others the consul of the United States of America, and the vice-consul of England, Mr. Wilson, in the absence of Mr. Pritchard, adhered formally to this treaty, which Admiral Dupetit-Thouars hastened to communicate to them. "I have the honour," Mr. Wilson wrote to him on the 12th of September, "to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 11th of this month, and to assure you in reply

that I congratulate myself on the settlement of the difficulties which existed between the French and Otaheitan governments, without your having had to resort to hostile measures, and on such moderate and favourable terms. I have also the honour to say that I shall have great pleasure in seeing you, and in affording you, whenever you may be pleased to ask it, my assistance in forming an administration fit to maintain good order and harmony amongst the foreigners resident at Otaheite, as well as for the general advantage of the inhabitants." More reserved in their adhesion, the Protestant missionaries, however, evinced the most pacific resignation; they wrote thus, on the 21st of September, 1842, to Admiral Dupetit-Thouars: "We, the undersigned, ministers of the Protestant mission in the islands of Otaheite and Moorea, assembled in committee, and being informed of the changes that have recently taken place with regard to the Otaheitan government, assure your Excellency that as ministers of the Gospel of peace we consider it our imperative duty to exhort the people of these islands to a general and tranquil submission to the existing powers. We think this the best mode of serving their interests, and that, above all, such submission is required by the laws of God, in which we have up to this period endeavoured to instruct them."

Notwithstanding these local demonstrations, as soon as the news of the event reached us, I foresaw the embarrassments to which it might lead. For forty-five years the English missionaries had been established at Otaheite; they were the delegates

the great *Missionary Society of London*, founded in 1795, for the express purpose of imparting the Christian faith to *Otaheite* and to those very *Society Islands* which, for half a century, French and English voyagers had been incessantly calling to the attention of the European public. The departure of the first missionaries, twenty-nine in number, nine of whom took with them their wives and children, had been the occasion of solemn, fervent, religious meetings in London; a special journal, the *Evangelical Magazine*, had been established to support them. On arriving at Otaheite, they found the inhabitants in a most deplorable state of moral degradation: murder, theft, libertinism, polygamy, infanticide, falsehood, and perjury were not only habitually practised, and admitted as common law, but infanticide in particular was the avowed object of a detestable association, called the *Arreoys*, which undertook its accomplishment. Although not cannibals, the Otaheitans were given over to an idolatry equally cruel and absurd; they often immolated human victims, and over the slaughtered bodies laid the rude foundations of temples consecrated to their idols. The English missionaries had struggled with these inveterate traditions of superstition and vice; several of them had been massacred; some, terrified or disgusted with their task, had abandoned it and returned to England; those who remained had to surmount every kind of obstacle, and to undergo every description of trial. They persisted in spite of all; they received constant from their patrons in England; successive Christ recruits, as devoted as the first, came to per-

petuate and renew the mission. It had done much more than persevere; it had succeeded. By their inexhaustible devotion and prolonged action the missionaries had changed, not only on the surface and in appearance, but in reality, the faith, habits, and social condition of the Otaheitans. It is not on their own testimony, but on that of voyagers foreign to their nation and work, that this assertion rests. In 1824, after passing fifteen days at Otaheite, the scientific Captain Duperrey, commanding the corvette *La Coquille*, wrote thus: "The state of the island of Otaheite is now very different from what it was in the time of Cook. The missionaries of the *London Society* have entirely changed the manners and customs of the inhabitants. Idolatry has ceased; they profess generally the Christian religion; the women no longer come on board the ships, and are extremely reserved on all occasions. Their marriages are celebrated as in Europe, and the King confines himself to a single wife. Wives are admitted to sit at table with their husbands. The infamous association of the Arreoys exists no longer. The sanguinary wars in which this people used to engage, and their human sacrifices, have entirely ceased since 1816. All the natives can read and write, and have religious books translated into their language and printed at Otaheite, Raiatea, or Eimeo. They have built handsome churches, to which they repair twice a week, and pay the greatest attention to the discourse of the preacher. It is not uncommon to see individuals taking notes of the most interesting passages in the sermons to which they listen."

It was after such results of their labours, and forty years of moral rule, that the English Protestant missionaries saw themselves threatened with the loss of their preponderance in Otaheite; it was a faith and work up to that point laborious and successful, which they had reason to look upon as compromised by the dawning empire of another nation and another creed. For nearly twenty years Otaheite had been, as it were, a delicious prey, of which the Protestant and Catholic missionaries mutually coveted possession. On the 25th of June, 1835, Brother Columbanus wrote to the Bishop of Nicopolis: "I landed at Otaheite after a voyage of five days. On the arrival of a child of the Sacred Heart in this land so long consecrated to the demon, it is not surprising that this enemy of all good should have redoubled his fury, and that the Protestant emissaries believed I came to overthrow their empire." More than one Protestant missionary responded to this fanatic jealousy by the same sentiment; Mr. Pritchard, amongst others, assured the Otaheitan chiefs that Brother Columbanus was the Pope, and that if he was allowed to enter the country, he would, on his departure, carry away all they possessed.[1] It would be to ignore completely human nature and history not to comprehend the profound emotion which, in such a state of minds, the French protectorate at Otaheite could not fail to excite, not only in the missionary societies, but in the public England, and the displeasure, filled with embarrassment, which the English cabinet would inevitably feel.

[1] Annals of the Propagation of the Faith, Vol. X.

Admiral Dupetit-Thouars had acted without authority from the government; the instructions he received on his departure spoke only of the Marquesas Islands. We did not hide from ourselves the difficulties in which his proceedings at Otaheite might involve us; we resolved, nevertheless, to ratify them. The act wounded no international right; the English government neither possessed nor claimed any over the Society Islands. Whatever might have been the motives that influenced her, Queen Pomare, in her independence, had proposed and signed the treaty which established the French protectorate; the fact was accomplished; the flag of France, planted at the Marquesas, was making its first permanent appearance in the South Seas; it could not be suffered to assume the aspect of doubt and timidity. On the 20th of March, 1843, the *Moniteur* contained this announcement: "Government has received despatches from Rear-Admiral Dupetit-Thouars announcing that the Queen and chiefs of the Otaheitan Islands have demanded that they should be placed under the protection of the King of the French. The Rear-Admiral has accepted the proposal, and taken the necessary measures, while expecting the royal ratification, which will be immediately forwarded to him."

On the following day, the 21st of March, Count Pelet de la Lozère expressed in the Chamber of Peers some anxiety for the missions established at Otaheite, and for the progress of Christianity in that archipelago. I replied to him immediately: "The Chamber comprehends that it is impossible for me to enter into any detail on such a recent fact; nevertheless, I

am happy to calm at once the apprehensions of the honourable speaker. No, certainly, it will never be the King's government, penetrate where it may, that will cause Christianity and civilization to retrograde, and that will withhold from Christian populations, and from the transformation of idolatrous tribes to Christian worshippers, the most effective protection. It will protect, not only Christianity, but tolerant and free Christianity. And here I anticipate the difficulty in the mind of the speaker, but which he has not perfectly expressed. It is true that in the archipelagoes of the South Seas, Protestant missionaries have found their way, simultaneously with Catholic missionaries, and that both have laboured effectually in the conversion of idolaters. Both will feel the effects of the protection of France, and Christianity will not recede in any country to which her power may penetrate."

The situation and intentions of the King's government thus clearly determined, we took the necessary measures to render their execution serious and effectual. On the 8th of January, 1843, Captain Bruat, an officer of tried bravery and intelligence, was appointed governor of the Marquesas Islands; on the 17th of April, when we had ratified the French protectorate at Otaheite, he received the title of Governor of the French Establishments in Oceania, and Royal Commissioner at the Court of Queen Pomare. Precise instructions, regulating his conduct and relations at Otaheite and the Marquesas, and with the chief commander of our naval station in the South Seas, as also with the natives, secured to him the full power he required, without exceeding the limits of the treaty

concluded by Admiral Dupetit-Thouars on the 9th of September preceding; and the transmarine questions being thus disposed of, a bill, presented to the Chamber of Deputies on the 24th of April by Admiral Roussin, then at the head of the naval department, asked for an extraordinary credit of 5,987,000 francs for the first outlay in 1843, and the permanent expenses of the new French establishments in Oceania.

The debate was serious without being animated. The opposition, of which M. Billault was the principal organ, varied from its ordinary attitude: instead of charging us with excessive prudence, it found us too enterprising and defiant; it disputed the seasonableness of our establishments in Oceania, it wished them to be, at least, more restricted and less expensive. I retailed the facts; I showed how we had been led by the incident at Otaheite to enlarge our enterprise. To justify this course, I placed in light, by facts and figures, the increasing state of our navigation and commerce in the South Seas; I urged the necessity, for France, of not remaining unconnected with the great movement of political and commercial extension which other nations were prosecuting so actively between America and Asia. The Chamber listened to me with more favour than confidence, interested in rather than convinced by the discussion, and admitting the fitness of our resolution without reckoning much on the results. When the subjects of material interest were exhausted, M. Agenor de Gasparin started the moral question, and expressed his regret at the protection which the

government announced its intention of affording in the Otaheitan islands to Catholic missions, although the native legislature had interdicted their introduction; he disputed the right of the French protectorate to impose religious liberty on a people who had no desire for it. I eagerly seized the opportunity of explaining clearly on this point our views and the regulating principle of our conduct. "It would be," I said, "a senseless undertaking for a government to charge itself with religious propagandism, and to impose faith by force, even upon pagans. We have not, nor ever had, such an idea. In this respect we have near us an eminent example. What I have said, England has done. The English government undertakes no religious propagandism; it imposes not the Protestant creed on pagan nations; there are missionaries in England." (Here a voice exclaimed, "Traders!") I replied instantly, "There are in England trading missionaries and non-trading missionaries; there are English missionaries solely occupied with religious interests, and the desire of expanding Christianity. Men who spontaneously, freely, at their own peril and cost, without any intervention of their government, carry their activity and devotion over the face of the globe, to extend their faith. They have ample right to do this; they are not the government of their country. But with their faith they take, wherever they penetrate, the name, the tongue, the influence of their government; and their government, aware of this, and reaping the fruit of their activity, follows them with its attention, supports and protects them in all places. In this, it

does its duty: every one has his task; to the free missionaries belongs the propagation of religious faith; to the government, the protection of its subjects, even missionaries, wherever they may go. Gentlemen, France has had missionaries as well as England; before you troubled yourselves with the subject, before you were acquainted with it, before your attention was for the moment called to it, sincere, courageous, devoted men, French priests, exhibited to the world, with the French tongue, and in the French name, what the English missionaries are doing in the name of their country. They did it on the shores of which we are now speaking, in the archipelagoes of the Pacific Ocean; they laboured to win in their turn the Gambier Islands, the New Hebrides, the Navigators Islands, New Zealand, and many others. Why should not the French government do for the French Catholic missionaries what the English government has done for the English Protestant missionaries? Why should it not follow them with its attention, and protect them, as England does hers? It is said, 'You wish, then, to make yourselves patrons of the Catholic faith; you are going to encounter all the complications and contests which the strife of Catholicism and Protestantism in those regions can engender.' I see no reason why France, within the limits and preserving the measures I have indicated, should not make herself protectress of the Catholic religion throughout the world; it is her history, her tradition, to which she is naturally called. What she has ever done in the interest of her dignity and power, I see no reason why

she should cease from doing to-day. Because, happily, religious liberty is established in France, because Catholics and Protestants live here in peace under the same law, is that to be urged as a reason why France should forsake her traditions, her history, and cease to protect in the world the religion of her fathers? No, gentlemen, no; if France has introduced religious liberty at home, France will carry it abroad. Why should not France do in Oceania what she has done in her own territory? It will be difficult, is the reply; there will arise complications and embarrassments. Gentlemen, it is the business of governments to deal with difficulties, and to suffice for any complications that may present themselves. Do you wish me to tell you what will be the consequence of the situation I describe? It has already appeared. You have already seen, amongst yourselves, Catholic priests who had lived in the bosom of religious liberty, in the midst of Protestants and of all sects—what did they become? They became gentle, tolerant, liberal. You have seen them archbishops at home; M. de Cheverus, Archbishop of Bordeaux, was formed in that school. Under the empire of our laws, under the empire of the facts in the midst of which they pass their lives, the same spirit will imbue the priests who traverse Oceania to accomplish their great work. And France will have been faithful to her past; France will have protected the Catholic faith in the world, without the slightest injury to religious liberty in any quarter; she will have gained, on the contrary, new examples and new servants."

The Chamber had not much reliance on the moderation of the missionaries—Catholic or Protestant; its disposition on the religious, as also on the material question, was somewhat unsettled; but there is a power in great moral truths, which upright minds cannot reject, even while they doubt its success, and it is in face of the hesitations and doubts of men, that they force their way in the world. Controlled by the honour of the French flag, and by the desire of showing themselves protectors at the same time of religion and liberty, both Chambers voted, by strong majorities, the credit we asked from them for our new establishments in Oceania.

We flattered ourselves that we had surmounted the principal difficulties of the affair: at home, the parliamentary question was settled; abroad, it presented nothing serious. Without concealing its displeasure, and clearly implying doubts as to the spontaneity of the request from Queen Pomare for the establishment of the French protectorate, the English cabinet formally declared that it had no right or intention either of raising any obstacle to it, or of giving succour to Queen Pomare contrary to the treaty she had herself concluded. The English ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, expressed to me the anxiety of his government for the English missionaries at Otaheite. I gave him, on this point, the most firm and frank assurances; and on the 11th of July, 1843, soon after the Chambers had debated and passed the bill relative to our establishments in Oceania, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs in London, Mr. Addington, wrote as follows, by order of Lord

Aberdeen, to Sir John Barrow, secretary to the Admiralty:[1] "However much her Majesty's government may regret to see Queen Pomare reduced to submit to a foreign power, in the communications which have taken place between the governments of France and England on the subject of the *Society Islands*, since the first intelligence of the partial absorption of the sovereignty by the French, her Majesty's government does not raise any question as to the right in virtue of which France assumed that sovereignty. All it has done has confined itself to requiring that the English subjects in those islands may not be molested, and to obtaining from the French government a positive assurance that equal protection will be accorded to the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries established there. Her Majesty's government desires that no difficulty may be made by the officers commanding her Majesty's naval forces, who may visit the *Society Islands*, in saluting the flag introduced there by the French admiral, and that no dispute may arise as to the right of the French to exercise authority, conjointly with the sovereign, in those islands." On the 25th of August following, Lord Aberdeen, in a despatch to Lord Cowley, which was communicated to me, held the same language. The situation was, therefore, clear and settled between the English government and us, as between us and Queen Pomare, and our establishment at Otaheite had only to continue and develop itself within the terms and conditions of the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842.

[1] Parliamentary Papers, No. 3, 1844.

It was not destined to such a natural and peaceable course. After being absent from Otaheite nearly fourteen months, where he had left, under the title of Provisional Government, two naval officers, entrusted with the French interests in the island, and with the first establishment of the protectorate, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars returned there on the 1st of November, 1843; and after five days' parley between him and the Otaheitan government, as to what had passed since the month of September, 1842, especially on the question of a flag wrongfully planted and maintained, as he said, by Queen Pomare, he set aside the treaty of the protectorate, declared Queen Pomare deposed from her sovereignty at home and abroad, and on the 6th of November, in the name of the King and of France, took complete and definitive possession of the *Society Islands*. According to his reports, which reached us towards the middle of February, 1844, the hostility manifested against the French establishment by some English naval officers at Otaheite, the active intrigues of Mr. Pritchard, who had returned to the island, to excite Queen Pomare and the Otaheitans against us, the difficulties which these intrigues had engendered for the two officers who represented France, the pretensions to total and malevolent independence testified by certain acts of the Queen and her advisers, were the motives which had made the Admiral look upon the treaty of the 9th of September as violated by the Otaheitan government, and consequently annulled; and had determined him to substitute, for the system of the protectorate, the complete sovereignty of France.

We investigated most scrupulously this act of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, and his motives. The act in itself was violent and contrary to the simplest maxims of public right. Nations do not abolish suddenly, and by a single will, a treaty recently concluded, and the extreme weakness of one of the contracting parties is an additional reason for moderation and equity. A certain and pressing necessity could alone explain the Admiral's resolution. Now, his reasons were more specious than real: despite the hostile demonstrations of some officers of the English navy; despite the jealous intrigues of Consul Pritchard, and the embarrassments they had caused to the two officers provisionally entrusted with the French interests, those two officers, "left alone at Otaheite, without troops, without ships, with six marines for their sole support," as the Admiral said in his despatch, had not the less carried out their mission; finally, their authority had always been respected; the flag of the French protectorate had never for a moment ceased to wave over the island. Admiral Dupetit-Thouars had not considered the situation very perilous or urgent, since he had passed fourteen months on the western coast of America without appearing in the archipelago of the *Society Islands*. The English officer most opposed to the French protectorate, Commodore Toup Nicholas, commanding the frigate *Vindictive*, in which Mr. Pritchard had returned to Otaheite, had just been recalled from that station by Admiral Thomas, commander-in-chief of the English naval forces in the South Seas; and Captain Tucker, of the frigate *Dublin*, who replaced him, held

a line of conduct much more circumspect, on which the French officers hastened to congratulate themselves. Mr. Pritchard himself had recently received positive instructions from his government in direct contradiction to his own bent. On his return to Otaheite, on the 13th of March, 1843, he had written to Lord Aberdeen, reminding him of the terms of two despatches, one from Mr. Canning in 1827, another from Lord Palmerston in 1841, which seemed to promise to the Otaheitan government the effective protection of England in case of need; but Lord Aberdeen replied, on the 25th of September, 1843: "You seem to have completely misunderstood the passages in Mr. Canning's and Lord Palmerston's letters, quoted in your despatch, in support of the active intervention of Great Britain against France in behalf of Queen Pomare. It follows from the integral tenor of those letters that the government of her Britannic Majesty was not disposed to interfere openly in favour of the sovereign of the *Society Islands*, although it offered her its full protection and good offices, distinct from active intervention. But it must not be supposed that at the moment when her Majesty's government refused to take the *Society Islands* under the protection of the crown of England, it thought of interposing its good offices in favour of the sovereign in such a manner as to expose itself to the almost certainty of a collision with a foreign power. The British government sincerely deplores the pain and humiliation inflicted on Queen Pomare; it wishes to do all in its power to alleviate her distress; but unfortunately the letter asking for French protection was

freely signed by the Queen, and the convention which followed was equally contracted and accomplished by her will. . . . . Her Britannic Majesty's government finds itself thus deprived, by the voluntary and spontaneous act of the Queen, of all just and plausible pretext for opposing the possession and exercise of the French protectorate. It does not, therefore, intend to raise any question relative to the exercise of that power, nor to the legitimacy of the new flag which the French have thought fit to substitute for the old Otaheitan standard." [1]

Thus, neither at Otaheite, nor on the part of any European power, did the French protectorate incur any serious risk; it had existed for fifteen months, with embarrassments, but without real obstacle. Queen Pomare had recently addressed letters to the King, forwarded by Admiral Dupetit-Thouars himself, in which, while invoking his justice, in the name of the treaty, she renewed her most positive adhesion to it. We thought, therefore, in virtue of facts and right, that Admiral Dupetit-Thouars had not had sufficient reasons for substituting by a violent act, for the system of the protectorate, a position which could not fail to bring with it more serious difficulties, and on the 26th of February, 1844, the *Moniteur* contained this announcement:—"The government has received intelligence from the island of Otaheite, dated from the 1st to the 9th of November, 1843. Rear-Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, having arrived in the Bay of Papeite on the 1st of November, to execute the treaty of the

[1] Parliamentary Papers, 1844, No. 9.

9th of September, 1842, which the King had ratified, felt himself called upon to depart from the stipulations of that treaty, and to take possession of the entire sovereignty of the island. Queen Pomare has written to the King demanding the terms of the treaty, which secured to her the internal rule over her country, and praying him to re-establish her in her rights. The King, with the advice of his council, not finding, in the facts reported, sufficient grounds for annulling the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842, has ordered its pure and simple execution, and the re-establishment of the French protectorate in the island of Otaheite."

On the day of the announcement of this resolution, it became, in the Chamber of Deputies, on the part of every shade of the opposition, the object of a heavy attack. They maintained that, far from disavowing the act of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, we ought to have approved it, and have accepted with promptitude the complete possession of Otaheite, in place of the uncertain system of the protectorate. But this was not the true and hot point of war; we were directly accused of having been swayed on this occasion by weakness and pusillanimous complaisance towards the English government. They pretended that the ill-humour and complaints from London had alone decided us; they arrayed against us the popular sentiments of which England was the object. Never, looking at facts in their entirety, was such an accusation more unfounded. When we accepted the protectorate, which took from Protestant England the exclusive preponderance she enjoyed at Otaheite, we had certainly not temporised. We had disturbed and

wounded across the Channel a profound national sentiment. We should have acted without consistency or justice had we repeated and aggravated that wound by sanctioning a second act as useless, in fact, as contrary to right. I threw back, with more indignation in my soul than I permitted myself to express in words, a coarse and absurd reproach. Astonishment was expressed that we had waited eight days after the arrival of the Admiral's despatches before declaring ourselves. We were asked why we had not taken our resolutions before in London and in the House of Commons they had spoken of the affair? "I am unlucky," I said; "for what seems proud to my honourable adversaries, appears to me timid and mean. How! Because we fear some words may be spoken in a neighbouring parliament on a question in which it is interested, we must therefore decide that question in a race! We must sanction or condemn in twenty-four hours the conduct of a French officer, to avoid the expression of a sentiment or opinion on the other side of the Channel! Gentlemen, I have lived long enough to see pass before me many governments, many powers; I have seen the Empire, with the ascendancy of its glory; I have seen the Restoration, with the authority of its memories; I have seen popular rule, with the enthusiasm of its ideas and passions. None of these, I venture to say, has ever found me complaisant or disposed to bow before it. In the course of a life already long, I have more frequently resisted than yielded to the force that governed in our society. And now, I am about to perform an act of concession and weakness to foreign powers! Gen-

tlemen, the supposition is absurd. Undoubtedly, in taking our resolution, we have considered our relations with England; it would have been, allow me to say, ridiculous to have acted otherwise. It is the first rule of reason, the first duty of even moderately intelligent policy, to estimate all questions and affairs at their just value, and to be aware of the consequences they may produce in the general bearing of our dealings and relations with other States. I am the first to declare that as soon as we examined this affair we thought of our relations with England. But this does not interfere with our solution of the question in the most complete independence of all foreign influence, English or other, and on considerations emanating solely from the interest of France herself. I say it loudly, I say it without fear of offending the honourable men who sit in the British parliament, no more than I fear wounding my own friends; we form our decision on French reasons, not on account of English words. We had no fear of those words being spoken, and we have conducted ourselves after, precisely as we should have done before. I entreat you, gentlemen, to think seriously of this matter. It is true the advent and settlement of France in the South Seas were regarded by England with an anxious eye, and perhaps a degree of jealousy. Do not deceive yourselves; the most animated and active force at present existing in Oceania is the force of religion. When I use that term I apply it equally to Catholics and Protestants; those archipelagoes are covered with Catholic as well as Protestant missionaries. Mention has several times been made, in this chamber, of the

English missionaries resident at Otaheite. We have promised and guaranteed to them liberty, protection, security, and I do not hesitate to say that the English government has full confidence in our word. But the word we have given we have also to ask for ourselves. In New Zealand, for instance, there are Catholic missionaries, who were the first to penetrate and establish themselves there. A French bishop, Monsignor Pompellier, is at the head of those missions, with much zeal and success. It is said that already more than twenty thousand native New Zealanders have been converted to Catholicism. They are under the English authority; we require that they should be protected, supported, that they should enjoy the same liberty, the same security which we guarantee to the English missionaries at Otaheite. Throughout the whole extent of Oceania the Catholic and Protestant religions stand side by side; they propagate together; both are sincere, convinced, ardent; both make proselytes, who, uncultivated and savage by nature, speedily become enthusiasts and fanatics. At this moment, those missions present a glorious spectacle, labouring freely, side by side, in the propagation of the Christian faith; but it is a difficult, delicate, dangerous spectacle, which can only last on the condition of being protected by the good intelligence and harmony of the two great governments under whose empire they exercise their functions. On the day when friendly understanding ceases between those governments, when political rivalry places itself by the side of religious differences, on that day, do not deceive yourselves, gentlemen, tempests will rise up

in the midst of that ocean; elements of discord and causes of war will present themselves which all the wisdom of Europe will find it difficult to restrain. If you desire that solemn work, in my opinion equally useful and beautiful, to continue and succeed, apply yourselves to maintain between the two governments implicated, confidence and harmony. And when these governments are agreed on the point, when they promise, and effectually interchange in the countries of which I am speaking, all the guarantees, all the liberties of which the work stands in need, do not allow it to depend on the will of a man, a navigator, however honourable, brave, and devoted to his country he may be (and it is not for me to deny to Admiral Dupetit-Thouars all these merits), do not allow it, I repeat, to depend on the will of a single man to disturb such a spectacle, to destroy such a work by breaking between two great countries who concur in it, the good intelligence and harmony on which depend its duration and success."

The Chamber was moved and convinced; an order of the day, proposed by the opposition in these terms: "The Chamber, without approving the conduct of the cabinet, passes to the order of the day," was thrown out by 233 votes against 187; and the same debate, renewed four times in two months in the Chamber of Peers, as in that of Deputies, had invariably the same result.

But while we were discussing it in Paris, the act of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars brought on in Otaheite the consequences to be expected, and kindled in that small corner of the world the fire of war. Queen

Pomare completely despoiled of her sovereignty, conquest replacing the protectorate, the stronger side abolishing the system and rights it had recently instituted—all these unexpected violences excited the gentle and indolent population of the island to a lively ferment. Consul Pritchard was eager to foment it; he had induced Queen Pomare to take up her abode in a house near his own, that she might be constantly under his influence; at the very moment when she was demanding the maintenance of the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842, he made her write a letter to Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, affirming that she had signed that treaty through fear, and he himself addressed the Admiral disputing the facts on which the treaty was based, accusing his own deputy, the English vice-consul Wilson, who had expressed his satisfaction at it, of drunkenness, and declaring that for his own part he could not recognize even the simple protectorate of France, not having yet been authorized to do so by his government. As soon as Admiral Dupetit-Thouars had laid aside the protectorate and assumed entire possession of the island, Mr. Pritchard lowered his consular flag and announced that he ceased to exercise his functions, at the same time telling the natives that England would not acknowledge the new system, and that her ships would soon bring succour to Queen Pomare. He convinced the Queen herself so thoroughly of this that on the 10th of January, 1844, at the moment when the English frigate *Dublin*, recalled by Admiral Thomas, quitted the road of Otaheite, she wrote to the chiefs and people of six districts of the island; "I inform

you that *our* man-of-war is on the point of sailing, having been recalled by the Admiral; there is still here a small vessel to take care of us, and another will arrive shortly. Do not, then, believe the person who tells you we shall not be succoured. Great Britain will never abandon us. Remain tranquil while waiting the execution of her promise. These are my words to you; do no wrong on any occasion; never ill-treat the French; wait patiently; look to me, and follow me. And let us pray God to deliver us from our troubles, even as Hezekiah was delivered." Finally, a few days after, when the sedition broke out at several points in the island, Mr. Pritchard persuaded the Queen to retire on board the small English man-of-war, the *Basilisk*, anchored in the road of Papeite, as the only place where she could be in safety.

While Papeite was in prey to this agitation, a letter arrived there from Commodore Toup Nicholas, the declared opponent of the French protectorate, and who, stationed on the coast of Peru with his frigate, the *Vindictive*, wrote as follows to a friend at Otaheite:[1] —"May the new year bring you more satisfaction than the last, and may I see the dear and good Queen restored to her full sovereignty and independence!" The ship which conveyed this letter to Otaheite brought, at the same time, several numbers of the *Dublin University Magazine* and the *Times*, filled with violent articles against the French; copies of which, taken by hand, were immediately and profusely distributed.

[1] On the 13th January, 1844.

In this complicated and delicate position, Captain Bruat, who had only assumed, a few weeks before, the government of the French establishments in Oceania, conducted himself with equal intelligence and energy. He repaired in person, attended by a sufficient force, to those points of the island where the insurrection was flagrant or imminent, and took everywhere the necessary measures for repressing or preventing it; opposing to false reports his presence and his acts; ready to intimidate the natives by his confiding firmness; striking, when required, without hesitation but with restraint; abstaining from loud words; preoccupied with the difficulties of the cabinet in Paris as with his own; and exercising with rigour the authority with which he was invested, without saying or doing anything which could aggravate the embarrassments, or compromise the resolutions of the government from which he held his command.

But M. Bruat could not be at the same time everywhere: at the centre, where the insurrection was hatching, and on the points where it exploded. He had left at Papeite, on his departure, in command of the place, to which his rank called him, the captain of a corvette, D'Aubigny—an officer as brave, but less provident and patient than himself. The hostile practices of Mr. Pritchard were, at this critical moment, the object of solicitude, and also of habitual conversation, with the French residents at Otaheite, whether military or civil. All reports were laid to the account of this underhand enemy; all suppositions were admitted with impassioned credulity; and the commandant, D'Aubigny, probably shared the sus-

picions as well as the anger of his companions. During the night from the 2nd to the 3rd of March, 1844, a French sailor on duty was attacked with his fists by a native, who seized his musket, and, being compelled to let it go, fled, carrying with him the bayonet. In the state of affairs, such an incident had in it nothing extraordinary or even important; nevertheless, it inflamed the commandant, D'Aubigny, with furious irritation. Instantly, by an order which contained the most rigorous prohibitions and prescriptions,[1] he

[1] I shall only cite here a few articles of this order:

ARTICLE 2.—Every resident, European or Indian, must enter his habitation on the firing of the evening gun, and receive no visitor after that hour.

ARTICLE 3.—After the firing of the evening gun until that of the morning, patroles commanded by an officer, and rounds of police commanded by the commissary of police, are authorized to open by force and examine in detail every house they may consider suspicious, or in which they may suspect a meeting of persons other than the ordinary occupants.

ARTICLE 4.—If the patroles or rounds of police find in the houses they visit persons not residing there, besides arresting those persons and the proprietors, with the immediate confiscation or destruction of all wines, alcohols, or other spirits, the houses will be destroyed, and their materials removed at the pleasure of the officer in command, to construct guard-rooms, magazines, or sheds useful to the garrison.

ARTICLE 5.—Boats of foreign ships, belonging to all nations, must quit the shore on the firing of the evening gun, carrying with them all persons belonging to their crew, and all passengers who may have landed during the day. All officers, sailors, or passengers, are forbidden to sleep on shore.

ARTICLE 6.—Between the firing of the evening and the morning gun foreign vessels are warned that besides the shot to which they would expose their men by sending a boat on shore, the crew will be arrested, and the boat immediately boarded or destroyed.

placed the town of Papeite in a state of siege; and on the same day, without any previous explanation, arrested Mr. Pritchard, as he was stepping into a boat to visit one of the English ships in the road, confined him in a small dungeon under a blockhouse, at the same time interdicting him from all external communication, even with his wife, and issued a proclamation, thus couched: "A French sentinel was attacked during the night between the 2nd and 3rd of March, 1844. In retaliation, I have seized the person called Pritchard, the sole mover and daily instigator of the excitement of the natives. His effects are sufficient to cover any damage occasioned to our possessions by the insurgents; and if French blood should flow, every drop will recoil on his head." [1]

[1] Mr. Pritchard, on his return to London, made an official report to Lord Aberdeen (on the 31st of July, 1844) of his arrest and detention, in the following terms:—"On the day of the proclamation of martial law (placing Papeite in a state of siege) I was thrown into prison, without the slightest indication of the cause of such treatment. On the 3rd of March, towards four o'clock, as I was on the quay, on the point of stepping into the boat waiting to carry me on board her Majesty's ship *Cormorant*, the chief agent of police rushed on me and seized me by the arm. He was immediately joined by some soldiers. They took me, through the town, to the top of a hill on which a blockhouse had been built. We ascended by a small ladder to the highest story of the blockhouse, which formed the guard-room. In the middle of the room was a trap-door. I was taken down through this trap to a dungeon underneath, and there I was imprisoned, without a drop of water to quench my thirst or alleviate my fever, until the following morning, between eight and nine o'clock. The trap was then opened, and I received the proclamation of M. d'Aubigny of the 3rd of March. As to the sentinel attacked by a native of the island, I know no more of it than could have known one of her Majesty's officers resident in

Four days after these measures of his lieutenant, on the 9th of March, 1844, Governor Bruat returned to Papeite. "I found Papeite," he wrote to the Minister of Marine, on the 13th and 21st of March, 1844, "with the aspect of a besieged town. I immediately relanded the French property which had been removed to the ships. The English missionary, Mr. Osmond, whom I had previously found much occasion to commend, has seconded me thoroughly. He had already engaged the people of Papeite to reply by a refusal to the emissaries of the insurgents. . . . . The number of these insurgents diminishes daily; on all sides confidence revives, and the leading chiefs of the country who have remained faithful to our cause, announce to me that, with patience, all will return to

London. I was then told that food would be brought to me, from my own house, twice a day. The dampness of the cell was such that on the third day I was seized by a violent attack of dysentery. I asked for a physician. That favour was granted on certain conditions: a ladder was placed in the dungeon, on which I mounted high enough for the doctor to feel my pulse, to examine me, and ask questions as to my health. He wrote to the governor saying that if I was not withdrawn from that damp cell I should soon be dead. After that letter I was carried by night on board a French man-of-war anchored in the harbour. I was still kept in solitude there; but all was dry and light, and I was much better off than in the dungeon. Her Majesty's ship *Cormorant* having received orders from the governor to leave the harbour, it was settled that I should be put on board that vessel after she had sailed, on condition that I should not be disembarked on any of the *Society Islands*, and that I should be taken to some one of the islands within my jurisdiction. The *Cormorant* touching at Valparaiso, I thought it my duty to come home and place the affair under your lordship's eyes, that her Majesty's government may take it into consideration."

their homes. . . . . The copies of the correspondence addressed to me by Commandant d'Aubigny during my residence at Taravai will acquaint you with the necessity under which he found himself of placing Papeite in a state of siege, and of arresting Mr. Pritchard, ex-consul of England. In the agitation under which the country found itself, the first measure was necessary; but I cannot approve either the form or motive of the arrest. Meanwhile, the gravity of events was such that I could not recall what had been done without discouraging our party and strengthening the rebels. On my arrival, I immediately transferred Mr. Pritchard from the blockhouse to our frigate *La Meurthe*, ordering the commandant Guillevin to receive him at his table. Considering Mr. Pritchard merely as an English resident at Otaheite, whose influence over the ex-Queen Pomare and the revolted party had become dangerous for the tranquillity of the island, I wrote to the captain of the English ship *Cormorant*, Mr. Gordon, requesting him to leave Papeite, where he had no mission, and to take away Mr. Pritchard, whom I promised to place at his disposal as soon as the vessel quitted the port. After receiving the consent of Captain Gordon, I ordered M. Guillevin, commanding *La Meurthe*, to apprise Mr. Pritchard that the *Cormorant* would take him on board, and that he was at liberty to receive his family. . . . . The departure of the *Cormorant*[1] has produced the best effect; all reports tell me this, and your Excellency

[1] This vessel left the road of Papeite on the 13th of March, with Mr. Pritchard on board.

may rest assured that the hope of relief so long promised by the English agents and captains is the sole cause of the resistance manifested, and which will cease when these promises are found to be fallacious. Not wishing to employ force until the last extremity, and when all chances are favourable, I shall not take advantage of the additional means afforded for the moment by our frigate *La Charte*[1] unless I see an absolute necessity for so doing, and if the proposals of the missionaries fail."

Several English missionaries had, in fact, written to the governor, on the 19th of March, "We, the undersigned Protestant missionaries, assembled in committee at Paofaï, in Otaheite, deeply convinced that it is our duty, as ministers of the gospel of peace, to attempt collectively what individual efforts have not succeeded in accomplishing, namely, to persuade the natives now assembled in the eastern part of the island to return to their dwellings, and knowing the great influence which the insurgent chiefs possess over the people,—we believe that even our collective effort would prove fruitless unless we are authorized by his Excellency the governor to offer them, in return for their submission, terms of amity. We shall be happy to receive from your Excellency an early answer." Ten missionaries signed this letter. M. Bruat replied the same day, "I have just received the letter you have done me the honour to address to me, and I see with real pleasure that you

[1] This frigate had arrived, on the 13th of March, from the Marquesas Islands, bringing to Otaheite several passengers, and the 26th company of infantry, which M. Bruat had asked for.

are animated by sentiments which ought to preside over every religious assembly. I am convinced that those you express to-day have always formed the basis of your conduct towards a people whose spiritual direction you have undertaken. Since you sincerely desire peace, my opinion is that the step which would most promptly lead to that result would be your calling upon me and frankly acknowledging my authority. Your co-operation then would have its full power for the maintenance of the tranquillity so necessary to the work in which you have been so long labouring, and which my instructions and private conviction make it my duty to support. It seems to me that until you adopt this course, the Indians, however slightly they may be versed in European usages, will always find, when you exhort them to submission, something in your own conduct not exactly in accord with the instructions you give them. Whatever may be your determination on other points, the step you propose has my consent, as you have submitted it to my approbation; but I cannot authorize you to speak in my name, as you have not received my instructions. Nevertheless, to arrive at the very desirable results you hope to obtain, you may promise to the chiefs who repair immediately to Papeite to make full and entire submission to the French government, that they will neither be imprisoned nor exiled."

The English missionaries did not hesitate; they requested an audience of the governor, who granted it at once; and after this step, which proved the sincerity of their pacific intentions, they applied them-

selves anxiously to allay the insurrection. They were unable to accomplish this as promptly as they expected; the Otaheitans, once in movement, showed themselves more bold and impassioned than was expected. M. Bruat was compelled to exercise in this little war against an insignificant tribe buried in the midst of the ocean, all his resources of military skill and personal courage, as well as of political patience and ability. He only succeeded completely after a struggle of two years, for it was not until 1846 that Queen Pomare, who had retreated to one of the other islands of the archipelago, consented to return to Otaheite to resume possession of the internal sovereignty of her island, and that the French protectorate was peaceably re-established in terms of the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842.

While the question was thus taking the form of war in the Pacific Ocean, it assumed even a more important aspect between the coasts of the British Channel. Towards the end of July we received news of the incident at Otaheite regarding Mr. Pritchard, and at the same moment Mr. Pritchard himself arrived in London, and acquainted his government with his adventure. I wrote on the 30th of July to the Count de Jarnac, our chargé d'affaires at St. James's, during the absence of M. de Saint-Aulaire on leave: "We have very unpleasant news from Otaheite. The facts are related and explained in the documents I send you. Communicate them to Lord Aberdeen. How is it that in the month of March last the intrigues of Mr. Pritchard and several English

naval officers against us recommenced with so much ardour? How is it that Mr. Pritchard, who was already acquainted with his appointment as consul at the *Friendly Islands*, persisted in remaining at Otaheite without official character? How is it that, far from conforming to the instructions of Lord Aberdeen of the 25th of September, 1843, he has carefully concealed them? All this perplexes me extremely. All this will render the return to the protectorate at Otaheite more difficult, and the debates in Paris and London more bitter and embarrassing. I have done, in this matter, all in my power; I have accepted, without hesitation, my very heavy share of the burden, and it is but just and necessary that nothing should aggravate it; and that the intentions of the English government should be respected and carried out by its agents. I have not time this morning to tell you more, and to discuss the details of this untoward incident. I send you at once what I know of it."

Before my letter reached Count de Jarnac, or he could have said or communicated anything to Lord Aberdeen, on the evening of the 31st of July, in the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel, being questioned by Sir Charles Napier as to the rumours current on the subject of Otaheite and Mr. Pritchard, replied:— "I have the honour to declare that her Majesty's government has received reports from Otaheite; and, presuming that they are correct, I do not hesitate to say that a gross outrage, accompanied by a gross insult, has been committed against England in the person of her agent. These accounts only reached us

last Monday; but her Majesty's government has adopted instant measures to satisfy the honour of the country; and it has been since acknowledged that this outrage was committed by persons invested, at Otaheite, with temporary power. Resting, as to the affirmation of this fact, on the authority of the French government, I presume that it will take immediate steps to make to this country the ample reparation it has a right to demand."

These words surprised me: they were violent, and in some respects incorrect. When Mr. Pritchard was arrested he had ceased to be, at Otaheite, the agent of England, and we had not yet held with the English government any communication on the incident. But at the same time the vivacity of Sir Robert Peel gave me the measure of the public emotion around him; he had evidently spoken with precipitation, and under a strong external pressure. Called on in my turn, on the 3rd and 5th of August, in the Chamber of Peers by M. de Boïssy, and in the Chamber of Deputies by Messrs. Berryer and Billault, my attitude was reserved, and in marked contrast with that of Sir Robert Peel. "Questions of foreign policy," I said, "have various phases, and they cannot, in all these phases indiscriminately, enter into this Chamber. They are not such that the door must necessarily be opened to them every time they knock at it. There are moments when discussion brings light to these questions; there are others when it sets them in a blaze. Feeling convinced that real inconvenience would attend the debate of the point in question to-day, I peremptorily decline it. There are involved in

it facts and rights, to be cleared up and reconciled. This is what I have to do at the moment. I shall do it, with regard to the rules and considerations which preside over sound international relations, maintaining at the same time the rights, honour, and dignity of the agents of France, and of her naval officers in particular. When the debate reaches its proper hour I shall have to justify before the Chamber what the government has done, and the motives by which it has been swayed. At present, I should fail in my duty to the King and the country if I said more."

Despite the urgency of the opposition, I persisted in silence. We were approaching the term of the session; it was closed on the 6th of August, 1844, and I had time before me to discuss the question with the English cabinet, and dissipate the embarrassments to which this incident gave rise.

At the first moment[1] I had written to M. de Jarnac, "Do not let it be established that Mr. Pritchard was still English consul at Otaheite, and that it was the English consul who was arrested and banished from the island. This is not the fact. Mr. Pritchard had ceased to be consul at Otaheite, for he had himself abdicated that character by striking his flag when Admiral Dupetit-Thouars assumed the sovereignty; and Mr. Pritchard struck his flag not on account of any wrong done to him, or insult offered by the French government, but to avoid recognition of that authority; and he also declared

[1] On the 1st of August, 1844.

formally that he denied that authority, and for that reason resigned his functions as consul. It would be too accommodating to maintain the position and rights of consul in conjunction with a government the position and rights of which were denied, and while efforts were making to overthrow them.

"*Postscript.*—I have just found and enclose a copy of the letter of the 7th of November, 1843, in which Mr. Pritchard himself announced to Admiral Dupetit-Thouars that he struck his flag and ceased his functions as Britannic consul. I ask if, after such a letter, he could have been considered at Otaheite as holding that office?"

M. de Jarnac acquitted himself of his mission without delay; and at the same time, with polite firmness, expressed to Lord Aberdeen his regret at the words which, in the first moment, Sir Robert Peel had uttered. The difference between my language and his had been felt in London. Lord Aberdeen replied to M. de Jarnac that Sir Robert Peel did not admit the complete accuracy of any of the versions given in the newspapers of his speech, and M. de Jarnac was authorized to declare this to me. "I am very glad to receive this declaration," I wrote to him.[1] "You have no idea of the effect produced here by those words of Sir Robert Peel, and how they have augmented the difficulties of a situation already sufficiently complicated. The main point of the affair has almost disappeared in face of this language, held so suddenly, before any explanation or

[1] On the 8th of August, 1844.

information had been received from hence; before the declaration, so unexpected by me, that the French government had been already addressed, and that ample reparation might be relied on, when I was correct in saying I had received no official notice, and that the two governments would examine the facts before delivering their opinions. When I was called upon last Saturday and Monday in our Chambers, I could have made use of your despatch, and have affirmed the incorrectness of the English journals. I preferred doing nothing of the kind, and avoided throwing an additional difficulty on Sir Robert Peel; I comprehend those he has to encounter, and have no wish to increase them. But the result of all this is a very lively impression, which greatly aggravates the embarrassments of the affair."

The first of these embarrassments was speedily removed. The English government admitted that Mr. Pritchard, having himself struck his flag and ceased his functions as consul at Otaheite, had no longer any public character there; but it was not less certain, said Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel to M. de Jarnac,[1] "that an English citizen, still an officer of the Queen, as Mr. Pritchard held commission as consul in other archipelagoes of the South Sea, had been arrested, imprisoned, and expelled without the establishment of any positive charge against him under any form of jurisdiction. There were ample grounds for the English government requiring reparation for this proceeding; but it

[1] On the 7th of August, 1844.

delayed all official demand, in the hope that, when fully informed, we should spontaneously offer what we considered suitable."

The reparation which the English cabinet desired, while hesitating to demand it officially, was, that we should permit the temporary return of Mr. Pritchard to Otaheite, if only to look after his family who were still there; and that we should also temporarily remove from the island M. d'Aubigny, who had so roughly imprisoned him, and M. Mœrenhout, consul for France and Belgium, looked upon by Mr. Pritchard as his bitterest enemy, and the principal author of the accusations alleged against him. "Lord Aberdeen," M. de Jarnac wrote to me on the 10th of August, "asked me yesterday to call upon him with reference to the affair of Otaheite, which was to be considered again in council this morning. He expressed with much earnestness his regret at not having heard anything from you on the subject. He said he was really anxious about the matter, which time aggravates in England, while perhaps it simplifies it in France. He says it can be clearly proved that no specific accusation was ever drawn up against Pritchard. He deplores, above all things, the absence of any reply from you to the overture he made as to the return, at least temporarily, of the said Pritchard to Otaheite, and he even expressed some regret that he had not officially acquainted Lord Cowley with the affair. I have reason to think that a portion of the cabinet inclines to the immediate return of Mr. Pritchard to Otaheite in the *Collingwood*, with orders to remain there until the departure of M. Mœrenhout. Lord Aberdeen and Sir

Robert Peel have both given me a glimpse of this alternative. I answered that you could scarcely avoid seeing in that one of those provocations which render hostilities almost inevitable."

I hastened to remove all doubt from the English government as to my sentiments and resolutions on this point. I wrote on the 15th of August to M. de Jarnac:—"I reply to the idea which seems to me specially to prepossess Lord Aberdeen, the possibility of a return, at least for the moment, of Mr. Pritchard to Otaheite. I lay aside what has passed within the last fifteen days in Paris and London, the effect which such a measure would produce here, the position in which it would place the cabinet, now, and at the opening of the next session. I examine the measure in itself only, in its effect at Otaheite, in its relation with what is now passing, and will soon pass there. An insurrection has exploded in Otaheite. The French establishment is attacked, on some points by armed hands, on others by very active intrigues. It is said and affirmed that means of organization and resistance are supplied, from without, to the natives, that arms and munitions of war have been disembarked. One thing is certain, the war is flagrant. Can the thought be entertained, in such a state of things, of allowing a man to return, to appear only in the island, who, right or wrong, is there considered by the French and the natives as the instigator, at least the standard of resistance, insurrection, and contest? This would evidently be to feed the war with fresh aliment, to inspire the insurrection with new hopes. It would be to weaken the French, for the moment, in the struggle

they have to maintain, and to compromise their security. By authorizing such an act I should be wanting to all my duties as to all the laws of sound judgment.

"There is yet more. When the insurrection at Otaheite is suppressed, and the war ended, when the French authority is firmly and incontestably re-established, all will not be over; far from it; something extremely difficult will remain to be accomplished—the execution of the King's order of the 26th of February last, abolishing the system of complete French sovereignty, and enjoining a return to the strict execution of the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842—viz., to the protectorate pure and simple. I appeal to Lord Aberdeen's impartiality; does he believe that this return will be an easy matter? It has not been easy, God knows, to arrange and maintain it up to this. It would have been in any case, if nothing had happened in the interval, a delicate operation to carry it through at Otaheite. But, since the last events, at the close of an insurrection, after all the proceedings which have more and more irritated and compromised, on that little theatre, parties and men, unquestionably the re-establishment of the protectorate, in place of complete sovereignty, will be a serious undertaking. During the final sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, and on account of recent circumstances, we were newly and vigorously attacked for this measure; even more, we have been formally called upon to renounce it. What would be said if we added to its difficulties, and if the return of Mr. Pritchard preceded or closely followed the restoration of Queen Pomare? Who can

foresee the consequences of such a juxtaposition? I do not hesitate to affirm that until the situation of Otaheite is made clear and secure, until the war has ceased, and the French protectorate is definitively re-established, prudence, which is here an imperative duty, commands me to do and say nothing to aggravate the dangers of a situation already so thorny, and which carries blindly from Europe to Otaheite new and inappreciable chances of disturbance, which might recoil on us in Europe with a deplorable rebound.

"I am the more compelled to this prudence, my dear Jarnac, as I am personally convinced that Mr. Pritchard is really the principal instigator of the resistance and of the insurrection against the French establishment. The more I examine his conduct by going back to the originating causes of all this, or by looking through the details, the more my conviction of his active, obstinate hostility, and of his intrigues against us, is confirmed. He appears to me a cunning, contriving, cautious man, clever in keeping up appearances, but who never loses sight of his object, and travels towards it by every variety of road. I look upon his presence at Otaheite as irreconcilable with the peace of the island, and the tranquil, regular exercise of the French protectorate. Hold your ground then firmly; we are in the exercise of our right. We act according to the most evident counsels of the most necessary prudence. If Pritchard returns to Otaheite, the French authorities, who exiled him, are demolished; we must recall them; all moral French ascendancy is lost; we must send more troops, more ships of war, and raise new fortifications through-

out the island. This is neither possible nor proposable, and whatever may be the empire of personal prepossessions, I cannot believe that Lord Aberdeen will refuse to acknowledge it himself.

"My opinion on the arrest and solitary imprisonment of Pritchard, and the proclamation of the commandant D'Aubigny, I have already communicated to you. If from London they speak to me officially, I may express on these points my regret and a certain degree of censure. In any case, the language of the proclamation cannot be defended. Some circumstances which have, as it appears, accompanied the imprisonment, are equally to be lamented. According to the facts with which I am acquainted up to this, it does not seem to me that the imprisonment itself was necessary. M. d'Aubigny might have done at the first moment what M. Bruat did on his return—remove Mr. Pritchard from the island in an English ship. This is what may be admitted, with great reserve in the language, for M. d'Aubigny believed he was acting under the empire of a pressing necessity, and we cannot abandon altogether the right of preventive and temporary imprisonment. A case might arise in which it would be the only mode of arresting culpable intrigues, and in which the material means of banishing a dangerous foreigner might be wanting. Restrain your words within these limits, admitting that, ready to recognize what is true and just, I might say, in a more official form, something analogous to what I now state confidentially to you.

"We cannot either allow that for the expulsion of

a foreigner considered dangerous, a previous process and the intervention of judicial forms or power are absolutely necessary. This is a police right which appertains to public authority, to be used according to its conviction. More than one Frenchman has thus been expelled from Mauritius by a simple act of the English governor and without formal process."

Four days later I transmitted to M. de Jarnac precise information as to six particular cases in which Frenchmen had been rudely driven from Mauritius, and upon slighter grounds than in that of Mr. Pritchard at Otaheite. It was thus clearly established that not only the expulsion of foreigners, but their previous arrest and imprisonment were the common law and habitual practice of the English colonies, and that this practice had frequently given rise to acts of rigour committed without judicial forms—acts which, nevertheless, had not been considered by the English government as outrages against the country to which the expelled foreigner belonged, and had not called, on its part, for any reparation.

When treating with such men as Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel, it was a great step towards the settlement of a question to affirm thus frankly our rights and object; but it was not enough to place them in a position to resist the pressure laid upon them by the opposition in parliament, the various missionary societies, and all the ardent patriotism of England. Sir Robert Peel especially, from sympathy or a disposition to let things take their course, was tempted to give these opposing influences a marked satisfaction. Every time that M. de Jarnac saw Lord

Aberdeen, he found him perplexed. "I have been obliged," he said one day to him, "for the satisfaction of my colleagues, to prepare an official note, which Lord Cowley will be instructed to hand to M. Guizot, announcing to him that Mr. Pritchard will be sent back to Otaheite in the *Collingwood;* it is there on my desk; place me in a position to leave it there." A council was held on the 13th of August, at which all the members of the cabinet, with the exception of the minister for foreign affairs, declared for an immediate and strong increase of the naval armaments of England. Such a step would have greatly aggravated the situation, and Lord Aberdeen was obliged to exercise his full personal influence and the whole authority of his position to set it aside. "I will do all in my power," he said to M. de Jarnac, "to smooth the path for the King and M. Guizot; but I am prepared for the worst."

On my side, being fully resolved not to exceed, by way of reparation, what I had already named, I repeated incessantly to M. de Jarnac, "Reiterate in every sense the idea that it is impossible to allow the peace of the world to be disturbed by Pritchard, Pomare, and D'Aubigny, without some serious and commanding reason. It would be disgraceful to both cabinets. This is the cry of sound judgment. Give the crowd on both sides of the Channel time to feel this; they will come to this conclusion. For myself, I will go as far as justice to our agents and our own dignity allows. If there is discontent in London, I will wait until it subsides; but if an act of arrogance is committed, I cannot submit to it."

I came to an understanding with the King. "I know not," I said to him, "how this Pritchard affair may end. I presume that the King would not wish, under any circumstances, to make war on England for Otaheite; but if to avoid war it became necessary to abandon Otaheite, I could not hold myself responsible for such an act, and should request the King's permission to retire." The King replied, without contradicting me. "I wish," he wrote, on the 20th of August, "Lord Aberdeen to be well assured that he may reckon on my efforts as on yours to bury this lamentable broil by all *practicable* means; that is to say, by all those that would not expose France and the world to the dangers of a ministerial crisis at home. But let us not have Pritchard sent back to that unfortunate Otaheite."

Very soon after the opening of the quarrel in London, on the 6th of August, 1844, M. de Jarnac had written to me, saying: "I thought I noticed in my last interview with Lord Aberdeen, that Mr. Pritchard had perhaps given him to understand that an indemnity in money would satisfy him more than an infinity of political measures discussed by the cabinet, to extricate public self-respect from this difficult affair. I did not push Lord Aberdeen on the point, who, undoubtedly, neither suggested nor dwelt on it; but I think it well to acquaint you with this induction, which I extracted from some words essentially inofficial, which fell from my interlocutor. You will judge whether it is of any value." This mode of arranging the question had nothing in it either to surprise or offend us: it was that employed by Mr.

Pritchard himself, when in 1836, after causing the expulsion from Otaheite of the two Catholic missionaries, Fathers Caret and Laval, he had obtained for them from Queen Pomare, on the formal demand of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, an indemnity of two thousand piastres; a precedent was here furnished by the representative of France and accepted by that of England. I replied to M. de Jarnac:—"If you can carry through the insinuation you suggest of an indemnity in money, I am disposed to entertain it. Follow up this vein. Since you have caught a glimpse, there should be a way of working it."

In the first heat of the negotiation, this idea continued remote and obscure; but when the English cabinet felt convinced that we should not make any of the concessions demanded, that we should refuse consent to the return of Mr. Pritchard to Otaheite, or to the recall of any of our officers, and that sending back the former consul to Otaheite in the *Collingwood* would lead to more serious consequences than were ever discerned by those who insisted on it, the idea of the indemnity entered into the negotiation and changed its character. All appearance of menace on the one side or weakness on the other vanished. We had admitted that the expulsion of Mr. Pritchard, otherwise legitimate and necessary, was attended by useless and inconsistent rigour, which subjected him to sufferings and losses we might consider it just to indemnify. I wrote to M. de Jarnac that we were ready to declare officially what we proposed to do; and after the exchange of some amicable observations on the terms of our declaration, I forwarded the two

following despatches to M. de Jarnac, with instructions to communicate them to Lord Aberdeen :—

I.

"*Paris, August* 29, 1844.

"COUNT,

"I have laid before the King in council, the conversations I have had with the ambassador of her Britannic Majesty, relative to the return of Mr. Pritchard to the island of Otaheite, and to the accompanying circumstances. The King's government abstained from expressing any opinion, or forming any resolution on this incident until it had collected all the information it could hope to obtain and maturely examined all the facts, for it is most anxious to anticipate everything likely to produce alteration in the relations of the two States.

"After this examination the King's government remains convinced :—

"1. That the right of removing from the island of Otaheite any resident foreigner who may disturb, or labour to disturb and overthrow established order, belongs to the King's government and its representatives, not only in virtue of the common law of all nations, but in the express terms of the treaty of the 9th of September, 1842, which instituted the French protectorate, and runs thus :—"The direction of all affairs with foreign governments, as well as of all that concerns resident foreigners, is placed at Otaheite in the hands of the French government, or the person appointed by it.

"2. That Mr. Pritchard, from the month of February, 1843, to March, 1844, has constantly endea-

voured, by every description of act and intrigue, to impede, disturb, and overthrow the French establishment at Otaheite, the administration of justice, the exercise of authority by the French agents, and their relations with the natives.

"When, therefore, in the month of March last, an insurrection broke out in a part of the island, and was preparing in Papeite itself, the French authorities had lawful reasons, and found themselves under the necessity of using their right, for removing Mr. Pritchard from the territory of the island, where his presence and conduct fomented amongst the natives a permanent spirit of resistance and sedition.

"With regard to certain circumstances which preceded the removal of Mr. Pritchard, especially the mode and place of his temporary imprisonment, and the proclamation published respecting him at Papeite on the 3rd of last March, the King's government regrets them sincerely, and the necessity does not appear to have been justified by the facts. Governor Bruat, as soon as he returned to Papeite, hastened to put an end to these vexatious proceedings, by ordering the embarkation and departure of Mr. Pritchard. The King's government does not hesitate to acknowledge to the government of her Britannic Majesty, as it has signified at Otaheite also, its regret and disapprobation of the circumstances to which I am now alluding.

"The King's government has given, in the Society Islands, undeniable proofs of the moderation and firm equity which regulate its conduct. It has constantly taken care to secure to foreigners and natives

the most complete and effective liberty of religious worship. This equality of protection for all creeds is the common law, and also constitutes the honour of France. The King's government has consecrated and applied this principle wherever it exercises authority. The English missionaries themselves have acknowledged it, for the greater part of them have held aloof from the intrigues of Mr. Pritchard, and several have afforded to the French authorities valuable co-operation. The King's government will scrupulously maintain this liberty of conscience and respect for common rights; and at the same time it will also support and cause to be respected its own rights, indispensable at Otaheite for the preservation of good order, as also for the safety of the French residents and authorities charged with the exercise of the protectorate.

"We feel confident that the intention of the British cabinet accords with ours, and that, penetrated by mutual esteem, the two governments have the same desire of inspiring their agents with the sentiments by which they are themselves animated; of interdicting all acts that might compromise the relations of the two States, and of strengthening, by an equal respect for their dignity and mutual rights, the good intelligence which happily subsists between them."

II.

"*Paris, September* 2, 1844.

"COUNT,

"While expressing to the government of her Britannic Majesty its regret for, and disapprobation

of certain circumstances which preceded the removal of Mr. Pritchard from the island of Otaheite, the King's government is disposed to accord to Mr. Pritchard, on account of the loss and sufferings which these circumstances entailed on him, an equitable indemnity. We have no means here of estimating what ought to be the amount of that indemnity, and we are not inclined to refer it to the sole assertions of Mr. Pritchard himself. It seems to us, therefore, convenient to remit that appreciation to the two commandants of the French and English stations in the Pacific Ocean, Rear-Admiral Hamelin and Admiral Seymour. I instruct you to make this proposal to her Britannic Majesty's government, and to forward the answer to me without delay."

The English cabinet willingly accepted this mode of regulating the promised indemnity, and three days afterwards, on the 5th of September, the speech delivered in the Queen of England's name on the prorogation of Parliament, contained this paragraph: "Her Majesty has recently found herself engaged in discussions with the government of the King of the French, respecting events calculated to interrupt the good understanding and amicable relations between this country and France. You will be glad to hear that, owing to the spirit of justice and moderation which animates the two governments, that danger has been happily removed."

Between the two countries and governments the affair was ended. It was not so in France for the French cabinet. We had to defend in the Chambers

the conduct we had maintained in the negotiation, and to obtain approval of the issue. The lively displeasure caused at the first moment by the sharp words of Sir Robert Peel had been ardently diffused and fomented by the opposition journals; they repeated every morning that we were certainly on this occasion, as on all others, pusillanimously complaisant to England. In such a state of feeling, the Pritchard incident could not fail to be, in the approaching session, an object of important debate. King Louis-Philippe felt more disturbed than any one else, in the interest of good relations with England, and the stability of the cabinet, which he warmly desired. On the evening of the day when the council decided, in principle, the indemnity, and I had announced it to London, I received the following letter from him:[1]—

"My dear Minister,—I have reflected much on what passed at the council to-day relative to the Pritchard affair. We have admitted that an indemnity is due to him for the injuries he has sustained. We have determined that you should inform Lord Aberdeen of this officially, and propose that the amount should be regulated by the two Admirals, Hamelin and Seymour, commanding the naval forces of the two powers in the Pacific Ocean. I consider this mode of adjustment at the same time equitable and convenient. Nevertheless, it presents to me, for practical application, more than one difficulty.

"The first is, that the two Admirals having necessarily to meet at Otaheite to examine and appraise

[1] Dated the 2nd of September, 1844.

the damages in question, it is certain that we cannot deny to Mr. Pritchard the power of enforcing his claims and pleading his cause before them, either in person or by power of attorney. Now, I think the council agrees with me that we must not consent, under any circumstances, to the return of Mr. Pritchard to Otaheite, to appear personally in his cause. Pleas by power of attorney in a place where all is public, and all comes back to us with comments for insertion in the journals, seem to me, also, to present great objections, and I consider it most desirable that they should be avoided.

"A second difficulty presents itself in the enormous time required: 1. To convey to the two admirals the order for proceeding to the valuation with which they are charged; 2. To enable them to combine their movements in the vast extent of the Pacific, so as to meet on the appointed day at Otaheite; 3. To complete their work; 4. To transmit it to us in Europe.

"Do not forget, besides, that such protracted delay will produce a bad effect in England, and inevitably furnish ground for increased damages to Mr. Pritchard; and, moreover, these delays, already so long, will be of necessity increased by the time that must elapse before our Chambers vote the credit required to clear the indemnity which the admirals may allot to Mr. Pritchard. You know for how many years the vote to liquidate the sum allowed to the United States was referred from one session to another, and that these protractions very nearly excited war between France and America.

"The best, and indeed, in my idea, the only method of escaping from these difficulties, is to request Lord Aberdeen to regulate, with Mr. Pritchard, a sum in consideration of which the latter would give a receipt *in full of all demands*, and the payment whereof would be immediately carried out, without asking or waiting for any legislative sanction. In that case, it is evident that the amount of this payment can only be found in two sources: one, to which I am as determined to refuse my concurrence as you are to ask it, to draw from the secret funds for foreign or domestic affairs, already insufficient for the State exigencies to which they are appropriated; the other mode consists in my personal supplies, the revenues of my civil list, of my private and the crown domains; and I shall be delighted, in spite of the charges and embarrassments with which they are at this moment burdened, to give from thence, without mystery, the sum wanted to pay the indemnity to Mr. Pritchard. Moreover, according to what Lord Aberdeen has implied, the sum required for this object is not of a nature to augment materially the mass of my debts—about one thousand pounds sterling, say twenty-five thousand francs. I find it quite suitable that the King alone should bear an expense which his government and himself equally look upon as equitable, and consequently honourable, and well calculated to facilitate the continuation of our good relations with England. I add, to conceal no part of my feeling and idea, that I shall enjoy, as King, the opportunity of securing this advantage to France without subjecting her to the inconvenience

of the delays and difficulties which the demand of the legislative sanction for such a trifle might produce, and also to the suspense of waiting the moment when it might be possible to submit it to the Chambers.

" I wish, therefore, my dear minister, that without changing or modifying in any degree the proposition of my government to commit to Admirals Hamelin and Seymour the settlement of the amount of indemnity they may consider due to Mr. Pritchard, you would instruct Count de Jarnac to request Lord Aberdeen to propose to Mr. Pritchard the immediate payment, under the head of an agreement, of the sum of one thousand pounds sterling, or twenty-five thousand francs, which I will supply against his receipt *in full of all demands*. And then, whatever may be the result of the investigation by the admirals, there will be nothing to ask from the Chamber; their decision will merely amount to a voucher that an indemnity was really due to Mr. Pritchard; and, nevertheless, as it might be necessary to make known that Mr. Pritchard was satisfied, if questions were put to you in the Chambers on this point, you would evade them by saying nothing would be required from them; and if they asked whether Pritchard had received an indemnity, you might reply that nothing had been paid to him from the public funds, with a declaration on honour that neither had he received anything from the secret service money of the ministries. All the world might know that it is I who do not wish to impose on the public revenue the sum I had thought fit to pay."

32436

I did not consider the King's proposition acceptable; it would appear to have no other object than removing from the cabinet what it would fail to remove, the necessity of obtaining a vote of the Chambers for the Pritchard indemnity. It was evidently not in the amount, but in the approbation or blame of Parliament that the importance of the vote consisted; and, far from shunning the debate, it became us to accept it openly, let the issue be what it might. All my colleagues participated in my opinion, and the King conformed to it without difficulty.

At the opening of the session of 1845, we did more than accept the debate; we hastened to anticipate it. The King's speech responded, as to the Pritchard incident, to the sentiments which the Queen of England had manifested in hers, on proroguing parliament. "My government," he said, "was engaged, with that of the Queen of Great Britain, in discussions which might have excited alarm, lest the relations between the two countries should be changed; a mutual spirit of good-will and equity has maintained, between France and England, that happy accord which guarantees the repose of the world."

In the committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to draw up the address in reply to the speech from the throne, the friends of the cabinet were in a great majority; they proposed to the Chamber a paragraph in perfect harmony with the speech, and giving unqualified approbation to the conduct of the ministers. "Incidents which, at the first moment, seemed of a nature to disturb the friendly relations of France and England, excited a lively emotion in both coun-

tries, and called for the full attention of the government. We are gratified to learn that a reciprocal sentiment of good will and equity has maintained, between the two States, that happy understanding equally important to their mutual prosperity and the repose of the world."

The question was thus distinctly laid down. The opposition grappled with it eagerly. For the first time since 1840, owing to the vivacity of the popular emotion and the hesitation partially disclosed by some members of the conservative party, it conceived the hope of overturning the cabinet. The debate lasted for six days, alternately impassioned and dexterous, at one time embracing the varied points of foreign policy, at another strictly concentrated on Otaheite and Mr. Pritchard. I shall not detail here the different phases; the point of attack was always the same; the cabinet was accused of having failed, in its communications with the English government, in firmness and dignity: my defence consisted in a summary of the facts and negotiations, as I have here related them. In the cabinet, MM. Duchâtel and Dumon supported me with steady concurrence. Two members of the committee on the address, MM. de Peyramont and Hébert, maintained, with eloquent vigour, the approving paragraph it proposed. Two amendments, which substituted blame for approval, were suggested, one by M. de Carné, the other by M. Léon de Malleville. The first, general, and rather restrained, was rejected by 225 votes, against 197. The second was more special and explicit; it expressed a formal regret "that in conceding a reparation that

was not due, the cabinet had not sufficiently considered the rules of justice and the reciprocity which France should always respect." After energetically repulsing this, I ended by saying: "I thank the committee for its frank adhesion; I thank the opposition for its equally frank attack. We are convinced that for four years we have carried on a good, honest policy, useful to the country, conformable with its interests, and morally sound. But this policy is difficult, very difficult; it has many prejudices, many passions, many obstacles to surmount—on these benches, beyond these benches, with the public, with the world—great and little obstacles. It requires, for success, the free and firm concurrence of the great powers of the State. If this concurrence failed us, I will not say completely, but if it were insufficiently firm to enable us to continue it with success, we should cease to undertake the charge. We cannot suffer the policy that we believe to be sound, to be disfigured, enervated, deteriorated in our hands, and that it should become inefficient through weakness. All we ask is, let the decision be clear, perfectly intelligible to all the world. Be it what it may, the cabinet will rejoice at it." The amendment of M. Léon de Malleville was rejected without the necessity of a ballot.

When the censure called for by the opposition on the cabinet was thus cast aside, there remained the vote of approbation contained in the paragraph proposed by the committee. Within this last entrenchment the opposition concentrated its efforts; it attempted to intimidate the majority on the bearing

and effect of a decided and explicit adhesion to this point. "If the Chamber," said M. Billault, "associates itself with such an act by an eulogy so complete, so precise as that which is proposed, the ministry may henceforward demand everything from it, and without fear of refusal, be the question what it may. I implore the Chamber to take the only attitude which seems to me becoming in this matter —silence; and, since it cannot do better, resignation."

"Do you understand," exclaimed M. Dumon, with animation, "what the honourable speaker who has just sat down proposes to the Chamber? It is, to have no policy, no opinion on the great affairs of the country—to abdicate entirely. None know better than we do the important part the Chamber has to act; but on what condition is it a political power? On condition of having always an opinion; of expressing and assuming, in all affairs, its share of responsibility. They say to you, 'You have refused to censure—refuse, at least, to commend!' Wh
then, would be the situation of the Ch
the country? A great questio
great measure adopted, a polic
asks the opinion of the Chambe
has no opinion! It has not con
approved. It will remain in
abstention. I solemnly adjure
deliver its opinion clearly, frankly
pendence, and without regard
ences with which it is threate
confirm or overthrow the poli

M. Odilon-Barrot's loyalty

the attempts at intimidation and counsels of abdication addressed to the Chamber by M. Billault. He accepted fully the question as stated by the cabinet; and when votes were taken on the approving paragraph, 213 adopted, while 205 rejected it.

This was not a sufficient triumph for the opposition: it was, however, a serious check to the ministry. Still in a minority, and in presence of a majority, irritated though enfeebled, the opposition was, unquestionably, not strong enough to take office, and must have called on the King to dissolve the Chamber; but the task of government became, for us, more difficult and precarious. We resolved not to accept the situation, and to let the weight fall back on those who had brought it on—the opposition by its violence, some members of the majority by their weakness. As soon as the report spread of our resolution to retire, a lively reaction, mingled with anger and uneasiness, manifested itself. Two



ys after the vote on the address, the conservative ties, to the number of 166, met, and 47 who tend forwarded their complete ermined to call on the cabinet remain in office and maintain its ng men of the majority, MM. rt, Salvandy, Bignon, Jacque- bastiani and Bugeaud, proposed eeting. A deputation waited, in its al Soult, and then on me, and desire. The King, sorrowful notionless. All comprehended e conservative party to raise

itself above this check, and testify its perseverance in our common policy. The trial was serious for the parliamentary system, but it was effectual. The resolution of the conservative party determined ours; the majority and the cabinet mutually gained strength by tightening the strings of their alliance; the Pritchard question returned to the shade from whence it ought never to have emerged, and the session resumed its course without disturbance.

When I say the Pritchard question returned to the shade, it is true as regarded the Chambers, but not the public; the impression excited by this affair, its first features, and the declamations to which it gave rise, remained, and probably still remain, on many minds. I know no instance of an impression more superficial and false. By the occupation of Otaheite we had deeply wounded the religious feeling of England, and given its preponderance in the South Seas an unpalatable blow. By the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Pritchard, we seemed to hold the quality of English citizen in little account, and had thus offended the national pride. Neither of these acts was necessary in itself nor commanded by our instructions. We had nevertheless maintained both by refusing all the satisfactions in principle claimed by the English government, and by according only, on account of certain inconsistencies committed by one of the French agents, the most moderate of all equivalents, an indemnity in money. As a right, it was difficult to refuse more and accord less. As a fact, it would have been absurd to compromise, for such a trifling cause and reparation, the good intelli-

gence, and perhaps the peace, of the two States. Both governments were justified in saying that it was "owing to their mutual spirit of equity and moderation that this danger had been warded off." They did more in this instance than remove a danger: in presence of French and English passions vehemently stirred up, the two cabinets, in their definitive resolution, held solely to those moral considerations which form the pledge and honour of civilization. A rare and difficult policy after the long reign of force, for nations then misinterpret its conditions, and revenge themselves on moderate and just governments, for the reverses and calamities brought upon them by violent and despotic rule.[1]

[1] If examples were necessary to prove the extent to which our conduct in this affair was natural and legitimate, I could cite one quite recent and of incontestable authority. In 1855, under circumstances and from motives far less serious than those which, in 1844, decided us to grant a pecuniary indemnity to Mr. Pritchard, the Republic of the United States of America did not hesitate to give the French Empire a more brilliant satisfaction. The Consul of France at San Francisco in California, M. Dillon, had been summoned to appear personally, as a witness, before the district court, in a prosecution instituted against the Consul of Mexico. He refused formally in virtue of a consular convention concluded on the 23rd of February, 1853, between France and the United States, declaring himself otherwise ready to give his evidence, verbally or in writing, to any magistrate appointed to receive it at his own dwelling. The judicial authorities of California at first admitted and subsequently denied the right claimed by the French Consul. An order for arrest was issued against him, and on the 25th of April, 1854, the marshal of the United States presented himself at the consulate, accompanied by armed agents, and proceeded to arrest M. Dillon, who, after protesting against this act of violence, followed him to the court, where he renewed his protest. The judge, after some observations, told

him he might retire; but M. Dillon strenuously insisted on his right, demanded reparation for having been illegally arrested, and took down his consular flag. After various incidents and a long discussion, the cabinet of Washington acknowledged officially the right claimed by the French Consul of refusing the injunction of the district court of San Francisco, and signified its regret at the outrage committed on their agent. The re-establishment of official relations between the consulate of France and the Federal authorities, followed this declaration. On the 30th of November, 1855, the American frigate *Independence*, commanded by Commodore Mervin, which had anchored opposite San Francisco the evening before, saluted with twenty-one guns the French flag floating on board the Imperial corvette *L'Embuscade*, commanded by M. Gizolme, captain of a frigate. The corvette having in turn saluted the American flag with the same number of guns, the French flag was immediately hoisted upon the consular residence, amidst cries of *Long live France! Long live the Consul!* repeated by the numerous French population who were present at the ceremony. Then the Consul of France, in his official uniform, advanced to the peristyle of the house, and addressed his countrymen in a speech received with similar applause. The affair thus terminated to the satisfaction of the two governments, who both acted rightly, the one in asking, the other in according just reparation for a violent and useless act.

CHAPTER III.

ALGERIA AND MOROCCO.

GENERAL BUGEAUD GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF ALGERIA.—HIS CHARACTER AND TWO PRINCIPAL IDEAS ON HIS MISSION.—DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THOSE IDEAS AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE CHAMBERS.—THE CABINET RESOLVES TO SUPPORT GENERAL BUGEAUD FIRMLY IN THE WORK OF COMPLETE FRENCH RULE OVER THE WHOLE OF ALGERIA.—CAMPAIGNS AND SUCCESS OF GENERAL BUGEAUD.—HIS OPINION OF ABD-EL-KADER.—HIS SUSCEPTIBILITY IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE MINISTRY OF WAR, THE CHAMBERS, AND THE JOURNALS.—HIS PAMPHLETS.—HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME.—HE IS MADE A MARSHAL.—ABD-EL-KADER FALLS BACK ON MOROCCO.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF MOROCCO, AND EMBARRASSMENT OF THE EMPEROR ABD-EL-RHAMAN.—INVASION OF THE TERRITORY OF ALGERIA.—OUR REMONSTRANCES WITH THE EMPEROR OF MOROCCO.—MY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONSUL-GENERAL OF FRANCE AT TANGIER.—THE PRINCE OF JOINVILLE IS APPOINTED COMMANDANT OF A SQUADRON ORDERED TO THE COASTS OF MOROCCO.—UNEASINESS OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.—SUSPICIONS OF SIR ROBERT PEEL.—SAGACITY AND LOYALTY OF LORD ABERDEEN.—HIS STEPS TO INDUCE THE EMPEROR OF MOROCCO TO YIELD TO OUR DEMANDS.—THEY FAIL OF SUCCESS: WAR IS DECLARED.—THE PRINCE OF JOINVILLE BOMBARDS TANGIER AND TAKES MOGADORE.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD ENGAGES AND ROUTS THE ARMY OF MOROCCO ON THE BANKS OF THE ISLY.—THE EMPEROR OF MOROCCO SUES FOR PEACE.—IT IS CONCLUDED AT TANGIER.—ITS CONDITIONS AND MOTIVES.—DEBATES IN THE CHAMBERS ON THIS SUBJECT.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLING THE FRONTIERS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO.—TREATY OF LALLA MAGHRANIA.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD EVINCES AN INCLINATION TO RETIRE.—ABD-EL-KADER RECOMMENCES THE WAR IN ALGERIA.—INCIDENT OF THE GROTTOES OF DAHRA.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD COMMENCES HIS PLAN OF MILITARY COLONIZATION.—THIS

PLAN IS ILL RECEIVED IN THE CHAMBERS, AND BY THE MINISTRY OF WAR.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD WISHES TO RETIRE.—HE ARRIVES IN FRANCE.—NEW AND GENERAL INSURRECTION IN ALGERIA.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD RETURNS AND SUBDUES THE INSURRECTION.—HE IS DISPOSED TO PURSUE ABD-EL-KADER TO MOROCCO.—I WRITE TO HIM ON THIS SUBJECT.—HE ABANDONS HIS INTENTION.—HE URGES HIS PLAN OF MILITARY COLONIZATION.—HIS LETTER TO THE KING DEMANDING IT.—PRESENTATION TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF A BILL CONFORMABLE TO HIS VIEWS.—UNFAVOURABLE RECEPTION OF THIS BILL.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD FORESEES ITS ILL SUCCESS.—HE IS ILL AND UNABLE TO COME TO PARIS.—THE COMMITTEE OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES PROPOSES THE REJECTION OF THE BILL.—THE GOVERNMENT WITHDRAWS IT.—MARSHAL BUGEAUD TENDERS HIS RESIGNATION.—THE DUKE OF AUMALE IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF ALGERIA.

(1841—1847.)

When, on the 29th of December, 1840, the King, at the suggestion of the cabinet, appointed General Bugeaud governor-general of Algeria, I did not conceal from myself the consequences of this choice, and the obligations, I add the difficulties, which it imposed on us. General Bugeaud was not an officer to whom we could give specific instructions, with the certainty that he would limit his ambition to their execution according to his best ability, and advance in his career by satisfying his chiefs. He was a man of original and independent mind, of fervent and fertile imagination, of ardent will, who thought for himself, and gave great weight to his own opinion while serving the power from which he held commission. Neither education nor study had, in developing, regulated his strong nature; thrown early into the rude trials of military service, and too late into the complicated scenes of political life, he had formed himself on his

personal observations and experience, according to the instincts of a bold, clear sense, which sometimes failed in restraint and tact, never in precision and power. He had, on all subjects, especially on the war and affairs of Algeria, his own ideas, plans, and resolutions; and not only did he pursue them in fact, but proclaimed them beforehand, at every opportunity, to all comers, in his conversation and correspondence, with a force of conviction and an energy of words which increased with contradiction or doubt: he thus engaged passionately, whether on his own side, or against those who differed from his views; so possessed by his own firm judgment and patriotic intention, that he failed to perceive the prejudices inspired by the intemperance of his language, and was unable to foresee the difficulties with which those prejudices would beset his steps, when called upon to act after having spoken so freely.

While he thus created, of his own accord, factitious difficulties, he fell into no illusion as to the natural obstacles of his mission and the extent of the means necessary to surmount them. That mind, which, in its exuberance and self-confidence, seemed sometimes chimerical, was remarkably exact and practical, severely careful in forming a correct estimate of obstacles to be encountered and forces required, concealing nothing from himself or others, without complaisance for the false ideas and vain hopes of the public or consideration for the embarrassments or weaknesses of his superiors. He was an agent thoroughly veracious and powerfully effective, but little accommodating, and who rudely mingled exi-

gence and independence. He was, moreover, suspicious, sensitive, and ready to believe that his services and his glory were undervalued. When the natural difficulties of his mission, or those he sometimes brought on himself, rendered him dissatisfied or uneasy—when he thought he had to complain of the King, the Minister of War, the Chambers, or the newspapers—he addressed himself to me to give vent to his annoyances and discontents, and to demand a remedy. It was not that there was perfect intimacy between us; our antecedents, our tastes, our habits of mind and life did not sufficiently resemble each other to unite us so closely; but he knew the high opinion I held of him, and reckoned on my good-will and readiness to support him in the council, in the Chambers, and before the public. He was, also, in general politics, an ardent conservative, impressed, above all things, with the conditions and necessities of order, and one of my most staunch adherents. "While I shall pursue the Emir in his retreat," he wrote to me, on the 18th of October, 1842, "you will be struggling to maintain your majority against inconstancy and inconsistency. You will find, with me, that it is as difficult to keep as to conquer; but you will fight with talent and firmness. I hope, as strongly as I wish, that you may triumph. You defend and support me, in an emergency; and you only do so from justice and kindly feeling for an old political friend in whom you have also confidence as a general. Unknown to yourself, you repay an old debt: how often have I defended you against the absurd prejudices of empty or passionate minds!"

At a later period, after four years of active campaigns and brilliant successes, having become marshal of France and Duke of Isly, he had, in a fit of ill temper, a temptation of personal prudence; he wanted to retire. I happened at that time to be recovering from a severe illness. He wrote to me as follows on the 30th of June, 1845:—"Before I touch on the immediate subject of my letter, I wish to speak of the anxiety your health has given me, on your own account, for us, and for the country. I did not write to you in complaisance or flattery; but I instructed M. Blondel, Director of Civil Services in Algeria, to call on you, and acquaint me with the progress of your illness. I also desired him to congratulate you on the happy result of the negotiation on the right of search. But what need have I of protestations? You know my old sentiments towards you; they could not be weakened on this double occasion. I rejoice to see you recovered, at the same time that you have obtained a treaty which deprives your adversaries of their strongest field of battle. This being said, I pass on to a less important matter, but which I am sure will engage your interest, as it concerns myself. Having always looked upon you as the principal author of the position which has enabled me to render some services to the country, I owe you an account of the resolution I have formed to retire from it." He then explained to me the motive for his determination, arising from personal discontent in his relations with Marshal Soult and the War Department, rather than from any serious sentiment of the difficulties of his situation

after his victories. But he soon abandoned his retiring inclinations; and some months after he had announced them, he wrote again to me, on the 18th of August, 1845:—"I arrived in my government of Algeria at a period closely resembling two epochs in your parliamentary life. When, after the Revolution of July, the ministry of the 11th of October, 1832, had consolidated the new monarchy, and driven back the tide of revolutionary passions, a party of its friends broke from their ranks, and wished to take possession of a situation that had become a good one. The same thing happened again after the formation and first successes of your ministry of the 29th of October, 1840. And now, as regards myself, having settled the great and leading questions, to wit, the system of war by which to conquer and reduce the Arabs to submission, and the question of ruling the country with security to Europeans; having placed colonization in train, quadrupled the European population, quintupled the revenues of the land, and increased the commerce tenfold; having completed great colonizing works, such as roads, bridges, tolls, buildings of every kind—having founded several towns and many villages—it is clear that I have run my course and am no longer good for anything. Unfortunately these attacks commenced in a journal subsidized by the Ministry of War, the editors of which live in the greatest intimacy with the offices for the direction of affairs in Algeria. This is one of the causes which induced me to demand a successor. The offices thus revenged themselves for the vexations I caused them in com-

bating the false measures proposed by the Marshal, Minister of War. It is probable that a powerful intrigue of envious and ambitious rivals has seized these threads to endeavour to demolish me. This is their own expression.

"I beg you to believe that the attacks of the ordinary press have not made, and will never make, any impression on me. I shall pursue my straight course as long as I am supported by the King's government. I shall be compensated for the abuse of the evil-minded by the general approbation of the army and population of Algeria. On the 6th or 7th of September, I shall be near Marshal Soult, at St. Amand. I shall discuss with him some of the principal questions. If we understand each other, as I hope we shall, after the friendly disposition he has evinced towards me for some time, I shall again embark in the roughest galley to which a simple mortal was ever condemned."

On re-entering, as governor-general, that galley on board which he had for several years lived and rowed, he brought to it, with a passionate conviction, two dominant ideas—the necessity of reducing the Arabs to submission throughout the whole extent of the ancient regency, and the equal necessity of military colonization to found and fertilize our establishment. This meant war throughout Algeria, with a powerful army to sustain it; and, after a successful war, still the army, for a long time, as principal actor in the bosom of peace.

Nothing was less in harmony with these ideas than the dispositions of the Chambers and the prejudices

of the public. Unquestionably we wished to remain in Algeria; but we also wished to restrain in that quarter the war, and the expenses of war. We looked upon the continual preponderance of the military system as injurious, and military colonization as impossible, both in itself, and on account of the enormous charges it would impose on the country. We were anxious to see Algeria enter into the laws and paths of civil colonization, the only condition the State could protect without payment and responsibility.

As to the necessity of completely subjugating the Arabs, and of extending French rule throughout the whole extent of Algeria, I agreed with the opinion of General Bugeaud; the question was no longer, as from 1830 to 1838, between restricted and enlarged occupation. The position of France in the north of Africa had changed; facts had developed themselves and brought their consequences; the effective conquest of all Algeria had become the condition of our establishment at Algiers and on the coast. Minds hostile to that establishment, and timid minds who still dreaded the expense, endeavoured to resist what they called a dangerous prepossession; but to those of firmer texture and more extended view, it appeared as a necessary result of the situation and a fact already accomplished. Thus are carried out the chief part of the eminent actions achieved for great nations by the hands of eminent men: it was the glory of General Bugeaud to comprehend forcibly the necessity of this, and to follow it up with impassioned perseverance. Under King Charles the Tenth, France took Algiers; under King Louis-Philippe, and by General Bugeaud,

she conquered Algeria. It was the merit of the cabinet to place General Bugeaud resolutely at the head of this work, to support him firmly there, and to furnish him, in spite of many difficulties and much resistance, with the means of its accomplishment.[1]

Called to-day to retrace and estimate the principal facts of the war of Algeria at that epoch, I have not wished to content myself with my personal reminiscences, necessarily superficial and incomplete; I have sought amongst the men who lived and served with Marshal Bugeaud a safe witness and competent judge. Marshal Bugeaud himself had already indicated him to me. On the 2nd of July, 1845, he wrote thus:—"You overwhelm me with satisfaction by telling me that Captain Trochu will have the first vacant step amongst the lieutenant-colonels of cavalry. If you knew him, you would be as much satisfied with him as I am; he has precisely the head and sentiments that you love. He is calculated to arrive at any height. I know no man in the army more distinguished than he is. Take care, then, I pray

[1] On the 1st of July, 1840, before the formation of the cabinet of the 29th of October of that year, and the appointment of General Bugeaud as governor-general of Algeria, our military forces in that quarter amounted to 64,057 men.

On the 1st of July, 1841, they reached 78,989 men, French troops, auxiliaries, and natives.

On the 1st of July, 1842, they reached	.....	82,281 men.
On the 1st of July, 1843	„	85,664 men.
On the 1st of July, 1844	„	90,562 men.
On the 1st of July, 1845	„	89,099 men.
On the 1st of July, 1846	„	107,688 men.
On the 1st of July, 1847	„	101,520 men.

of you, that the promise is fulfilled." It was so in fact; and General Trochu, at this day as high in the esteem as in the ranks of the army, has fully justified the opinion of his illustrious chief. From him I asked a characteristic summary of the ideas and proceedings of Marshal Bugeaud in the war of Algeria, and he has replied to my questions in such a clear and masterly manner that I shall be careful not to alter his words: I reproduce them here textually as a faithful portrait of the man and the operations they portray.

"The new Governor of Algeria," General Trochu wrote to me on the 8th of November last, "brought with him a force which did as much for the conquest as soldiers and money—a force entirely moral, which, in the hands of General Bugeaud, was the instrument of all the successes of his career. He never doubted; and he knew how to convey that sentiment to an army which a perpetual alternation of success and reverse, in an enterprise the object of which was still badly defined, had left in uncertainty.

"The lieutenants of Marshal Bugeaud, whose worth and services I do not think I disparage by making this declaration, were superior men, who had formed themselves in that war, and were already formed, for the greater part, when he assumed the direction of their efforts. Thus, what they did belongs to themselves individually; and the Marshal profited largely by it. There is not an old officer of the army of Africa who has not still present to his mind the intelligent and bold operations by which General de Lamoricière, in the winter campaign of

1841 and 1842, in the province of Oran, turning the wood which formed the principal seat of the personal influence and governmental power of Abd-el-Kader, made two-thirds of that province, in a few months, fall into our hands; and the audacious enterprises of General Changarnier in the province of Algiers, in the midst of which shines with such animated brilliancy the combat of *Oued-Fodda*, which will last in the military history of the country as one of those hazardous strokes success alone can justify, but wherein the general, officers, and soldiers, at cruel sacrifices, covered themselves with glory, and impressed a decisive impulse on the march of events. But the system of war in Africa had for its original point of departure a theory which belongs to Brigadier-General Bugeaud—a theory the application of which at the combat of Sikkak, on the 6th of July, 1836, at a time when his future lieutenants were still unknown or of slight reputation, had conferred on him a lofty and most legitimate notoriety.

"A French column, considerable from the valour of the officers and men, after laborious operations in the west of the province of Oran, found itself driven to the sea in the sandy delta formed by the mouths of the Tafna. It was surrounded by all the armed masses of the country, attacked daily in a position scarcely defensible, subjected to continual efforts and grievous sacrifices. Its moral and material condition approached disorder. The situation was serious. Government and popular opinion were moved by it. An immediate despatch of troops from the ports of the Mediterranean was resolved on. The command

was given to General Bugeaud. He disembarked at Tafna with a brigade, assembled round him all the officers present, and explained to them, with a clearness and firmness of views to which they were not accustomed, how he viewed the crisis, and intended to extricate himself from it. 'The Arabs,' he said, 'are brave, but not more so than you. You oppose your discipline and organization to their confused masses, which are the more easily thrown into disarray as they are more numerous. They are badly armed; you are excellently equipped. They have a scarcity of ammunition; you are well supplied. What, then, do you require to beat them? I will tell you, and show you at the same time that I bring you what you require. Adopt the sentiment of your incontestable superiority, and carry it with you to battle, so as to impress it on the minds of your adversaries. They look upon you as compromised, given up to despondency, reduced to the defensive without remedy or issue. Well; we are about to astonish them by an offensive movement so sudden, energetic, and unexpected, that by a moral revulsion, the effect of which is inevitable, trouble and uncertainty will oppress their spirits, and we shall strike a great blow which will overthrow them in their turn. But how, dragging with us so many guns and carriages in a mountainous difficult country, without roads, can we take the offensive against an enemy always assuming it up to this, unincumbered by a military train, and active to such an extent that you pronounce him unassailable? You must make yourselves as light as he is; you must get rid of those *impedimenta* which,

far from being a strength, are a permanent cause of weakness and danger. You are tied to their existence; you follow them painfully wherever they can pass; you never march against the enemy when opportunity offers; and all your time is occupied, all your efforts are exhausted, in defending your artillery and equipages, when the enemy, skilful in choosing the moment of your embarrassments, falls upon you. I tell you that I have ordered the embarkation of our field *matériel*, and its return to Oran. Our soldiers will carry more rations. A small reserve will be loaded on the horses and mules, with which we shall also organize the transport of our wounded and sick. With these means, summarily constituted, I promise to lead you instantly against the enemy, and to defeat him.'

"This order for the return of the field guns produced, upon the general's auditory, a marked effect of surprise and discontent. Announced by a general-in-chief, on his first essay in Algeria, to officers who were already, in great number, veterans in the war, claiming experience, and holding a powerful artillery as the chief strength and safeguard of the army at certain moments, it was extremely ill received. The senior commandant of a corps present, Colonel Combe, an officer under the Empire, an energetic man, on whom a glorious death under the walls of Constantine conferred, the next year, a well-deserved notoriety, stood forward as the organ of the general sentiment. In a reply perhaps too unrestrained, and not entirely divested of bitterness, he combated the views of General Bugeaud, giving him

to understand that his African inexperience alone could have induced him to adopt arrangements so notoriously compromising. He ridiculed, in covered words, the confidence which, when explaining his system of march and combat, the general had expressed of being able to turn the Arab masses and make prisoners, a result which, in fact, at that epoch, was considered extremely difficult, if not impossible.

" General Bugeaud was compelled to put an end to the discussion by the military argument, *Sic volo, sic jubeo;* and a few days afterwards replied to his contradictors by the victory of the Sikkak, decisive, complete, carried by attack, and which left in our hands a great number of prisoners, and resounded so triumphantly through Algeria and France. The system of the African war was established."

This was, in fact, the system which, from his arrival in Algiers as governor-general, and in his first as also in his following campaigns, General Bugeaud applied on a grand scale, and with as much dexterity as perseverance; he at once gave the war a character of bold initiative, of easy, unexpected movement, of prompt and indefatigable activity. He applied himself to pursue or anticipate, to attack, to conquer or baffle, on all points of the Arab territory, Abd-el-Kader, or rather the Arabian nation personified in its hero. " They fall into a strange error," he wrote to me on the 3rd of March, 1846, " when they say in the press, and even in the Chambers, that we are only engaged in combating a partizan leader, who carries with him seven or eight hundred horsemen. If we had only this little force to deal with, we should be

sadly degenerated to occupy ourselves with it so seriously. They forget that it is the entire Arab nation with which we are engaged, and that if we manœuvre with such activity to prevent Abd-el-Kader from penetrating into the interior of the country, or at least from establishing himself there, it is that he may not set in a blaze the magazines of powder heaped up behind us, or have time to organize or consolidate any plans. We know the immense prestige he exercises over the Arabs by his genius, his eminently religious character, and the effect of a ten years' reign. Nothing is more false than to compare him to an ordinary chief of partizans thrown on the flanks or rear of an army to intercept convoys, isolated detachments, despatches, to burn stores, to take or destroy all that an army leaves behind it on an advance. Such a chief must have great military qualities, but he need not be a politician; his sudden strokes in war are to be feared, and not his political influence. The military actions of Abd-el-Kader are his least formidable achievements. His power over the tribes is wonderful: no one can resist him; as soon as he presents himself all the warriors take their arms and follow him; even his presence is not always necessary. Has he not excited to revolt the whole province of Oran and the west of that of Algiers by his letters, his emissaries, and the exaggerated report of his successes at Ghazaouat and Aïn-Temouchen? Has he not already, from a still greater distance, thrown the ferment of agitation on various points of the province of Constantine? Abd-el-Kader is not a partizan; he is a lawful pretender by all the services

he has rendered to the Arabian nationality and religion; he is a prince who has reigned ten years, and aspires to conquer a throne, assured, as he is, of the passionate love of all his old subjects."

It was by the light of this just and great idea that, from 1841 to 1847, and in seventeen campaigns skilfully combined, without reckoning isolated incidents, Marshal Bugeaud prosecuted and accomplished the general submission of the Arabs, and the definitive conquest of Algeria. Two important facts were still wanting to that conquest when he quitted the government: Abd-el-Kader still wandered and warred in Algeria; and even in the province of Algiers the great tribe of the Kabyly preserved its independence. It was under the government of the Duke of Aumale that Abd-el-Kader renounced the struggle; and it was Marshal Randon who, in his long and wise administration of the country, had the honour of undertaking, accomplishing, and consolidating the submission of the Grand Kabyly to France. But both these able successors of Marshal Bugeaud would, I am confident, be the first to recognize that it is to him that France owes the entire and strong possession of Algeria. For seven years he filled that vast theatre with his presence and his name, powerful in acts and words, varying his measures in war with as much ingenious invention as practical judgment, exposing himself personally without appearing to think of it, and, with courage as simple as commanding, inspiring his troops with a conviction that he loved and took the greatest care of them at the moment when he required the severest efforts; displaying, in fact, with

the full authority of the general, all the qualities of the soldier.

I select here and there, in his correspondence with me, some of the traits which manifest his mode of action and character. On the 18th of October, 1842, he wrote to me:—"I have just ended prematurely, on account of the heavy rains, a campaign in the east, against Ben-Salem, fifth *kalifat* (lieutenant) of Abd-el-Kader. I think I have nearly destroyed his power. I have taken from him all that was good or profitable in his government. There remain to him only some Kabyle tribes, over which he still exercises a slight degree of credit. This expedition would be amongst the most successful if I had not lost one of my best officers, Colonel Leblond. Abd-el-Kader, like a man of courage and talent, struggles against his ill-fortune with remarkable energy. He writes from all sides, calling upon them to take up arms, or, at least, to keep up the sacred fire. At any point, where he sees the hope of re-establishing a centre of resistance, he rushes to it with his handful of gallant cavaliers, and sometimes collects twelve or fifteen hundred men. He still has at disposal, it is said, a sum of two or three millions, and seems desirous of establishing himself, for the winter, in the mountains of Ouad-Serris, between the Chélif and the Mina. I am endeavouring to throw a bridge over that dangerous river, that the column of Mostaganem may pass it to protect the submissive tribes on the right bank, and also to attack the Emir in his fastness, after the heavy rains. In all cases, I shall, in the spring, confine him within that mountainous ridge, with three columns, and I

expect in fifteen days to deprive him of this refuge, with his reserve of 20,000 Kabyle infantry."

A year later, on the 27th of October, 1843, he wrote:—"You follow without doubt the different phases of our affairs in Africa, and you see that all the country which obeyed Abd-el-Kader is subdued, with the exception of a very narrow belt to the south and south-west of Mascara, where that leader still resists with courage, talent, and perseverance, with the wrecks of his army and the horsemen of two or three tribes. After to-morrow I depart for Mascara, to finish with this more than Jugurtha; but I fear the want of forage for the cavalry will render this impossible before the spring. The war must modify itself according to circumstances; to-day we must take measures to strike our enemy at a distance; I am, therefore, endeavouring to procure the transport necessary to carry two battalions of infantry which will march to the support of my cavalry. In 1841, we proportioned the means of Europe to the circumstances of Africa at that time; we made ourselves light and offensive; but our columns were composed of four or five thousand men, because our adversary could still collect, on different points, twelve, fifteen, or twenty thousand. He could no longer do this in 1842, and we therefore subdivided our forces to strike the enemy and his interests on more extended surfaces. In 1843, the war became, in the open country, a question of speed, and we acted therefore with columns of mounted infantry. We are still in the infancy of that system; our means of transport are deficient; I am labouring to collect such as cost the state nothing, and

I have already a portion. I am making trials of the best equipment for mules and camels to enable them to carry a foot soldier and rations for fifteen or twenty days. I shall use the utmost efforts to be ready by the approaching spring. Then, if Abd-el-Kader is not extinct, I will give him an extraordinary chase. His tents and those of his partizans must be very distant if I do not reach them. You will, perhaps, say that I speak to you of war only. It is because active war carries everything along with it. You would adopt this opinion if you could see the swarm of Europeans in motion, and of every imaginable quality, from Algiers to Milianah and Médéah, from Tenez to Orleansville, from Mostaganem to Mascara, from Oran to Tlemcen. The first agents of colonization and progress are the supremacy and security they produce. What could be effected when it was impossible to advance a league from our forts on the coast without a strong escort? You could neither travel nor remove more than two or three times in a month. Now, you may do either at all hours, by day and night, singly and without arms. Thus, movement corresponds to confidence; men and capitalists have ceased to be timid; buildings multiply; commerce prospers; our revenues on the coast increase, and the Arab impost, despite the devastations of war, will yield this year more than two millions. This is what has been done by a government so feeble and contemptible in foreign eyes. It subdues a people powerful in numbers, and still more formidable from its warlike habits, from its soil broken and without roads, its climate, its social and agricultural constitution, its mobility which arises

from the absence of all heritable property, and finally, from its religious fanaticism and the total dissimilarity between its manners and ours. Not only does it subdue this people, but it introduces into its bosom a new population, for whose benefit a portion of the land is appropriated, with a menace that more will be taken every day. These are, as I think, facts to oppose to the insolent declamations of our adversaries. The plough cannot march, as the journalists would wish, abreast with the sword; the latter must move on rapidly, and colonization is slow in its nature: it advances, I believe, is as quickly as possible with the means as yet at our disposal; it may accelerate its pace now, when the army will be less occupied with the war, and the army alone, with its numerous hands and at a trifling cost, can give it an effective impulse. . . . . Meanwhile, we shall labour to complete the old establishments and to found new ones, such as Orleansville, Tenez, Tiaret, Bogaur, and Teniet-el-Had. Already, on these different points, progress has been considerable. Orleansville and Tenez assume the aspect of towns. Civil population flows thither quicker than I wish, for I should prefer those places for military colonists. I have no desire to sow weakness where we require strength."

In the midst of so much activity and success in Algeria, General Bugeaud preoccupied himself, with passionate solicitude, with what was said in Paris of his operations, his projects, and his army; he fancied himself engaged at the same time in two fields of action—that of public discussion in the tribune or the press of France, and also in that of the African

war; and, on all occasions, he wished to be in presence and do battle with both. In the spring of 1842 he fancied he saw in the journals, in the debates in the Chambers, and even in the correspondence of the Ministry of War, an intention of reducing the effective force in Algeria: not content with addressing his observations to the King's government on this subject, he even appealed to the public in an animated pamphlet, denouncing any step of the kind. Marshal Soult was justly offended at this public and anticipated opposition to a presumed design, and signified his displeasure to General Bugeaud. To soften the effect of this reprimand, while indicating to him my own idea, I wrote on my own part thus:[1]—"You complain of me, and with some reason. Nevertheless, I am not without excuse. I have a great dislike to empty words. I had nothing important, nothing practical, to say to you. I venture to believe you reckon on me, at a distance as well as near, whether I speak or am silent. I have therefore not written to you. I enjoyed your successes, which I expected, because I had confidence in you. I have supported you in the council and elsewhere, on every occasion that presented itself. I have worked with some result to carry on the only policy which can sustain you and you can sustain. These, my dear general, are tokens of friendship; rest assured that you have acquired mine, that I shall always preserve it towards you, and be delighted to give you proofs. You are entrusted with a great work, and you are succeeding in it. This

[1] On the 20th of September, 1842.

is glory. You love it, and you are in the right. There are only two things in this world worth the trouble of desiring—domestic happiness and glory. You have both. The public begin to be convinced that they must rely on you for Africa, and give you what you require to accomplish the work you have commenced. I have just read what you have written; it is conclusive. In your place, I know not whether I should have written. Action has more authority than words; but your arguments rest on your acts. I shall use them in the approaching session. Between this and then complete the settlement and security of military rule. We will then occupy ourselves with the territorial establishment. I am as much impressed as you are with the necessity of acting in Africa during the peace of Europe; Africa is the business of our leisure."

He replied, on the 18th of October, 1842:—"Yes, I reckon on you at a distance as well as near, whether you write or keep silence, and I am proud of the friendship of which you give me assurance. 'In your place,' you say, 'I know not whether I should have written; action has more authority than words.' I did not write to aggrandize my actions, of which I said not a syllable; I wrote especially to combat an idea manifested in the tribune, in the journals, in private conversations, in letters, and, above all, in the correspondence of the Ministry of War—the reduction of the army of Africa. The Marshal Minister of War has blamed this publication. Had he a right to do so, according to precedents? You will judge by the answer I made him, and of which I herewith send you

a copy. But suppose I was reprehensible, was it necessary to admonish me in the newspapers? I have been seriously annoyed by an article on this subject in the Parisian *Moniteur*. I do not believe I have failed either in discipline or propriety, and I flatter myself that no general-in-chief two hundred leagues from home was ever more strictly subordinate than I am."

The susceptibilities of the general were not better understood and humoured in Paris than he understood and humoured those of his superiors. Towards the end of April, 1843, I received from him the following letter:—"On a first impulse I wrote the enclosed to the Minister of War. Reflection has determined me not to send it. But to relieve my oppressed soul, and my justly wounded pride, I wish to communicate it to you. If anything could console me, it would be the thought that they must entertain a very high opinion of my devotion and self-denial when they substitute for a *promised* recompense a riband which has been given, for the most trifling services, to men who have merely appeared in Africa, without shining there."

Some months before, he had been led to hope, in fact I may say he had been promised, the staff of a marshal of France, and they gave him instead the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, postponing the higher reward of his successes "to another occasion." Although he had not forwarded to the Minister of War the letter a copy of which he transmitted to me, his discontent became known, and the authorities hastened to dissipate it. Three months after, on the 31st of July, 1843, he was made marshal; but from

a strange awkwardness of language, or a haughty incivility, the Minister of War, in announcing his approaching promotion to that rank, added, "His Majesty, however, adds a condition, in the interest of the public service and your own glory; it is, that you continue to exercise your double functions of governor-general and commander-in-chief for another year; and that during that interval you renounce your project of returning to France, even on leave, so that the supreme direction of the war and government may remain in your hands for a sufficient time to enable you to complete what you have so skilfully commenced."

The true motive of the reserve thus expressed, was the highly judicious and legitimate intention of giving the Duke of Aumale time to prepare himself for the general government of Algeria, and to show his capability. Nothing was more easy than to come to a suitable understanding with General Bugeaud on this point, and to induce him to accept graciously this prospective arrangement. He entertained a serious and sincere devotion for constitutional monarchy and the reigning family; but the word *condition* offended him deeply. "I believe it is the first time," he wrote to me, "that such a thing has been done. You will judge yourself whether my susceptibility is exaggerated. I send you a copy of the passage in Marshal Soult's letter, and of the answer I have returned." His reply was dignified and bitter. People seldom calculate the difficulties added to matters of business by a want of tact and delicacy in the manner of transacting them.

An opportunity soon presented itself to Marshal Bugeaud of proving how well he merited the exalted rank to which he had been raised. During the spring of 1844 Abd-el-Kader had been hunted and vanquished throughout the interior of Algeria; the greater part of the tribes, decimated and discouraged, abandoned, or only supported him secretly and with hesitation. The surprise and capture of his *smahla*[1] on the 16th of May, 1843, by the Duke of Aumale, had given his prestige, even amongst the Arabs, a severe blow; our multiplied expeditions in the least accessible districts of the regency, from the defiles of Jurjura to the frontiers of the Great Desert, the permanent occupation of Biskara and other important points, had spread everywhere the conviction of our superior force and firm resolution to establish our empire in all quarters. It might be said that the conquest was accomplished. But Abd-el-Kader was one of those men who never renounce hope or resistance; he had established himself to the west of the province of Oran, on the doubtful frontier of Morocco, and from thence incessantly carried on or recommenced the war. At one time he made sudden incursions in the Regency with his wandering bands; at another he inflamed the natural fanaticism of the Morochian populations, and carried them against us, in his train, finding always amongst them a certain refuge. He

[1] *Smahla* means the military and domestic establishment of the Emir combined, including his wives, herds, and followers of every kind. *Deira*, which occurs subsequently, implies his military household alone.

acted powerfully upon the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman, alternately inducing him to participate in his Mohammedan passions, and terrifying him both on our account and on that of his own subjects. He raised between that prince and us a question of possession as to the territories situated between the course of the Tafna and the frontier of Morocco. We victoriously repulsed the incursions; we inflicted severe chastisement on the aggressive tribes; we remonstrated strongly with the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman against these continual violations of peace between the two states; we demonstrated, with evidence, the old right of possession by the Turks, and, consequently, by us of the disputed territories; but our remonstrances, demands, and victories produced no effect; the Emperor was unable to enforce obedience, even when sufficiently in awe of us to desire it; we were in presence of a fanatical population and an anarchical government, both at the service or under the yoke of an inveterate enemy. At no cost could we suffer or accept such a situation.

It exploded spontaneously, and in a manner to dissipate all doubt, if any could have existed. On the 30th of May, 1844, a numerous body of Morochian horsemen, issuing from Ouschda, the first town of Morocco to the west of the province of Oran, entered our territory, and advanced, with loud shouts, to attack General de Lamoricière in his camp at Lalla-Maghrania, two leagues within our boundary. The general repulsed them vigorously, pursued them to the frontier, and in forwarding an account, the same evening, of this incident to Marshal Bugeaud, said: "According to

two prisoners saved from the sabres of our light cavalry, the cause of this sudden movement is as follows:—A personage allied to the imperial family, named Sidi-el-Mamoun-ben-Cheriff, arrived this morning at Ouschda, with a contingent of five hundred Berbères, sent from Fez by the son of Muley Abd-el-Rhaman, to join the troop of observation assembled in our front. Sidi-el-Mamoun, carried away by ardent enthusiasm, declared that he would at least have a close view of the Christian camp. They put themselves in march despite the resistance and remonstrances of the Cadi of Ouschda, El Ghennaouin, who, while waiting the orders of the Emperor, dared not oppose a formal refusal to a prince of the imperial house. The want of discipline of the Berbères and the fanaticism of the negro troops increased in our presence, and hostilities began. Let the truth of these accounts be what it may, war has commenced in fact; the actions about to follow will show the extent to which they desire to push it. There can be no doubt that Abd-el-Kader will endeavour to turn it to his advantage."

Marshal Bugeaud immediately reported this fact to Marshal Soult, and also lost no time in acquainting our consul-general at Tangiers, M. de Nion, chargé d'affaires at the court of the Emperor of Morocco. "For several days," he wrote to him, "we were provoked by menaces and excitements addressed to our tribes to urge them to revolt; we have had in our hands a letter from the Cadi of Ouschda to one of our cadis, in which he invites him to hold himself ready for the war they are going to make on the Christians.

'When the moment for striking arrives,' he says, 'we will apprise you, and provide you with all you may require; in the meantime, endeavour to procure arms and cartridges.' Marshal Bugeaud added: 'It is impossible to show more moderation than General de Lamoricière has done. I go to join him the day after to-morrow; I intend, on my arrival, to demand serious explanations from the Morochian chiefs. If their intentions are such as may lead me to the hope of returning to a state of peace, I shall take advantage of the outrage they have committed by attacking us without any previous declaration, to obtain a convention which, while settling our frontier, will establish in a precise form our relations as friendly neighbours. The principal bases of this convention will be—1. The exact limitation of the frontier; 2. That the two countries mutually agree not to receive populations who may wish to emigrate from one to the other; 3. That his Majesty the Emperor of Morocco engages not to afford any assistance in men, money, or munitions of war to the Emir Abd-el-Kader. If the latter is driven into the states of Morocco, the Emperor must cause him to be confined, with his troop, in the west of the empire, where he will be carefully guarded. On these conditions, friendship may exist between the two countries. If, on the other hand, the Morochians desire war, my pressing demands will force them to declare it. We shall no longer be in this equivocal position which may excite great embarrassments in Algeria. I prefer open hostilities on the frontier to a war of conspiracy and insurrection behind me. If war it must be, I shall carry it on with vigour, for I have good

soldiers, and, on the first outbreak, the enemy will see me in their territory. I confess to you that if I had been in the place of General de Lamoricière, I should not have been so moderate, and would have pursued the assailants sword in hand, to Ouschda. Perhaps the general has done better in abstaining from this. The consequences will decide."

General de Lamoricière did well in not engaging further, and by leaving entirely to the King's government the question of peace or war, and the conduct of the negotiation which would lead to one of those results. We judged, in our turn, that the moment had arrived for taking, in this view, a definitive resolution. By the unanimous advice of his council, the King determined that a formal demand should be addressed to the Emperor of Morocco of reparation for the recent inroad on our territory, and of a specific engagement that he would take steps to secure Algeria from the secret practices of Abd-el-Kader and his partizans, whether Arabs or Morochians. It was resolved at the same time that the necessary reinforcements in case of war should be despatched to Marshal Bugeaud, and that a squadron, commanded by the Prince of Joinville, should cruise upon the coasts of Morocco, to give the negotiation the moral support of his presence, and if necessary, the co-operation of his force. I addressed, in consequence, the following instructions to our consul-general at Tangiers :—

"*Paris, June* 12, 1844.

"SIR,—The despatches of General de Lamoricière, dated the 30th of May, announce to us that on

that same day he was attacked, within our frontier, by a body of from twelve to fourteen hundred Morochian horsemen, and five or six hundred Arabs, but that this aggression was severely chastised. As it took place without provocation on our part, and in the absence of any declaration of war, we are inclined to consider it as a simple accident, and not as indicative of a decided rupture authorized by the Emperor of Morocco. But we are justified in complaining of it as a signal violation of the law of nations, and of the treaties in virtue of which we are at peace with that empire. You will, therefore, on receipt of this despatch, write immediately to the Emperor of Morocco, and address to him the most explicit representations on the subject of an attack which cannot be justified, and demand the satisfaction due to us, particularly the recall of the Morochian troops assembled in the environs of Ouschda; and, at the same time, you will require him to explain his intentions. Does he wish peace or war? If, as his true interests advise, he desires to live in good relations with us, he must cease those armaments which are a menace to Algeria, respect neutrality by withdrawing all support from Abd-el-Kader, and issue prompt and stringent orders to prevent a recurrence of what has happened. If he wants war, we are far from desiring it; we should even sincerely regret the alternative; but we do not fear it, and, if we are compelled to fight, they will find us ready to do so vigorously, with the confidence that justice brings, and in a manner to make the aggressors repent. Meanwhile, we only ask, I repeat, to live on good terms with the Emperor of

Morocco, and we firmly believe he is not less interested in maintaining the same with us.

"I have already informed you that men-of-war of the royal navy are ordered to cruise upon the coasts of Morocco; a squadron commanded by the Prince of Joinville, consisting of the ship-of-the-line *Suffren*, the steam frigate *Asmodeus*, and another steamer, will repair at once to Oran, where his Royal Highness will place himself in communication with Marshal Bugeaud. The Prince will also have occasion to communicate with you, and I do not doubt your readiness to place yourself at his disposition, and to render him all the co-operation in your power. But the instructions of his Royal Highness are pacific, and start from the point that war between France and Morocco is not declared. His presence on the coasts of that empire, at the head of naval forces, has for its object to impose and restrain rather than to menace. We wish to believe that, with this view, it will have a salutary effect.

"I here recapitulate your instructions. You will demand of the Emperor of Morocco—

"1. A disavowal of the incomprehensible aggression made by his subjects on our territory;

"2. The disbandment of the body of Morochian troops assembled at Ouschda and on our frontiers;

"3. The dismissal of the Cadi of Ouschda, and of the other agents who have urged the aggression;

"4. The removal of Abd-el-Kader from the territory of Morocco.

"You will close by repeating—

"1. That we have absolutely no intention of

taking an inch of Morochian territory, and that we desire to live in peace and good relations with the Emperor;

"2. But that we shall not suffer Morocco to become an inviolable retreat for Abd-el-Kader, from whence may emanate similar aggressions to that which has recently occurred; and if the Emperor does not take proper steps to prevent them, we shall enforce signal justice for ourselves."

Instructions coinciding with these were forwarded by the Minister of Marine to the Prince of Joinville, by the Minister of War to Marshal Bugeaud; and all necessary measures for their competent execution, if requisite, were vigorously hastened.

This intelligence excited lively emotion in London, with the government more perhaps than with the public. England had extensive commercial relations with Morocco; from Tangiers, Gibraltar derived the greater part of its supplies; and the security of the Morochian fortress was considered important to the English stronghold. At the first moment, a general impression sprang up in England that the same course of events would follow which had taken place in Algeria, and that war between France and Morocco would be the first step towards French conquest. The prospect of such an issue became, on the other side of the Channel, a subject of uneasiness, which Sir Robert Peel, the head of the cabinet, shared as strongly as the most suspicious spectator. The appointment of the Prince of Joinville to the command of the squadron aggravated the sensation. He

had published, a short time before, a "Note on the Naval Forces of France," which attracted much attention in England; and this act of French patriotism was taken, beyond the Channel, as an indication of hostility. Popular suspicions are the most obstinate of blindnesses.

These latter were very ill founded. As we were determined not to suffer Morocco to disturb Algeria indefinitely, we were equally removed from any views of conquest in Morocco. Nothing could have been more opposed to sound judgment and French interests. The possession and colonization of Algeria were already a heavy burden for France, and a sufficiently extended perspective. Our policy, in this conjuncture, admitted the most complete frankness, and I took pleasure in proclaiming it, certain of being understood by Lord Aberdeen, and of finding in him the same sincerity. I wrote thus to Count de Sainte-Aulaire, on the 15th and 17th of June, 1844:—

"Be well assured that if we have war with Morocco it will be because we are forced to it—strongly and duly forced. In no part of Africa do we seek more quarrels or possessions. Before 1830, the territory disputed with us to-day formed a part of the Regency of Algiers; the natives acknowledged the sovereignty of the Dey, and paid him tribute through the medium of the Bey of Oran, who sent Turks, at certain fixed periods, to levy it. We have long occupied this territory without objection or contest, either on the part of the inhabitants or the Morochians. It is Abd-el-Kader who, in recent times, has sought and found

this pretext, to excite and compromise the Emperor of Morocco against us. To speak truly, it is not the Emperor, but Abd-el-Kader, with whom we have to deal. At first he sheltered himself as a suppliant, and then assumed the master in this province of Ouschda. He has, without much trouble, won over the minds of the populations; he preaches to them daily; he animates Arabian patriotism and Mohammedan fanaticism; he controls the local authorities, threatens, intimidates, persuades the Emperor, and acts from thence, as from an inviolable fortress, to renew incessantly the war against us which he can no longer sustain in his own territory. Jugurtha was not, I assure you, more skilful, bold, and persevering; and if there is a Sallust in our days, the history of Abd-el-Kader deserves to be written by him. But in rendering this man justice, we cannot accept the situation he has taken and made for us on that frontier. The question is not here of a new position, of a hostile fantasy seizing the Emperor of Morocco for the first time, and of which we might be blamable for complaining so promptly and severely. Nearly two years has this state of things lasted, and we have shown ourselves overflowing with moderation and patience. We have rigorously abstained from all reprisals; we have made every possible remonstrance; we have employed the amicable and the menacing tone; we have sent ships of war to cruise before Tangiers, Tetuan, &c., to disturb and intimidate. We have obtained disavowals, promises, postponements, and sometimes appearances. At the end, things remain as they were.

To speak more correctly, they are ever in a state of aggravation. For six weeks a holy war has been preached throughout Morocco; the populations are rising and arming in all directions; the Emperor has reviews at Fez; his troops collect on our frontier; they have recently attacked our territory. This is intolerable. It is not enough for the Emperor of Morocco to renounce, for the moment, his hostile demonstrations, and give us empty assurances of peace; he must suppress the causes of this smothered war, incessantly brooding and breaking out on our frontier: there must be no more concentrations of troops; Abd-el-Kader must be banished, and a fixed boundary arranged and accepted between the two states. This is the end we absolutely require and have a right to attain. To accomplish this, Morocco must be strongly intimidated. This is the only mode of acting upon the Emperor if he participates in the fanaticism of his people, or of strengthening him against that fanaticism if, as I believe, Muley Abd-el-Rhaman desires no better than to continue at peace with us, and seriously dreads Abd-el-Kader. The more the demonstration which has become indispensable is strong and menacing, the more certainly will it produce the effect we look for. The presence of one of the King's sons will aid much more than injure it, for it will prove the importance we attach to the affair, and our determination to make it successful. The Prince of Joinville leaves to-morrow, or the day after, to take the command of the squadron. When there is serious occupation to give to young and capable princes, it should be given to them; it is

only when idle that they indulge in fancies. I have conversed freely on the subject with the Prince of Joinville. He thoroughly comprehends his mission, and will do all that depends on himself to render a simple demonstration at the same time effective and sufficient. We shall give him, from the opening, a force sufficient to act upon imaginations, or to strike a prompt and decisive blow should there be a necessity for action—perhaps three men-of-war, and as many steamers. You are now, my dear friend, fully apprised of the state of things; let Lord Aberdeen be equally well informed. He has written to Lord Cowley to say that he would willingly be guarantee with the Emperor of Morocco for the honesty of our intentions and declarations. I thank him for this, and rely in every instance on his full confidence; but he is not ignorant that absurd suspicions are abroad in all quarters, and that I also am sometimes called upon to vouch for his sincerity. In presence of these blind mistrusts, our best course is, I think, to communicate mutually without reserve. I shall never fail to do this, and Lord Aberdeen will, I hope, reciprocate the same candour."

I was not deceived in my expectation. Lord Aberdeen comprehended and admitted, with clear-sighted equity, our necessity and our design. He had the more merit, as, in consequence of the disagreements between Sir Robert Peel and his own party, on the question of free trade, the English cabinet was at that time in one of those parliamentary crises which, two years later, brought on its fall. He might have been tempted to elude delicate questions of foreign policy.

Lord Aberdeen did not hesitate to accept that which now presented itself. "I saw him yesterday," M. de Sainte-Aulaire wrote to me on the 17th of June, 1844; "he told me that he should immediately send an order to the English consul at Tangiers, Mr. Drummond Hay, to demand a personal interview with Abd-el-Rhaman, and to use all the means in his power to prevent war. Mr. Drummond Hay will declare to the Emperor that the English government engages its moral responsibility in this question; and either by expostulations or menaces he will endeavour to bring him to a just appreciation of the good conduct to be held towards us. 'If I were dying,' added Lord Aberdeen, 'I should wish to die as a good Christian, and this would be the last act of my ministry.' He then read to me the instructions forwarded on Sunday to Mr. Drummond Hay, and which Lord Cowley has orders to communicate to you." These instructions were positive, and strongly urged the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman to give us the satisfaction we required. Lord Aberdeen wrote at the same time to the Lords Commissioners of the English Admiralty:[1]—"With reference to my letter of the 2nd of this month, relative to the reinforcements destined for her Majesty's squadron before Gibraltar, I have to acquaint your Lordships that the Queen has ordered instructions to be forwarded to the officer commanding that squadron, prescribing to him the necessity of taking ample care to make known to the authorities of Morocco that in sending these forces

[1] On the 10th of July, 1844.

to their coasts, her Majesty's government has no intention of affording any aid to the government of the Emperor in his resistance to the just and moderate demands of France, if, unfortunately, that resistance has taken place. In order to avoid any misunderstanding on this point, the officer commanding must explain clearly that the protection of English interests is the sole object of the squadron; but her Majesty's government would see with pleasure the employment of any influence whatever in support of the reasonable propositions set forward by the French authorities to terminate the differences that have arisen between France and Morocco." "Lord Aberdeen has no doubt," M. de Sainte-Aulaire added, "that the mission of his consul will lead to a happy result if no circumstance of our raising interferes to thwart it; but he looks upon the arrival of the Prince of Joinville on the coast of Morocco as extremely inopportune. I have combated his opinion to the utmost, by the reasons you lay down with so much force and authority in your letter of the day before yesterday. I have sent the letter to Lord Aberceen, that he may read it at his leisure."

The anxieties of Lord Aberdeen would have been soon dissipated if, with my letter, he could also have read that which the Prince of Joinville himself, who had arrived with his squadron in the Bay of Gibraltar, addressed to the Minister of Marine, on the 10th of July, 1844. "Having left Oran on the morning of the 7th," he said, "at the same time with the squadron, I removed my flag to the *Pluto*, steering directly for Gibraltar. I anchored there on the 8th,

in the evening. On the 9th, I repaired to Tangiers, where I received on board the visit of our consul-general. Having written to complain of the aggression of the 30th of May, M. de Nion has received from Sidi-ben-Dris, first minister of the Emperor of Morocco, an arrogant and offensive answer, in which all the wrongs are retorted upon our generals, of whom he demands that a severe example should be made. His letter terminates by menaces. 'The terrible clamour of an entire nation calls for a holy war. Reinforcements are being sent to the frontiers.' This letter, written on the 22nd of June, was received on the 7th of July. Yesterday, the 9th, a new despatch arrived from Bousclam-ben-Ali, Pacha of Larache, written on the 7th of July, 1844. This despatch, totally different from that of Sidi-ben-Dris, expresses the regret of the Emperor, who is now better informed as to the facts which lately occurred on the frontier, by the Cadi El-Ghennaouin. The Emperor disavows them, promises to remove the chiefs who have deceived his confidence, and throws back on the irregular contingents the acts of hostility. The letter is couched in moderate terms.

"In the midst of this conflict of contradictory intelligence and uncertain information, it is difficult to disentangle the truth. That they are preparing for war throughout Morocco, is a fact beyond doubt; that the Emperor wishes to prevent war, may be supposed; but that he can restrain the immense movement of fanatic populations is, at least, uncertain. His interest requires it; but as we find it extremely difficult to ascertain the truth as to what passes in

his empire, he may be deceived as to our intentions, and be induced, by perfidious counsels, to believe that we seek to overthrow his authority.

"On the one hand, the result of the mission to Morocco of Mr. Hay, consul-general of England, and on the other, the facts passing on our own frontier, seem to me the only exact data on which we can found an opinion. We may doubt the authenticity of all the diplomatic communications. Perhaps they are merely a mode of gaining time to prepare more effectually for war. . . . Morocco is not a country in which the action of the government is instantaneous; the care of pacifying minds must be left to time. All that may be done, by way of demonstration or menace, by land or sea, will only tend to aid the projects of our enemies. . . . . For myself, unless Marshal Bugeaud, driven to extremity, declares war, or contrary orders reach me from the government, I have decided not to appear on the coasts of Morocco. I shall so manage that they may know I am in the neighbourhood, ready to act if the madness of the Morochians compels it; but I shall avoid giving, by my presence, fresh aliment to the excitement of the public mind.

"One case alone would, however, incline me to lay aside these considerations—that of the arrival of an English squadron on the coasts of Morocco. This squadron is said to be stronger than mine; if it confines itself, as we do, to acting, from Gibraltar, the part of observation only, nothing can be better; but if it proceeds to the coasts of Morocco, I shall do the same on the instant. In the interest of our dignity, as

also in that of the influence we have a right to exercise on the states contiguous to our possessions in Africa, it is essential that this affair of Morocco should not be conducted under the guns of a foreign squadron."

Neither the moderation nor the loyalty of France and England sufficed to arrest the course of events; the measure of Morochian fanaticism and of our patience had reached their full height. The Prince of Joinville waited in vain for the efforts of the English consul to determine the Emperor of Morocco to give us the satisfaction we demanded. Marshal Bugeaud paused twice, and fruitlessly, after having chastised the incursions of the Morochians on our territory. Although the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman had an impression of the danger of war, he was too ignorant to appreciate its gravity, and too weak to resist the passion of his people. Mr. Drummond Hay obtained no distinct answer from him, and the hostile forces assembled in the province of Ouschda increased from day to day. By land and sea, war was inevitable, and the only method of settling the questions which had excited it. Determined by these facts, and by my instructions of the 6th of August, 1844, the Prince of Joinville, with as much boldness in the execution as he had evinced patience in forming the resolution, attacked Tangiers, silenced the fire of the place, and destroyed the fortifications. On the 14th of August, Marshal Bugeaud, with 9,500 men, "made at Isly," General Trochu wrote to me, "a new and truly magnificent application of his views on the moral effects of a new system of march

and combat, most ingeniously adapted to the exigencies of a situation which had no precedent in the wars of Africa. The shock of Isly was comparatively trifling; our losses were almost insignificant, for the rout of the Morochian army and its contingent Arabs, was complete and irremediable from the first hour. But, honestly, and while collecting the remembrance of the impressions interchanged in the camp, which of us, before the event, and in the proportions it offered to our eyes, would have ventured to predict this astonishing result? Twenty-five thousand cavalry were in fact assembled there, with several battalions of infantry, and eleven pieces of artillery. The Marshal took possession of their camp, their cannon, their standards, and all their baggage, including the tent and papers of a son of the Emperor."

On land, the battle of Isly put an end to the war. By sea, on the day following that victory, the Prince of Joinville bombarded Mogadore, a place at the southern extremity of Morocco, the principal commercial centre of its empire, the favourite town of Abd-el-Rhaman, and the site of his private estate. The Prince seized, not without stubborn resistance, the small island which closes the entrance to the port, and established there a garrison of five hundred men. By sea also, and in nine days, the war was terminated under the eyes of an English squadron, which followed at a distance the movements of ours.

It was quite natural that the English government should be moved and exceedingly displeased by these events; it was ordinarily the protector of Morocco; it

had endeavoured to prevent the war by making up our quarrel with the Emperor; it had not succeeded; the war ended by two victories for France. What would be the consequences of these victories? The question would inevitably present itself to English minds and excite some anxiety. Sir Robert Peel took an extreme view, which denoted, on his part, a false appreciation of facts and persons, and of which we should have been justified in complaining. He exhibited a double fear; one, that in spite of our contrary declarations we should take permanent possession of some portion of the territory of Morocco; the other, that we should increase our naval forces to direct them ultimately against England. He reverted incessantly to our first occupation of Algiers, and the engagements of evacuation which, according to him, France had entered into at that epoch. "It is undoubtedly too late," he said, "to demand from France the execution of those engagements; but it is on account of this original error that Morocco and Tunis are now in peril; if we do not hold a very decisive tone with France, if we are not ready to act in the interests of Tunis and Morocco, those two states will meet the fate of Algeria, and will become, if not in name, at least in fact, portions of France." Sir Robert listened to all the reports which reached him relative to the enormous works we had in progress, it was said, in all the ports from whence England could be menaced, at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Cherbourg, Brest, and St. Malo. He refused to consider our pacific and amicable assurances as sufficient guarantees, and insisted with his colleagues that England should prepare promptly and extensively

for a war which seemed to him probable and near. It was against these dispositions and apprehensions of the first minister that Lord Aberdeen had to defend the policy of peace and the friendly understanding with France; he did so with thoroughly loyal ability, at the same time persevering and conciliatory, just without complaisance, opposing to the vain alarms of Sir Robert Peel a more correct and acute appreciation of events, of men, and of the chances of the future. When disquiet was expressed at our attack on Mogadore, and at the garrison established in the adjacent islet, "the French," he said, "have already placed themselves in a very disadvantageous situation by declaring that they sought no permanent occupation or conquest. To say that to an enemy is to encourage him to continue the war and to act with great imprudence. Such a declaration may have been necessary to satisfy England; but, without that, it could not have been justified. I hope it will be admitted that the occupation of the islet of Mogadore was indispensable for the attack on the place, and that it will not be continued longer than the blockade requires. The French have already done much by mutilating their means of hostility; we can scarcely expect, when they make an attack, that they should deprive themselves of what is necessary to its success. I persist in thinking they would be delighted to induce the Emperor to accept their conditions, by removing all projects of occupation or conquest on the coast of Morocco, and I do not despair of seeing matters brought to that termination."

Lord Aberdeen was one of those men who have a

mind sufficiently elevated not to suffer himself to be tossed about by every puff of wind that blows below, and firm enough to wait until the course of events establishes their true bearing.

I was not, and I could not, be ignorant of the discontent and mistrusts of Sir Robert Peel, the echo of those with which the English journals were filled. I neither wished to be silent nor to disavow my surprise. "What new or unexpected incident has occurred," I wrote to M. de Jarnac, on the 25th and 27th of August, 1844, "to excite in London the emotions, apprehensions, I will not say suspicions, which are manifesting themselves around you? The English government has long been aware of our complaints against Morocco, and of our demands for satisfaction. We communicated all to them from the opening of the affair. They found them to be just and moderate. Before resorting to force we exhausted every means of conciliation. We delayed, by land and sea, as long as it was possible to delay. By land, Marshal Bugeaud remained several times within our boundaries after having repulsed and chastised the Morochian aggressors. By sea, the Prince of Joinville waited, from day to day, the answer to our ultimatum and the return of Mr. Hay. We did not commence war until it was evident that the Morochians were only seeking to gain time for preparation on their side, and waiting the period of the year when it would be impossible for us to operate against them effectively by sea and land, with our ships and troops. This intention was evidenced at sea by the evasive, dilatory replies given to our demands and brought back by Mr. Hay; on

land, by the assembling on our frontiers of Morochian troops continually increasing in numbers and excitement. Was it to make peace that the Emperor's son arrived in the neighbourhood of Ouschda with more than 20,000 cavalry and every variety of military equipment, causing a holy war to be preached in his very camp, and sending his horsemen to attack our advanced posts at Lalla-Maghrania? Sidi-ben-Hamida, in his pacific parleys with Marshal Bugeaud, and Sidi-ben-Dris, in his confused and evasive answers to M. de Nion and Mr. Hay, evidently sought only to gain time and to make us lose it. We are acting moderately and loyally, but seriously. The object we declared from the first moment, and which we are fully justified in pursuing, is no other than the security of our own territory; we wish to accomplish this effectually, and we cannot be satisfied with words and appearances. Not more to-day than before the war broke out, have we any project or idea of permanently occupying any part of the empire of Morocco, or of the towns on the coast. Our successes in no way alter our plans, and add nothing to our pretensions; but we cannot renounce any lawful means of war or any condition essential to its efficacy. England, in 1840, disembarked marines in Syria; they occupied towns, and remained there for a considerable time. We neither expressed surprise nor complaint; we only required that the occupation should be temporary. There will be no need to-day to make that demand of us, for we neither occupy, nor, as I hope, shall we have cause to occupy, any town of Morocco.

But we have a right to ask in turn the confidence we have manifested."

Victory is a convenient position, for it permits moderation with dignity. We had, from the commencement, openly declared our reasons for war and our conditions of peace; we resolved to make no change in them. Many persons recommended us to be more exacting, to occupy permanently certain towns in Morocco, and to demand a heavy indemnity for the expenses of the war. We rejected these ideas; not from inconsiderate generosity, and because France, as they said at the time, was rich enough to pay herself with glory—but for more important reasons. "As to the conditions of peace," Marshal Bugeaud wrote, on the 3rd of September, 1844, to the Prince of Joinville, "I should be less rigorous than you, so as not to add new difficulties to those which exist and are already sufficient. If we had not at our side jealous England, I think we could obtain everything on account of successes already realized, and because the empire of Morocco is in a bad condition to make war, so much is it disorganized and undisciplined. But in our position, in face of our suspicious neighbours, we ought to be moderate. I should, therefore, not ask the Emperor to pay the expenses of the war, or to give up Abd-el-Kader to us. I am convinced he would rather risk the continuance of an unpromising contest than part with a single million. I know he is sordidly avaricious. As to Abd-el-Kader, he could not deliver him up without being disgraced in the eyes of his whole nation. Let us be

satisfied with requiring that he shall be confined in one of the towns on the sea-coast, and prevented from rekindling war on the frontiers."

A consideration, perhaps even more urgent, added itself to these reasons. The hesitations and reverses of Abd-el-Rhaman had seriously compromised, with the Morochian populations, his power and even his throne; round him, they conspired against him; at various points of his states, seditions broke out, and warlike tribes leagued themselves in savage independence. Another danger also presented itself. After the battle of Isly, Abd-el-Kader manifested his indignation at a defeat which he imputed to imperial weakness; and an idea spread throughout the empire that, if he were on the throne, he would have opposed and would still oppose effectual resistance to the Christians. It was evidently our interest not to shake still more the tottering Abd-el-Rhaman, for his fall would have thrown us into collision with a people given over to passionate anarchy, and perhaps to the hands of a more formidable leader. We found, in a great act of moderation conformable to our general policy in Europe, more security for our establishment in Africa. The Prince of Joinville entered fully into this view, and I addressed to the Duke de Glücksburg and to M. de Nion, instructed to carry on, in concert with him, the negotiations for peace, the following instructions:—

"The brilliant successes recently won by our military and naval forces in the contest with Morocco, have changed nothing in the intentions manifested by the King's government before the commencement

of this struggle. What we then demanded as the necessary condition for the re-establishment of amicable relations between the two states, and as the only suitable guarantee to secure us against the return of the incidents which have disturbed those relations, we still demand without any addition; for the end we propose to ourselves is always the same, and no views of aggrandizement mingle with our well-considered resolution not to permit any denial of the rights and dignity of France. Let the extraordinary assemblies of Morochian troops on our frontier, in the neighbourhood of Ouschda, be immediately broken up; let an exemplary chastisement be inflicted on the authors of the aggressions committed, since the 30th of May, on our territory; let Abd-el-Kader be banished from the Emperor's dominions, and receive in future no support or succour of any description; finally, let a complete and regular boundary be settled and agreed upon between Algeria and Morocco, conformably to the state of things acknowledged by Morocco itself, at the epoch of the Turkish rule in Algiers; nothing will then oppose the re-establishment of peace. The court of Morocco, after all the injuries it has done us, perhaps expects less moderation on our part. To afford it an eminent proof, and to furnish it with an opportunity of responding by the immediate acceptance of our proposals, the King commands you, gentlemen, to repair to Tangiers, in one of the men-of-war of our squadron, and to deliver to the authorities of that place, a letter addressed to the Emperor, in which you will announce to him that, if he accepts purely and simply the conditions of the *ultimatum* I

here recapitulate, you are still authorized to treat on that basis.

"It is to be perfectly understood that this step is not to have the effect of suspending hostilities, and that our forces by land and sea are to be at full liberty to carry on operations until the Emperor accepts our offers."

Before these instructions reached their address, and three days only after they had been determined on in Paris, Sidi-Bouselam, Pacha of the northern provinces of Morocco, and confidential adviser of the Emperor, wrote from Tangiers[1] to M. de Nion:—"We hereby make known to you that, as the preliminaries of the conferences took place between you and the court of his Majesty, when you resided in this port of Tangiers, we address ourselves to you, seeing that his Majesty has instructed us to accord the four demands you have specified against him. If it is still you who are appointed to treat of the relations of France with our happy court, come and visit us, that we may terminate the affair by meeting, for our glorious master has never ceased to be at peace with your government, on the same footing with his ancestors. If, on the contrary, another person is instructed to speak, acquaint him with this letter, that he may come to us in this happy port of Tangiers, so that we may confer together on amicable grounds."

In communicating to me this pacific overture, the Duke de Glücksburg and M. de Nion added:—"The

[1] On the 3rd of September, 1844.

Prince of Joinville thinks that, before going further, it would be prudent to assure ourselves of the nature of these full powers with which Sidi-Bouselam says he is furnished. In consequence, M. Warnier, interpreter to his Royal Highness, and M. Fleurat, interpreter to the consulate, leave for Tangiers this evening; they will bear our answer. It will be short: we have no idea of repulsing a first step, which, if serious, becomes on the instant of great importance; but we indicate to the Pacha that some explanations are necessary, and that M. Warnier goes to demand them. If his return clears up all our doubts, the Prince intends to accompany us, or to send us to Tangiers with his instructions."

Two days later MM. Warnier and Fleurat returned from Tangiers to Cadiz, bringing the subjoined letter from Sidi-Bouselam to the Prince of Joinville:[1] —"Praise be to the only God! The agent of the court highly exalted by God, Bouselam-ben-'Ali—may God in his mercy pardon him!—to the Admiral of the French ships of war, the son of the Emperor, the Prince of Joinville. We inquire anxiously after the state of your health, and offer up equally our good wishes for the preservation of the days of your revered master. I attest by these presents that I hold in my hands the order of the Emperor to conclude peace with you."

Leaving Cadiz immediately with the Prince of Joinville, MM. de Nion and de Glücksburg wrote to me on the following day, the 10th of September, from the road of Tangiers, and on board the *Suffren*:—

[1] Dated the 7th of September, 1844.

"We arrived this morning in the road of Tangiers. The consul-general of Naples, M. di Martino, immediately came on board, and told us there was great impatience in the town, and that Sidi-Bouselam waited with anxiety for our arrival, and the communication we had to make to him. In accordance with our previous arrangements, he announced the arrival of the governor of the town, the Cadi Ben-Abbon, who came, accompanied by the captain of the port, on board the *Suffren*. Ben-Abbon repeated to his Royal Highness that the Emperor expected peace from him, and that his plenipotentiary, Bouselam, was ready to sign it. He retired, evidently flattered by the reception he had met with. A few moments afterwards, M. Warnier repaired to the Pacha, bearing with him the convention drawn up and arranged between us, approved by the Prince, and a copy of which your Excellency will find subjoined. M. Warnier was instructed to present it to the Pacha, and to ask him, without permitting or entering into any discussion, whether he was ready, in virtue of the power he held from the Emperor, to affix his signature. The Pacha's answer was affirmative. A si[illegible] informed us of this. We immediately land[illegible] found the consular body already expecting[illegible] were also received by the governor of the[illegible] guard of honour, who conducted us t[illegible] where we were introduced, in the impe[illegible] to Bouselam, who was accompani[illegible] administrator of the customs, a per[illegible] played a political part of some impor[illegible] events. After exchanging some w[illegible]



we asked the Pacha if he was disposed to sign the treaty we had submitted to him. He requested some explanations on the nature of the engagement which Article 7 imposes on his government, and appeared satisfied with our answers. In our turn, we insisted on the urgency of measures relative to the convention for the settlement of the boundary between the two states, the principle of which is detailed in Article 5. We reminded him of the dispositions which the good feeling and generosity of his Royal Highness dictated to him, with reference to the evacuation of the Isle of Mogadore, and informed him that as soon as the convention was signed, the general consulate would be re-established, and the management entrusted to M. Mauboussin, until the exchange of ratifications. It was then agreed that as soon as the French flag was re-hoisted on the consular residence, it should be saluted by twenty-one guns from the town, and that the Admiral's ship should return the salute. We then proceeded forthwith to the signature of the convention; copies in French and Arabic, duly signed and sealed, were placed in the hands of Sidi-Bouselam; [illegible]wo corresponding instruments will be carried to [illegible] M. de Glücksburg."

[illegible]ty was in strict conformity with our *ulti*- [illegible]the additional articles had no other end [illegible] the strict execution of its provisions.

[illegible]me, in the following session, in January, [illegible]t of the usual attacks of the oppo- [illegible]roached us with not having exacted [illegible]imposing on Morocco a heavy war [illegible]th not having taken more effective

guarantees against Abd-el-Kader. They congratulated themselves on the victory; they rejoiced at the peace; but they condemned the treaty. Marshal Bugeaud, being present in the Chamber of Deputies, exhibited some ill-humour at not having played a more conspicuous part in the negotiation. The rapid course of events had naturally taken it to Tangiers, and to the hands of the diplomatic agents, who were and ought naturally to be entrusted with it. Before his arrival in Paris, the Marshal had candidly expressed his regrets to me, and his observations in the Chamber still bore the impression of them. The opposition endeavoured to turn against the cabinet this sentiment of one of the conquerors. The Marshal, who had partly forgotten his letter of the 3rd of September to the Prince of Joinville, explained himself with perfect loyalty, declaring that events and his own reflections had induced him to doubt his first impression, and led him to think that the cabinet had acted judiciously in not demanding from Morocco a war indemnity, or other guarantees against Abd-el-Kader, which would have imposed too heavy a task on the army of Africa, without, probably, being more effective. We were specially accused of having made peace—a peace too prompt and easy—from weakness towards England, and to appease her dissatisfaction. "How!" I said; "there exists at our doors a State long and specially protected by England, in face of which, at some leagues from its coasts, England has one of her principal and most important establishments. We have made war on that State; we have made it in spite of the apprehensions it inspired in Great Britain—apprehensions

founded on legitimate interests impossible to forget. Not only have we made war, but we have attacked, in face of Gibraltar, the very place which feeds Gibraltar; we have destroyed its fortifications; some days after we went to destroy the principal commercial town of Morocco, with which especially the commerce of Great Britain is carried on. We have done all this in face of English ships which followed ours to witness our operations and combats. And now we are told that in this affair we have suffered ourselves to be governed by fear of England—by English interests! In truth, gentlemen, never did facts and acts give beforehand a more marked denial to such a charge. What I expected to hear from this tribune, what I shall carry to it myself, is justice rendered to the loyalty, the wisdom with which the English government has comprehended the motives of our conduct and the necessities of our position. It has understood, admitted, and proclaimed that the complaints of France against Morocco were just, that the demands of France against Morocco were moderate. Not only has it acknowledged this, but it has said, it has notified officially to Morocco that if satisfaction was not given to us, in no manner whatever would direct or indirect support be afforded by England. The English government has ordered its military and diplomatic agents to employ their influence to induce Morocco to acknowledge the wrongs of France, and to accept the conditions offered by France. This is what has passed between the two governments, neither more nor less. The conduct of the French government in this affair has been what it ought to

be, what we have no right to claim as a merit; it has been fraught with independence and consideration for French interests. The conduct of the English government has been full of loyalty, wisdom, and sincerity. I seize with eagerness this opportunity of rendering to it the justice which is its due, and of which one of the documents deposited on the table of the Chamber is a striking proof; let any one read the despatch of Lord Aberdeen to the Lords of the Admiralty,[1] transmitted to the officers of the English squadron, and ask himself if ever words were more loyal and more worthy of an ally."

Both Chambers were entirely convinced; all the amendments which had for object to efface or weaken the approbation expressed in the drafts of the address were rejected; peers and deputies declared formally that, in this affair, prince and ministers, government and army, generals and soldiers, had done their duty, and that "Algeria had seen its safety secured by our power and moderation."

An important question remained for settlement; the territorial frontier between Algeria and Morocco, as provided by Article 5 of the treaty. I arranged with Marshal Soult that this mission should be confided to a person capable of comprehending at the same time war and policy, and already experienced in Algerian affairs. Our choice fell upon General Count de la Rue, a brave officer and man of the world, firm and prudent, skilful in detecting and baffling hostile artifices, and well knowing in his own conduct how

[1] Dated the 10th of July, 1844. See, in this volume, at page 146.

to distinguish and apply frankness and address. We associated with him, as interpreter-general, M. Léon Roches, recently a prisoner with Abd-el-Kader; bold, sagacious, and indefatigable, he had acquired, in the perilous adventures of his life, a rare talent in treating with Mussulmans, and was strongly recommended to me by Marshal Bugeaud. General de la Rue received, between the 10th and 14th of January, 1845, my instructions, with those of the Minister of War, and departed immediately on his mission. He occupied two months in examining the western frontier of Algeria, in interviews with the chiefs of the tribes scattered over the territory, and in debating with the Morochian plenipotentiaries the line of demarcation indicated by local traditions, and still possible to define between the two states. The negotiation ended in a treaty, which settled the limits of our rule not only in the Tell, but even to the desert, where at no previous epoch any understanding between the regency of Algiers and Morocco had ever existed. "Four years ago," General de la Rue wrote to me,[1] "the old Turkish general, Mustapha-ben-Ismaël, being consulted with this view, caused a chart to be drawn of the frontier (this extremely curious map exists still in the Ministry of War), and having reached Koudiat-el-Debbagh, he paused, saying, 'The country beyond cannot be fixed; it is the land of muskets.'" The treaty was signed on the 18th of March, 1845, at Lalla-Maghrania, on the exact territory we had recently contested. "I venture to hope

[1] On the 18th of March, 1845.

it is an important result," General de la Rue wrote to me,[1] "our having compelled the acceptance of all our conditions; and, above all, by the effect produced on all these peoples, by having brought the Morochian plenipotentiaries under the cannon of the fort of Lalla-Maghrania, to sign there the division of territory, and still better, that of Mussulman populations, between a Christian and a Mohammedan emperor. I guarantee to your Excellency that there is not a single member of the opposition, in our tribes, who will dare to say now that France is not a great and powerful nation, imposing abroad and mistress at home."

The Morochians shared, in this respect, the sentiment of the French general, and the treaty appeared to them so advantageous to us, that the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman withheld the ratification for three months; it was only on the 20th of June following, after menacing notices twice conveyed by M. Léon Roches to the Pacha Sidi-Bouselam, that he determined to give it.

From the opening of his mission, and before his own success, General de la Rue had been struck by the great effect of the recent war and the negotiation by which it had been terminated. He wrote on the 22nd of February, 1845:—"Our position with our own tribes and the Morochians is good. They acknowledge our superiority and the power of our military forces. The expulsion of Abd-el-Kader from Algeria, the invincible Sultan of Morocco beaten and his army

[1] On the 22nd of March, 1845.

dispersed, have impressed the imagination of the Arabs; they say that God is decidedly for us, since we are the strongest. This impression has already spread even amongst the most distant tribes, to such an extent that a Marabout, venerated in the desert, said yesterday, 'I want neither power, nor honour, nor riches: I have enough of all these; what I desire, and would add to the distinction of my family, would be to receive a letter from the great Sultan of France to whom God gives victory.' On several points in the province of Oran," added General de la Rue, "the tribes offer to subscribe sums of from 25,000 to 30,000, and even 40,000 francs for the establishment of dams in their rivers to irrigate the fields, such as General de Lamoricière has recently constructed on the Sig, which waters and fertilizes nineteen thousand hectares[1] of arable land. I have also just seen tribes offer a subscription to General de Lamoricière to establish a journal in Arabic, to tell them the news and impart general instruction for their improvement. There can be no doubt that this would be an eminently useful measure to enlighten these people, and to extinguish gradually their fanaticism by weakening the influence of their priests. But the editorship of such a paper should be confided to a man of first-rate talent, and superintended by extremely clear-sighted authorities. A journal, *a single* Arabic journal, would be a very powerful method of completing our sovereignty and the submission of the tribes, a work so

[1] The French hectare is rather more than an English acre and a half.

gloriously achieved by the army, and which it ought to be allowed to perfect, to the exclusion of ignorant scholars, and old, damaged civil functionaries, who have been too often sent to Africa to impede and bring everything into disrepute."

While the peace negotiators were congratulating themselves on these results, the two heroes of the war, Abd-el-Kader and Marshal Bugeaud, recommenced it in Algeria, as if the one cared little for his defeats, and the other was not yet satisfied with his victories. In great enterprises, perseverance in hope and labour is the first of human qualities. Abd-el-Kader and Marshal Bugeaud both possessed it in a rare degree. Abd-el-Kader might have remained in safety, with his *deira*, in the territory of Morocco, in the mountains of the Riff, whither he had fled; the treaty of the 10th of September, 1844, had taken from him the active support, not the sympathetic tolerance, of the Morochians, and, in spite of the treaty, the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman had neither the strong wish nor probably the power of expelling him by force from his dominions. Marshal Bugeaud, created Duke of Isly, had, some months after his victory, forwarded his resignation to Marshal Soult, and requested a successor. At the first aspect the moment seemed to him favourable for returning under his tent; he also believed himself to be the object of a secretly inveterate hostility on the part of the Minister of War. "I am convinced," he wrote to me on the 30th of June, 1845, "that Marshal Soult intends to disgust me with my position to induce me to resign it. This idea results from a crowd of little

facts which, put together, prove that he has no regard for my opinions and proposals. You saw the objections he urged against the engagement entered into in council, to demand 500,000 francs for a trial in military colonization; it is the same, or nearly so, with everything; it is enough for me to make a proposal to ensure the contrary, and the meanest creature in his offices has more influence than I have in the administration and colonization of Algeria. At all times the successes of generals have increased their credit; mine has lowered in proportion with the progress of affairs in Algeria. I cannot be the artizan of the demolition of what I may, without vanity, call my own work. I cannot be present at the sad spectacle of the march in which they hurry on in double-quick time. Untimely, ridiculous, mad extension of all civil matters; the successive amputation of the army and of public works, to cover the silly expenses of a staff which would suffice for a population ten times more numerous,—this is the system. I am tired of struggling without success against so many false notions, against bureaux inspired by the journal called *Algeria*. I wish to resume my independence, that I may be able to expound my own ideas to the government and the country. Patriotism demands this of me, since I am convinced that the most important affair of France is badly conducted."

Neither Marshal Bugeaud nor Abd-el-Kader submitted to their annoyances or reverses. Both were devoted to a single dominating idea and passion. One sought to drive the French from Algeria, the other to keep them there. Both were eager, one to

return to and the other to remain on the theatre of their work. Abd-el-Kader resumed his rapid and unexpected incursions through the provinces of Oran and Algiers, from the sea-coasts to the borders of the desert, stirring up the tribes in all directions; at one time allying himself with those amongst the native leaders whom he found faithful to their common cause, Bou-Maza, Mohammed-Ben-Henni, and Bel-Cassem; at another labouring to supplant the chiefs over whom he had no control, and to replace them by his own friends. On the other hand, flattering words from the King, and "an amicable phrase which terminated one of Marshal Soult's letters," induced Marshal Bugeaud to withdraw his resignation; and from the autumn of 1844 to 1845 the Governor-General of Algeria re-entered into contest with local, partial, and disconnected insurrections, but still animated, excited, and sustained on all points by his indefatigable adversary.

In one of these risings, that of the tribes of the Dahra, between the course of the Cheliff and the sea, an incident which has made some noise furnished Marshal Bugeaud with an opportunity of calling into play a quality as essential in military as in political life, a firm confidence in his agents; and he found in it, at the same time, a fresh cause of complaint against Marshal Soult. Colonel Pelissier had been ordered by the governor-general to reduce a tribe hitherto insubmissive, that of Ouled-Riah, whose territory abounded in vast and deep grottoes, where the Arabs, in cases of danger, were accustomed to take refuge. In the course of the struggle against the French column, the

Arabs fled to one of these grottoes. Colonel Pelissier summoned them to come forth, promising life and liberty, on condition that they would give up their arms and horses. This they refused. The colonel renewed the offer at several intervals, repeating the assurance that none amongst them should be sent as prisoners to Mostaganem, and that as soon as the cavern was evacuated they should be free to return to their homes. They demanded that in the first instance the French troops should withdraw. Colonel Pelissier, in turn, rejected this condition; the entrance to the grotto was blocked up by faggots and fascines; the Arabs were told that if they continued to hold out, fire would be applied; they persisted, and fired on some of their own people who endeavoured to escape. The wood was then kindled. "A long time before daylight the colonel ordered the heaping of fascines to be suspended. Another emissary was despatched. He returned with a few panting men, who explained the extent of the misfortune. About fifty Arabs were then extracted from the cave; but the state of the atmosphère in the interior suspended this labour, which could only be resumed at daybreak. We were able to rescue one hundred and ten individuals. More than five hundred had found death in the cavern."

The report of Colonel Pelissier to Marshal Bugeaud concluded with these words: "Such, Marshal, are the operations we undertake when compelled; but I pray God that I may never have to repeat them."

This lamentable account created a most melancholy impression. The journals resounded with it. The session was approaching its close; the Chamber of

Deputies had ceased to sit, but the Chamber of Peers was still assembled; and the Prince of the Moskowa questioned the Minister of War on the fact thus reported. Marshal Soult, on this occasion, was deficient in his usual presence of mind and authority; he expressed, in a few embarrassed words, a cold and timid censure, giving up Colonel Pelissier, without satisfying those who attacked him. Marshal Bugeaud vehemently resented this desertion, and carefully abstained from imitating it. "I regret, Marshal," he wrote to the minister on the 14th and 18th of July, 1844, "that you have thought proper to condemn, without any palliation, the conduct of Colonel Pelissier. I take upon myself the responsibility of his act; if the government thinks there is any justice to be done, let it fall on me. I ordered Colonel Pelissier, before we separated at Orleansville, to employ those means in the last extremity; and, in fact, he only adopted them after exhausting every resource of conciliation. With good reason I may call the interpellations at the sitting of the 11th *deplorable*, however praiseworthy the principle may be. They will produce a very painful effect on the army, which cannot but be aggravated by the furious declamations of the press. . . . Before administrating, civilizing, or colonizing, we must compel the populations to accept our law. A thousand examples prove that they will only accept it by force, and our force is impotent if it does not strike individual persons and interests. By undeviating philanthropy we should perpetuate the war of Africa, or at least the spirit of

revolt, and thus we should fail to attain even the philanthropic end."

These reasons of Marshal Bugeaud might be contested; they might be found insufficient; in presence of such facts the cry of humanity is legitimate, and ought to make itself heard, even by those who in a complicated and urgent crisis have not thought it their duty to obey it; but Marshal Bugeaud, in this circumstance, held the attitude and language which suited the head of a government and army. If he had had under his eyes at that moment "The History of the Consulate and Empire," by M. Thiers, he might have recalled a fact which assuredly Marshal Soult had not forgotten. In the glorious battle of Austerlitz, a Russian column was intercepted in a moment of retreat by the French division of General Vandamme; frozen ponds were its only avenue of escape. "Then all the Russians together throw themselves towards these ponds, and endeavour to open a passage. The ice with which the ponds are covered, weakened by the heat of a fine day, is unable to resist the weight of men, horses, and artillery; it gives way at some points under the Russians, who are engulphed; it resists at others, and offers an asylum to the fugitives, who retire in a crowd. Napoleon, having arrived on the slope of the table-land at Pratzen, looking towards the ponds, perceives the disaster he had so well prepared. He orders a battery of the guard to open fire on those portions of the ice which still remain firm, and completes the destruction of the unfortunates who have taken refuge

there. Nearly two thousand found death under that shattered ice." [1]

The Emperor Napoleon was more fortunate than Colonel Pelissier; he had by his side, in 1805, neither tribune nor press to censure his operations in war as barbarous, and no superior to denounce him.

However opposite in this sad episode may have been the attitude of the two marshals who presided over the government of Algeria, there were between them differences of opinion more profound and more difficult to reconcile. I have said that Marshal Bugeaud had with regard to Algeria two fixed ideas—the complete submission of the Arabs throughout the entire extent of the regency, and colonization by the army. As far back as 1838 he had declared, and even drawn up in legislative articles, his views on this last point, in a pamphlet entitled, "On the Establishment of Legions of Military Colonists in the French Possessions of the North of Africa; followed by a Plan of Arrangement addressed to the Government and the Chambers." Called in December, 1840, to the government of Algeria, he received from the Minister of War, under the date of the 13th of August, 1841, a series of questions on the various modes of colonizing the regency. He replied on the 26th of November, 1841, by a long memoir, in which, taking for starting-post the necessity of colonization to render Algeria something more for France than a field of battle and a burden, he laid down that military colonization, organized and supported at first

[1] History of the Consulate and Empire, vol. vi.

by the State, could alone attain the different ends of permanent security, productive proprietorship, and progressive reduction in the expenses which a provident government ought to propose to itself. It was by officers and soldiers recruited from the active army, or invited, after their retirement, to establish themselves as proprietors or heads of families in Algeria, under certain conditions of service and discipline, that military colonies ought to be founded, and become the root of a French-African people, capable of war while employed in the labours of peace.

In support of this system, Marshal Bugeaud brought a host of considerations, all ingenious and specious, some really strong and practical; but he forgot two things stronger than all the reasonings in the world —the nature of our government, and the necessity impressed by the action of the times. He attached no value to the opinion of the Chambers, and wished to anticipate the work of years. All colonies, those which have become powerful States as also others which have not so extensively flourished, have established themselves slowly, after painful efforts, cruel sufferings, and repeated alternatives of struggle or repose, of progress or languor. It was the design and hope of Marshal Bugeaud to spare French Algeria, by military colonization, these long and laborious trials; and he predicted and promised with impassioned faith the success of his plan. I read as follows at this moment, in a letter of his[1] to M. Adolphe Blanqui, member of the Institute, who had

[1] Dated the 23rd of October, 1843.

travelled in Algeria:—"To reduce the army successively by one half, without compromising its conquest, or retarding the progress of its utilization—this is the problem. I think I have discovered an infallible solution. It would be too long to detail to you here the means of execution; I confine myself to telling you that the principal basis of my system is military colonization, and I am almost certain that with a sound constitutive law to that effect we should easily find 12,000 military colonists every year, and I am equally satisfied that the actual army can, beginning with next year, and with the means of every description at its disposal, instal annually 12,000 families of military colonists. In ten years we should thus have 120,000 families living under the only system which can give the unity and strength necessary to command the country. This will form the basis of the ruling people. When founded on points well chosen in all respects, the army can be diminished by one half without compromising our supremacy and without stopping the great works destined to render the conquered country valuable and fertile. My military colonists will give to the general works all the time which the seasons withhold from agriculture, and at the same rate with our soldiers, that is to say, at five cents for every hour of labour and forty cents for eight hours."

The Chambers, as well as the central administration, were far from partaking this confidence, and when Marshal Bugeaud expressed it in his conversations as in his pamphlets and letters, his overflowing and fluent words inspired surprise and doubt much

more than they produced conviction. It was the prevailing sentiment that the expenses of the system would be infinitely more considerable and its results far more uncertain and slow than its originator affirmed. With some reluctance, consent was given to limited supplies for trifling experiments; but all recoiled absolutely from the idea of engaging in such an extensive, doubtful, and onerous scheme.

From improvident enthusiasm rather than deep premeditation, Marshal Bugeaud persuaded himself that by taking a bold initiative he would induce the cabinet and the Chambers to accept his plan and place it in course of execution. On the 9th of August, 1845, he addressed to all the generals under his orders in Algeria, this circular:—"General, I have reason to regard as extremely near, the moment when we shall be authorized to undertake, to a considerable extent, the attempts at military colonization. The conditions are detailed below. Instruct the commandants of corps to make them known to their subordinates, and to furnish you as soon as possible with lists of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who desire to form part of the military colonies."

To this circular was attached a series of articles enumerating the advantages accorded to, and the obligations imposed on, the future colonists, regulating the administration of the projected establishments, organizing, finally, in a complete and precise manner, the military colonies as a fact already determined, in detail as in principle, and waiting only for immediate realization.

Great were the surprise and disapprobation in Paris

when this circular arrived there. The opposition press hastened to turn it against the ministry, affecting to see in it a first attempt of Marshal Bugeaud to declare his independence, and prepare a dismemberment of the French Empire. The members of both Chambers were offended at the silence preserved in the circular as to their rights, power, and necessary intervention in such a matter. To the cabinet, and the Ministry of War in particular, it appeared as a blow against the dignity and privileges of the central government, and a serious incentive to confusion, if not a disloyal design. The King and several of the ministers were then at the Château d'Eu; they forwarded the circular to me on the instant, expressing their displeasure and embarrassment. I had some difficulty in making them understand the ingenuous enthusiasm of Marshal Bugeaud, and his ardent prepossession on this question; to put all things in their proper places, the Marshal himself as well as the cabinet, I caused to be inserted in the *Journal des Débats*[1] an article to the following effect:—"If the Governor-General of Algeria appeared to us to pass over the government and the Chambers, we should be as eager as others to remind him of the respect he owes to the authority under which he holds. But we cannot see in the intention which has dictated his circular anything more than the desire of opening a sort of inquiry on the means of realizing a project which he believes to be sound, useful, and practicable. A plan of this nature and extent cannot be executed

[1] Of the 28th of August, 1845.

or even commenced by decree, in the interval between one session and another. Marshal Bugeaud is not only an able general; he is also, we are sure, a man much more constitutional and less dictatorial than people wish to represent him. If he saw that the government of his country did not partake his views, we are persuaded that he would withdraw from his circular simple theoretical statements which appear applicable to his personal views. Let France, then, tranquillize herself; there are judges in Berlin; there is a government and Chambers in Paris; and there is no question of founding a new kingdom or a new dynasty in Africa."

With this public advertisement, and to confirm while softening it, I wrote privately to Marshal Bugeaud:[1]—"I was delighted to see you abandon your intention of retirement; but with lively regret, and with candour equal to my sorrow, I must complain of you to yourself, and tell you that by your circular of the 9th of August to the generals of your army, and by the plan of military colonization attached to it, you have created for me and for yourself great difficulties in a question which already offered too many. You are not ignorant, my dear Marshal, that there exist in the cabinet, in the Chambers, in the committees of finance, in all the powers whose co-operation is indispensable, strong prejudices against your system of military colonies. There is something even more serious than prejudices; there are opinions manifested, self-respects

[1] On the 23rd of August, 1845.

compromised. How are these obstacles to be surmounted? I know but one way. Make a limited essay of your system; oppose to prejudices an accomplished fact, confined within strictly determined bounds. You thus reply to the double objection which prepossesses everybody—the immensity of the enterprise and expense, the uncertainty of the result. In place of that, what do you do by your circular of the 9th? You present your project in its full scope; it is no longer an experiment, it is the programme and putting in train of your whole system. You appeal, for its execution, to all the officers and soldiers who may wish to concur in it. You show yourself ready to receive all who present themselves; and you impose on the State, towards all, the full obligations and burdens which the system entails. You thus confront all objections and prejudices; you offend all the self-loves engaged against such a vast enterprise. Perhaps you have thought to bind beforehand and compromise the government beyond retreat in this undertaking so completely displayed in its first steps. This is an error, my dear Marshal; you only seriously embarrass your best friends, for at the moment when they speak and can only speak of an experiment, you exhibit and call on them to support the whole burden. I entertain towards you, my dear Marshal, much esteem and friendship; I am most anxious to execute, on my part, what I have said to you. I have not concealed from myself the great difficulty, be well assured, of causing to be accepted and favourably carried out, even here, this limited experiment; but I have finally determined and undertaken to do so. It.

has, therefore, become a necessity and a duty for me to tell you what I think of the step you have taken, and of all it will add to the burden we have to bear in common. Find, then, I pray you, a mode of reducing this burden to what it can and ought to be, and to recall your words and promises within the limits of the experiment I look upon as possible. Consider it as certain that we must confine ourselves specifically within those limits to have any chances of success."

While maintaining his plan and act, the Marshal comprehended his error and my reproach. In withdrawing his resignation, he asked leave to pass some weeks in France, to explain himself with the Minister of War; he came, in fact, and after a very short residence at Paris, where I happened not to be at that juncture, he wrote to me from his estate of La Durantie:[1]—"Your letter of the 23rd of August has reached me here, at the moment of my arrival to visit my fields; I have given them a rapid glance, and to rob them of nothing, I rise before daybreak to reply to you. . . . . At the moment of my departure from Algiers, I left, for insertion in the *Moniteur* of the 5th of September, an article which responds to your desire of seeing me extenuate, by some act, what you call the bad effect of my circular. . . . . It ought not to have had any publicity. . . . . I am also bound to say that the terms were too positive; I should have placed the verbs throughout in the conditional mood; instead of saying, 'The colonists will

[1] On the 28th of September, 1845.

receive,' &c., I ought to have said, 'If the government adopted these views, the colonists would receive,' &c.; change the tense of the verb, and you will see no more than a simple matter, a statistic investigation which falls within the rights and usages of command, and is intended to enlighten the government itself. . . . . What proves that I had no time to lose in ascertaining a result before my departure is, that I have only just received the returns from the division of Algiers; these give me 3,996 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, representing amongst them the value of 1,700,000 francs. We may calculate that the two other divisions will give each about 3,000 applications. Here are nearly 10,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, of from twenty-four to thirty years of age, young, active, vigorous, disciplined, hardened, acclimated, who offer to devote to Africa themselves and their descendants. . . . . If France were so ill advised as not to take advantage of these dispositions to consolidate her conquest promptly and permanently, such blindness could not be too much deplored. . . . . But, in answer to the silly and wicked accusation of the *Presse*, which calls me a revolted pacha, I come to deliver myself up to the bow-string, and I have first presented myself at the office of the Minister of War. If I had entertained any fears, his gracious reception would have effaced them: he clearly satisfied me, in his conversation, that the attacks of the newspapers had produced some effect on his mind; but as soon as I explained to him my motives, entirely based on my profound conviction that the act will prove of great service to

France, and is itself within the rights and usages of command, the cloud dispersed, and during two days' conversation on the affairs of Africa, I found in him the most friendly sentiments towards myself, and admirable dispositions with regard to affairs in general. On my side, I exercised mildness and deference to an extent of which you will scarcely believe me capable, and with so much success that I shall certainly adopt the same course in future."

In speaking thus to me, Marshal Bugeaud deceived himself as to the dispositions of the minister and his own skill in gentleness and respect. Marshal Soult had not become more favourable to him; simply less eager, and tired of the struggle, he did not care to strike his lance openly against the visor of a rival younger in glory and years, and to take upon himself the sole responsibility of refusal. Marshal Bugeaud soon discovered this, and resumed his own rudeness with his discontent. But the news from Algeria gave, for the moment, another course to his ideas. Since his departure, the situation had been greatly aggravated. It was no longer partial and disconnected risings with which we had to deal; the Arabian insurrection was becoming general, concerted, organized. From the province of Oran, the centre of his influence and operations, Abd-el-Kader, by delegates or by his own sudden appearances in the provinces of Algiers and Constantine, animated fanaticism and directed the movement. Some isolated posts were carried; small bodies of our troops had encountered glorious but lamentable checks. Anxious and irritated, the army and colonial population unanimously

called for Marshal Bugeaud. His lieutenants, prepossessed by the extent of the danger, and the responsibility of temporary power, pressed his return. One of his orderly officers, the lieutenant-colonel of cavalry Rivet, brought to him, with a detail of events, the expression of this public sentiment. His patriotism, a just feeling of his strength, and the hope of acquiring fresh glory and authority, determined the Marshal at once. Without returning from Durantie to Paris, without asking for positive instructions, he wrote on the 6th of October, 1845, to Marshal Soult:—"I leave in the night of the 7th and 8th for Marseilles, where I hope to find the *Caméléon*, or some other ship, to carry me at once to my post. I have thought that being still nominal governor of Algeria, I could not reject the appeal made to me by the army and population, which would be to fail in my duties to the government and the country." He then stated his views on the causes of the insurrection, the requirements of the campaign he was about to commence, enumerated with precision the reinforcements of all descriptions that he considered necessary, and closed his despatch thus:—"We are going, Marshal, to play a great game, which may be decisive of our rule if we play it well, or to prepare great troubles and sacrifices if we play it badly. Economy now would be for ever deplorable. We are engaged with an energetic, persevering, and fanatical people; to conquer them, we must show ourselves more energetic and persevering; and after having conquered them several times, as such efforts cannot be repeated for ever, we must, at any cost, entwine them with a numerous, active popula-

tion, strongly constituted. Unless we do this, there will be nothing but futile efforts and sacrifices constantly recommenced, until a great European war or a signal catastrophe in Algeria forces us to abandon a conquest we knew not how to consolidate, under the influence of the false ideas of our writers. It is not unquestionably the premature development of civil institutions which will establish conquest; the catastrophe will be nearer at hand if civil administration is extended at the expense of military force."

He wrote to me the same day, enclosing a copy of his letter to Marshal Soult:—"I am perfectly convinced that a great plot of revolt has been long formed throughout the whole surface of Algeria. I frustrated it last spring by crushing the first insurgents who displayed themselves. It has since revived in the train of the fanaticism animated by the Ramadan. Some serious errors, committed by brave and devoted but inexperienced officers, have procured successes for the Emir which have certainly revived the ardour and hopes of the Arabs. The circumstances, therefore, are urgent; they call for prompt decisions. This is no time to talk to you of my wrongs and demands, without the satisfaction for which I did not intend to return to Algeria. I hasten to the fire; if I have the good fortune to extinguish it once more, I shall renew my efforts to compel the adoption of measures of consolidation for the future. If I fail, nothing in the world shall bind me longer to this rock of Sisyphus. I find it most appropriate to say to you to-day, what Marshal Villars said to Louis XIV., *I am going to fight your enemies, and I leave you in the midst of mine.*"

At the moment of taking this judicious and generous resolution, Marshal Bugeaud once more abandoned himself to one of those acts of indiscreet and improvident exuberance which several times embarrassed and weakened his friends and himself in the prosecution of their common objects. On his departure for Algeria, he wrote to M. de Marcillac, prefect of his department,[1] "Colonel Rivet brings me most unfavourable news from Algeria; the army and people loudly clamour for my return. I had too much cause to complain of the desertion of the government, in face of my enemies in the press and elsewhere, not to have declined returning to Algeria, unless with the commission I demanded, and the promise of gratifying some of my fundamental ideas; but events are too serious for me to bargain my return to the post of danger. I have resolved, therefore, to leave the day after to-morrow. I beg you will send me four post-horses to convey me to Perigueux." And after giving M. de Marcillac some details on the insurrection of the Arabs, he concluded by saying, "It is much to be feared that an extensive war is about to recommence. Alas! events give too much reason to the opposition I was making against a system which extended without necessity the civil administration, and reduced the army to cover the expenses of that extension. My heart is broken by so many misfortunes, and by so much blindness on the part of the authorities and the

[1] On the 6th of October, 1845.

press, which latter governs us much more than we choose to confess."

The Marshal attributed to a secondary fact—to the extension, at that time extremely limited, of civil administration in Algeria—the events which proceeded from causes infinitely more general and powerful; but, whether right or wrong in his complaints, the publication of such a letter by a general officer in active service, and at such a moment, was both inconsistent and inopportune. This was not the act of the Marshal himself. M. de Marcillac had thoughtlessly shown and given his letter to the editor of the *Conservator of the Dordogne*, who, instead of simply extracting the facts of intelligence, as the prefect had requested him to do, published it entire in his journal, whence it was copied into those of Paris, and of several departments. Commented on by some with pleasure, by others with regret, it produced in all quarters a baleful effect, which, as soon as the Marshal arrived at Marseilles, the prefect of the Mouths of the Rhône, M. de Lacoste, acquainted him with. The Marshal was much vexed at this, and immediately expressed to me his profound regret. "My letter," he wrote to me,[1] "was the confidential communication of a friend to a friend; it ought not to have been published. This is another tile which falls on my head. I lament it particularly, because the opposition press will not fail to use it against the government. I thank you for

[1] On the 11th of October, 1845.

the energetic measure adopted by the council." We had just sent him considerable reinforcements. "With these I feel confident that we shall soon re-establish affairs." At the same time, he caused to be inserted in the newspapers of Marseilles his disavowal of the publication of his letter, and explanations tending to weaken its evil effect.

I did not think these explanations would suffice, nor that with the Marshal himself we could pass over in silence an act so opposed to dignity and good order in the government. On learning that he was about to depart immediately for Africa, I wrote as follows:—

"A few words, my dear Marshal, not many, but such as I find indispensable, between you and me, on personal matters. You have done wisely in adjourning for the moment your demands and complaints: this accords with your patriotism and character. You know that amongst the things you have nearest at heart there are some, and the most important, which I have promised you to support, within limits the necessity and prudence of which you yourself acknowledge, for the present. I shall act as I have promised. My first disposition is always to second you, for I entertain for you a high esteem and sincere friendship. But I cannot accept the reproach that you have not been supported by the government. It belongs to and dwells with minds like yours, my dear Marshal, to distinguish great things from small, and to attach yourselves to the first alone. There are only, as concern you, two great things in Africa: one,

having been sent there; the other, having been provided, altogether and in a general sense, with all the necessary means of action. The cabinet has done this for you, against many prejudices and in the face of many difficulties. You have yourself acknowledged and proclaimed it. After that, at such or such a moment, on this or that question, the government may not have participated in all your ideas, or approved of all your acts. Nothing can be more simple; it is its right. You may have encountered, in a particular committee or bureau, errors, injustices, false ideas, unfriendly proceedings, obstacles. This is also possible. There is nothing in all this but what is natural, and almost inevitable; these are the secondary influences which a man like you ought to apply himself to surmount without astonishment or irritation; for he weakens and embarrasses himself by allowing them in his thought and action a higher place than really belongs to them.

"The journals attack you fiercely: this is true. The government does not, in your defence, enter into a continued polemic with the journals: this is also true. My dear Marshal, allow me to think and act in this for you as for myself. I care little for personal attacks in the journals, and I never reply to them. I take pride in thinking that, after what we have both done, we may let the journals talk. Our lives speak for us, and it is only in the tribune that it becomes us to answer. I have more than once done you justice there; I shall do so again with much pleasure. It is there you ought to be defended; but greatly, and on

great occasions, not by keeping our ears always open to every trifling report that besieges them, and by trying vainly and incessantly to silence it. Your letter to M. de Marcillac, published in the *Conservator of the Dordogne*, has grieved me much, both on your account and my own. That when you think you have anything to ask from or reproach the government with, you should write, in confidence, to your friends in that government, all that passes in your mind and heart; that you should do so with all the unreserve, all the vivacity of your impressions and character, nothing can be more natural. Far from complaining, I shall always rejoice at it; for I expect to know and receive from you your fullest impressions, though they may be exaggerated and unjust. It becomes my affair afterwards to see that you are righted if I think you have been wronged, or to tell you why I think you are to blame, should such be my opinion. But to bring the public into the confidence of your relations with the government you serve, to take the newspapers for the organs of your complaints—this, my dear Marshal, cannot be. This tends to disorder. You would not suffer it near yourself. And, believe me, it imports quite as much to you as to the power to which you are devoted."

Marshal Bugeaud made no attempt to defend his letter; he was capable of nobly acknowledging his errors and faults, although he sometimes forgot them too readily.

Having reached Algiers on the 15th of October, amidst the acclamations of the entire French population, military and civil, he entered immediately on action,

and between the autumn of 1845 and the summer of 1846, conducted a campaign, not the most fertile in perilous and brilliant combats, but the most active and effective of all those which had filled and honoured his government of Algeria. "Eighteen movable columns," General Trochu writes to me, "were put in action. The one commanded by the Marshal in person counted only two thousand five hundred bayonets and four hundred sabres. Marches, countermarches, overwhelming fatigues, unheard-of efforts, were imposed on all; but not one, to speak correctly, seriously engaged the enemy, who, being organized in no quarter, remained unattackable, one might say invincible. The Marshal's light cavalry encountered that of Abd-el-Kader ât Tomda, which made little show of resistance, and disappeared quietly, seeming to obey a command to disperse. Finally, when the eighteen exhausted columns were operating at a distance, that of Marshal Bugeaud between Medeah and Boghar, we learnt suddenly that Abd-el-Kader, turning their flanks with two thousand horsemen of the south, had penetrated by the valley of the Isser to the settlement of the tribe of Krachena, whose chiefs, our agents, he had killed, and plundered their tents. He was thus at the entry of the Metidja, the plain of our principal colonization, defended by only three or four dozen scattered gendarmes, at twelve leagues' distance from Algiers, which had no garrison, and where a battalion of criminals, in addition to the militia, had to be hastily formed and armed. The alarm was most animated; Algiers ran no risk, nor Algeria either, for the bold object of Abd-el-

Kader could only be an incursion; but the ears of the colonists of the Metidja had a narrow escape!

"The serenity of the Marshal at this formidable crisis, one might say his gaiety, filled us with astonishment and admiration. This perfect calmness in a responsible chief, on whom the Algerine and metropolitan press were preparing to let loose their utmost rancour, and also the continual watches, the fatigues, excessive at his age, were, in this ultra-laborious campaign of nearly a year, facts which placed in new relief the valiant moral and physical organization of the governor. But his part in action differed not, and could not differ, from that of other generals, launched, like himself, with small groups in pursuit of an enemy without solid body, and who showed himself unexpectedly, when the indigenous populations, otherwise in intelligence with him, were generally in submission, and had resumed their usual encampments.

"The war ended suddenly, as often happens, by a chance which proved an unlooked-for stroke of fortune. The cavalry of Abd-el-Kader were denizens of the desert, inordinate plunderers, and who, when once gorged with booty, had only, according to their habit, one desire, that of transporting it to their tents, an enterprise not without its difficulties and dangers. At that moment, ten companies of young soldiers recently arrived from France, and a battalion from Djigelly, were sent, at hazard, against the Emir in the Isser. In the night-time, with some surprise to themselves, they surprised his people, filled with the ideas of return I have mentioned. At the first discharge of musketry, the Arabs broke, and fled towards the south. Abd-el-

Kader, thus abandoned, was nearly made prisoner, and never recovered this check, which cost us nothing.

"The Marshal often spoke of this campaign, which was marked by no brilliant military action, with satisfaction, and he had ample right to do so; it was one of the great crises, perhaps the greatest, in his Algerian career. When he re-entered Algiers in a military cloak worn out even to the string, surrounded by a staff with clothes in shreds, marching at the head of a column of bronzed, lean soldiers, with determined aspect, and carrying their rags proudly, the enthusiasm of the population reached its height. The old Marshal enjoyed it fully. He had recently seen in close proximity the hair by which Providence holds suspended great reputations and careers, at an age (sixty-two), when if that hair is severed, it is difficult to reunite it."

While general, officers, and soldiers were displaying in Africa this laborious and inexhaustible vigour, in France the government, the Chambers, and the public followed with perplexed attention the complicated events of this war, scattered over such a vast space and so incessantly reviving. In journals, correspondence, and conversation, the ideas and operations of Marshal Bugeaud were continually discussed and criticized, at one moment with the accustomed ill-feeling of distant and frivolous lookers-on, at another with the ordinary spite of political adversaries. All these reports reached Marshal Bugeaud in Africa in the midst of the toils and vicissitudes of his campaign, and he preoccupied himself with them passionately, but without suffering the

controversy, into which he was ever ready to plunge, to shake his plans or disturb his actions. "I know Africa, its inhabitants and conquerors, for twelve years," wrote M. Léon Roches,[1] whom I had sent to Marshal Bugeaud to acquaint him thoroughly with my own ideas; "I have been more than any one else on my guard against the mischievous impressions produced in France by the events of 1845 and 1846. Nevertheless, I partook in some degree of the general opinion; I thought Marshal Bugeaud might have been able to centralize the action of his command and avoid many useless marches; I feared that disgust might glide into the ranks of his army. I was wrong. The Marshal held uninterrupted communication with his columns; his orders were sometimes intercepted, but he was always able to make them arrive in time. He required the mobility with which we reproached him to find himself always in person in face of his indefatigable enemy. The Arabs detest us, without a single exception; those we call devoted are only compromised; they are all friends to independence, which with them signifies disorder; they are all warriors: they preserve in the bottom of their hearts a leaven of fanaticism, and as often as it is rekindled by men of the temperament of Abd-el-Kader, they will rise and try efforts more or less effective, according to our means of supremacy, to drive us from their country. But our position has in it nothing alarming; only it will be a long time difficult, for the subjection of a people whose territory you wish to

[1] On the 5th of March, 1846.

possess and incorporate cannot be the work of fifteen years."

I shared the confidence of the army of Africa in its leader, and resolved to second him energetically; but this work, difficult in itself, became much more so when in the fits of his anger against the journals and the bureaux of the War Department, or in the impulses of his warlike imagination, the Marshal appeared inclined, alternately, to accuse, by his complaints, the government he served, and to compromise it by his proceedings. He was, as we might expect, more occupied with his own situation than with that of the cabinet, and with the war rather than with our policy. To deliver Algeria from Abd-el-Kader was his ruling passion and idea, and to accomplish this object he was every moment on the point of renewing the war with Morocco, and of pursuing indefinitely on the territory of that empire the great Arab chief who, whether the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman wished it or not, was ever seeking refuge there. Marshal Bugeaud did not content himself with following this bias; he framed it into a premeditated plan, maintaining that, at any cost, it was imperative to deprive Abd-el-Kader of all chances of asylum in Morocco; and asking, if we did not feel disposed to authorize formally this act of defensive invasion, to be left to himself, with the risk of the future responsibility. Neither of these propositions was acceptable to a steady government resolved to respect the right of nations and its own dignity. We had recently concluded with Morocco a treaty of peace, and also another for the settlement of the frontier between the two States; we were

exacting from the Emperor the strict observance of these treaties; it was equally our duty and inclination not to infringe them ourselves, even though our struggle against the insurrection in Algeria might thereby be prolonged. I instructed M. Léon Roches to impress strongly on the Marshal the firm resolution of the cabinet, as also my own, on this point. My envoy acquitted himself loyally of his mission, and after several reports of his interviews with the Marshal, wrote as follows on the 23rd of April, 1846:—"With a lively feeling of satisfaction I hasten to acquaint your Excellency that the Marshal Duke of Isly has completely renounced his plan of invading Morocco; the next courier will undoubtedly bear an official assurance from the governor-general of this wise resolution."

I know not whether this resolution, if ever seriously adopted, would have been long or effectually preserved; but on the same day, when M. Roches announced it to me from Algiers, the cabinet took officially, and I myself amicably, a decisive step with the Marshal, which removed all doubt as to the determined maintenance of our policy in Algeria as in Paris. The Emperor Napoleon the First said, when speaking of the difficulties of his government, "Do people believe that it is an easy matter to control such men as a Soult or a Ney?" In our constitutional system we had not, to govern their equals, the means possessed by the Emperor Napoleon; but we were quite as determined not to be governed by them, and although our proceedings were different, our policy was not less fixed. I knew Marshal Bugeaud; I knew him to be

loyal, and capable, despite his passion, of listening to reason, and of pausing before power and legal order. I used the methods with him which become a free government in its relations with respected and important agents, when announcing to him peremptorily our policy. I took care to explain its reasons, and to show my desire of convincing his mind while I restrained his will. I wrote on the 24th of April, 1846:—

"You have every reason to be satisfied with your long and arduous campaign. I cannot judge its operations in detail, but I see the whole, which proves the decisive progress of our rule in Algeria; and this progress is your work. For several years we wandered as conquerors in the country, but it belonged to our enemies; now Abd-el-Kader wanders as an aggressor in a country which belongs to us. He may still excite insurrections and find asylums; he can no longer establish himself. The distinction is enormous. I hope that the debate shortly to come on in the Chambers will show this in full light, and that justice will be done to you.

"I am, with you, very far from believing that in this country, now ours, the struggle is over. We shall have long and frequent war, similar to that you have recently carried on. You repeat this often; neither you nor we can repeat it too frequently, for it is essential that everybody here, government, Chambers, and public, should not forget it at this moment. We have too often said, and allowed to be said, at every crisis of success, that the triumph was definitive, the sovereignty complete, the pacification

secured. Let us extirpate these illusions; this is the only way of securing the efforts necessary to transform them into realities.

"I see, by your last despatches, that your principal attention is now directed towards the frontier of Morocco, to the position which Abd-el-Kader will probably resume there, and the conduct we ought to pursue. You are strongly in the right. Abd-el-Kader wandering and carrying on war in the territory of Algeria, or Abd-el-Kader encamped and in ambush on the territory of Morocco, are two dangers, with which, as long as Abd-el-Kader lives, we shall have to live and contend.

"I do not rely more than you do on the sincerity of the Emperor of Morocco, nor on his decided action in our favour. He shares perhaps in reality, or, beyond doubt, he is compelled before his subjects to seem to share, their antipathy against us and their sympathy for the Emir; but unquestionably he fears us, and fears Abd-el-Kader on our account; he would be delighted to deliver himself from him by giving him up to us. If he abstains from doing this, it is that he cannot or dares not. I believe in his powerlessness to assist us, not in his desire to help Abd-el-Kader. He will allow his subjects to do for the Emir what he cannot prevent, or what will not too seriously compromise himself. He will do what he believes indispensable to avoid collision with us, and possible without embroiling himself with his own people. You see, I do not in the slightest degree encourage self-delusion on this point. But I add that these declarations, these appearances, have in

Africa, in France, in Europe, a positive value, and we are bound to respect them.

"In Africa, protestations of friendship, appearances of co-operation with the Emperor of Morocco, have certainly the effect of impeding and restraining to a certain extent, within his territory, the ill feeling of his subjects, and of discouraging and intimidating the Arabs, in ours. The moral action of Ald-el-Kader in Morocco and Algeria is thereby weakened, while ours is fortified.

"In France, assure yourself that if the Chambers saw us embroiled with Morocco, and engaged in a war which would, of necessity, be unlimited in space, time, and expense, they would fall into extreme disquietude, and would not second us in this new struggle; or, what would be worse, they would only give us lukewarm, inefficient support, and always with reluctance and censure. We find it already difficult to induce them to bear the burden of Algeria. You know, from experience, with myself, the trouble we find, and not always with success, in making them comprehend the difficulties of our establishment and in obtaining the means of meeting them. We have always before us an anti-African party, including important, influential men, ever ready to retort the charges, faults, misfortunes, and dangers of the enterprise, and whose dispositions find an echo in many hearts, which makes little noise, but is ever there, ready to respond if an opportunity offers of increasing its voice. We could not accept a fresh burden and future of the same kind; and Algeria itself would suffer much from the credit its adversa-

ries would thus acquire, and from the discouragement into which many of its partizans would fall.

"In Europe, serious complications would soon spring up. You know, as well as I do, that the sudden explosion, the greatness of the Revolution of July, the shock it occasioned, the fears it inspired, made all the powers, at first forget and then accept our conquest of Algeria. It is evident we could not reckon to-day on a second similar fact, and that the invasion, the conquest, total or partial, of Morocco, would profoundly agitate European policy. It is equally evident that at the end, and by the inevitable influence of a state of real and prolonged war between us and Morocco, Europe would see conquest, and act under that conviction.

"Everywhere, therefore, in Africa, in France, in Europe, and in every aspect, foreign or domestic, parliamentary or diplomatic, under which we may consider the subject, sound judgment counsels and prescribes to maintain between us and the Emperor of Morocco the actual situation of general peace, of friendly official understanding, of semi-concert against Abd-el-Kader; we ought to give carefully to our whole conduct and operations towards the west of Algeria this character, that they are solely directed against the Emir, and have no other object than to guarantee the security due to us by the Emperor of Morocco, and formally promised by the treaty of Tangiers, the treaty of Lalla-Maghrania, and by his recent engagements; a security which, if he does not give, we have a right to take for ourselves, even though for that purpose it might be necessary to

enter and make war within the boundaries of his empire.

"On this point, I have declared our right. All the world, including the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman, has acknowledged it. In what manner, therefore, and within what limits, shall we exercise it to accomplish our special object of Algerian security, by maintaining, between us and Morocco, the general situation I am now characterizing? This is the real question, the question of conduct we have at present to solve.

"I comprehend two systems of conduct, two trials of solution.

"We may undertake to pursue Abd-el-Kader and his *deira* into the territory of Morocco, wherever he retires, making war only on him, but resolved to push or renew our efforts and expeditions until we reach him, and definitively extirpate from Morocco this scourge of Algeria, whom the Emperor Abd-el-Rhaman ought but is unable to extirpate.

"This system has for consequences, some certain, others so probable that we may readily call them certain.

"1. It condemns us to pursue, in Morocco, an object we have for many years vainly pursued in Algeria, the destruction or seizure of the person and *deira* of Abd-el-Kader. Evidently the difficulty and cost will be considerably increased, the chances of success materially diminished. We shall place ourselves, with much greater efforts, expenses, and perils, in search of Abd-el-Kader, who will retire and remove much more easily before us. There, as elsewhere, chance alone can enable us to reach him, and

this chance is more improbable there than anywhere else.

"2. To engage speedily in war with the people and Emperor of Morocco, who will not suffer our repeated and extensive expeditions into their territory, and will be inevitably driven to make common cause with the Emir.

"3. To compromise the interior of Morocco, at this moment much disturbed, and the already tottering throne of the Emperor, and consequently to deliver up the whole country to an anarchy which will hand it over either to Abd-el-Kader or to a multitude of chiefs with whom we shall be unable to treat or live; this will fatally constrain us to a prolonged war, which can only end in conquest or the forced abandonment of the enterprise.

"4. To bring on thus, in France and in our Chambers the embarrassments, in Europe and in our political relations the complications, I have just pointed out.

"My dear Marshal, this cannot be. The stake, important as it is, is not worth the risk.

"Here is the second plan of conduct:—

"Not to undertake the indefinite pursuit of Abd-el-Kader and his *deira* in Morocco, and to extirpate him definitely from thence, but to show ourselves and be actually quite determined to render his sojourn in the Morochian territory, in the neighbourhood of our extended frontier, totally impossible; that is to say, to seek him within those limits, to drive him from them when found, and to chastise the tribes dwelling there in such manner that they may be no longer able or

willing to receive him, and to compel him to retire to a greater distance, in the interior of Morocco, so that he may no longer be able easily and promptly to return to our territory and foment insurrection.

"With this object we should keep in the province of Oran a sufficient number of disposable troops to constitute, in case of need, on the territory of Morocco adjacent to our frontier, amongst the tribes who inhabit it, and within the limits considered necessary, a ready, effective police, to prevent the establishment or residence of Abd-el-Kader and his *deira*. We should retire within our own boundaries after driving him from the neighbourhood and severely chastising the tribes who received him. We should thus destroy, if not our enemy himself, at least every asylum or retreat available to him near us, and should establish an intermediate space where he could not remain, and which would constitute a certain guarantee against his future enterprises.

"This second plan of conduct embraces none of the inconveniences of the first. It does not condemn us to the indefinite pursuit of an object indefinitely escaping and recoiling before us. It does not engage us, with the Emperor of Morocco and his people, in a general war. It does not compromise the internal repose of that empire and the stability of its existing government, which it is our interest to preserve. Finally, it cannot give birth to any serious complication in our European policy; for if it proves our firm resolution to secure the safety of our possessions in Africa, it evinces at the same time our sincere intention of not extending them by fresh conquests.

"This plan, I admit, has the objection of not definitively rooting out the evil, and of leaving in existence its principle, more removed from us, but still within possible range and with chances of success. This is a situation which, in presence of semi-barbarous populations and irregular and weak governments, we are often constrained to accept. There is no method of establishing, with such governments and people, even after giving them the sharpest lessons, certain relations and effectual guarantees. We must either push war against them to the end, even to conquest and complete incorporation, or resign ourselves to the embarrassments, incidents, and contests entailed by such a proximity, by being prepared to surmount them; or to drive back to a greater distance the sources we cannot dry up. Between these two courses we are compelled to choose.

"After having well reflected, after maturely weighing the for and against of these opposite lines of conduct, the King and council, my dear Marshal, have adopted the second as the most conformable, all points well considered and balanced, with the interest of our country. The Minister of War has sent you, within the last few days, corresponding instructions. I am anxious to explain to you their true character and motives. There will be found, I doubt not, in this system, serious, unforeseen, and uncalculated inconveniences and difficulties. This happens with every system. I feel confident you will know how, in the execution of this plan, to correct its defects, as far as possible, and to render it effective by confining yourself within its limits."

I was not deceived in my expectation; Marshal Bugeaud felt the weight of our reasons and resolve: Resigned rather than convinced, but sincerely resigned, he replied to me on the 30th of April:—"What you say of the conduct we ought to hold towards Morocco seems to me perfectly just, placing myself at your point of view; and it is there we must place ourselves. Under an absolute government, considering only the military question, and the success of our enterprise in Africa, I should reason otherwise. But you must have seen in my despatches, and in the instructions I have recently given to MM. de Lamoricière and Cavaignac, that I entered entirely into your policy. Therefore, have no uneasiness on this point: what you wish will be done; and I am going also to use your own words to impress these orders more stringently on the generals at the frontier."

Being thus compelled to renounce, on the question of war, his own favourite plan, Marshal Bugeaud sought, in the second of his ruling ideas, his plan of military colonies, a compensation for his disappointment. In the spring of 1846, after the successes of his campaign against the great insurrection of 1845, he resumed for a moment the project of retirement which he had also suddenly conceived in 1844, after his victory over Morocco. Articles in the journals had replunged him into a fit of anger and sadness. "I know," he wrote to me on the 11th and 30th of April, 1846, "that you mean to defend me in the tribune, and you will defend me well; but can your eloquence efface the mischief now working, and which will continue to work daily? Do you think I can

remain, on such conditions, in the painful and inextricable post in which I am placed? My time is over, that is evident; the work having become something, all the world appropriates it; every one wishes to add his stone, good or bad. I cannot stem this torrent, and I have no wish to follow it. I therefore remove from the bank. I have already composed the letter in which I ask the Minister of War to submit to the King's government the request I make for a successor. I found my demand on my health and age, which no longer permit me to support such a burden, and also on my family affairs; but, between ourselves, my chief reason is, that I do not choose to be the artizan of the false ideas which prevail generally on the great questions of Africa. I neither dread the fatigues of war nor those of administration; my soldiers and the functionaries of Algeria are all aware of this; but I fear misguided public opinion. I am ever thankful for the great mission which has been confided to me; I have not forgotten that it is to you, in a great measure, that I owe it, and I shall never forget this, happen what may. I know also that it is to you I am indebted for having been well supported in this hard task. You may, therefore, reckon on my grateful attachment, as I depend on your exalted esteem. I am now going to ask you a favour; to grant me a specific leave of absence to the commencement of July, permitting me to assign the interim command to General de Lamoricière, as also to prolong my stay in France for several weeks, in case I find myself in presence of very serious circumstances. In three months I shall be delivered from this hell."

I refused his pretended desire; I defended him energetically in the tribune. A ministerial incident restored his confidence; Marshal Soult, fatigued and ill, had quitted active ministry, retaining still for some time a seat in the cabinet and the title of President of the Council. General Moline Saint-Yon replaced him in the War Department; Marshal Bugeaud, far from dreading his ill-will, was on friendly relations with him, and felt satisfied with his proceedings. He came to pass some weeks in France, and, returning to Algiers in October, 1846, directed all his efforts to his plan of military colonization. At the same time that, in his official or private correspondence, he urged this point without intermission, he wrote pamphlets to demonstrate to the Chambers and the public the merits of his system, and to refute the objections which were raised against it in all quarters. We had promised him to ask the Chambers for the funds necessary to make a serious trial; he ascertained that the question, after being reintroduced in the council, had been again adjourned, and wrote to the King on the 30th of December, 1846:—

"SIRE,

"When, in the month of September last, I had the signal honour of laying before your Majesty the importance of military colonization for the consolidation of our conquest, you seemed to partake my opinion, as you had already done the preceding year, in the council to which I was called. Your Majesty instructed me to speak of it to M. Guizot, to endea-

vour to obtain from that minister, before my departure, a formal engagement to bring the question before the Chambers, on the opening of the next session, by a demand of an experimental credit. This engagement was accepted by M. Guizot as far as regarded himself, for he could not answer for his colleagues. I was therefore authorized to reckon on success, as I had the consent of the King, and of a minister who exercises, on just grounds, a powerful influence in the council. Nevertheless, I am informed that, after a serious deliberation, the question has been adjourned. Is it on a plea of inadmissibility, or merely as a parliamentary manœuvre? I have asked explanations on this point from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. If it is a plea of inadmissibility, your Majesty will deign to remember the words I had the honour of addressing to you when you insisted on my return to Africa. These are the words: 'Sire, I obey, but I entreat your Majesty to arrange that I may have something great and decisive to do in colonization.' After having accomplished the important undertakings which have settled the two leading questions—the conquest of the country, and the organization of the government of the Arabs—I cannot wish to exhaust myself in the miseries of a powerless system of peopling which, while unable to satisfy public impatience in any respect, exposes me daily to be assailed by criticisms, and even insults. I have addressed a memoir to M. Guizot on colonization in general. I entreat your Majesty to accept a copy. If this work does not rally the majority of the council to my side, nothing will remain for me but to pray

that better modes may be discovered of securing the future of Algeria.—I am, &c. &c.,

"THE MARSHAL DUKE OF ISLY."

We had no intention of evading the promise we had made to the Marshal, and at the moment of his demand we were preparing to fulfil it. When the session reopened on the 11th of January, 1847, the King said to the Chambers in his speech:—"You will also have to occupy yourselves with measures adapted to second, in our African possessions, the progress of colonization and internal prosperity. The tranquillity so happily re-established in Algeria by the valour and devotion of our army permits us to examine maturely this important question, on which a special bill will be presented to you." On the 19th of February following I wrote to Marshal Bugeaud:—"The two bills relative to Algeria, one for the ordinary supplemental credits, the other for an extraordinary credit of three millions for the experiments in military colonization, will be brought forward in a few days. Your presence in the Chamber during the debate will be indispensable. The Minister of War has already despatched the order for your coming. I repeat to you, my dear Marshal, it is indispensable, and I depend on it. The question will be formally proposed by a special bill announced in the speech from the throne. The debate must be complete, and it cannot be so without you. We shall support, I will support the bill most strenuously; but there are a host of points that you alone can clear up, a crowd of questions that you only can answer. I said this

yesterday to the young officer you introduced to me, M. Fabas, and who appears to me extremely intelligent. He is going to write a pamphlet the bases of which I have indicated to him. I therefore expect you towards the middle of March at the latest. I suppose the debate will come on between the 15th and the 20th of that month."

The bill was in fact presented on the 27th of February. The exposition of motives began by enumerating the various experiments and modes of colonization attempted in Algeria, especially since the government of Marshal Bugeaud. It enumerated the results already obtained, more important than were generally supposed, although very insufficient, and still far from the proposed end. "In summary," said the Minister of War, "twenty-seven new centres of colonization have been founded in the province of Algiers since the conquest; six old towns have been rebuilt, not including Algiers, which has become a European city of the first rank; and a population of nearly 73,000 souls is established in that district. Eight new centres have been created in the province of Oran; three towns raised there, independently of Oran; and a European population of 22,000 souls is permanently resident. In the province of Constantine also, eight new centres have been founded, three old towns rebuilt, and a population of nearly 12,000 souls added. . . . . But until the consecration of time has more universally established our rule in Algeria, until a compact European population has covered the whole surface of disposable soil, it is of high interest for the security of persons and property,

that first of all the conditions of colonial progress, to found in the heart of the country, at the limits of the occupied territory, in presence of a fanatical people specially formed for war and ever accessible to ideas of rebellion, come from what quarter they may—it is, I repeat, of the highest interest to found a stronger colonization, more defensible than free and civil colonization—in a word, an *armed* colonization. This advanced guard, which ought in some degree to form the buckler of the establishments in its rear, to act with gun and spade, to be ever ready to defend itself and protect its neighbours, would be useless if its elements were sought in a population unaccustomed to the trade of arms; those only who have known how to effect the conquest are fitted to this military work, which is no more than a continuation, because they have the means of furnishing a choice of young men, vigorous, acclimated, inured to war, active; capable, in fine, of keeping the Arabs in constant restraint and of making them understand that we are determined to remain masters of the country.

"With the object of encouraging, by means of this powerful protection, the more rapid possession of the soil by European speculators, as yet timidly concentrated on some parts of the coast, as also to bestow a token of satisfaction on the army of Africa, which has deserved so well of France by the continuance, brilliancy, and disinterestedness of its services, the King, moved by an idea analogous to that which influenced Napoleon, when, in 1808, he decreed the camps of Juliers and Alexandria, has instructed us to

present to you a bill, the object of which is to obtain an extraordinary credit, specially destined to found in Algeria agricultural camps, each comprising one thousand soldiers."

The bill exposed in detail the organization of these agricultural camps, and the entire system of military colonies designed to transform itself by degrees into definitive civil colonization. The greater number of these arrangements were taken from the ideas and pamphlets of Marshal Bugeaud.

When this bill reached Algiers it found the Marshal attacked by a violent cold, and almost confined to his bed, in consequence of rapid and repeated journeys in a rigorous season. "I have just had read to me the preamble of the bill," he wrote on the 9th of March, 1847; "if I reckoned only on this statement, the plan would seem to me extremely defective. I never saw anything more tame, timid, and colourless than the speech of the Minister of War. He has mixed up in it an incomplete history of the colonization, the system of General Lamoricière and that of General Bedeau: mine is brought in at the end as accessory. It is not supported by any of the great considerations; the narrowest possible range is given to it; it is excused much more than recommended, or proved to be useful. I expect very little from the speech of the Minister of War, but much from yours. It is now the work of the Ministry; you will not like it to receive a check. For my own part, I attach to it only a patriotic interest; my personal feeling could soon reconcile itself to ill success. I am already somewhat old for this hard work in Africa, and you know that if I continue to

hold the government after having settled the questions of war and the subjection of the Arabs, it is solely to place the country, before my retirement, in a path of colonization capable of perpetuating our conquest, and of relieving France from the heavy burden she supports. My health is improved; I hope to leave on the 14th."

A few days later, on the 15th of March, he wrote to me again:—"I once more address you from my bed of sickness. Wishing to be cured quickly, I urged the doctor to use the most energetic remedies to dissipate my violent pain in the chest: revulsive ointments, blisters, purgatives, camphorated compresses, sedative water—nothing has been neglected. I have suffered a martyrdom: my chest is one entire wound, and still there is no amendment in my internal state. I begin to fear seriously I shall not be able to come to Paris before the end of the month, and what could I do then? Resolutions will be taken; the committee will have made its report. If favourable, the affair will probably go on well; if not, it would be out of my power to alter the result."

A postscript added, "I learn by a private letter the names of the commissioners of seven bureaux of the Chamber for the African credits. I think the majority very unfavourable. The government, so strong in the bureaux, has not then endeavoured to elect the candidates of its own choice. All this is a bad augury."

The Marshal's information did not deceive him; the committee elected by the Chamber of Deputies to examine the bill was almost unanimously opposed

to it; it chose for president M. Dufaure, who, in the preceding session, had openly declared himself against military colonization. Independently of the special objections raised against the plan of Marshal Bugeaud, it was the general feeling of the Chamber that the system comprised an excessive pretension to dispense with time for one of those undertakings in which time is the necessary ally of men. It was soon evident that the bill would not pass. We had not made it a cabinet question; however important the affair, our general policy was in no way engaged in it; it was one of those cases in which a sensible government was called on to leave a wide latitude to its own party, and if we had acted otherwise, our stanchest friends would have justly cried out. Marshal Bugeaud himself foresaw the result of this situation, and took precautions beforehand not to engage personally in the parliamentary struggle: he kept away from Paris, and wrote to me, on the 21st of March and 28th of May, 1847: — "The Minister of War has without doubt made known to the council my determination to retire in face of the reception given by the Chamber to the bill for military colonization. I am sure that *in petto* you approve my resolve. As you would not wish in government to defend ideas not your own, you will think I ought no longer to desire the application of systems of colonization repugnant to my practical reason, and consequently to my patriotism. The state of my health does not permit me to come to Paris as I intended; I am using remedies which require tranquillity and rest; then, I must go to the baths.

However, my strong constitution leaves me the hope of re-establishment in the course of the year."

In presence of this resolution of the Marshal, the bill became, for the cabinet, an embarrassing question; it was to him we had accorded this attempt; without him, and in the prospect of his retirement, the debate was not important. M. de Tocqueville made, on the 2nd of June, in the name of the committee, a report in which, after discussing the various plans of colonization, and in particular that of the agricultural camps, he concluded by refusing the credit demanded for that experiment. Eight days after the reading of this report the government withdrew the bill.

The retirement of Marshal Bugeaud preceded that incident. While sincerely regretting it, I found his motive serious and legitimate. After having accomplished a great work, the dominion of France in Algeria, the Marshal had conceived a grand idea, the prompt establishment in Algeria of a people of French soldiers. This was to desire too much and too quickly, and to press what the equally sincere conviction of the Chambers rejected. Before this conflict, Marshal Bugeaud could not but retire; and he retired with dignity, for he carried to his retreat the glory of his life and the independence of his thought. But for the King's government a great question then presented itself, and which could not be adjourned: what successor to Marshal Bugeaud should be appointed for the command in Algeria? Round him, eminent lieutenants were not wanting; Generals Changarnier, Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Cavaignac had proved their skill as well

as valour. Nevertheless, none of them had yet acquired the universal reputation, the undisputed preponderance, which in some degree confer, by natural and public right, supreme authority. The state of affairs in Africa, besides, required no longer that power should have an essentially military character. Marshal Bugeaud had really completed the work of conquest; Abd-el-Kader still wandered here and there, seeking opportunities and means of continuing the struggle; but French supremacy prevailed irresistibly; a powerful moral ascendancy attached itself, throughout the old regency and the entire neighbourhood, to the name and arms of France; the great Kabyly alone maintained an independence, reserved for Marshal Randon to subdue. The day had arrived when the government of Algeria might be political and civil as well as military. The Duke of Aumale was more suited than any other person to give it this double character; he had taken part with distinction, occasionally with brilliancy, in some of the most active campaigns; he was equally loved and esteemed in the army; his name and rank had, with the Arabs, an important prestige; they ranged themselves more readily under the hand of a son of the Sultan of France, than under the sword of a conquering general. For some time he had been thought of for the great post which the resignation of Marshal Bugeaud would leave vacant: on the 17th of July, 1843, Marshal Soult, when announcing to the general the King's intention of conferring on him a marshal's staff, wrote thus:—"The Duke of Aumale could not consent to exercise the government of Algeria *ad interim*; but

his Royal Highness does not renounce, for the future, the prospect of that distinction. Until then, his desire would be to command, in the month of October next, the province of Constantine, and to serve there under your orders." A few months later, on the 23rd of October, 1843, Marshal Bugeaud wrote to M. Blanqui:—"I wish a prince to replace me here, not in the interest of the constitutional monarchy, but in that of the position; they would grant to him what they refuse to me. The Duke of Aumale is, and will become more so every day, a capable man. I shall leave, I hope, a work in good train; but for a long time there will be much still to do; it is a labour of giants and ages." Finally, the next year, Marshal Bugeaud wrote to myself:—"As to the government of the Duke of Aumale, I see no objection, except for the monarchy, which will assume one responsibility more. The young Prince is capable, and acquiring experience rapidly. I think that, from the beginning, he will govern well and become a distinguished soldier; for this, he requires only a little more practice and meditation."

It has often been said that King Louis-Philippe forced his son on the cabinet and on Algeria, solely through favour and family interest. Nothing is more false; the King wished undoubtedly that the princes his sons should strengthen his line by conferring honour on it; but on this point, he was never exacting or impatient, or given to thrust them forward until he considered them capable of doing service to the country. With regard to the Duke of Aumale in particular, the King waited until time and circum-

stances naturally called the Prince to the post he was desirous he should fill. The opportunity could not be more favourable. It was solely in account of the disagreement between his ideas and those of the Chambers, and by an act of his own will, that Marshal Bugeaud retired; the choice of the Duke of Aumale to succeed him was solely determined by motives drawn from the common interests of France and Algeria, of civil and military administration. The cabinet agreed with the King in this opinion; and when, on the 11th of September, 1847, the Prince received the charge of governor-general of our possessions in Africa, he was called to it as the most natural successor of Marshal Bugeaud, and as the one most willingly accepted by the eminent men who might have aspired to the power with which he was invested, as also by the soldiers and populations over whom that power was to be exercised.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MUSSULMANS IN PARIS.—TURKEY AND GREECE.

MUSSULMAN CHIEFS IN PARIS, FROM 1845 TO 1847.—BEN-ACHACHE, AMBASSADOR FROM MOROCCO.—AHMED PACHA, BEY OF TUNIS.—IBRAHIM PACHA, SON OF THE VICEROY OF EGYPT, MEHEMET ALI.—MIRZA MEHEMMED ALI KHAN, AMBASSADOR FROM PERSIA.—REDSCHID PACHA, GRAND VIZIER.—BARRENNESS OF ATTEMPTS AT REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.—THERE IS NO TRUSTING TO APPEARANCES.—AFFAIRS OF SYRIA.—PROGRESS OF THE CONDITION OF THE CHRISTIANS IN SYRIA FROM 1845 TO 1848.—AFFAIR OF THE CONSULATE OF FRANCE AT JERUSALEM IN 1843.—QUESTION OF THE RENEGADES IN TURKEY.—OF THE SITUATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN EUROPE.—AFFAIRS OF GREECE.—M. COLETTIS AND M. PISCATORY.—M. PISCATORY AND SIR EDMUND LYONS.—KING OTHO.—MY INSTRUCTIONS TO M. PISCATORY.—REVOLUTION OF ATHENS (15TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1843).—OPINION OF M. COLETTIS.—NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN GREECE.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM.—SENTIMENTS OF THE CABINETS OF LONDON, ST. PETERSBURG, AND VIENNA.—ARRIVAL OF M. COLETTIS IN GREECE.—THE MAVROCORDATO MINISTRY.—ITS FALL.—MINISTRY OF COLETTIS AND METAXA.—M. METAXA RETIRES.—THE COLETTIS MINISTRY.—HOSTILITY OF SIR EDMUND LYONS.—MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH M. COLETTIS.—ATTITUDE OF SIR EDMUND LYONS TOWARDS M. PISCATORY.—INSTRUCTIONS OF LORD ABERDEEN.—FALL OF THE CABINET OF SIR ROBERT PEEL AND LORD ABERDEEN.—LORD PALMERSTON RESUMES OFFICE IN ENGLAND.—HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS GREECE AND THE MINISTRY OF M. COLETTIS.—FIRMNESS OF M. COLETTIS.—INTERNAL

TROUBLES IN GREECE.—M. COLETTIS REPRESSES THEM.—QUARREL BETWEEN THE COURTS OF ATHENS AND CONSTANTINOPLE.—ILLNESS AND DEATH OF M. COLETTIS.

(1842—1847.)

BETWEEN 1845 and 1847, I saw arrive in Paris representatives of all the great Mussulman powers Europe, Africa, and Asia. Sidi-Mohammed-ben-Achache, ambassador from the Emperor of Mcrocco; Ibrahim Pacha, eldest son and heir to the Viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali; Ahmed Pacha, Bey of Tunis; Mirza Mehemmed Ali Khan, ambassador from the Shah of Persia. At the same epoch, the reformer of Turkey, Redschid Pacha, was ambassador from the Porte in France, and on the point of quitting his post to resume, at Constantinople, first, that of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and secondly, of Grand Vizier. I have treated, not only at a distance and by correspondence, but in person and conversation, with these Mussulman chiefs, who, by their almost simultaneous presence, rendered homage to French power and policy, and came to seek with the government of King Louis-Philippe more friendly ties. I found in them men of very opposite characters, placed in different degrees of civilization and enlightenment, and often animated by contrary designs. My relations with all ended in giving me, as regards the Mussulman in contact with the Christian world, the same idea, and the same impression of the future. There is nothing important to be expected from the Mussulman world, either for its own reform, or for the Christians who are placed by the unhappy course of events under its laws.

Sidi-Mohammed-ben-Achache of Morocco was a young Arab of agreeable person, serious, modest, and gentle, of mild and elegant manners, anxious to show himself scrupulously attached to his faith, respectful with dignity, and more sedulous of obtaining a good reception for himself and the sovereign he represented than intent on any distinct political object. His person and air recalled those last Moorish Abencerrages of Grenada, whose great lives and reminiscences are still perpetuated in his family at Tetuan, where it had established itself on quitting Spain. He was sent to Paris as an evidence of friendly relations between France and Morocco, and to give to the treaty of the 10th of September the full *éclat* of peace, rather than to conclude with us a specific and effective arrangement.

The Bey of Tunis, Ahmed Pacha, conducted himself, while in France, as an intelligent and skilful politician, without high or rare distinction, but with remarkable self-command, careful to preserve the attitude of a sovereign prince while paying court to a powerful neighbour from whom he expected his safety. He expatiated incessantly, with admiration and flattery, on French and Christian civilization, remaining always a Mussulman in manners and tastes, although without zeal. A short time before he visited France, to please the philanthropic Christians he had decreed throughout his regency the abolition of negro slavery. At Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles, wherever he stopped, he gave liberally to the charitable institutions. He was eager to promise reforms, without inclination or confidence, and fancied he could always

pay, with compliments and presents, for the services of which he stood in need.

Ibrahim Pacha was a brave and prudent soldier, more cunning than clever, and sensible, but with vulgar habits and feelings. The exalted fortune, the intimate society, and strong discipline of his father had made of him what a superior man can make of an ordinary one. He knew how to comprehend and advance an object, to command troops, to administer provinces; but he was a stranger to elevated views, to any bold or original initiative, grasping rather than ambitious, miserly even to parsimony; anxious, above all other considerations, as he himself confessed, to become the richest prince in the world; ungifted with the desire or power of pleasing, and equally capable of cruelty and servility in the exercise of a power which he would never have been able to found. He submitted with terror to the ascendancy of his father. When, in 1844, Mehemet Ali, in a fit of passion which bordered on madness, quitted Alexandria suddenly for Cairo, threatening with exemplary punishment all he left behind him, "I saw," lately wrote to me the Marquis de Lavalette, who was then consul-general for France in Egypt—"I saw Ibrahim Pacha, who no longer felt his head on his shoulders, shed tears of alarm. 'It is me,' he exclaimed, 'my father points at, more than the rest; and yet, what can he reproach me with? Have I not obeyed him all my life? When I commanded his armies, let my state of health be what it might, I never took leave of absence for twenty-four hours without his permission. I have made myself an executioner to please

him!' And he then related to me that, several years before, his father had for superintendent of his treasury a certain Copt, whose corruption Ibrahim had often pointed out without convincing Mehemet Ali, who suspected both, and was unwilling to believe the statements of his son. One day, Ibrahim, who commanded the camp of Kouka, in the neighbourhood of Cairo, saw the Copt enter his tent, bearing a sealed note from the great Pacha. Ibrahim opened it, read and re-read it, took up a pistol which lay near him, and blew out the brains of the unfortunate financier. The note ran thus: 'Kill me this dog with thine own hand!'" All this docility failed to inspire the Viceroy with increased confidence or complaisance for his son. When Ibrahim fell sick, he with difficulty obtained his father's permission to repair to the hot baths of Vernet, in France, which his physician, Dr. Lallemand, prescribed for him. He came there at length, without any political object, and after three months' residence, traversed France, and resided for half a year in Paris, merely as an indifferent spectator, more occupied with his health and gross pleasures than with his future prospects. 'My son, the seraskier, is older than I am,' said Mehemet Ali; and the father, in fact, survived his son, and also his own reason. The hereditary establishment of his family in Egypt, and Egypt opened as a beautiful and fertile field to the labours and rivalries of Europe—this is what the genius and glory of Mehemet Ali have accomplished; but nothing more."

The Persian ambassador, Mirza Mehemmed Ali

Khan, was an insignificant courtier, despatched to France by the Shah, his master, more from vanity than any serious design, perhaps to satisfy some intrigue or rivalship of the Court of Teheran. His presence in Paris, and his conversation, served only to confirm the idea I had already conceived of the state of decline and sterile anarchy into which Persia had for a long time fallen.

Redschid Pacha was deficient in one of the qualities most essential to the success of the work he was attempting in his country: he was too little of a Turk himself to be a powerful reformer in Turkey. When Peter the Great undertook to force Russia into European civilization, he was, and continued to be, profoundly Russian. A bold and ambitious innovator, he wished to advance his nation rapidly, but he remained identical and sympathetic with it, in manners, passions, traditions, and in the rude and barbarous practices of life. The Sultan Mahmoud II. was as thoroughly a Turk as the janissaries he destroyed, and his efforts tended much more to re-establish his own power, than to reform the social state and government of his people. Educated from youth, and engaged through his whole life in the relations of Turkey with Europe, Redschid Pacha became pre-eminently a European diplomatist. An observer more acute than profound, and an adroit politician without courage, his mind was impressed by the dangers to which the enterprises and contests of the great European powers exposed his country: he applied himself to the desire and hope of disseminating throughout the Ottoman Empire some of the conditions and rules of European

civilization; not that in his inmost heart he admired or loved them better than the Mussulman habits and traditions. "He was sincerely devoted to his country and his master," recently wrote to me the Count de Bourqueney, who knew him well, and observed him closely during his embassy at Constantinople. "This attachment had in it something of what we call patriotism; he had no conception of life without the Bosphorus, the harem, and the pillau." But he saw in a certain assimilation of the Turkish with the European governments, the only means of preserving for his master and his country their place and weight in European policy. To satisfy Europe in Turkey for the maintenance of Turkey in Europe, was his dominant and constant idea. To succeed in this difficult enterprise, he had to struggle, on the one hand, against the intrigues and rivalries of the seraglio; on the other, against the instincts, traditions, prejudices, and fanatical passions of his country. Skilful in the interior of the seraglio, a shrewd courtier and an intelligent diplomatist, he often succeeded in obtaining, preserving, and resuming power with the Sultan; but when it became necessary to act upon the old Turkish nation, and draw it to his course, he wanted vigour and authority; neither warrior nor fanatic, more humane than belonged to his race, and timid even to pusillanimity, his personal demeanour neither accredited nor sustained his reforms. He scattered at random foreign seeds without himself possessing or strongly cultivating the soil wherein they were to take root and increase.

In public life we too often accept the temptation of

satisfying others, and of being satisfied with appearances. Few men sufficiently study themselves and their actions to be exclusively intent on advancing, really and effectively, towards the object they pursue. When Redschid Pacha had published in Turkey, and throughout Europe, the reforms inserted in the hatti-sheriff of Gulhané, on the 3rd of November, 1839, he was satisfied with himself, and believed that Europe also ought to be satisfied. When the European diplomatists at Constantinople had obtained some influence in the Turkish administration, and certain concessions in favour of the Christians of the East, they thought that they had done much for the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire, and for peace between the Mussulmans and Christians united under its laws—a falsehood or illusion on both sides. Neither the Turkish reformer nor the European diplomatists rendered to themselves a justly severe account of the problems they had to solve, and were not as self-exacting as they ought to have been. If they had thoroughly sounded the difficulties of their enterprises, and scrupulously weighed what they called their successes, they would soon have recognized the immense insufficiency of their works. We must not reproach their vain confidence with too much rigour. Man is with difficulty convinced that he effects so little when he promises so much, and when he has sometimes expended such great efforts on the little he has accomplished. But those alone are true political agents, and merit the attention of history, who, whether before or after they commence action, penetrate beyond the surface of things, take no fugitive

appearances for effective results, and follow up by vigorous execution the serious completion of their designs.

The more I talked and treated with these Mussulman politicians, the highest in estimation and the most enlightened of their various countries, the more forcibly I was struck by the emptiness and impotence of that Islamism of which they were the representatives. All were, in fact, depressed and anxious as to the state and government of their nation. All avowed their conviction of a certain necessity of reforms; but in their ideas and efforts in this sense there was neither spontaneity nor fecundity; they neither thought nor acted under the impulse of the personal ideas and internal activity of Mussulman society. Their reforming desires and labours were merely painful borrowings from European and Christian civilization, loans contracted solely to sustain a tottering existence by a slight assimilation with foreigners from whose propinquity and power they were unable to escape. Imitation and fear are two dispositions essentially barren. Imitation does not penetrate the masses, and constraint remains without sincerity. Given up to themselves, all these Mussulmans—Turks, Egyptians, or Arabs—would have done nothing of what was attempted upon them; and, except for those who were satisfied with appearances, all that was attempted was superficial and vain.

According as my attention was directed towards them, particular facts confirmed me in the general impression as to the state of the Mussulman peoples and governments which I had derived from my

relations with their leading representatives. The Syrian question was one of those which, from 1842 to 1847, occupied, externally, the most prominent place in our negotiations, and, internally, in our debates. It was also the question respecting which, at that epoch, the cabinet was in the most complicated position; and the public under the most habitual illusion. As often as the Christians of Syria were alluded to, the opposition assumed for its starting post, either in demand or criticism, the ancient treaties between France and the Porte, and our rights of protectorate over the Christians in the East. They scarcely took the trouble of consulting the text of those treaties, concluded for the first time under Francis the First in 1525, renewed and amplified under Henry the Fourth in 1604, in 1673 under Louis the Fourteenth, and in 1710 under Louis the Fifteenth. They applied essentially to the French agents and Christians established or travelling in the Ottoman Empire, and it was by the paths of induction or tradition that our protectoral right had extended and exercised itself, especially in the Libanus, in favour of the Catholic subjects of the Porte itself. We were perfectly determined to maintain it in that bearing; but after the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the situation of France in the East was much changed. She was formerly almost the sole Christian power in intimate relations with the Porte, and the only one in a position to exercise, in the Ottoman Empire, and for the advantage of the Christians, an effective influence. Russia, as yet, reckoned for nothing, either in Europe or at Con-

stantinople. England did not approach India by that route, and had little credit or interest there. Subsequent to the latter half of the seventeenth century, on the contrary, we met at every step in the Ottoman Empire those two powers, active, jealous, and recognized. The Catholic Christians were not alone protected; the Greeks had also a powerful patron. The Protestants were beginning to penetrate and gain influence in Turkey, by their power rather than by their creed. The Porte, to elude or diminish our ancient rights, cultivated these complications and rivalries. We ourselves had much contributed to our enfeeblement on that theatre. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries we were, for the Porte, allies who occasioned no embarrassment, inspired no uneasiness, and disputed none of its provinces. From the opening of the nineteenth century we held a very different attitude. We had conquered Egypt transiently, and Algeria permanently; we had protected and liberated Greece; we were supporting against the Sultan his vassals of Alexandria and Tunis. Not only had we ceased to be alone present and powerful near the Porte, but we inspired it with sentiments totally opposite to our old intimacy; we were no longer necessary, and had become suspected.

When we were asked to act and dominate in the Libanus, as Louis the Fourteenth might have done, these facts were completely forgotten; it was demanded that France should exercise in the East the policy of the old system, in face of Europe, such as she had been made by the eighteenth century and the Revolution.

I had no disposition to yield to this mistake. I have already said, in a former volume, with what care, instead of pretending to exercise in Syria an isolated and exclusive action, I endeavoured to establish an understanding on that theatre with other European powers, in concert with ourselves, and to unite in a common object those separate influences. Prince Metternich was the first to enter into this concert, accepting the principle openly, but displaying weakness in the execution. Lord Aberdeen hesitated more at first, like a man less eager to display his ideas, and more exacting on his own account when he decided to act. He soon recognized the necessity and justice of joining his action to ours; and his ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, more bitter and as serious as himself, executed with loyal energy instructions conformable with his own sentiments. If I had been obliged to sacrifice to this understanding something of the natural and national policy of France, I should have regretted the sacrifice while accepting the necessity; but I had nothing of the kind to submit to: it was the object and essential character of the French policy in Syria that the province of the Libanus should be placed under the authority of a single Christian chief, subject to the Porte, and bound to it by certain conditions, but governing directly the various populations of what was called the Mountain; amongst whom the Maronite Christians were the most numerous, and the particular objects of our interest. This mode of legislation was long consecrated in the Libanus as a traditional privilege, supported by France, exercised by

the Christian family of the Cheabs, and of which the head of that family, the Emir Beschir, had been, in recent times, the clever, hard, greedy, and sometimes little faithful representative. It was the ardent ambition of the Porte to abolish this privilege, and to bring back the Libanus under the sole and direct authority of a Turkish pacha; and this, when it recovered possession of Syria, in 1840, constituted its entire policy in that province. Despite the disadvantages of our position in the East at that epoch, I immediately resumed, not only in principle, but in my declarations from the tribune and in my diplomatic labours, the policy of France, the re-establishment in the Libanus of a single and Christian administration. From 1840 to 1848 the struggle between these two policies comprised the history of Syria; whether in our concert with the European powers, or at Constantinople and with the Porte itself, we had never ceased for a moment to demand the Christian and French policy. With some hesitation and slowness, England and Austria accepted it as alone effective against the absurd tyranny of Turkey; and in spite of difficulties incessantly reviving, it continued, throughout that period, to make from year to year a certain degree of progress.

I shall not deny myself the pleasure of recapitulating here those advancements, the importance of which nobody is less disposed than I am to exaggerate. I have already indicated their starting point. At the end of 1842, after a long resistance, the Porte consented to give to each of the various populations of the Libanus a chief of its own religion and race;

to the Maronites, a Maronite chief; to the Druses, a Druse chief. But it introduced in the application of this system an obstinate ill-will and the power of inertness. The Turkish pachas appointed over Syria preserved in fact all the authority; the extraordinary commissioners charged with inspecting and correcting the pachas persisted in a similar path; the frequent mixture of Maronites and Druses in the same places, and the complication of rights of local feudality with those of the central authority, excited, as to the administrative separation of the two races, inextricable difficulties. In 1843, after three years of Turkish shuffling and European recrimination, the promise of instituting indigenous magistrates in the Libanus was not yet seriously fulfilled; an anarchical oppression perpetuated itself there; civil war, or rather alternate massacre and pillage, had broken out between the Druses and Maronites, always to the great injury of the latter, for the Turkish officers, in hatred to the Christians, supported, more or less openly, the Druses. The return of Redschid Pacha to Constantinople, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave to the European diplomatic action a little more efficacy; the appointment of two caïmacans, or native chiefs, for the two principal races of the Libanus, became a reality; in the towns and villages where the Maronites and Druses were mingled, the same principle was applied to the municipal system; the two nations obtained, in this system, under the name of *vekils*, distinct representatives; mixed and elected councils were placed by the side of the two caïmacans. A plan of taxation was established contrary to the oppressive exactions

of the Drusic feudalism. The disarming of the Druses, until then much less complete than that of the Maronites, was really effected. The territories disputed between the two races were replaced under the jurisdiction of the Maronite chiefs. The evidence of Maronites in their disputes with the Druses was admitted in law. A solemn declaration by the Porte confirmed their religious privileges. Indemnities were granted to those amongst them who had suffered most in the civil war. The Christian convents and European merchants, established at Beyrout or on the various points of Syria, received also ample compensation for their losses. Some of the Turkish officers, who had tolerated or favoured the violences against the Christians, were removed and punished. Finally, the government of Syria and of its several pachalics was confided to partizans of the policy of Redschid, attentive to carry out, in their provinces, the promises which Europe had received from him at Constantinople. From 1845 to 1848 the condition of the Christians in Syria was sensibly ameliorated, and gave them hopes of an improving future.

In conjunction with these attempts at reparation, reform, and progress, the ordinary vices and evils continued in operation throughout the various portions of the Ottoman Empire. In July, 1843, our consul at Jerusalem, the Count de Lantivy, recently arrived at his post, elevated rather precipitately the French flag on the consular residence. According to the terms of the treaties, this was our right;[1] but at

[1] Article 49. The pachas, cadis, and other officials shall not

Jerusalem, considered by the Mussulmans as one of their holy cities, and filled with a fanatical populace, this right had not been exercised for a considerable time, either by the consul of France or by any of the other foreign consuls residing there. A violent commotion broke out: the consular house was surrounded, and for a moment invaded; throughout the city the Christians were insulted; the consul himself, while repairing to the local divan, incurred some danger. The Pacha of Jerusalem, while acknowledging our right, and making apparent demonstrations against the outbreak, encouraged it secretly, and dared not punish it. Before receiving orders from me, our ambassador at Constantinople complained to the Porte, and demanded severe redress. My instructions directed him to follow it up warmly. The Porte hesitated, discussed, delayed, and offered modified terms; it yielded at last, formally acknowledged our right, and submitted to all our conditions. "I think," M. de Bourqueney wrote to me on the 12th of September, 1843, "they comprise the most complete reparation which has been obtained in this country. The Pacha of Jerusalem is dismissed. His successor will call officially on the King's consul, to express the regrets of his Highness's government. The principal leaders of the riot will be sent to the galleys. The French flag will be solemnly hoisted at Beyrout on an appointed day, and will receive a salute of twenty-one guns. The right of displaying it at Jerusalem

prevent the consuls or their appointed substitutes, from hoisting their flags according to etiquette, in the places where they are accustomed to reside for any length of time.

remains unquestioned; the Porte knows only that I shall conform to the usage constantly followed in the holy cities, by confidentially apprising our consul that motives exclusively founded on the fear of compromising the tranquillity of the city determine me to suspend until further orders the exercise of the right of our flag at Jerusalem. I have selected Beyrout for the place where our colours will be saluted, first, because the governor-general of the province resides there, and secondly, because the report of the reparation will extend from thence to the Libanus, and will produce on the Christians of the Mountain a lively and salutary impression."

At Aleppo, Latakia, and Moussul, analogous incidents, insults, pillages, abductions, and murders, occurred, and brought on similar results. At Beyrout, in October, 1845, an Arab, employed for fifteen years as a copyist in the French consulate, and who had gone on business to the small town of Zouk, three leagues from Beyrout, was arrested and imprisoned, without plausible motives or pretexts, by the Turkish commandant of the place. Our consul, M. Poujade, demanded his release energetically, and was refused. After several renewed and fruitless applications, the consul warned the Turkish functionary that if he persisted in his refusal, the French frigate, *Belle Poule*, which was cruising near Beyrout, would anchor in the Road of Djounie, and carry away the clerk of the consulate. The Turks refused a second time. The *Belle Poule* appeared before Djounie. Captain Ornano, who commanded her, sent one of his officers on shore, accompanied by

a dragoman, to demand the Arabian scribe. Not obtaining any reply, he manned his boats, which advanced armed to the shore. The French officer landed again, and on his approach the Turk finally surrendered his prisoner. The affair occasioned some stir at Constantinople; the Porte complained to our ambassador of this act of military force. I wrote to M. de Bourqueney: "I cannot but approve of what our consul has done in despair of his cause. Undoubtedly it was a strong measure, and one not to be frequently adopted; but it ought only to be imputed to those whose conduct, equally imprudent and odious, rendered it indispensable. It is well to apprise the Porte that such things may happen; this is the best way of compelling it, for its own interest, to prevent anything that might lead to a repetition of the necessity."

A more delicate question than this arose at Constantinople. An Armenian Christian had become a Mohammedan. At the end of a year, in a fit of repentance, he abjured again, and once more became a Christian at Constantinople, believing his Islamism to be forgotten. He was recognized, arrested, and condemned to death in virtue of the Turkish law against renegades, unless he returned to the Mussulman religion. Sir Stratford Canning, to whom his family applied to obtain his pardon, employed useless efforts with the Turkish ministers. The Armenian was executed in the streets of Constantinople, refusing to the last moment to speak the word which would have saved him. When informing me of this fact, on the 27th of August, 1843, M. de Bourqueney wrote:—"I have

sent our first dragoman, M. Cor, to Rifat Pacha,[1] to repeat from me these simple words, 'It would have been better for you to have lost a province than to have assassinated the Armenian who perished yesterday.'" I replied immediately to the ambassador:[2]— "I fully approve the language you have addressed to Rifat Pacha; but this manifestation, the only one you could make before receiving special instructions, is not sufficient in presence of such a monstrous fact. You will address the subjoined note to the minister,—

"The undersigned has received orders from his government to make the following communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte:—

"'The King's government has learnt with painful surprise the recent execution of an Armenian who, after having embraced the Mohammedan religion, returned to the faith of his fathers, and who, for this single act, has been visited by capital punishment because he refused to purchase his life by a new abjuration.

"'It would be futile, in explanation of such a deplorable fact, to appeal to the imperious dispositions of the law. This law, made for other times, has fallen into disuse; and, in any view, it was too easy to remain blind to an act accomplished out of Constantinople, even out of the Ottoman Empire itself, to allow what has recently occurred to be considered as one of those deplorable necessities in which

[1] At that time Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople.
[2] On the 16th of September, 1843.

policy sometimes finds, not a justification, but an excuse.

" 'Even if humanity, a name never vainly invoked in France, had not been also cruelly wounded by the punishment of this Armenian; even if the King's government, which has always considered, and will ever continue to consider, itself protector of the Christians in the East, could forget that it is Christianity itself which has suffered this sanguinary outrage; the interest it takes in the Ottoman Empire and its independence, would still impress it with profound grief for what has taken place.

" 'The King's government believes that it fulfils an imperious duty in making known to the Porte the impression it has received from a fact unfortunately irreparable, but which, if renewed, would be of a nature to bring down real dangers on the government which could be weak enough to make such concessions to an odious and deplorable fanaticism.' "

I communicated to the King's representatives in London, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, the note I instructed M. de Bourqueney to deliver at Constantinople. The English, Austrian, and Prussian cabinets coincided, with some inequality of degree, in the step we had taken; the Russian government stood aloof. The affair would probably have confined itself to words, when we learnt that a fact similar to the execution of the Armenian had been repeated at Biled-jeck, in Asia Minor. A Greek, who had become Mussulman, was also punished with death for returning to his original faith. Our remonstrances then became more precise and urgent; the

English cabinet fully united its action with ours. Lord Aberdeen, in a despatch addressed to Sir Stratford Canning, on the 16th of January, 1844, declared the *irrevocable* intention of his government of obtaining from the Porte official guarantees against the recurrence of similar acts; and if Sir Stratford Canning failed with the Turkish Ministers, he was ordered to carry the question to the Sultan himself. The Austrian internuncio attempted for several days to avoid associating himself with such peremptory demands; the Russian Minister seemed inclined to persist in his reserve; but when they saw to what point the representatives of France and England were decided and closely united, their language also became animated: "The Porte would be extravagant," said the Baron de Sturmer to M. de Bourqueney, "if it reckoned on any support from governments which have declared themselves less absolutely than those of Paris and London; in such a question divergences at the opening end by unanimity at the close; the Porte must give the guarantees required." It tried, however, at one time, to delay its answer; at another, to weaken its value. In an official conference with the ambassadors of France and England, Rifat Pacha proposed a declaration thus conceived: "The law permits no change whatever in the dispositions relative to the punishment of apostates. The Sublime Porte will take all the effectual measures possible to prevent the execution of Christians who, having become Mohammedans, shall return to Christianity." The two ambassadors rejected peremptorily an answer which consecrated the Turkish law by promising to

do what could be done to prevent its execution. Sir Stratford Canning demanded an audience of the Sultan; the Porte yielded; the President of Turkish Justice, Nafiz Pacha, who had opposed the concession, was removed; an official note, addressed on the 21st March, 1844, to the two ambassadors, expressly stated: "His Highness the Sultan has formed the irrevocable resolution of maintaining the amicable relations, and of drawing more closely the bonds of perfect sympathy, which unite him to the great powers. The Sublime Porte engages itself to prevent, for the future, by effectual means, the infliction on any Christian, abjuring Islamism, of the punishment of death." The two ambassadors had only occasion to present themselves to the Sultan to thank him for the engagement, and to receive the confirmation of it from his own mouth.

Thus, in all quarters, the Turkish habits of violence, fanaticism, absolutism, and anarchy, immediately provoked European remonstrances, and everywhere reparations closely followed the offences which promises and attempts at reform had been unable to prevent. But promises, reforms, and reparations were ever the result of constraint or the work of a sterile and incoherent imitation. Civilized Europe weighed upon the Turkish government, and the Turkish government yielded under the pressure of Europe; but there was no internal, spontaneous, and free effort of the Turkish nation, and consequently no real or durable progress. Sixteen years have rolled on since that epoch; great events have taken place in Eastern Europe. Has Turkey done more than undergo them? Has she

become reformed or developed? Has she been more able to take care of herself? Has Syria been exempt from oppression, devastation, civil war, plunder, or massacre? The same disorders, the same excesses, the same evils have been renewed in the Mussulman world, with the same powerlessness of its masters to dry up the sources by their own strength; the same European intervention, diplomatic or armed, has been more and more necessary to arrest the course, without being more efficacious in preventing the return. European wisdom watches, like a sentinel, at the gate of the Ottoman Empire, to prevent the different European ambitions from violently precipitating its ruin, and to preserve it, while it yet lives, from a too offensive discordance with the European system. This is all that it undertakes and all that it obtains.

As long as that empire does not destroy itself, and by its own vices, Europe is right in practising towards it this policy of patient conservatism. The principles of the right of nations and the interests of the European balance equally advise this course. There are problems in the East which ambitious and premature force could not determine, and a Mussulman Poland would be, for the Christian world, a source of immeasurable disorders, and, at the same time, a brutal aggression. But if Europe ought not, in deliberate resolve, and to deliver herself from a dying neighbour, to scatter Turkey in pieces, or allow it to be dismembered, neither ought she to be the dupe of false appearances and delusive hopes. She will not reform the Ottoman Empire; she will not transform it into a regular and living element of

European order; she will not deliver from their lamentable condition six millions of Christians oppressed by three millions of Turks, who not only compel them to submit to a detestable yoke, but shut out from them the future to which they aspire, and for which they are destined. And when any particular section of those Christians attempts courageously to free itself and to become once more a people, the only rational and effectual policy for civilized Europe is to come seriously to their aid, and to accomplish, by natural and partial movements, the deliverance of those fine countries, one of the two sources of European civilization.

Europe entered into this policy when she accepted the resurrection of Greece. French, English, Germans, and Russians, civilized nations and Christians, could not endure the spectacle of a small Christian population struggling heroically, after ages of oppression, to recover its place and name in the civilized world. From impulse or calculation, with a good or ill grace, Europe held out her hand to Greece. But with this unanimous movement there mingled immediately interests and designs of the most opposite nature. It was impossible to resist great and honest policy, but it was rendered inconsiderate and incoherent. In London they resigned themselves to liberated Greece, but they supported even more strenuously mutilated Turkey. At St. Petersburg, they congratulated themselves on obtaining a client in Greece hostile to the Turks; but they desired not, at any price, an independent neighbour capable of becoming a rival. Greece was permitted to revive,

but on condition that she should remain too small and weak to grow or scarcely to live. That nation was assisted to emerge from its tomb; but it was confined in a prison too narrow for its reanimated members:—"From the frontier of my liberated country," said M. Colettis to me one day, "I see in my country, still enslaved, the place where I left the tomb of my father."

I feel no surprise at these incoherences and contradictions; I scarcely reproach the cabinets of London and St. Petersburg with them; I know the empire exercised over the conduct of governments by the complication of situations and interests, by national traditions, and the necessity of yielding to any particular question only a place measured by its importance in the general policy of the State. But the error, because natural and excusable, is not the less real and injurious. It was an unfortunate and unskilful fact to devote Greece to languor while restoring her to life; and this fact became the source of serious embarrassments and false steps for the powers who thus enervated the work they accomplished. France had the happiness of not finding in her private interests or general policy anything which impeded her good feeling towards Greece. We applauded her resurrection, not only in the present but in the future, and with all which that future could add to her greatness. While in London they accepted the independence of Greece as an untoward necessity, we accepted in Paris as an unfortunate condition the narrow limits within which that independence was circumscribed. We neither shared in the dreams nor the impatience of

the Greeks; we were firmly resolved to observe loyally the treaties which had founded Greece, and to maintain, on this point, accord between the three powers, whose common protection was indispensable to her returning life. But while rejecting every attempt at extension at the expense of Turkey in the Greek provinces she still possessed, we did not understand that Greece was to be interdicted from great hopes, and we promised ourselves to second, in the small State which had become the heart of the Greek nation, all the internal advancements of prosperity, activity, good government, and regular liberty, which might preface and legitimize its future destinies. We had confidence in the fertile virtue of the seed, and we wished to cultivate it with a friendly hand while patiently expecting the fruit.

I did not conceal from myself the difficulties of this policy, the rigour of the advice we should have to give the Greeks, or the importance of the circumspection we should be compelled to observe with the European cabinets. However identical and fixed a starting point may be for allies, it is impossible to rest there without motion: events occur, situations develop themselves; we must act, we must advance; and when we diverge in our views, no matter how distant they may be, there is no method of remaining always united on the road. But, in spite of these embarrassments, the policy of France in Greece had this immense advantage, that it was perfectly exempt from reticence and inconsistency, sympathetic with prudence, and favourable to the future without compromising the present. In both senses it was agree-

able to me. I love great ends pursued by rational means.

I had near me the two men best adapted to comprehend and second this policy, M. Colettis and M. Piscatory, a glorious leader of the Palikari, and a tried philhellenist, both passionately devoted to the Greek cause, both possessing the confidence of the Greek people, and both of mind and heart sufficiently firm not to give themselves up blindly to their own desires, and to resist in Greece chimerical attempts, as also the disorderly habits of insurrection and war. M. Colettis had been for some years minister of Greece in Paris; he lived there modestly, supporting with dignity, and without useless noise or agitation, the interests of his country, and observing, with patriotic curiosity, on the great theatre of France, the work of the establishment of a free government and the complications of European policy. His small house adjoined mine; he often visited me, whether I was in or out of office, and we conversed in unrestrained intimacy. I was struck by the progress, I might say the transformation, operated in him under the influence of the spectacle at which he was present. The bold conspirator of Epirus, the astute physician of the sanguinary Ali, Pacha of Tepaleen, the adventurous chief of heroic but semi-barbarous insurgents, became, I may almost say suddenly, a sagacious and judicious politician, quick in comprehending the conditions of regular power as of civilized liberty, and rendering himself daily more capable of governing, as a statesman, that people, still scattered and unbridled, with whom he had recently plunged

into secret societies, incessant insurrections, and anarchical rivalries.

M. Piscatory, having returned for about eighteen months from the mission with which, in 1840, I had entrusted him in Greece, had conducted himself there with rare and prudent ability; he had resumed, without display, his position as ancient champion of Greek independence; he had renewed, without enslaving himself, his relations with some of the principal leaders in the struggle; he had brought me precise ideas and a completely formed experience. I asked the King to appoint him minister in Greece. "Do you promise me," said the King, "that he will not make court to the opposition there, and that we shall have no sudden outbreaks?" "Yes, sire, I promise, and I will watch over him. Despite our disagreements of 1840, he has a sincere friendship for me, and is really capable, loyal, full of resources and resolutions; no one can be so available in Greece." The King consented, and on the 10th of June, 1843, M. Piscatory left Paris as French Minister at Athens, while M. Colettis remained Greek Minister in Paris.

My instructions to M. Piscatory were short and clear: they prescribed to him to support the government of King Otho while pressing him to accomplish the administrative reforms loudly demanded by the protecting powers themselves, as also by the Greeks, and to neglect no means of living and acting in harmony with his colleagues, the representatives of Europe at Athens, and especially with Sir Edmund Lyons, the English Minister. "France," I said to him, "has only one thing to demand of Greece in

return for all she has done for her. Let Greece learn how to develop the infinite resources enclosed in her own bosom; let her, by a skilful, prudent, active administration, elevate herself gradually, without shock, without encouraging dangerous hazards, to the degree of prosperity and strength necessary to occupy the place in the world to which the natural destiny of politics leads her. We shall thus be fully satisfied; the combination we proposed to ourselves, by favouring the enfranchisement of the Hellenes, will be realized; and, happy at having attained our end, we shall certainly not think of requiring from King Otho any other testimony of gratitude."

I added, in a private letter: "Persist in maintaining concert with your colleagues, even though it should cost much trouble and even sacrifice. This is the only method of effective action. I trust to yourself to take care of your particular position and your personal popularity. You love popularity, for good reasons, and to turn it to advantage; but still you love it. You will not sin to forget it. I cannot tell how far we shall be able to carry our concert, but we must carry it as far as we can. By concert, and while it lasts, we shall fortify ourselves for the moment when it may fail us."

From London, and without any previous understanding, Lord Aberdeen addressed analogous recommendations to Sir Edmund Lyons. He informed him that he was considered too harsh with King Otho, too domineering with his diplomatic colleagues; that from Vienna and Berlin his recall had been formally demanded, and that at Paris and St. Peters-

burg they had signified that it would be highly acceptable. He promised to support him against these attacks; but he prescribed to him more respect to King Otho, not to make himself a partizan in Greece, and not to live in a state of rivalry and contest with his associates in office.

M. Piscatory executed my instructions faithfully and cleverly; he sought no occasion or mark of particular favour or influence either with the Greeks or with King Otho; he applied all his care to calm the fears or jealousies of his colleagues, and to enter with them, especially with Sir Edmund Lyons, into confidential and close relations. "They live," he wrote to me, "M. Catacazy and Sir Edmund, in perfect intelligence. I have endeavoured to prove that I had not the slightest wish to disturb it; to do so would lead to nothing, and would be at once suspicious. I stand very well by their side, and I think I see the moment when I shall be in the midst of them. Meanwhile, I make myself small; I have even a little huffed our friends. I practise a trade here very opposite to my nature: I thwart myself on all points, and I make enormous sacrifices to my colleagues, who make none in return; they follow their course, either that of their own humour or of their government. Do not think I am tired of the 'unpleasant quarter of an hour' which, in all circumstances, we must learn to put up with; I am often vexed, but I know how to wait, and I shall wait to the end. Let us then not speak of my popularity, since you do not trouble yourself on that head. I do nothing but what is right to main-

tain it, and perhaps some day you may be very glad to find it." [1]

On one point, and a highly important one, it was extremely difficult for M. Piscatory to continue in harmony with his colleagues while differing from them, and to retain sympathy with the Greeks when opposing their bent. The unpopularity of King Otho was great, as much so with the diplomatic corps at Athens as with the people. Sir Edmund Lyons said publicly and with heat, that it was impossible to act with him; M. Catacazy gave way with cold reserve, and as if indifferent to the result. In face of this attitude and language of the diplomatists, the Greeks gave free utterance to their sentiments; it was not of evil designs, of contempt for justice, of breach of faith, or of acts of violence that they accused King Otho. They complained of his inertness, of his mania for drawing and retaining all questions to himself without settling them, of his barren taste for absolute power, of his deaf and mute opposition to every independent movement, every effective reform. "The country is perfectly calm," M. Piscatory wrote to me, "but it has a profound conviction that the King cannot be always there to prevent it from advancing. . . . . The long efforts which this prince has made, and still continues to make daily, to conduct and decide everything, to struggle against a situation he is unable to comprehend, has led him to this point, that he can no longer recognize himself.

[1] Letters of the 30th June, 31st of July, 8th of August, and 20th of December, 1843.

Greek or foreigner, all the world says, This is impossible. The remedy suggested, and the chance of which is discussed—referred by some to the conference of London, by others to a national assembly—is a constitution. 'Yes,' says Sir Edmund Lyons, 'the King is impossible; a constitution, and the more liberal the better.' M. Catacazy deplores the King's madness, and declares that a constitution is the remedy. For myself, I say the question of the King cannot be raised; he is there, and there he must remain. Yes, reform is necessary to give pledges to the country; but more than that is revolution, and it is not the trade of governments to protect revolutions."

M. Piscatory, in holding this language, thoroughly understood and practised our policy, and I hastened to confirm him in it. 'Resist on every occasion the sentiment and proposition, *this is impossible*, which you name to me in general terms. It is the disposition of our age to say quickly, *this is impossible*, and to say it of what is necessary. We fancy ourselves more powerful than we are to do what pleases us, and we are not sufficiently ready to accept what we dislike. There are inevitable, incurable evils, evils with which we must live, for we should die of the blow which extinguished them. I believe all you tell me of the evil of which you speak, and nevertheless I persist. Assuredly, not because we do not struggle against evil; we must struggle, and without intermission; but you know as well as I do, we struggle very differently, according as we mean, in the end, to accept or repudiate. Maintain strongly in the spirit of the Greeks the necessity of accepting what is, and aid them in the contest."

Almost at the moment of addressing these instructions to M. Piscatory, I had occasion to explain in our tribune their character and motives. The Chambers were debating a bill relative to the half-yearly payment of the Greek loan, and the financial obligations of France towards Greece. "We do not thoroughly estimate," I said, in the Chamber of Peers on the 21st of July, 1843, "the true interest of France in Greece; it is more simple and lofty than is represented. France has but one interest in Greece—that the Greek nation should endure, strengthen, and prosper. In following up this interest we practise the policy of France. This is not here a detached, disinterested policy; it is a sound and wise policy, only somewhat exalted, and this forms its honour as well as utility. For its success, to obtain the duration and security of Greece, what has experience taught us? That we should encounter three obstacles in our way: one, the rivalry of internal parties, factions, and Greek coteries; another, the rivalry of foreign influences in Greece; the third, the imperfections, inactivity, and disorder of the Greek administration. These are the three obstacles we have always seen opposing the consolidation and development of the Grecian State. How are they to be surmounted unless by a collective action? How suppress the struggle of foreign influences at Athens except by concert? And as for the inertness, the disorder of Greek administration, that administration defended itself in its vices by opposing a power to a power, an influence to an influence. To overcome this evil, collective action, the concert of all, is evidently the only effectual

method. It is not, therefore, a fancy, a spirit of system which has brought us to this point; it is the experience of facts, pure necessity. Concert, collective action in Greece, is, for us, the means of securing the success of good policy, of French policy. If, to obtain this end, isolated action appeared to us better than concerted action, we should adopt isolated action; concert or isolation—these are the methods to be used alternately, according as the situation demands. Experience has shown us that collective action here, the policy of concert, was the only course which could surmount the internal and external, the diplomatic and national obstacles, which opposed themselves to the duration, the establishment, the pacific and regular development of the Grecian State; and this is the true French policy. We have, therefore, frankly adopted collective action, the policy of concert, without suffering ourselves to be alarmed or arrested by words or appearances. What we wish, is success; what we look to, is the end; and there are no other means of reaching our object."

While I was using this language in Paris, the state of minds in Greece, and the imminence of a crisis, impressed the men who we had reason to believe were the least disposed to receive it. The representative at Athens of the cabinet the most uneasy as to the resurrection of Greece, the minister of Austria, M. de Prokesch, wrote thus to a friend in France:—"It is impossible to live amongst this intelligent and patient race without feeling convinced that they have a future as well as a past. You cannot imagine the success here of the last speech of M. Guizot in

the Chamber of Peers: that in the Chamber of Deputies left no doubt of the good feeling; the second has convinced them that this good-will was intelligent. Everything is expected from the conference of London. They will wait as long as the smallest hope remains. This country trembles to place its hand to its own affairs. Meanwhile, the duty of the citizen begins to evince itself, and there have been two very serious and independent debates in the State Conseil. The King is ever what you know him to be. For my own part, I do not believe in the excessive danger of the country interfering in its own affairs; I fear it less than the country itself does, and I know only a constitutional solution for the situation. But this is not accomplished by the hand of man; the public sentiment, which is the expression of Providence in the affairs of peoples, must act. Until then we must believe in the possibility of what is, and labour for its duration by regulating, constraining, and directing it. This is difficult; perhaps it is impossible. But that matters little; it is the only honourable conduct, the sole course to adopt."

On the same day, when in my correspondence I communicated this letter confidentially to M. Piscatory, the 16th of September, 1843, he announced to me the constitutional revolution accomplished at Athens on the preceding eve, the 15th of September: "At one o'clock in the morning, the general, the tocsin, several musket-shots, and cries of 'Long live the constitution!' woke up the population of Athens. The troops were soon under arms, having nearly all their officers at their head. It was evident

that it was not by orders of the government that this movement took place. It was unanimous, and the commotion, military and civil, arrived in front of the palace without encountering any resistance. The troops marching regularly, under the command of their chiefs, drew up in order between the palace and the populace. Cries of 'Long live the constitution!' were repeated with fresh vigour. The King attempted to harangue the soldiers, to recall the officers to their duty, to protest before the people his devotion to the country. They refused to hear him. His voice was overwhelmed by cries of 'Long live the constitution!' Two of his aides-de-camp, who endeavoured to make their military authority respected, were compelled to take refuge in the palace.

"The first step of the representatives of the three courts was to repair to the residence of M. Rizo.[1] They found him alone, perfectly resigned, and his first words were that the movement was general and inevitable, that neither he nor the other ministers of the King could do anything to oppose it, that he had not seen his colleagues, and that he believed they would find it impossible to meet in council.

"At daybreak we repaired to the square of the palace, which was already surrounded by the people and the troops. In the impossibility of reaching the King, we called for the superior commandant of the garrison to declare that we held him individually responsible for the inviolability of the palace and the King's person:—'I will answer for both with my head,' replied Colonel Kalergis.

[1] At that time Minister for Foreign Affairs in Greece.

"The other members of the diplomatic corps being informed, joined us at the house of the Russian minister. Although apprised that we should not be received at the palace, but convinced that it was our duty to signify that in such circumstances our place was with the King, we presented ourselves at the gate, which was closed to us. The order was absolute. The Council of State had assembled and submitted propositions to the King, which his Majesty was called upon to accept within an hour.

"The diplomatic body, after protesting against the refusal to admit them, feeling sure that the King's person would be respected, and judging that their presence could only excite the constantly increasing crowd, retired from the square. Meeting again in the neighbourhood of the palace, they sent repeatedly to ask if the gates would soon be opened to them. The answer returned was, that they would be admitted as soon as his Majesty had accepted the propositions of the council, which we add to this despatch, with the signatures affixed, comprising those of all the members present at the assembly.

"In a short time the commandant of the troops informed the representatives of the foreign powers that the gates of the palace were unclosed to them. They hastened to the King's presence, and acquainted him with the efforts they had made to reach him. His Majesty did them the honour of saying that he had written to convoke them, being desirous of their advice in such a difficult position. He then gave them a full account of all the events of the night and morning, adding that he was informed the con-

stitutionalists had taken possession of Nauplia, Missolonghi, and Chalcis. The King also said, with lively emotion:—'I have abandoned all my prerogatives; I am no longer a king; and when they have imposed on me ministers, a national assembly, a constitution, and the army has ceased to obey me, I felt bound to ask myself whether I ought to retain the crown or abdicate. As a man, the last determination was that which became me; as a king, I thought of the anarchy which my abdication would inevitably entail. I have therefore submitted to events. But the new ministers given to me by the council of state pretend that they cannot answer for the public peace or make the troops and populace retire, whose cries you hear, unless I sign a proclamation thanking the nation for its wisdom, the army for the order it has maintained, and issue a decree declaring that a medal shall be given to all who have taken part in the movement. This is a degradation to which I cannot submit. Gentlemen, what is your opinion of it?'

"We entreated the King to permit us, although we fully comprehended the sentiments he expressed, to reserve our advice until after we had seen the new ministers, who waited his answer, and had ascertained all the exigencies of the situation.

"We represented to the ministers the danger of humbling royalty, the duty they had contracted of trying everything to arrest an evil already so complete. They answered that it was beyond their power to restore tranquillity without satisfying the double demands of the people and the army.

"Returning to the King, and understanding the painful feelings he never ceased to express, we asked him to submit to this last sacrifice, in the name of the sentiment which had influenced him in more important resolutions. The King yielded, and, presenting himself in the balcony, surrounded by the ministers, where we also deemed it fitting to accompany him, was received by cries of '*Long live the King!*' '*Long live the constitution!*'

"The ministers took the oath of fidelity between his Majesty's hands, while we remained with the Queen; and then descending to the square of the palace, they announced the last concessions of the King to the people and troops, who instantly retired.

"During this sad morning, two gendarmes were killed, and a young man grievously ill-treated by the people.

"The diplomatic body remained with the King until three o'clock, and did not leave the palace until assured that, for the moment at least, complete tranquillity was restored.

"Before returning to the palace, on the King's invitation, in the evening, we have the honour of detailing these occurrences to your Excellencies. You will readily understand that we confine ourselves to a mere recital of these deplorable events. It requires more freedom of mind than we can at present exercise, and a serious examination, to appreciate the starting post of this revolution and to estimate the consequences. All that we ought to say, to give a just and general idea of the event, is, that public opinion, whether spontaneous or excited, was unani-

mous, and everything proves that what has recently passed at Athens, is at this moment accomplishing itself in the provinces. Without expecting a catastrophe so prompt, we had but too certainly foreseen it."

This report, addressed to the Conference of London, was signed by the three ministers of the protecting powers of Greece, by M. Catacazy, as also by M. Piscatory and Sir Edmund Lyons, who thus attested the facts, and the common advice they had given to King Otho.

As soon as this document reached me, together with the letters of M. Piscatory, which confirmed the events, with comments according to his own impressions, I summoned M. Colettis, and, after giving him all the despatches to read, "What say you?" I demanded. "Is this a spontaneous, natural, national, and purely Greek movement? or is it the result, more or less factitious, of a foreign intrigue?"

Colettis. It is not a purely spontaneous and national movement. It is a Russian affair. Russia has never had but one object—to reduce Greece to the condition of Wallachia and Moldavia, a principality with a Greek prince, semi-Russian. I saw this work commencing in 1827. It has never ceased for a moment since. The society of Philorthodoxy is the instrument. Russia does not wish the Greek kingdom to last, nor King Otho, nor any other king.

Guizot. I am unwilling to think Russia has desired, prepared, or fomented what has just happened. The Emperor Nicholas is neither bold nor

enterprising; he does not anticipate or provoke events; when they occur, he accepts them readily, and then seeks to work them according to the policy of his country; but, in reality, he fears more than he desires them: his whole life, his entire conduct in the East, has demonstrated this. Without, therefore, speaking of all the appearances which indicate in this a national movement, the character of the Emperor Nicholas is my principal objection to your idea. What proofs have you?

COLETTIS. I have proofs. I cannot repeat all I know, even to you; there are words of honour given. But I am sure of my fact.

GUIZOT. It is serious; but it has no influence, for the present at least, on our conduct. We shall do as we were doing: we shall try to maintain things as they are, King Otho with the constitution; we shall advise King Otho and his country to endeavour to get the best national assembly possible; and to this end we shall employ, both with one and the other, all the influence we possess: this is the best course for Greece, and it is our legitimate part. And you—do you mean to leave Paris?

COLETTIS. Yes, in a few days.

GUIZOT. And what do you propose to do?

COLETTIS. Nothing. I shall observe. I look upon King Otho as lost. The national assembly will be *Nappist*.[1] I shall not trouble myself with that. I have no concern in what they may do with King

[1] This name was given to the Russian party, who received it from a certain Nappa, a sort of madman who, during the war of independence, panegyrized Russia in the streets of Nauplia.

Otho. When I see anything commenced against the country, anything which menaces its safety and independence, then I shall fall upon them with my Palikari, and give them a good lesson.

"GUIZOT. Reflect well on one point; the union between England and us is re-established. This event may draw it still closer. I hope that, in your affairs, England will go entirely with us. That is the chief consideration.

"COLETTIS. Certainly. There is much to be said about England; whether she wished us ill or was herself deceived, she has often acted badly for us; she has urged what might have ruined us. At present, if she marches with you, it will be excellent. I leave that in your hands. It rests with you to accomplish it."

I immediately informed M. Piscatory of this interview. "Here is Colettis," I said to him; "here is this ancient head of a party, penetrating, forecasting, bold, devoted, but exclusive, passionately suspicious, seeing nothing but secret societies and conspiracies, lying in ambush, and conspiring himself until the day of open war. It is possible that day may arrive. It is possible that what there is of truth in the ideas of Colettis, may one day become the situation and make the events. But at present, and for us, the reality and rule of our conduct do not lie in that direction. We require a broader, a more public policy, which answers better to the entire state of things in Europe, and follows step by step the highway of events, instead of verging, by a narrow and concealed path, towards a distant and uncertain end. These are the

ideas which float in my mind and should govern you, for they will continue to govern me until facts and information change them.

"I do not think that what has recently happened was desired, sought, or prepared by the Emperor Nicholas and his agents. I repeat to you what I said to Colettis. The Emperor Nicholas does not court events; but whether he has or has not had part in this, he will see and seek in it chances for the policy of Russia, which is, essentially, what Colettis declares; he will not accept or support a constitutional Greek monarchy. Instead, therefore, of having him for a malevolent ally, as he was, we shall now find in him a concealed adversary.

"I am not, however, convinced that it will be impossible to make successful and enduring what exists at present, King Otho and the constitution. We have not succeeded in persuading King Otho sufficiently, or in having weight enough to induce him to adapt himself to the country. Will the country, victorious to-day, be intelligent and rational enough to adapt itself to the King, without completely breaking him down? The question lies there. We have made a sad trial of King Otho's reason and our influence over him. We are about to try the reason of Greece, and our power over that. I do not despair; I do not wish to despair of the result. I hold for certain that success is most necessary; for the danger will be immense, if we succeed no better in the second effort than in the first. No one can promise himself to bring Europe to our opinion on the choice of a new Greek king, or to regulate that opinion in a manner suitable to us.

And if Europe cannot agree, Greece may easily perish in the European discord. Greece, my dear friend, must be taught this; repeat and urge it around you; speak to the country as you recently spoke to the King. We shall have England loyally and closely with us. I am inclined to think Austria will assist. I hope to make the peril of King Otho comprehended at Berlin. I admit perfectly with you, that were Greece as intelligent, judicious, and moderate as we require her to be, this King would be always an enormous embarrassment to her prosperity. Is the obstacle insurmountable? It may be so, but we must act as if it were not. Perhaps we shall succeed. And if we fail, if King Otho must fall, in order that we may retain, after that event, the authority of which we shall stand greatly in need, it is necessary that we should exhaust ourselves in our efforts to prevent it.

"When I say *exhaust*, you will readily understand that I do not call upon you to consume in this attempt your capital of a good position and credit in Greece. On the contrary, take care of and increase it. Be always extremely Greek, in close sympathy with the national spirit. I am assured that, in fact and on the whole, not judging by individuals, this spirit rules in all Greek parties, and that it is possible in the name of the Greek nationality and interest to act upon the Nappists as upon our friends, commencing with M. Metaxa. I leave this to you."

My official instructions, debated and accepted in the King's council, contained the expression of this policy. I insisted specially on the necessity, for King Otho, of marching steadily and without reserved views

in the path on which he had just entered. "For a long time," I said to M. Piscatory, "we have foreseen, while deploring beforehand, what has occurred in Greece. We have given to King Otho the only counsel calculated, according to us, to prevent it. Now that facts are accomplished, and have been accepted by the King himself, who has found nowhere, either in his country or his court, any resting point for resistance, it remains only to restrain them within just limits and to regulate judiciously the consequences. King Otho will, perhaps, be tempted, and even amongst the men who shrank from him at the moment of danger he may probably find some who may advise him, to hold a different conduct, to endeavour to withdraw what he has promised, to destroy what he has recognized, to produce by his own hand the miscarriage of the new order of things in which he has officially placed himself. Such conduct we are deeply convinced would be as imprudent as dishonourable. It is sometimes the duty of kings to refuse concessions demanded from them; but when they have once admitted them, it is also their duty to act loyally towards their people. Fidelity to engagements, respect for a pledged word, is a salutary example which ought always to descend from the height of the throne, and which aids, sooner or later, the great and true interests of royalty. King Otho told you himself that he deliberated on the question whether he should consent to what was demanded of him, or abdicate; and that a foresight of the anarchy which would follow his refusal, and of the perils into which Greece would fall,

alone determined him against abdication. We think he acted wisely, and that in the new position in which he is placed, he can render immense services to Greece, and wear his crown with dignity. He will, assuredly, have many means of exercising, upon the future constitution of the State, which he ought to regulate in concert with the National Assembly, a legitimate influence. Let him employ those means without hesitation, and without reserved intentions; let him labour, either personally or by his advisers, to cause the prevalence, in this great work, of monarchical ideas, and the necessary conditions of regular government. He will undoubtedly encounter great difficulties; he will meet with painful disappointments; but the stability of the throne and the strength of the government are so evidently the first interest of the Greeks, that a people of their quick intelligence cannot fail to comprehend this of themselves, and to assist in surrounding royalty with the dignity, authority, and means of action which, under a constitutional system, eminent examples prove that it may readily possess."

I did not deceive myself in reckoning on the firm concurrence of the English cabinet with this policy. Lord Aberdeen formed the same judgment with us on what had occurred in Greece, and gave similar instructions to Sir Edmund Lyons. Sir Robert Peel found in the first draft of them, which Lord Aberdeen communicated to him, some expressions too indulgent towards the Greek revolutionary movement, the military feature of which shocked him. Lord Aberdeen willingly modified his style, without materially

altering his idea. "I am no friend," he said, "to revolutions, and perhaps it would be well to wish they might never happen; but I know no change more imperatively provoked, more completely justified, and more wisely accomplished than this which has just taken place in Greece. The army, it is true, has had the leading share in it; but the people are neither opposed nor indifferent, as is often the case. The whole nation, on the contrary, appears to have been unanimous. This takes from the event the character of a military revolt, and certainly nothing has occurred which was not long foreseen."

At Vienna, as the language and attitude of M. de Prokesch evidenced, the anticipations accorded with those of Paris and London; but it was the policy of Prince Metternich to regard all revolutions as faults and misfortunes, even when he found them natural and inevitable. He never acknowledged their right, and condemned while accepting them. Moreover, he had a lively dread of the contagion of the Greek revolutionary movement in southern Europe, above all in Italy, and signified his uneasiness to Count de Flahault: "I have thought it my duty," M. de Flahault wrote, on the 30th of September, 1843, "to say, that it appears to me very desirable for all governments to use their endeavours to prevent such revolutions as have recently exploded at Athens; that it was the consequence of the bad and blundering administration of King Otho. With regard to Italy, it was to be feared that the same causes might produce the same effects; it was much to be desired that they would satisfy the well disposed people by sound legis-

lative measures and wise reforms; in the Roman States, for instance, the introduction of the secular element would produce the best effect; but the pontifical government had always opposed it. 'To whom do you say this?' cried the Prince. 'Have I not myself sent to the Pope, not a constitution, scarcely a plan of reform; as you well know, the most innocent thing in the world, and which might have borne good fruits. The Holy Father received it benignantly, and evinced no repugnance; but when he submitted it to his cardinals, they replied, 'Have nothing to do with it; return it to the Jacobin who sent it to you.'"

M. de Metternich was, moreover, determined not to enter into contest with France and England when he found them frankly united. Without giving M. de Prokesch instructions in accordance with ours, he ordered him not to oppose, but rather to second our action, at the same time to do so with reserve, and to abstain from engaging his responsibility.

The Emperor Nicholas made more noise, but scarcely with more effect. As soon as he learnt the events of Athens, he gave vent to his anger: he ordered the immediate removal of M. Catacazy. "He is not *recalled*," said the Russian Minister at Berlin, Baron de Meyendorff, to Count Buresson, "he is *dismissed*." "I expel from my service such a traitor!" exclaimed the Emperor himself at St. Petersburg; "he deserves to be shot. How could my Minister advise King Otho to sign his own dishonour? Let Greece henceforward do what she pleases: I meddle no more with her. Let the powers arrange as they may agree. As to King

Otho, he has yielded to constraint; but he has sworn; a Sovereign must keep his word. In his place I would have abdicated, or incurred massacre. What have I to do with the constitution of Greece? I am not versed in constitutions. I leave that pleasure to others."

Count Nesselrode extenuated while explaining the act and language of the Emperor. "What we desire above all things," he said to Baron d'André, our chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, "is to show that we disapprove the Greek revolution, and that it cannot suit the Emperor to associate himself with the establishment of a constitution in that country. Later, if all is not overthrown, if sufficient securities are left to the royal power, we shall see what we have to do." At Paris, M. de Kisseloff, when communicating to me the despatches of Count Nesselrode, commented on them with as much moderation as the vice-chancellor had evinced in his annotations on the words of his master. M. de Catacazy, on his arrival in Russia, was not harshly treated. His secretary, M. Persiani, remained at Athens as chargé d'affaires. In London, the conference of the three protecting powers of Greece continued to meet, and Baron de Brünnow to take his seat there, declaring, at every opportunity, that he remained a perfect stranger to the political questions raised by the recent events, and that he only attended on account of the financial questions arising out of the guarantee, accorded in 1833, by the three powers to the Greek loan.

All these reserves and reticences failed to deceive me as to the lively preoccupation of the Russian cabinet

on the subject of Grecian affairs, and on the concealed influence it continued to seek and exercise. I thought, with Lord Aberdeen, that the constitutional revolution at Athens had not been premeditated or prepared at St. Petersburg, although the avowed clients of Russia were amongst the most ardent promoters of the Greek discontent, and the first engaged in its explosion. The military leader of the insurrection of the 15th of September, Colonel Kalergis, was considered a near neighbour to the Russian party; and the first minister of the new cabinet imposed on King Otho, M. Metaxa, was its acknowledged head. Apart from these personal questions, "here is an observation," I wrote to the Count de Jarnac on the 9th of October, 1843, "which I recommend to the attention of Lord Aberdeen—why did the insurrection explode at Athens? Because the instructions of the conference of London appeared vague and futile, leaving no hope to the Greeks of effective action on our part to obtain the necessary reforms from King Otho. Why that coldness and impotence in our instructions? Because the suspicions and fears of Russia, with regard to the constitution, have enervated and neutralized us in our recommendations of reforms far more restricted than a constitution. If France and England had acted according to their joint convictions, we should most assuredly have weighed more upon King Otho, and perhaps might have prevented the insurrection. Lord Aberdeen, I feel confident, has no more taste than I have for this uncertain and barren policy, which speaks without enforcing action, which has the air of a will, and yet

wills not in a manner to command success. Nothing can succeed with such policy, which risks the loss of consideration and influence. Let us take care not to incur this danger a second time. Admitting, as I do, that Russia counts for nothing in the late events in Greece, we cannot deny that, after all, she judges differently from us, and will not regulate her conduct by the same ideas and sentiments, the desire of seeing King Otho and the constitutional system advance and establish themselves together. Let us never forget this actual truth of the affair, or sacrifice the power and efficacy of our action to accommodate particular tendencies."

Lord Aberdeen refrained from explaining himself as categorically on the danger of Russian influence. He carefully maintained friendly relations with Baron de Brünnow, and helped him, in the London Conference, to evade the embarrassments excited by the proclaimed anger of the Emperor his master. "I am not disposed," he said to M. de Jarnac, "to form in line with France against Russia;" but his action in the affairs of Greece and his understanding with us on the subject were not affected by this circumspection. Both became daily more complete and confiding. He often communicated to M. de Jarnac, not only his official instructions, but his private letters to Sir Edmund Lyons: "I see with regret," he wrote to the latter, on the 15th November, 1843, "that you have an inclination to maintain the old distinction of parties. I must tell you that M. Piscatory, although speaking of you in the handsomest terms, and professing the most perfect cordiality, complains a little

of this. I recommend you to be very careful not to put forward Mavrocordato, or any one else, as representing the policy and views of England. I am sure the French Minister will receive the same instructions with regard to Colettis and those who would represent themselves as supporters of the interests of France. We have to contend against intrigues of various kinds which will endeavour, in Greece, to impede the establishment of the constitution. It would be much to be lamented, if, where governments are perfectly in accord, any local jealousies or personal pretensions should aggravate our difficulties."

Even before the revolution of the 15th of September, I had done more than address similar instructions to M. Piscatory; I had engaged M. Colettis not to quit Paris immediately for Athens, whither he had been recalled; I did not wish his presence to bring any embarrassment to the good understanding springing up between M. Piscatory and Sir Edmund Lyons; and, despite the animated entreaties of his friends, M. Colettis himself had so well entered into my idea that he had, in fact, postponed his departure. After the revolution of the 15th of September, and when the elections to the Greek national assembly had nearly terminated, he resolved, and with good reason, to depart from France. He came to take leave of me towards the middle of October, at Auteuil, where I was passing some of the fine days of autumn. He was sincerely and affectionately moved, with a degree of solemnity at once natural and voluntary: he was returning to Greece after eight years of absence; he was leaving France, where he had been well received,

had seen and learnt much. "Greece," he said to me, "has many friends in France; you and the Duke de Broglie are the best. She has also many enemies, many pretenders to rule her, many factious malcontents. She is small, very small, and she believes in a great future, which belief is shared by others. She has been a slave for ages, and wishes to be free. She has a right to be so, but the task is difficult. I rely, I will not say on your support, of that there can be no doubt, but on your daily action and aid; I shall require it for advancement and restraint with both friends and enemies; do not fear the latter; I am stronger than they are." I repeated to him, with most friendly urgency, the same counsels, the same recommendations, which for three years had marked our conversations. We embraced, and he left me. "I have given him a steamer," I wrote to M. Piscatory when announcing his departure; "he must arrive suitably and under our flag." M. Mavrocordato had returned from Constantinople to Athens a few days before in an English vessel.

"After having touched at Syra, where he was received with the most enthusiastic welcome," M. Piscatory wrote to me fifteen days later, on the 30th of October, 1843, "M. Colettis entered the Piræus yesterday morning; the English ships were the first to salute him, ours followed the example. The news having reached Athens, all his friends repaired to meet him, and when he disembarked, he was hailed by more than three thousand persons, who greeted him with loud acclamations. He started with this cortége. Near the road stands the small monu-

ment, erected in 1835, on the spot where he was killed, to the memory of George Karaïskakis, the last of the Greek heroes who fell combating the Turks in the war of independence. At this point M. Colettis paused, and quitting the road for a moment, went, followed by his friends, to kneel and pray before the tomb of his brave companion. This incident took place in silence and without preparation. On reaching Athens, M. Colettis found the same reception. The house at which he alighted was filled with people. M. Metaxa was there, expecting him: a serious indisposition had confined M. Mavrocordato to his bed. In the evening all the ministers came, and it was midnight before I was able to converse with him. I sought to tell him the truth as to facts, situations, and persons, and I found his dispositions such as to give me great hope for the cause we must defend in common. I repeated to him what Sir Edmund Lyons had just said to me: 'There is but one sound policy, that pursued by France and England together; it is true everywhere, above all true in Greece, and this has never been so evident as since the events of the 15th of September. You and I, Mavrocordato and Colettis, desiring the same things, tending to the same object by the same means, the game of the constitutional monarchy is won.' I explained to M. Colettis on what points he was to be careful with Sir Edmund Lyons. He will call upon him to-day, after seeing the King, and I hope much from this first conversation, to which both parties will bring the most friendly dispositions."

M. Colettis did not falsify this expectation; always

suspicious in his inmost heart, yet ever dignified even when concealing his real thoughts, he allowed no personal mistrust or exigence to appear, but applied all his care to preserve a good understanding with MM. Mavrocordato and Metaxa, to humour the jealous susceptibilities of Sir Edmund Lyons, and to restrain his rough and impatient friends. "You will learn with pleasure," he wrote to me, on the 10th of November, 1843, "that despite my absence I have been chosen by eight electoral colleges; my fellow citizens have not forgotten me. M. Mavrocordato and I have accepted the proposition made to us by his Majesty to take part in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers in all that relates to the national assembly and the maintenance of public tranquillity. It was proposed to appoint us ministers without portfolios, but we thought it right to refuse, while offering the cabinet the tribute of our old experience. This conduct on our part has produced the best effect; it proves how much we both desire union betwixt parties, to attain with as slight checks as possible the accomplishment of the great work of the constitution."—"The conduct of the leading men appears to me excellent," M. Piscatory wrote a few days afterwards.[1] "No disagreement has arisen between MM. Mavrocordato, Colettis, and Metaxa; and yesterday, MM. Kalergis, Grivas, and Griziottis being present at the council, the good understanding was complete, and the resolutions most judicious; the military chiefs said to the political leaders, 'What we ask of you is to agree.

[1] On the 19th of November, 1843.

After that, do what you judge good for the country; we are ready to follow you.' "

Opening on the 20th of November, 1843, the national assembly employed nearly four months in debating and voting the constitution. Previous to this Lord Aberdeen and I had been asked for our more explicit advice on this subject. M. Colettis, before his departure, had even urgently entreated me, not only to send him in writing my ideas as to the constitution, but to reduce them to articles. I positively refused to do this. "One cannot at a distance," I said to him, "arrive at this degree of practical precision, and it is ridiculous to attempt it." But I could not avoid giving, and Lord Aberdeen himself requested it from me, instructions at Athens on this great question, for the exercise of our common influence. I therefore wrote as follows to M. Piscatory, on the 28th of October, 1843 :—

"I see, according to what you tell me, that Greece has already made considerable progress in political ideas. Two chambers—one elective, the other appointed by the King, the right of dissolution, the general administration in the royal hands under the responsibility of ministers; these are the elementary and requisite principles of the constitutional system. I am delighted to see that in Greece also the good sense of the public has adopted them.

"I fear lest they should think this comprises all, and that, to have a good constitution in Greece, it suffices to resemble those which are good elsewhere.

"The spirit of imitation is, in our days, the plague of policy. Not only does it attach no importance to

what deserves the highest consideration—to the history, the manners, all that past of peoples which ever continues so powerful in the present—but it equally disowns a fundamental principle, a political necessity of the first order, the relation which ought to exist between the constitution and the standard of society.

"If we were to adapt a steam engine of six hundred horse-power to a small vessel, instead of making it advance it would tear it to pieces. It is so with constitutions. It is a tremendous error in theory, and fatal in practice, to believe that the machine which suits a great State is equally fitting to a small one.

"What is the basis of a constitution such as ours?

"Three great powers, independent of each other, constantly in presence, and mutually indispensable, not only for particular affairs of State, but that the State may have a government.

"In such a system, the government, in its actual application to public affairs, does not subsist of necessity, and by itself; it must be formed by the amalgamation, fusion, and harmony of the three powers. This is what we mean when we say there must be majorities in the two chambers, that these majorities must agree with the sovereign, and that from their accordance issues a cabinet which governs with the confidence of the king and the chambers.

"When this result is not obtained, there is no strong and regular government.

"When this result is obtained, it is immediately questioned.

"A continual ferment and struggle between and in

the bosom of the great public powers, to form or support incessantly a government incessantly attacked—this is the representative system, as it is and ought to be in great States.

"This incessant ferment and contest, this continual mobility, whether in fact or in perspective, would be intolerable and impracticable in a small state.

"Impracticable within. Far from any government issuing from thence, all government would perish there. The disproportioned force of the movement would keep the social body in a confused and sickly agitation. The political parties and powers, thus opposed to each other, would not find space enough to coexist and work regularly together. Individual passions and interests would be too close to each other, and too near to the recourse of force. There would be neither calmness nor coherence in the administration of public affairs. The oscillations of the machine, at once extremely animated and stringently confined, would derange and compromise, at any moment, the machine itself.

"Impracticable without. Such a state of political ferment, in a small country surrounded by great ones, would cause too much solicitude to its neighbours, and would offer, at the same time, too much hold to their influence. It is said that corruption is the vice of the representative system. In a great State it is at least combated and surmounted by the empire of general interests and sentiments; in all cases it is almost impossible from foreign influence. In a small State it would be much more easy and powerful, and might readily come from without.

"Let Greece not fall into a servile and blind imitation of the great foreign constitutions. The independence and dignity of her policy are as much interested in this as her repose. She requires a more simple, a less stormy machine, which shall not make power the object of a struggle and the result of a continual excitement; a machine in which the government subsists a little more in advance and of itself, although placed under the control and influence of the country. The three great elements essential to the constitutional system lend themselves well to this idea. Royalty exists in Greece; let it only act with the advice and under the guarantee of responsible ministers; let the two chambers associated in the government of the State control the action of the ministry, and impress on it a direction conformable with the national spirit; but let them not convey to it, at the same time, the agitation and mobility of their own nature. Let the struggle of parties, the formation and maintenance of a majority, not be the first, the most pressing, the most constant affair of the ministers. Let the chambers, in a word, be sufficiently near to the government to exercise over it, in the unity of affairs, an effectual superintendence and influence; but let them not be so intimately in contact with it as to constrain it to live in their arena, and to elaborate itself there incessantly.

"This end would be attained if the elective chamber were only placed in presence of the government at rather distant intervals—every three years, for example—and if the senate, more habitually in contact with power, assumed towards it in a certain degree,

and in the most important affairs, the office of a council of State.

"An elective chamber, meeting only once in three years, would not introduce into the government the ferment, the chances of division, the continued internal labour and control, which a great State endures and surmounts, but which would plunge a small one into greater confusion than it could bear, and, perhaps, into dangers more serious than confusion. Nevertheless, such a chamber, voting the budget for three years, examining and debating the conduct of the ministry during that interval, deliberating on all the new laws the necessity for which might be felt—such a chamber, I say, would certainly be strong enough to protect public liberty, to secure the wholesome management of public affairs, and to recall power to paths conformable with the national interest and spirit, should it have wandered from them.

"At the same time, a senate appointed for life, and which, independently of the triennial session in which it would co-operate with the elective chamber, would meet more frequently, either at fixed epochs, or on the special convocation of the king, to receive a public account of the budget of each year, and to occupy itself with affairs in which it would have to act as a council of State: such a senate, I repeat, would be an effective curb and a useful support to power, and for the country a great political school, in which men already known and distinguished would acquire the genius of government, and prepare themselves for its exercise.

"When a country has no aristocratic class, naturally

devoted to the management of public affairs, or when it has no wish to buy the advantages of such an aristocracy while supporting its inconveniences, institutions must supply their place, and undertake to form for the service of the State the men not furnished by its social system. This is the use of a senate sufficiently separated from the government to consider it with independence, and, at the same time, near enough to it to comprehend its facts and necessities.

"I can only indicate the motives and results of a constitutional combination of this nature; but I am profoundly convinced that it is better suited to Greece than the incessant and formidable play of the representative machine as it exists in France and England. I return to my starting-post. As regards a constitution, the spirit of imitation is convenient to idleness and agreeable to vanity, but it falsifies and kills sound policy. What do honest and thinking men, true friends to their country, require in a constitution? Surely, not a theatre in which skilful actors daily amuse an idle public; but practical securities for the external safety of the State, for internal order, and for the able management of public affairs and the regular development of national prosperity. The means of reaching this end are not everywhere the same. Amongst the cases which make them vary, some spring from the state of manners, the degree of civilization, and from moral circumstances which can only be known when we have seen a country closely and lived in its bosom. I have said nothing of these causes as regards Greece; for I could not appreciate them of my own judgment. But there is one circumstance

which strikes the eye, and can readily be estimated from a distance—the dimension and stature of the State to which the constitution is to be applied. I look on this point as highly important, and it is, in my opinion, the neglect of it which, in our own days, in Europe and America, has occasioned the deplorable failure of more than one constitutional attempt. I hope the Greeks will have good sense enough to see this rock, and avoid running against it. Independently of the internal advantages they will thence derive, they will find this in addition, that Europe will regard such conduct on their part as a great evidence of wisdom; she will conclude from it that radical ideas and revolutionary fancies do not govern the Greeks, and that, animated by a true national spirit, they know how to acknowledge and satisfy at home, and for their own practice, the real interests of government and liberty. On the day when Greece of herself conveys this conviction to Europe, she will have made a great advance in her stability and future."

Peoples, equally with individuals, dislike to hear themselves called little, and to be told that they would do well to remember it. Wherever, at that epoch, the desire of a constitution was manifested, the great system of France and England offered itself to minds, with the combined attraction of novelty and the empire of routine. Why not adopt what had been practised and had succeeded elsewhere? In communicating my views on the Greek constitution to M. Piscatory, I instructed him to give them no official form or appearance, and to offer them to the Greeks

solely as the counsels of a friend convinced of their utility. Lord Aberdeen, when informing Sir Edmund Lyons that I should write in detail on this subject to M. Piscatory, recommended him to support my advice, but without assuming the responsibility of giving it. He had himself doubts as to some of my ideas; and Sir Robert Peel, less liberal in spirit and more governed by his English habits, declared himself favourable to the annual convocation of the Chamber of Deputies, and opposed to all participation of the senate in the special part of a council of State. The Greek constitution, debated by the National Assembly, accepted by King Otho, and promulgated on the 16th of March, 1844, was monarchical and liberal, but based on the model of the constitutional system of France and England, and thus destined to encounter, on that small stage, many difficulties and dangers.

As long as the National Assembly charged with the birth of the constitution was sitting, the necessity of common action and accord was universally accepted by the leaders of the Greeks as well as by the foreign diplomatists. Amongst the former friends of M. Colettis, many were indignant at his impartiality, reproached him with complaisance to his old adversaries, and urged him to place himself openly at their head against the partizans of MM. Mavrocordato and Metaxa, who did not always return what he did for them. "Nothing shall make me change my conduct," he replied; "the constitution cannot be arranged without mutual understanding; I shall continue faithful to it. I know that several of the

friends of MM. Mavrocordato and Metaxa will not give me their votes; this signifies little to me; I shall vote for them, and all who trust in me will do the same.—You are, then, against your friends and for your enemies?—Neither the one nor the other; I am for mutual understanding at any price." M. Piscatory supported him firmly under this difficult trial. "I follow," he wrote to me, "the path you have traced out, and we are looked upon here as very honest people—somewhat duped. I have had to endure rough remonstrances on the part of our friends, but I give way to no weakness. We shall cut our tail, our very bad tail, and replace it by a better." Sir Edmund Lyons, despite his prejudices and pretensions, was struck by this example, and did justice to those who gave it to him. "M. Guizot," he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, "has here, in M. Piscatory, an admirable agent." He made an effort himself to conform to the recommendations of Lord Aberdeen, to lay aside the spirit of party, and to maintain cordiality; but his habits and nature often resumed their empire; he frequently returned to his jealous suspicions, to his passion for exclusive influence and predominance. M. Piscatory informed me of this, and defended himself against it, on the spot, vigorously, but without ill temper. "There are here," he wrote to me, "people who would let the vessel sink rather than see it saved by our hands. The Greek government has asked for the admission of four young men at Toulon as pupils in our navy. You write me word by the last courier that it is granted. I communicate this to the Minister of Marine at Athens. His prin-

cipal officer, entirely devoted to Sir Edmund Lyons, comes to an arrangement with him, and orders these young people to embark in an English ship. They complain of this in great distress. I immediately inform the Minister of Marine that even though I should be compelled to send sailors to take them, the young pupils must go to Toulon. He then apologizes, and I shall immediately despatch my four Greeks." I informed Lord Aberdeen of this incident. "What do you say of France and England squabbling to run away with four little sailors? I could send you much more gossip of this kind, but one instance is enough. Let no reflection of this, I beg of you, reach Athens. M. Piscatory is highly pleased with Sir Edmund Lyons, has full confidence in his loyalty, and in all material points they march admirably together. Let us do nothing to disturb this. Only it is well to look from time to time behind the very animated scenes of this small theatre, to avoid being duped by the intrigues which are incessantly plotting there."

I wrote, at the same time, to M. Piscatory: "Continue to subordinate the interests of rivalry to the general understanding, small policy to great. And make Colettis persist. This is indispensable. We do not seek our own pleasure, we seek success. We wish to promote the fortune of Greece, not that of any particular Greek. But always tell me everything. You are there to see all and to let me know all, agreeable or disagreeable. Only take care not to see in what Sir Edmund Lyons says or does more than there really is. There is nothing in either of political treason or real and active discord as to the inten-

tion and end towards Greece; there is merely the English vice, ambitious pride, constant and impassioned preoccupation with himself, the ardent and exclusive desire of having everywhere his part and place, and the greatest possible, no matter at the expense of whom or what. This is very inconvenient and intolerable, and must be checked from time to time, when it becomes utterly injurious to affairs or offensive to dignity. Thus you have acted rightly in the incident of the four young sailors. But always take care to combine loyalty, good sense, courage, and a greater attention to the security of common action and commerce, than we encounter elsewhere."

The constitution being completed and published, a still more difficult problem presented itself. It was necessary to form a ministry capable of restraining while satisfying this people revived in arms—of securing this tottering throne, of supporting public liberty while maintaining the law. Scarcely had this task been commenced, when troubles and dangers burst forth. The ministry born of the revolution, and which had presided over the work of the constitution, disappeared. M. Metaxa tendered his resignation: he had quarrelled with M. Mavrocordato, and the attitude of the Emperor Nicholas rendered constitutional government impossible to the Nappist party. "At last, the constitution is sworn to, the assembly dissolved, the revolution closed," M. Piscatory wrote on the 31st of March, 1844. "Shall we be able to form a reasonable ministry? I know nothing as yet. When the cabinet is completed, will it govern the king? I doubt this. The opinion

that it is impossible goes from province to province with the wisest and most moderate deputies, who are grieved by it, with the opposition and philorthodoxians, who are thereby encouraged to persevere in their projects. Lyons is always agreeable. I think he has chosen his side; but we must see him under the trial of the little questions of influence. I shall make all sacrifices that will not lessen us. Everywhere, and here in particular, reputation is important: ours is good; I do not parade it too conspicuously, but I study to maintain it."

The dispositions of M. Colettis disturbed me. He had communicated them to me with his manly frankness. Even before the constitution was promulgated, he had written to the director of political affairs in my ministry, M. Desages,[1] who equally possessed his friendship and my confidence: "When I arrived here, the government was in the hands of the men of the 15th of September. I felt bound to join the council, to neutralize the effect of the revolutionary element. I have succeeded. The assembly evinced dangerous tendencies. I had to contend, on the one hand, against the democratic spirit; on the other, against the petty jealousies of the very men who ought to have seconded me with the greatest candour. I openly declared my principles. I made no concessions to any one; but I laid aside all self-love, and totally lost sight of myself. While bringing back Metaxa, I formed a close alliance with Mavrocordato. The government, the assembly, the king, the mon-

[1] On the 29th of February, 1814.

archy, the country, were saved. But there is still a great danger for all—the execution of the new system. Mavrocordato was unable to manage Metaxa. Disagreement arose between them; it increased to a rupture, the consequence of which has been the resignation of the president of the council. The new ministry about to be formed will have to contend with a powerful enemy, and the more powerful that he will be able to direct the hatred—I use the proper word—of the people against the Fanariots, who, right or wrong, are denounced as authors of all the evils which have weighed upon the nation under the old government. The ministry, therefore, must be strong to accomplish successfully the heavy task which will be imposed on it. As to myself, I am far from dreading such a burden; but I desire to bear it nobly. I wish to have all possible chances of success. To succeed, I must be seconded by men who will be devoted to me. If the administration is not of one mind, success is impossible. Here the question is too serious for me to yield in anything. It embraces the safety of my country. I believe I am capable of saving it, but I must have the requisite means. I am therefore determined not to depart from the line of conduct I have marked out, and not to make to Lyons, or Piscatory, or Mavrocordato, any concession that might be injurious to the country, the King, or myself. I must succeed, or not undertake the work of regeneration. I do not refuse the co-operation of Mavrocordato; I am even ready to yield to him the presidency: but it is indispensable that I should have the active ministries in my own

hands. This is the only way of really securing the interests of Greece, of the King, and of French policy in the East. If I am unable, through political reasons, to succeed in forming a homogeneous cabinet, I shall retire, because I cannot trust to chance so many grave interests. If, on the contrary, I succeed in placing my own men in the active ministries, I answer for the future, provided France does not abandon me."

We were fully determined not to abandon Greece or M. Colettis; but I did not partake his full confidence in himself, and himself alone. I felt convinced that it was not too much to have, in Europe, accord between France and England, and in Greece the concurrence of the great parties and their chiefs, to consolidate that rising State; and that what had been found necessary for the dawn of the constitution was not less so for the first steps of the constitutional government. I wrote to M. Piscatory, on the 7th of April, 1844: "I admit all that you tell me of King Otho, the deplorable effect of his delays, and of his insisting on an infinity of secondary points, which excite the discontent of his most sincere friends. However, I find this impression a little exaggerated. I have read over again all that he has written, said, and demanded. All evinces an obstinate, untoward, selfish spirit; but I cannot find any mischievous intention. King Otho has not an expanded mind; this is no new discovery for any one in Greece; we must act accordingly; altogether, since the revolution of the 15th of September, he has conducted himself better than was expected; he has remained

tolerably quiet, and has shown probity. I cannot comprehend, on the part of such men as M. Colettis and M. Mavrocordato, the discouragement of which you speak. Allow me to repeat to you, and through you to them, what I have already said: in all situations, we have always before us facts we cannot change, obstacles we must accept while striving to surmount them. Of all the burdens of this nature, King Otho does not appear to me the heaviest possible: be assured, that if this particular one were removed, the Greeks would see many others fall on their shoulders, and that King Otho, despite all his failings, spares them more embarrassments than he excites. The means of struggling against the King's defects will not be wanting to his ministers; they will have the powers of the constitutional system; they will have the support of the French and English legations. This, I admit, is not enough to spare them the vexations, fatigues, errors, and sometimes the checks of such a situation; but it suffices to render their success habitually possible and probable. We have no right to expect more in this world. Let MM. Colettis and Mavrocordato pardon me this language; I only tell them what I incessantly repeat to myself; I also, in another way, have my immovable embarrassments and temptations to discouragement. Let these gentlemen remain united to form a cabinet and to govern, as they have combined to frame the constitution; they will succeed in like manner; perhaps with increased labour, but, in the end, they will succeed. Their union is, I feel convinced, the *sine qua non* condition of success; this is another of the necessities which must

be accepted and satisfied, no matter at what reciprocal sacrifices. To tell you all I think, I regretted, and continue to regret, the rupture with M. Metaxa; the Nappists are too important, too strong, to make it judicious to throw them altogether into the opposition. Were the religious party weaker, it will not do to have it entirely against us. That might be a revolutionary position, but is not one for government. How can the Nappist party be made to take a share in the cabinet? In the person of its leader, or by detaching from the chief his lieutenants and soldiers? It is impossible, at a distance, to form an opinion on this question; I leave it to our friends and to you. But be well assured that by one road or the other this object must be accomplished, and a portion of Nappism absorbed in the government. Would M. Metaxa like to come here as minister of Greece? We should accept him willingly."

M. Piscatory agreed with me, and had anticipated my instructions. "I have profound regret," he wrote to me, in an official despatch of the 10th of April, 1844, "in announcing to your Excellency that it has been impossible for me to support the pretensions of M. Colettis; they are such that I feel convinced they are pretexts not to accept his part in power, and to reserve himself for a future, which, right or wrong, he confidently foresees. All the efforts that political ties and personal friendship counselled under such circumstances, I have attempted; it seemed to me that I should have neglected my duties and disobeyed the instructions of the King's government if I had associated myself with a personal struggle, which,

fortunately, is not so much between MM. Colettis and Mavrocordato as between their friends. I felt that I ought to occupy myself with a single object, that of co-operating in the formation of the most reasonable, the most capable cabinet, and the most acceptable to public opinion. I therefore declared to M. Colettis, who reproached me with not supporting the French party, that I could not place myself on that ground—that it was not a proposition sustainable in a regular government, and that such ought not to be the result of common efforts to give Greece a constitutional government. He continued immovable." Some days later, on the 15th of April, 1844, M. Piscatory added, in a private letter: "I wrote to you in great haste, by the last boat, to tell you the position in which I had been placed by the personal requests of M. Colettis, and still more by his repugnance, not reserved but evident, to enter the cabinet. If he had owned this frankly, all was simple enough; he has not chosen to do so, even to his own conscience, and I have been compelled to adopt a course which has its inconveniences, I know, but the only one which establishes the true situation—the situation which becomes a regular government and its representative. I am now sure that I have done well here. Have I done well for Paris? You will tell me. What I wish is, even when right, not to create embarrassments for you. All my anxiety lies in that. I had another cause of uneasiness; but it exists no longer, or rather in a less degree. I was afraid of having wounded Colettis; above all, of having driven him into a path where he would infallibly lose

himself. I know not yet exactly how much bitterness he still retains in his heart against me; but I am confident that his loyalty, his sound judgment and patriotism, will suffice, despite the flatteries of some and the excitements of others, to maintain him in the conduct he has held since his return to Greece." A little later, on the 31st of May, 1844, M. Piscatory resumed some uneasiness: "I have abated nothing of the favourable ideas I had formed of the mind and heart of Colettis; but, on closer intercourse, I have found defects I had not perceived before: his finesse is rather gross, and he practises it in the same manner with a Palikar and a black coat; his ideas are vague, his imagination takes a wide scope; order affects him little, and he has a thorough contempt for the degree of moral quality in the man he attaches to himself or makes use of."

M. Colettis neither wished to run the risk of exhausting himself in the first ministry charged with the first essay of the constitution, or to contract a long and intimate alliance with M. Mavrocordato, the client of England, of the power most favourable to Turkey and the most opposed to the aggrandizement of Greece. In his patriotic pride he reserved himself for a future infinitely more remote than he imagined, and which he was not in a position to advance by a single day.

M. Mavrocordato hesitated much before assuming power. He demanded of M. Piscatory if he could rely on the concurrence of the French legation. M. Piscatory gave him that assurance. The cabinet was formed. Some days afterwards, M. Mavrocordato

wrote to me, explaining his acceptance of office, and again asking the support which I had once before given him. I promised it a second time. M. Piscatory employed himself effectively to obtain from M. Colettis an assurance that he would not attack the new cabinet. "After a first bitter letter to Mavrocordato," he wrote to me, on the 15th of April, 1844, "he addressed a second to him in a very friendly strain, and I feel certain he will keep his word. I see him daily, and find him always at work to restrain his old exclusive, rancorous friends, wanting everything for them, and saying, with much astonishment at not being believed,—'We are France; the others are England.' Here was a mischievous error it was necessary to end. This could only be done by a decided stroke. I have accepted the responsibility, and I do not repent of so doing, always on condition that it throws no difficulty in your way."

It was not in London that the difficulty could spring up. The satisfaction there was great. "The news from Greece," M. de Sainte-Aulaire wrote to me, on the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1844, "has worked wonders here; the conduct of M. Piscatory is highly appreciated. After having read his report of the 10th of April, Lord Aberdeen begged me to leave it with him, and sent it to Sir Robert Peel with these words: 'You see here the advantage of the mutual understanding.' Sir Robert Peel returned it to him, saying, that he was delighted with it, and that this conduct of our minister at Athens gave him some hopes for Spain!" The satisfaction in England was not of long duration; it soon became evident that the Mavro-

cordato ministry would not succeed. Its head was a man of just and acute mind, and sufficient administrative and diplomatic activity, of sincere patriotism, of acknowledged integrity, but without natural force of character and will; inclined to substitute, on all occasions, address for energy, and as incapable of resisting his friends as of combating his enemies. Moreover, he was not the representative of either of the great political parties of Greece—of the warlike or of the religious party. He came from Fanaria, and the Fanariots were suspected and hated by the Greek people. M. Mavrocordato had no strength beyond personal merit, scattered friends, and the support of England. This was not enough for the difficult task he had to accomplish; above all, for the practical application of the electoral law which the National Assembly had voted with the constitution, and which was to form the first chamber of deputies. The elections turned signally against him; he was evidently only a superficial and transitory power, without root in the country; the elections demonstrated the influence and demanded the government of his rivals, Colettis and Metaxa, and particularly of Colettis.

M. Piscatory had known and foretold this result to me, and prepared himself for it. After strongly pressing M. Colettis to ally himself with M. Mavrocordato, and loyally supporting the dawning cabinet of the latter, he was careful not to commit himself irrevocably to its destinies, and to remain in friendly relations with M. Colettis, while resolutely maintaining, towards him and his friends, the independence

of the French policy. "My object has been," he wrote to me, "to withdraw the French flag from his hands, and to bring it back to the legation. It is there now and nowhere else. Colettis thoroughly understood this, and evinced a degree of very ill humour in consequence; his friends more than himself. He and they have become calm, and he is now as I desire. Am I as he desires? Not exactly, but he makes no complaint; he treats me with great confidence, seeks sometimes to cajole and lead me, but in general, contents himself by professing that the French legation has its line of conduct, and he his, which need not interfere with an amicable understanding or personal friendship."

I entirely approved this attitude of our minister at Athens; but I was not satisfied to rest there: I had held such close intimacy with M. Colettis that it gave me a right to tell him my ideas without reserve. I wrote to him as follows: "When the day arrived, in your country, for forming a cabinet, I much regretted that you were not in it; I thought the alliance of the heads of the parties who had presided at the work of the constitution, ought also to preside over the first steps of the government. I saw many obstacles; but, in great affairs, no obstacle should supersede necessity, and it seemed to me that the necessity was there. You thought differently; you thought that in the interest of Greece it was better to leave to others the difficulties and hesitations of a first essay in the exercise of the new institutions. It may be that you were right. Now, if I mistake not, the moment is approaching when you cannot refuse to lend a helping

hand to affairs. Two points strike me so forcibly that I feel bound to name them to you. On both I feel confident that I am right.

"You are making a début in constitutional government, ever and in all places very difficult; more so in Greece than elsewhere, for you are a small State, placed between three great ones, the most opposed to the constitutional system—Russia, Turkey, and Austria. In presence of this fact alone, the birth of your constitution is a miracle. Its duration will be a greater miracle. If you wish this duration, apply yourself, above and before all other considerations, to rally and unite in combined action all that there is of governmental force in Greece. The division, dissension, and internal strife of governmental force is the greatest danger, the heaviest evil, of free countries. Amongst the countries that have tried to be free, nearly all those that have perished, particularly the small ones, have perished from that cause. I know how difficult it is to rally and unite the different governmental forces. I know the power of the spirit of party and coterie, of their traditions and passions. I know all that must be sacrificed and endured to resist them. I persist in saying, that in free countries, and still more in those which are neither great nor old, there is a necessity of following up this alliance, for it is a question of life and death.

"I add that, amongst the different parties, it is, above all, on that which has long struggled for national independence and liberty, that the necessity is imposed of managing and rallying the governmental forces; for, by the natural course of things,

that party does not possess them all. It is not in the bosom of an insurrection, even the most just, it is not in the struggle, even the most glorious, for liberty, that all governmental forces and situations are formed and placed. Many of those which existed before the contest remain unconnected with the movement, or rather, are lost in it. Amongst those which shine and elevate themselves, many are strangers, if not opposed, to the spirit of government. When, therefore, the day of government arrives, when constitutional order succeeds the national struggle, it is absolutely necessary that the illustrious party which has combated and conquered should learn to say to itself, that alone, it is not sufficient to govern; that it possesses not, within itself, and by itself, all the requisite and suitable forces for government. It must seek those forces where they are, it must accept them as they are, and give them their place and part in the government. Without this, the government will not establish itself, and all the struggles sustained by the country will be lost; for, after all, it is by government that countries last, and all struggles ought to end in a durable government.

"I come now to my second reflection.

"You are extremely preoccupied with the future of the Hellenic race, and you are in the right. I see the place which the future of that race holds in your thought and conduct. I believe with you in that future, and almost to the same extent. But do not deceive yourself on this point; it will not arrive to-morrow. Is it very distant? I know not; but I do know that it is not very near. Hold this for certain:

Europe—and when I say Europe, I include good and bad European policy, your friends, as well as your enemies—Europe does not wish to hasten the fall of the Ottoman Empire; Europe will do all she can to retard that fall and its consequences. Accept this situation for the present, without renouncing the future. If it is believed that you do not accept it, if it is thought that you press the event which Europe wishes to postpone, European policy will turn against you, and your best friends will become powerless in your cause. I should be sorry if you deceived yourself in this question. Europe has formed her fixed determination, and Greece will not be able to force the hands of Europe. I do not ask you to suppress the sentiments which animate you; I only ask you not to let them act unseasonably; for you would gain thereby neither honour nor profit. Believe what I say: occupy yourself with the internal condition of Greece; let her acquire the consistency of a State well governed within, undisputed without: this is all that can be done to-day, and the best mode of advancing her future."

Three weeks after the arrival of my letter at Athens, the presentiments which had induced me to write it realized themselves. M. Mavrocordato, beaten in the elections, fell from power. King Otho called M. Colettis to replace him, who formed a cabinet into which M. Metaxa entered: the two great national parties of Greece, the warlike and religious party, after approaching each other in the electoral arena, thus united in the government, and M. Colettis replied by saying to me:—"I saw with pain, that

you seemed to fear, under my ministry, a movement against the Ottoman frontiers. It is my duty to dissipate such apprehensions. I always thought, it is true, and I continue to think, that the limit of Greece is not Mount Othrix, that a holy tie united and unites the Greek provinces subject to Turkey with those which have been happy enough to be declared independent. The destinies of Greece are more vast than protocols have made her. Such is my belief; but I never fancied it was by invasion, by armed propaganda, that those destinies were to be accomplished. A time will come when the force of events alone will do what we could not do now without a general overthrow, which would perhaps entirely sweep away the kingdom of Greece. I am, therefore, a partizan of the *status quo*. Also, since my entry into the cabinet, I have seriously occupied myself in bridling the ardour of certain unreflecting and improvident spirits, who were disposed to drive the government into a dangerous and anti-national path. The measures I have taken have produced the happiest results: the relations between the Greek and Ottoman authorities on the frontier are quite friendly; they afford each other reciprocal support. I declare to you, my respected friend, that, as long as I am first minister, Turkey has nothing to fear on my part; I consider all hostile movement against the neighbouring frontier as impolitic and dangerous. I have often said this to you in Paris; I write it now to you from Athens."

Internally, M. Colettis declared himself resolved to sustain King Otho firmly, and full of hope that, in

spite of the blindness of popular passions and the exactions of personal interests, he should succeed, with the support of France, and the tranquil attitude of the continental powers, in restraining his country within the laws of constitutional monarchy and the limits of the treaties. But, at the same time, he manifested to me without reserve his profound mistrust of England and her representative. "You know," he said, "my opinion of the English policy; I have often unfolded it to you; it was based on long experience. Thus, the sincerity which M. Lyons affected to display has surprised me to such a point that I have often asked myself whether I had been self-deceived, and if my experience was at fault. I could not comprehend, however, that England, who had done so much to prevent the existence of Greece, could wish anything else than that Greece, existing in spite of her, should be organized as an English Greece, governed by an English minister. Facts soon proved to me that I was not mistaken. I acquainted our friend Piscatory with the tendency of M. Lyons, and his policy. I tried to convince him that, with M. Lyons, all Greece was comprised in the person of M. Mavrocordato, and a few men blindly devoted to his views. He differed from my opinion. I was compelled to say to him, 'My friend, we cannot agree on this question; let us remain on good terms, but let us speak no more of the affairs of the country.' I thought it then became my duty to cease writing to you. I was not in complete concert with Piscatory: to describe to you the manner in which I saw things, was to put myself in opposition to him; to represent things as he saw

them, would be to do violence to my conscience. I preferred keeping silence until the moment arrived when facts should prove that I was right."

Sir Edmund Lyons did all that was wanting to convince M. Colettis more and more that he was right. Sent to Greece by Lord Palmerston, and of obstinate temper, while ardent and faithful, he preserved the passions and traditions of the exclusive and imperious policy of his old chief. The fall of M. Mavrocordato was, for that policy, a serious check, and for Sir Edmund Lyons himself the fall of his own supremacy in Greece. His hostility against the new cabinet, or rather against M. Colettis, was public and unbounded; either in the transports of his anger, or from premeditated design, he attacked it at every opportunity with indefatigable animosity, attributed to it projects utterly opposed to the peace of Europe, and set himself to work, within and without, to obstruct it by every description of obstacle. He did more; he quarrelled openly with M. Piscatory, accused him of having laboured to overthrow M. Mavrocordato, and ceased to hold with him the relations and intercourse which their official position and recent intimacy rendered equally natural and necessary.

My embarrassment was great; it was precisely at this epoch that the most cordial understanding established itself between Lord Aberdeen and me. Recently, at Eu and Windsor, we had thoroughly discussed all important affairs. I had recognized and experienced in the question of the right of search, amongst others, the elevation and equity of his mind,

and his loyal desire for a solid harmony between our two countries and governments. I determined to treat with him, openly and sincerely, on the affairs of Greece, as on other points, and wrote to him as follows, on the 28th of October, 1844:—"I wish you to read all that reaches me from Athens. The impression I have received from our interviews at Eu and Windsor is, that, if we mutually show and communicate all our intelligence, we shall always end by understanding each other. Am I wrong? Whether or not, here is a textual copy of a portion of a letter from M. Piscatory of the 10th of October, of which I do not send you the whole, as it relates to matters unconnected with Greek policy:—

"'I am not fond of speaking to you of Sir Edmund Lyons; I would have preferred not mentioning him until suitable relations are re-established, as I hope they will be. I do not specifically qualify, even to you, his mode of action; I leave you to form your own judgment; all I can tell you is, that the attachés of the English legation complain of his proceedings, and have begged me to re-establish our former relations in all particulars. I replied that everybody knew it was not I who had changed them, that I had not taken seriously many proceedings of which he had a right to complain; that Sir Edmund Lyons polite, would find me polite, intimate for the future as in the past; and that, in fact, I cherished neither ill-humour nor rancour. Has all this been repeated? I cannot tell, but it seems probable. The fact is, that yesterday Sir Edmund and Lady Lyons came to Patissa, while

we were absent, that I shall return the visit to-morrow, and that all will be done to maintain the good attitude on the side where it already appears so evident.'

"With reference to all this, my dear Lord Aberdeen, I wish only to dwell on one fact—the moderate and conciliatory spirit of M. Piscatory. I am sure he is sincerely imbued with the desire of doing all in his power, and that he will, really, do everything he can with honour to conciliate Sir Edmund Lyons, and to live again with him, at first on good terms, and then in perfect intelligence. Assist him in this, as you only can.

"A single word on the chief point of Greek affairs. Do not entertain any irrevocable prejudice against Colettis. I know not whether he will maintain himself in office; the prognostics of M. Piscatory on this point are very different from those of Sir Edmund Lyons. But, in any case, be certain of these two facts: one, that M. Colettis is and will always be a man of much importance in Greece; the other, that he possesses a rare and elevated mind, capable of improvement from experience and good advice, and is one on whom much depends for the result you desire equally with myself—the tranquil establishment of this little Greek State. He is filled with suspicions against the policy of England towards Greece; but these old prejudices may be extirpated from his mind. He is, I repeat to you, a man very open to improvement and *enlightenment*. He has some esteem for my judgment, and full confidence in my good feeling towards his country. I wish to give him the same confidence in you, and to make him believe your

policy towards Greece, what it really is, as sincere as ours. He may, I feel confident, be brought to this, and it would be a great step towards the solid re-establishment of our cordial understanding at Athens, a result to which I attach infinite importance for the present and the future."

In this attempt to change Lord Aberdeen's opinion of M. Colettis, and the opinion of M. Colettis on Lord Aberdeen's policy towards Greece, I undertook a very difficult work, and placed Lord Aberdeen in a greater embarrassment than my own. If I convinced him we were right, I obliged him to recall Sir Edmund Lyons—a distinguished sailor, honoured in his career, an ardent English patriot, well esteemed and connected in his country, and strongly supported by Lord Palmerston. I thus imposed on Lord Aberdeen a serious internal and parliamentary difficulty, while at the same time I asked him to think and act, as to the Greek parties and their leaders, in a manner different to the course hitherto adopted by the English government and himself. He continued to protest, sincerely and openly, against all pretension to predominant influence in Greece. "There is such a thing as too much, as also too little, influence," he said to M. de Jarnac,[1] "and I am sure we shall always have enough in Greece, be the minister who he may. I am quite indifferent on that point. I think, indeed, with the ideas of conquest and aggrandizement which M. Colettis has not hesitated to proclaim, he may be a dangerous man; but I do not suppose France will

[1] On the 20th of September, 1844.

feel at all disposed to support him in those ideas; and, under any circumstances, I am sure that England and Russia will not lend themselves to such a course. I am, therefore, perfectly tranquil on that head. My great reason for anxiety and regret in all this affair is, my increasing conviction of the extreme difficulty of any cordial co-operation with the French agents, and the weakening of my confidence in the solidity of the good understanding I was so desirous of maintaining and strengthening." The instructions given by Lord Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons were in harmony with his words to M. de Jarnac: he enjoined him to keep aloof from all political discussion, to avoid the character of a partizan, and to show no hostility to the government of King Otho; he blamed his attitude and personal proceedings towards M. Piscatory. "Confidence between Sir Edmund and M. Piscatory," he wrote to me, on the 11th of November, 1844, "is quite out of the question; and I could not, as a man of honour, order him to affect what he does not feel; but the usual relations of society must not be altered, and I promise you that Sir Edmund will do nothing to oppose the government of M. Colettis. I cannot command him to approve of it, for I do not approve of it myself; but he will take no part in any plot against him, and, above all, he shall do nothing to advance the prevalence of English influence. I will take care that my instructions are scrupulously observed." At the same time he persisted in thinking and saying that M. Piscatory had not attended to mine; that he had seconded M. Colettis, in his efforts to overthrow M. Mavrocordato, only with more skill

and management than Sir Edmund had employed to sustain him; and he preserved against M. Colettis all the suspicions which from the first moment he had manifested.

In this difficult situation I immediately did two things; both necessary to give us, in Greece and Europe, power and right.

I was not ignorant that Prince Metternich shared the mistrust of Lord Aberdeen with regard to M. Colettis, and that he was, moreover, very far from being well disposed to the constitutional system at Athens, the issue of the revolution of the 15th of September, and to its partizans. But I knew him to be also of a liberal spirit, inclined to take, on all occasions, the part of an impartial arbitrator, and determined not to declare vehemently against the ministry of M. Colettis; for the chief of the Russian party in Greece, M. Metaxa, had a seat in it, and M. de Metternich temporized as much with St. Petersburg as with London.

It occurred to me that his minister at Athens, M. de Prokesch, preserved a neutral and expectant attitude. I wrote to Count de Flahault on the 18th November, 1844:—"M. de Metternich has too much knowledge of men not to know that they are not of constant and invariable quantity when naturally active and intelligent. He knew Colettis formerly—the Colettis of the struggle for Greek independence, the Colettis conspirator, chief of Palikari, a stranger to Europe. He does not know the Colettis who has been seven or eight years in France, separated from his Oriental habits and friends, the immovable and attentive

observer of Western policy, of civilized society; above all, of the laborious formation of a new government in the midst of diplomatic complications and parliamentary struggles. This is the Colettis who has returned to Greece and now governs that country." He differs materially from what he was formerly. I am far from saying that in the present Colettis there is nothing of the former one—that all false ideas and blind passions are extirpated from that spirit, and that he will not again allow himself to be sometimes vaguely led astray by certain ambitious or chimerical hopes. But I think that wholesome ideas and moderate intentions predominate to-day in the mind of that man. I think him sincerely determined to use his best efforts to sustain the throne of King Otho, to establish in his country, in conformity with the existing laws, some degree of order and government, resigned at the same time not to place himself, by attempts at Hellenic insurrections and territorial aggrandizement, in contest with European policy, with respect to the will and power of which he does not in any manner deceive himself.

"If this is as I think, Prince Metternich will agree that much use may be made of this man, in restraining, by gradual decomposition, the revolutionary spirit, which, within and without, is still in agitation in Greece, and in conducting the difficult affairs of King Otho. Prince Metternich can the more effectually act thus, and direct the action of his agents in this sense, as by this conduct not the smallest risk can be incurred, for, if it failed, if the Greek ministers were to re-enter on turbulent and revolu-

tionary paths, the five powers, who are perfectly agreed not to allow it, would be always prepared, without much effort, to stop them, and to unite instantly with that object.

My suggestion was not fruitless; the instructions of Prince Metternich confirmed M. de Prokesch in his favourable dispositions towards the Colettis-Metaxa cabinet; those of St. Petersburg prescribed to the Russian chargé d'affaires, M. Persiani, to support that ministry, and in all cases to regulate his attitude by that of the Austrian minister. The Prussian envoy, M. de Werther, held the same course. The minister of Bavaria, M. de Gasser, thought and acted with M. Piscatory. All the continental courts were thus, more or less explicitly, on good terms with the new cabinet at Athens, and Sir Edmund Lyons remained alone in his hostility.

But I did not deceive myself as to the degree of insufficiency and precariousness in this position; I knew the importance of English action in the East, and the weakness of the continental cabinets in resisting that of London, when London had really a will. I was therefore anxiously intent on diminishing the disagreement which subsisted between Lord Aberdeen and myself on the affairs of Greece, and to dry up, in some degree, the sources of it. I wished, at least, to confirm Lord Aberdeen in his intentions of political immobility at Athens, and to justify ourselves in his eyes more and more against the inferences of Sir Edmund Lyons. What tended most effectually towards the accomplishment of this object was the attitude, language, and conduct of M. Piscatory, for

it was essentially against him that the ill-humour and suspicion of the English cabinet were directed. I knew M. Piscatory well, and, in spite of our disagreements of 1840, I had a sincere friendship for and placed full confidence in him. Preoccupied with himself, and very careful of his own success, he was also a warm, faithful friend, and loyal servant of the power he represented: sometimes too impetuously governed by his impressions of the moment, by his first ideas, and the intemperance of his first words, he was very capable of rising above them, of governing himself according to a great design, and of taking his place courageously in a combined and prospective conduct. I resolved to act with him as with Lord Aberdeen—to tell him my full ideas on all points, to make him thoroughly understand our situation, and to assure myself of his co-operation while associating him with my own responsibility. I wrote to him thus: "You are, at present, my first consideration: really the first, for the fall of Mavrocordato has been in London, and for Lord Aberdeen personally, a bitter vexation. Not that he is exclusively bent on the continuance in office in Greece of any particular man or party. In that respect he is perfectly moderate; but he foresees the embarrassment which the present cabinet will give him in parliament. When he was attacked on our mutual understanding, when he was asked what had become of it, how it had succeeded, Greece was his answer, not only to his adversaries, but to those of his own colleagues who hesitated sometimes in his policy. When Sir Edmund Lyons wrote that you had loyally promised to support

M. Mavrocordato, "Here is the advantage of the friendly understanding," said Lord Aberdeen to Sir Robert Peel, who had expressed some doubts of it. He has now lost this answer. He is now in Greece in the same situation as in Spain; at Athens as at Madrid he expiates the faults and pays the debts of Lord Palmerston and his agents. This is a heavy burden; he feels uneasy and displeased under it. He lays it to us, to you. He reproaches you with the rupture of the good feeling, with the fall of Mavrocordato. He accuses you of having wished and contrived it, at least of not having done what you ought and could have done to prevent it. You ought, he says, to have had more power over Colettis; at first to induce him to take office with Mavrocordato, and subsequently to prevent his opposing him. I deny and explain; I assert that Mavrocordato fell through his own fault, through the fault of Sir Edmund Lyons, who advised him, and whom he knew not how to resist. I prove that you cautioned him in good time, and repeatedly, and that you supported him as long as you could without losing yourself or your government in the spirit of Greece. I embarrass Lord Aberdeen, I stagger him, for his mind is just and sincere; he wishes loyally to maintain the friendly understanding with us, and in Greece the regular development of constitutional government under King Otho; he has none of the ill feeling or reserved thoughts which Colettis imputes to him. I show him the truth, the errors of Lyons and their consequences; but I fail to convince him fully and definitively; I do not dissipate his ill-humour, for his

parliamentary embarrassments continue, and I cannot deliver him from them.

"I add, between ourselves, my dear friend, that at a distance, and for a calmly judging spectator, a little dissatisfied at the event, the fall of Mavrocordato, admitting that it was natural and inevitable, does not seem to have been honourably transacted, either by his adversaries or by Greece herself. All the complaints, angers, clamours, and cries of vengeance, against the Mavrocordato ministry, with regard to the distribution of places or electoral manœuvres, seem to be much exaggerated, and dictated by personal interests or passions. M. Mavrocordato committed no great or glaring act of culpable or bad policy. He neither betrayed the King nor the constitution; no really national interest, no startling danger, seem to me to have commanded his fall; it was effected by the rivalries and pretensions of parties, coteries, and individuals. Why would Colettis not be minister with him? To leave him to dry the constitutional plaster and to settle the elections—this may have been well calculated; this gives no great idea of the skill of Mavrocordato; but it inspires little esteem for the causes of his fall and his successors.

"Such is the state of Lord Aberdeen's mind; and he is the most impartial member of his cabinet, the best disposed towards us. Such are the dispositions against which we have to struggle, and with which we must live in London, as regards the actual government of Greece.

"My conversations and letters have not been without effect. I have obtained formal instructions from

Lord Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons:—1. To lay aside, in his social relations, his anger and ill-humour, and to live, as he ought, suitably with you. 2. Not to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, to abstain from attacking the Colettis ministry, and to excite no obstacle in its way.

"These instructions are seriously and sincerely given in London. How will they be carried out at Athens? We shall see; but I am in a position and have a right to demand their execution.

"Quite confidentially between ourselves, Lord Aberdeen communicates to me his fears as to the unconstitutional tendency of Colettis, and his views of aggrandizement. He requires me to assure him that within, the constitution, the monarchy, and the public liberties,—and without, treaties and the territorial *status quo* shall be respected. He much mistrusts the alliance with M. Metaxa, and asks what we should have said if M. Mavrocordato had contracted it, and if we are sure of not being duped.

"Such is the external aspect of Greek affairs between Paris and London. I now come to the purely internal and Greek view, as it appears to me.

"I admit all that you tell me on the causes of the fall of Mavrocordato, on the general satisfaction of the country, on the actual good direction of affairs, on the high position, the wholesome state of mind, and merited ascendancy of Colettis. We must support and help him. We must maintain, with circumspection, his union with M. Metaxa. We must practise, in a word, the policy truly Greek and advantageous to Greece, despite the embarrassments it may

occasion. On this question I have not the slightest hesitation.

"But bear strongly in mind the two points I now name.

"Colettis is a superior spirit, and may, for that reason, emerge from the beaten track of his ideas and prejudices. But he is of an ardently impassioned nature, and very tenacious in his enthusiasm, for he overflows with strength and devotion, and though he has learnt much, is still full of ignorance. Thus he may easily fall back into the habitual ruts.

"Amongst his old prejudices none is more deeply rooted than his suspicion of the policy of England towards Greece. He does not see the new facts which have modified or may modify that policy; and if he catches a glimpse of them for a moment, he forgets them, on the first pretext, to return to his antipathy and opposition.

"The English party may very easily, by the working of institutions, be beaten, and for a time ejected from power, in Greece. England will resign herself to this with a good or ill grace; but Greece cannot risk the permanent ill-will, the declared hostility of England. She is not in a condition to bear either the direct blows or European complications which would result therefrom.

"Never lose sight of this, and manage to impress it on Colettis.

"As an essential, fundamental rule of conduct, preserve amicable relations with the men of the English party who are ready to reciprocate; above all, with M. Mavrocordato. I should be surprised if he

rejected them. Always entertain the prospect of a reconciliation between him and Colettis. Contrive and prepare the possibility of this. It may one day be indispensable for Greece. It must also be advantageous to us, and should constitute our real policy and permanent attitude.

"I do not share the uneasiness of Lord Aberdeen as to the unconstitutional spirit of Colettis. From inclination or necessity he will be constitutional. But I am not so certain as to his territorial views, or the concealed efforts or unpremeditated enthusiasm to which he might surrender himself. Do not leave in that direction any uncertainty or chimera in his mind. The partial struggle which liberated and founded Greece cannot be renewed. The question is now greater and clearer. It concerns the maintenance or fall of the Ottoman Empire; the moment for deciding that does not rest with Greece.

"My dear friend, I do not require you to occupy yourself, above all other points, with our general policy, and in the affairs of Greece, with the part which belongs to them in the *ensemble* of our arrangements. That you would, perhaps, find impossible; it is my province. But I ask you never to forget our general policy, and to be continually on your guard, while transacting the affairs of Greece, and of France in Greece, not to excite in our general action more embarrassment than is really inevitable. You are now, I repeat, my principal difficulty. I do not complain of this; I do not reproach you with it; you have done what was required at Athens; I have approved of your proceedings, and I shall continue to

support you in them. But continually repeat to yourself that whatever may be our interest at Athens, it does not comprise the most important interests of France."

"P.S. Sir Stratford Canning, who is, you know, a thoroughly honest man, and who loves Greece, writes to Lord Aberdeen, without anger, but in sadness, and with reference to the existing state of things and the Colettis-Metaxa ministry:—'All this cannot turn to the advantage either of England or France.'"

Sir Stratford Canning apprehended that the alliance of M. Colettis with M. Metaxa would be profitable to Russia. He deceived himself; he knew not the extent to which those two men were unequal in stature, and the greater polital strength which M. Colettis would soon infuse into his personal superiority of mind and character. Facts were not slow in proving this. Two months after the formation of the cabinet, M. Piscatory wrote to me, on the 20th of October, 1844:—"Colettis goes on well; he has greatly enlarged his circle. We have decidedly gained a victory over his old ideas. Is he right in his complete confidence? I dare not affirm this; but he has certainly a substantial power. Will he succeed, as he thinks, in establishing a government? The task is hard; but he will not quit his hold easily. The King and Queen, delighted with their tour in the provinces, feel indebted to him for the reception they have everywhere met with; and the lovers of order, even those who preferred the name of Mavrocordato, feel that Colettis only can protect them, and that on his alliance or rupture with Metaxa depends the success or ruin of the cause." Two months later, on

the 30th of December, 1844, at the moment when the verification of powers ended in the Chamber of Deputies at Athens, M. Piscatory held the same language:—"The success of Colettis continues. I pass over nothing he does. Metaxa conducts himself honestly up to this. He sees clearly that his party dissolves under the sun of Colettis; but he feels that by separation he would lose himself. I watch him carefully. I occupy myself but little with the King. Colettis is all-powerful with the latter; at least, as much as is possible. We must see how the session turns out; I hope it will be satisfactory. I have saved several Mavrocordatist deputies; I will save Mavrocordato. I do this for you; here it is worth nothing; there is no country in which chivalry has less value, even with those who profit by it."

The more the session advanced, the more the majority declared itself decidedly for the ministry and for M. Colettis in the cabinet. Some important posts were vacant; amongst others, in the cabinet itself, that of Minister of Public Instruction and Worship. The friends of M. Metaxa were in the lists; M. Colettis wished to appoint one of them, but they were so ardent in the religious question that he hesitated to give them the superintendence of faiths. "I think," M. Piscatory wrote to me, on the 10th of January, 1845, "that if a sacrifice must be made, or ought to be, to the advantage of the alliance, I have no fear that it will be broken. M. Metaxa has no desire to do over again what he did during the National Assembly; he knows well that he has to deal with a much stronger colleague than M. Mavro-

cordato. He knows that M. Colettis would not fear to dispense with him. I think so also; but, if there is no serious danger in this separation, there would be, at least, great inconvenience. The ministry, as it is, ought certainly to go through the session. Having reached that point, it will easily continue until the opening of the next. The alliance, thwarted solely by the civil factions of the two parties, by the susceptibilities of M. Metaxa, and the too apparent triumph of M. Colettis, is watched with great care by all rational persons. M. Colettis, I have no doubt, will make concessions to him to maintain it; but he measures them so justly that I sometimes fear he may be too just. I remind him of this incessantly, and, above all, I sedulously watch the somewhat lively uneasiness of M. Metaxa. The Austrian minister watches on his side, and is less suspected than I am by the King and Queen when he recommends consideration for M. Metaxa, whose conduct in September and during the National Assembly is not readily forgotten at the palace.

"The English minister says now,—'The cabinet is bad, the Chamber very bad, its bureau detestable; nevertheless it may possibly succeed, and in that case success will prove the excellence of the institutions.' Sir Edmund Lyons used this language to M. de Prokesch. The Bavarian minister, who saw him yesterday, found him also more moderate, and speaking much of a leave of absence for eighteen months, to which he was well entitled after a residence of ten years."

Notwithstanding my satisfaction at the general

state of facts at Athens, this last report of M. Piscatory disturbed me keenly. "Take care," I wrote to him, on the 27th of July, 1845; "your situation appears to me very straitened. I direct your solicitude to two points. No rupture with Metaxa; Colettis will not hold on long alone, with Mavrocordato and Metaxa united against him. Also, keep strict watch over the men of disorder; for, after all, they are the friends of Colettis, and he humours them; not more, perhaps, than he is compelled, but certainly more than he ought. If he were to break with Metaxa, he would be given over to those men, and in the absence of strength he would resort to violence; and violence would not carry him far. Once more, I repeat, he would not have the resource of disturbing Europe; that depends not on him. But he would fall, to his own great injury, to the equal injury of Greece, and of ourselves."

My uneasiness did not deceive me. M. Metaxa supported with increasing impatience the ever augmenting ascendancy of M. Colettis. An opposition, formed by the friends of M. Mavrocordato and of the most ardent Nappists, dissatisfied that the cabinet did not do enough for them, manifested itself in the Chamber of Deputies. Sir Edmund Lyons encouraged it with his usual impetuosity; the interests of Greek orthodoxy appeared to him a favourable ground for engaging in combat. The Catholic faith of King Otho, and the difficulty of securing, according to the formal vote of the constitution, the Greek faith of his successor, led to incessantly renewed debates of this nature. "The Anglo-Russian alliance has been

attempted," M. Piscatory wrote to me on the 31st of July, 1845, "and M. Metaxa has allowed himself to be drawn into it. The question is raised between him and M. Colettis; between us and the alliance. The majority, which seemed for a moment doubtful, ended by proclaiming itself strongly by 65 votes against 32 in favour of M. Colettis. I am convinced that it would be well to turn M. Metaxa out at once; but I was bound to advise the contrary, and I did so. My colleagues looked upon me as perfectly convinced, and to-day it is M. Prokesch who accepts the idea of separation the most clearly, if the alliance is an obstacle." He added, a little later, on the 3rd of August, "Every day the separation of Colettis and Metaxa becomes more inevitable. The nomination of senators, which will be made known to-day or to-morrow, will be the signal. It is futile for me to say openly the alliance must be maintained; I am convinced it is impossible. M. Metaxa has tampered with the opposition; my colleagues see and say this without reserve. Do not feel uneasy at this event; the session will end well; order will not be disturbed, and very probably we shall soon have only to struggle against those who wish to lay the blame on the King. This opposition is not numerous, and has at this moment no root in the country. We possess, then, the material force; we have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies; we shall have one in the Senate; we have the entire confidence of the King; we support power and order. Is not this the right position here and before Europe?"

The rupture exploded at last. Appointed Greek

minister at Constantinople, M. Metaxa refused that mission. General Kalergis, the military leader of the insurrection of the 15th of September, and subsequently aide-de-camp to the King, was removed from his post, and named inspector of arms in Arcadia, which he also declined. All understanding ceased between the chiefs of the three great parties which divided Greece, and Europe in Greece; and M. Colettis, firmly supported by King Otho and the two Chambers, undertook alone to carry on and establish a free government, under the eyes and fire of MM. Mavrocordato and Metaxa, who had now become his declared enemies.

Before and after this event, I fell into no delusion as to its importance. I immediately wrote to M. Piscatory, on the 27th of August, 1845 :—"What is done is done. I regret it much. Metaxa embarrassed and annoyed Colettis; but, in fact, he neither impeded nor stopped him in anything of importance. When they differed in opinion, Colettis prevailed, and when they agreed, which often happened, much benefit accrued. And abroad, their union was a peremptory answer to all accusations and suspicions, a pledge, universally acknowledged, of strength and durability. What will now happen at home? I cannot say. I accept your prognostics. It is possible that Colettis, sole master, may rally round him the best Nappist elements, go on well, and last. His cause is good. I have confidence in him. I have confidence in you. I know that success and duration are possible, contrary to the expectations of his adversaries, and even of his friends. But be assured that, in a short time, at St.

Petersburg, at London, and even at Vienna, amongst the directors of affairs, and also in public opinion, his permanence in power will not be believed. This impression will add greatly to his difficulties. I cannot, at the first moment, estimate the measure of the intrigues of his enemies, or of the mistrust of those men, who, without being his declared foes, neither think well of him, nor bear him any good-will; but, certainly, his adversaries will be active, and the indifferent will leave him to himself. This very day I received a despatch from M. de Rayneval,[1] which tells me that the most favourable instructions we can hope from St. Petersburg for M. Persiani, are to hold himself aloof, and neither to approve nor sustain, while offering no opposition. Assure yourself that the Russian cabinet will take no part in any struggle, great or small, against that of London, and that it will rejoice at every opportunity of gratifying London by separating itself from us. And do not reckon on the German cabinets; they all have very bad opinions of Sir Edmund Lyons; but I doubt whether they will say this openly when they can no longer cover themselves with the alliance of Metaxa and Colettis. We shall be the only constant and declared friends of Colettis by himself.

"I need not tell you that we shall be in fact, and very decidedly, his friends. I rely on his imperturbable fixity on our two points of policy in Greece: without, the preservation of the territorial *status quo*, and of peace with the Porte;—within, the maintenance

[1] Then chargé d'affaires of France at St. Petersburg.

of King Otho and of the constitutional system. Tranquil on both these points, I shall firmly support the independence of King Otho in the formation of his cabinet, and the independence of the Greek cabinet in the conduct of Grecian affairs. I shall support Colettis as the leader of the national party, and as the most able, the most honest, and the safest of all who have interfered in the government of Greece. I thoroughly believe this, and I like the man. I believe you very capable of sustaining and restraining him, and I like you also. But do not deceive yourselves. The situation into which we are entering is extremely difficult. I do not clearly see that it was inevitable. I fear lest we should fall back into what has so long, and under so many different forms, ruined the affairs of Greece—the division and strife of internal parties and external influences. Do you and Colettis give the lie to this past. I will aid you with all my power. I forewarn you that I consider the danger serious, and that it is never out of my thoughts. Act and feel with me, and I hope we shall surmount this danger together."

I did not satisfy myself with conveying my prepossessions and advice to M. Colettis through M. Piscatory; I determined to express them directly to himself, giving him at the same time a fresh pledge of my friendship and support, and calling his attention forcibly to the additional responsibility which weighed on him, as he now stood alone in the possession of power. I wrote to him two months after the retirement of Metaxa, on the 14th of October, 1845:—"I have much pleasure in announcing that

the King has conferred on you the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. I watched impatiently a natural opportunity of proposing it to him. The journey of the Duke of Montpensier to Greece has supplied me with it. The King and Queen have been much moved by the reception which their son received from your Sovereigns, your nation, and yourself. What you are doing at Athens maintains and perpetuates the reminiscences you have left at Paris. Be assured you have stanch friends here, and they hope to see you again, when your country has less need of your presence.

"You advance, it appears to me, in your work, although your difficulties are always sufficiently great. This is the condition of government in free countries; success, even certain and brilliant, does not lighten the burden; every day you must renew the labour, and struggle as if nothing had been yet accomplished. You approach the end of your session; but then will commence for you another task, not less severe in itself, and perhaps even newer with you, that of internal government, of regular, responsible administration, necessarily directed to the maintenance or establishment of order, distributive justice, and public prosperity. Your enemies at home and abroad watch you, my dear friend, under this second trial. They say you are surrounded by a party at all times unacquainted with order, with a tranquil and regular state of things; that you will not succeed in making it submit to the yoke of laws, to administrative responsibility, to sound financial management; that the public offices and revenues will be handed over to

private ambition and embezzlement; that internal disorder and embarrassments will thus re-enter the State; that the three powers, creditors of Greece, will soon discover that they have not, under the constitutional system, better guarantees than they possessed before for the re-establishment of Greek finances and the payment of the interests on the loan; then, they say, will commence in Greece a new series of grievances, and events not less lamentable than those we have already witnessed. These predictions and fears undoubtedly reach you as they do us. I feel confident that you will baffle them, and that in applying to the second part of your task the full rectitude of your judgment, and the whole energy of your will, you will have the glory of opening to your country the era of the constitutional system, of administrative and political order, and of the regular and pacific participation of Greece in the general scheme of European policy. I think, with the emotion of a friend, of the sentiments which will fill your heart at the close of your life, if it is permitted to you that it should be thus occupied to the end."

I knew that I could evince my sympathetic solicitude to M. Colettis with this perfect unreserve, for he was one of those whose minds are rich enough not to absorb themselves entirely in political life, and who, in the midst of their severe trials, still remain sensible to other joys and sorrows. "Your letter," he replied to me, on the 30th of November, 1845, "has added a lively and sincere pleasure to the honour conferred on me by your King. Your sympathy for my country, your friendship for myself, your knowledge of the

necessities of all government, have inspired your words: thus I have hastened to read them to my Sovereign and my friends, who may equally profit by them. For me, they are the pledge of an esteem which I cannot repay by my best efforts, if it is granted to me to accomplish the task confided to me by Providence. Yes, I expect to advance in my work; every day I make a step towards the end I feel bound to propose to myself—the re-establishment of order in a country profoundly disturbed, the restoration of the throne to the high position belonging to it, the reconciliation, without shock, of constitutional laws with national habits. But do not judge my country and myself without an allowance for the particular features of our society; it is intelligent, but inexperienced; it has a taste for order, but is ignorant of the conditions; individual interest knows not what it owes, for its own success, to the general interest; men already cease to follow the inspirations of a leader, but do not yet rally round a principle; private interests are eager; the spirit of locality is sensitive. To brave all this evil to arrive at an absolute good, would be to compromise everything. Believe that if you have a just medium to preserve between opposing principles, we also have a just medium to establish between what is and what ought to be. Believe, in fine, that if I make concessions to what it is wished I should attempt to reform violently, I do not act so from weakness, but because I am convinced that shocks are most injurious to justice, to finance, to public prosperity, and to all the interests you recommend to my attention."

"M. Prokesch," he said to me, in other letters, "who had lately travelled in Eastern Greece, returned yesterday from a tour in the western provinces, and on that part of the frontier he found the country extremely tranquil, and the population much occupied with their agricultural labours. Above all, he expressed to me his satisfaction of the dispositions he remarked in the people and the officials to maintain friendly relations with Turkey. Until Greece is separated from Turkey by a wall similar to that of China, or until the Greek government is able to keep up twenty thousand men in permanent garrison on the frontier, I will not take upon myself to guarantee, neither will any one else, that no bandit shall escape from Greece to exercise pillage amongst the Turks. All that the Greek government can do, and does, is to give orders to the civil and military authorities on the frontier to keep up a mutual understanding with the Turkish pachas and agas for the prosecution of criminals, and I can assure you that the Greek and Ottoman authorities act so well together, that those districts have never been so quiet as at this moment."

The internal tranquillity on which M. Colettis congratulated himself was speedily disturbed, and the difficulties he foresaw, without being alarmed at them, soon presented themselves in a more serious form than he expected. The rupture between the leaders brought on the strife of parties in the country and also in the Chambers. While, in the latter, MM. Mavrocordato and Metaxa constituted a formidable opposition, that opposition, in the former,

transformed itself into material disorders, administrative irregularities, and conspiracies and seditions against the cabinet. During the first year of his solitary government, M. Colettis fought successfully against all these adversaries and perils: he had a majority in the Chambers; the King and the people became more and more favourable to him; wherever intrigue or rebellion sprang up, the crown and the nation gave him their co-operation to repress them; the attempts of some Greek bands either to pillage or provoke insurrection against Turkey on the frontier provinces were effectually prevented or disarmed. Such, in fine, was the state of affairs in Greece, that I was able to write to Count de Flahault, on the 11th of November, 1845: "We have now at the head of affairs, on the two points of eastern Europe which interest us the most, the two men best capable of comprehending and practising a degree of sound policy; Redschid Pacha at Constantinople, and Colettis at Athens. I hope M. de Metternich has not entirely forgotten what I wrote to you a year ago,[1] respecting Colettis, and that he finds his conduct has well answered my expectation. Colettis has won the confidence of King Otho, and even of the Queen. He applies himself to secure the throne, to elevate power. He gives way to none of the conquering or conspiring fantasies which may still prepossess his old party. He conducts himself towards the Greek Chambers with address and authority. He has just concluded

[1] On the 18th of November, 1844. See, in this volume, page 306.

a session; he will immediately and boldly commence another, to vote the budget of 1846 similar to that of 1845, and to have administrative time before him without political combat. He will endeavour to employ this interval in the introduction of some degree of order into the finances of Greece, in carrying on public works, in imposing on the agents of power and on the people some dawnings of tranquil and regular habits. The difficulties of the situation, already great, are much increased by the active, incessant hostility of Sir Edmund Lyons; I shall enter into no detail on this subject; M. de Metternich is undoubtedly as well aware of it as I am. I said to Lord Aberdeen at Eu all I think of it. I believe him almost convinced that Lyons judges erroneously the affairs of Greece, and conducts badly those of England in Greece. But—but—always but. . . . I am prepared for the continuance of this heavy difficulty. Fortunately, the representatives of the German courts at Athens, particularly M. de Prokesch, estimate their position correctly, and employ their influence well. This reassures me a little against the chances of new perturbations which Sir Edmund Lyons foments to the extent of his ability. Direct, I pray you, the attention of Prince Metternich to two points—1. To the Minister of Turkey at Athens, M. Musurus, a Greek entirely devoted to Lyons, who ever envenoms the slightest affairs of the Porte in Greece, and forwards insidious reports to Constantinople: a strong opinion delivered there respecting him would be very useful. 2. To the Russian chargé d'affaires, M. Persiani, insignificant and timid, but without bad intention or mischievous

efforts; he complains of not being sufficiently estimated by the King, the Queen, and some of his colleagues; it would be advantageous to have him treated with respect, and that he should acquire some confidence in his position and in himself. M. de Metternich will make what use he thinks fit of these confidential observations."

Prince Metternich gave the advice, and attended to the small matters I suggested to him. I say small, not that they were unimportant, and that if they had been neglected the Greek government would not have suffered thereby; but it was not external or diplomatic support, however indispensable it might be, that could place M. Colettis in a position to surmount the difficulties with which he was engaged; it was in himself, in his clear-sighted appreciation of Greek interests, and in his energetic determination to make them triumph, that he had to seek, and in fact sought, his strength. In a country recently and scarcely delivered from servitude by insurrection, he had to establish, at the same time, power and liberty. At the centre it was necessary to raise up royalty, and organize a governing majority in the Chambers. In the provinces he undertook to establish order, justice, and regular administration—facts unknown in Greece, as much since as before her enfranchisement. Without, he had to restrain the passions of the Greeks without extinguishing them, and to postpone indefinitely their great future without closing up its perspective. This was the difficult task, charged with contradictory problems, which Europe imposed on him and he imposed on himself, for his mind was expansive enough to mea-

sure its extent, and his heart sufficiently firm to accept the necessity. Such a work is not pursued without having many sacrifices to make, and many mortifications to endure in silence. To organize in the Chambers a governing majority, and to confine within the limits of the little Greek State the passions which aspired to the general liberation of the Greek race, it was necessary for M. Colettis to give to his old companions in arms, to the men of the war of independence, sufficient satisfaction to induce them to become resigned to the discipline of civil order and the inaction of peace. The only mode of obtaining from them this double effort was to leave to them, in their province, town, or rural district, the advantages and enjoyments of an influence closely approaching personal and local rule—a rule irreconcilable with sound public administration, and which became the source of a multitude of financial, judicial, and electoral abuses, the responsibility of which weighed on the central government, unable to repress them without irritating their authors, and without thus compromising their entire policy. These abuses were incessantly pointed out to M. Colettis by his friends who lamented them, and by his enemies who used them as weapons against him. The conversation and correspondence of Sir Edmund Lyons were the noisy echo of all these local disorders, of all the irregular or violent acts, of all the internal and external inconveniences, to which this situation gave birth, and he drew from thence an incessant accusation against the cabinet which either would not or could not preserve the country from them. Sir Edmund complained, on one occasion, bitterly of this to M. Colettis

himself; the Prussian minister, M. de Werther, seconded his complaints; M. Piscatory, who was present at the conversation, preserved silence, not wishing to contest an evil the reality of which he acknowledged:—"You require of me that the government should be everywhere present and active," M. Colettis replied to them: "that it should impose its rule in all quarters; you wish me to crowd all sail. I warn you that the masts will give way."

In spite of his uneasy forebodings, M. Colettis undertook to apply a remedy to the evils complained of; he issued stringent orders to all the authorities, all the agents of power, for the suppression of abuses, illegalities, party violences, depredations on the frontiers, and local disorders of every kind; he arrested and punished the perpetrators. Several criminals condemned to death for real and detestable acts of highway robbery, were in prison; for the infliction of the legal punishment of their offences had not yet been ventured. He ordered them to be executed. Discontent infused itself into his own party; irritated by measures which restrained their power, their independence and advantages of every kind, some of his old companions in arms joined their seditions to those of his adversaries. A valiant and popular chief of Palikari, Griziottis, who until then had supported the constitutional system and Colettis, took arms in Eubœa to resist them. These attempts were energetically combated and conquered; the greater part of the functionaries and the army continued faithful to the legal power. In the encounter which ended the revolt, Griziottis lost an arm. M. Piscatory, when

congratulating the first minister on his victory, saw tears in his eyes. "When we have no longer such men," said Colettis to him, "what will become of the country?" The head of the government did his duty, while cherishing in his soul the ambitions of the Greek and the sympathies of the old warrior.

The situation had now become singularly straitened and perilous. Sir Edmund Lyons greatly exaggerated its evils and dangers to his government, and attributed them entirely to M. Colettis, whose firm intentions, superior qualities, and successes in the policy of order and peace, he misinterpreted with passionate blindness. Deceived by these reports, and believing that I on my side was deceived by the contrary statements of M. Piscatory, Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel persisted in their injurious suspicions of M. Colettis, and manifested them towards him on all occasions. In the autumn of 1845, Prince Metternich, conversing at Frankfort with Lord Aberdeen, made what Count de Flahault called "a home charge" on him to induce him to change his feeling towards the head of the Greek ministry, but without success; the traditions of the English policy, the annoyance and check it had undergone at Athens, and the embarrassments of the parliamentary situation, were stronger than my information and arguments, and maintained the disagreement between us. I did not, however, suffer much uneasiness from this. Lord Aberdeen was far from having full confidence in the judgment of Sir Edmund Lyons; Sir Robert Peel himself blamed him for having taken at Athens the

with his personal mortifications than with the interests of his country or those of Greece. I had no apprehension that the English cabinet would proceed to any violent measures against that of Greece, or that our disagreement in that corner of the world would shake the cordiality which otherwise subsisted between us. "We must live under this evil," I wrote to M. Piscatory; "it is not likely to kill us. I regret the fact, but I resign myself to it. Good policy carried on in common would be better for all the world; let us continue it alone. I need not recommend to you, towards our adversaries at Athens, cold circumspection, and contempt for petty acts of ill-will."

But by the end of June, 1846, I lost the security with which, notwithstanding our differences of opinion, the character and general policy of the English cabinet inspired me. The reform of the corn laws entailed its fall. Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen retired from office. Lord Palmerston resumed the ministry of foreign affairs. I knew the dispositions he brought with him, his mode of treating them, and his confidence in Sir Edmund Lyons, one of his boldest and most devoted agents. I foresaw the point to which the difficulties of the situation at Athens would speedily aggravate themselves, for M. Colettis and for us. My presentiment did not deceive me.

I here indulge myself in the satisfaction of inserting the letter which I then received from Sir Robert Peel, in reply to one I had addressed to him, expressing my profound regret at his retirement. I had not with him the intimacy which had formed itself

between Lord Aberdeen and me; our impressions, as events occurred, had not always been in accordance; he had sometimes even evinced, as regarded me, a little impatience and inquietude. But we had, on the whole, and in main points, the same dominant idea, the same general object; both were anxious to impress on the policy of our respective countries a similar character. He took pleasure in giving me, when separating, a pledge of our harmony, and I am much gratified by its reproduction. "My dear M. Guizot," he wrote to me, "I should deeply regret my retirement if I did not feel assured that our united efforts, during the years recently elapsed, have given to the cordial understanding between England and France, foundations sufficiently solid to bear the shock of ordinary chances and personal changes in administration; at least in that of this country. Thanks to a reciprocal confidence, to an equal faith in the agreement of our views, and the purity of our intentions; thanks also (I may say so, since the receipt of your affectionate letter) to a mutual esteem and personal regard, we have succeeded in elevating the spirit and tone of our two nations; we have accustomed them to carry their views above miserable jealousies and obstinate rivalry; they have learnt to estimate at their full value the moral and social influence which good and cordial relations between England and France exercise everywhere, in support of every good and salutary design. Without this confidence and mutual esteem, how many lamentable difficulties would have increased to the point of becoming formidable national quarrels! Believe always in my

serious desire to contribute, either as a public man or a private individual, to the continuance and accomplishment of this great work, and be assured also of my unalterable friendship and of my most sincere respect and esteem."

For several months, it might be supposed that Lord Palmerston would with difficulty find a plausible opportunity of manifesting his ill-will towards M. Colettis, and of re-establishing at Athens the empire of Sir Edmund Lyons. The Greek government acted judiciously, and became more firm. Order and labour were sensibly progressing in the country. M. Piscatory, who had been in France for a few weeks, on leave of absence, wrote to me, after his return to Athens, on the 20th of October, 1846: "I have found Greece perfectly tranquil, excepting only a trifling disturbance in Acarnania, where a quarrel between the Grivas occasioned a little embarrassment of no consequence. Commerce and the soil will this year yield their produce in great abundance. There is real, evident prosperity, and, what is better, it is strongly felt. You know that Colettis has caused the execution of the brigands under sentence of death. The effect has been great, even on the spirit of Lyons. Few were present at this sad spectacle; not a single woman. Greece has still a right to call us *the Barbarians*."

An unexpected incident brought a serious difficulty on M. Colettis, and furnished Sir Edmund Lyons with a fresh opportunity of attack. A Greek officer, Tzami Karatasso, son of an old and valiant Palikari chieftain, had been accused, in 1841, of exciting

an insurrectionary movement in Thessaly against the Porte. Arrested at that time by order of the Greek government, at first confined in the fortress of Nauplia, afterwards a fugitive in the Ionian Islands, and then a prisoner at Egina, he only obtained restoration to his rank after a long trial of exile and submission. The revolution of the 15th of September, 1843, replaced him in favour, and he was appointed, at that epoch, one of the aides-de-camp to King Otho. No complaint came from Constantinople on this subject, and the Turkish legation at Athens treated Tzami Karatasso exactly as they did the other officers of his position. At the beginning of 1847, he had occasion to go to Constantinople, on private business; he obtained from the King a leave of several weeks, and a passport from the minister for foreign affairs: but when he applied to the Turkish legation for a *visa* to his passport, it was refused. The Turkish minister, M. Musurus, instructed one of his secretaries to acquaint M. Colettis with the reasons for this refusal: "I expressed to M. Konéménos my annoyance," M. Colettis wrote to me on the 30th January, 1847: "I reminded him that the antecedents of M. Tzami Karatasso, whatever they might be, were expiated, and that, in his new situation, he offered incontestable pledges of regular conduct. I requested the Turkish minister to reflect, and acquaint me with his final decision before I saw the King. M. Konéménos left me, promising to bring back the following morning the definitive answer of his chief. I waited in vain for the answer throughout the whole of the forepart of the next day. In the evening, there was

a private ball at the court, at half-past eight o'clock. I went there; I found the whole diplomatic body, and an instant after, the ball not having yet commenced, the King sent for me to his apartments. His Majesty asked me for information on the affair of the passport. I could only tell the King what I had heard from M. Konémenos, and the reply I had given to him; as to the final resolution of the minister of Turkey, he had not communicated it to me. His Majesty seemed to be much moved and offended at this conduct of M. Musurus. In the diplomatic circle, the King approached M. Musurus, and said to him "that he thought the King and his guarantee were entitled to more respect." M. Musurus said not a word in reply. After the circle, he passed into the drawing-room, where he conversed with M. Lyons and M. Mavrocordato; then he came up to me, and asked if I had reported to the King what he had conveyed to me through M. Konémenos. I replied that I had, adding that M. Konémenos had not brought the answer he led me to expect. M. Musurus said that the affair was delicate, and the responsibility would rest with me. I then felt myself under the necessity of replying that where the dignity of my sovereign and country were concerned, I accepted every kind of responsibility. A few moments after, pretending the indisposition of his wife, M. Musurus retired, followed by the persons attached to his legation.

The question, so trifling in itself, thus actively stirred up by the sharp words of King Otho, became more serious and envenomed from day to day. The Porte demanded expressly, and as its *ultimatum*, that

official apologies should be made to M. Musurus, without which he was ordered to quit Athens within three days, by the same vessel which brought his instructions. Haughty on his King's account, and also for his country and himself, M. Colettis rejected this imperious injunction. "What shall I do?" he asked M. Piscatory. "Nothing of what is required; do frankly and completely what can be done with dignity, and render the explanations worthy by carrying them to the sovereigns themselves." Eager to cover with his personal responsibility what was a little imprudent and inopportune in the words of King Otho to M. Musurus, M. Colettis adopted and put in practice the advice of our minister; he wrote to Ali Effendi, minister for foreign affairs at the Porte, and King Otho wrote to the Sultan himself. The two letters were frank, serious, and explained naturally the incident which occurred at the ball, while referring the originating cause to the uncourteous proceedings of M. Musurus in the whole course of his mission. The attitude and language of the King of Greece and his minister were approved of, not only in the diplomatic body at Athens, with the exception of Sir Edmund Lyons, but at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg; Prince Metternich even expressed his opinion in a note addressed to his internuncio at Constantinople, M. de Stürmer. But the Porte, finding itself supported elsewhere, persisted in its demands. Each side assumed the air of seeking expedients, and modes of accommodation; it was hoped at Athens that this quarrel would lead to the

for the fall of M. Colettis. All propositions were refused, and on the 1st of April, 1847, diplomatic relations ceased between the two States.

In the midst of this complication, another question and danger presented themselves, not between Greece and Turkey, but between Greece and the three protecting powers. I say the three powers, but I ought rather to say, one of the three—England. It concerned the payment of the interest on the Greek loan for the years 1847 and 1848. Greece was unable to provide for it from her own resources. That bad administration, inexperience, and disorder were the chief causes of this financial deficiency, in a country otherwise advancing, there could be no doubt; but the evil, thus accounted for, subsisted nevertheless. M. Colettis, to remedy it, employed efforts more sincere than skilful; he had neither the habits nor instincts of administrative regularity. Moreover, he fell ill, and so seriously, that he inspired me, as well as his friends at Athens, with serious anxiety. "The loss would be immense," I wrote to M. Piscatory; "not only does he serve his country well, but he does it honour, the greatest service that can be rendered. Greece has revived, thanks to some ancient and modern names. She requires that M. Colettis should not so soon join the battalion of Plutarch. I shall impatiently expect the next packet." It brought good news. M. Colettis had recovered, and offered solid securities to the protecting powers for the payment of the interest of the Greek loan in 1848. The French and Russian cabinets were disposed to accept them, and to give the Greeks still further time and

aid, insisting strongly on effective reforms in the administration. Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, seized this opportunity of striking a heavy blow at M. Colettis. He declared himself determined to require, on the part of England, the immediate payment of the half-year due for 1847, and three English men-of-war were ordered to leave Malta for Greek waters to enforce compliance with this demand. I immediately acquainted M. Piscatory[1] with the danger, and at the same time signified to St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin[2] the attitude which the French government intended to assume. Several days elapsed. "Why are those ships not yet here?" M. Piscatory wrote to me on the 29th of March. "The reason is perhaps the violent gales from the north? What will they do when they arrive? Letters from London say they will take possession of Egina. Here the report is that they will seize the customs of Syra or Patras. You interpret correctly when you foresee that intimidation is their object. At a distance they do nothing. When close at hand, we shall see. The King is quite firm. Colettis has grown young again. As to the country, it so little resembles all we know that I hesitate to give an opinion. For myself I am careful of every word I utter; I make no plan of campaign; every day will bring its own difficulty. Not to commit ourselves in the train of the Greeks, and not to abandon them—these are, I think, the two banks of the canal we have to navigate. I shall do my best."

[1] On the 11th of March, 1847.

[2] On the 20th, 30th, and 31st of March, 1847.

The emotion at Athens was lively. In presence of the English ships at the Piræus, of the menaces of Sir Edmund Lyons, and of the hostile measures of the Porte, people asked each other, "What will happen? Will King Otho yield? Will M. Colettis resign? Will a new cabinet be formed, and by whom?" The ministers of Austria and Prussia, without abandoning M. Colettis, advised him to retire. "You have on your hands," they said, "the anger of Lord Palmerston, the vengeance of the Porte, pecuniary exigencies, and excited disorders. Give way, and see what a Mavrocordato ministry will effect. It is doubtful whether it can be formed. If it succeeds, the ground will soon be cleared of all the lumber that now obstructs your path; later you will return with added strength." M. Colettis listened, but did not argue; M. Piscatory, without urging him, tendered his firm support; beyond Athens the country was more irritated than disturbed. King Otho was less disposed to yield than any one else; convinced that if he separated himself from M. Colettis, the disaffection of the country would be the inevitable consequence, he said openly, "I consent, if it must be so, to be driven away by foreign force; but to be expelled by the country itself, no; I prefer all risks rather than that." Queen Amelia, courageous and noble, confirmed him in his resolution. Strong in the support of the King and the people, and above all in his own energy, M. Colettis displayed it with unexpected boldness. His cabinet contained several ineffective or timid men; he replaced them by others more resolute and capable. He encountered in the

Chamber of Deputies a meddling opposition; he dissolved the Chamber, and the new elections secured to the new cabinet a strong majority. Seditions broke out on various points, amongst others at Patras. They were instantly repressed. One of the earliest, most persevering and influential amongst the Philhellenists, M. Eynard of Geneva, generously capable of placing his fortune at the service of the cause he espoused, advanced 500,000 francs to Greece to enable her to pay the half-year's interest demanded by England. The English men-of-war cruised in the Greek seas, frequently changing their anchorage, but never acting beyond an attempt at intimidation without results. The skilful energy of M. Colettis, the firm adhesion of King Otho to his minister, and the general sentiment of the country, raised them daily above the perils of the situation.

God, as a warning while he exalts us, displays the fragility of man in the midst of success. On the 10th of September, 1847, at the very moment when M. Colettis was exercising, in the face of the most urgent perils, his rarest qualities, and seemed on the point of reaping their fruit, M. Piscatory wrote to me:—"After a long struggle of fourteen days, the most energetic which a strong constitution and a resolute mind could sustain against a disease beyond cure, M. Colettis lies at the point of death. The close of the day will probably terminate also his life and sufferings. In the estimation of all who have seen him in his last moments, the death of this good and great citizen will form a material portion of his glory. He has lost nothing of his strength of mind and

calmness. From the commencement he spoke of his disease, and pronounced it incurable. Convinced of the inefficacy of remedies, he accepted them from the hands of his friends. Every day the King came to visit him. Whether his courage failed him, or he considered the danger less imminent, His Majesty delayed too long in asking the last advice of a man whose loss he deeply feels. Yesterday, with an effort to restrain his tears, the King held a parting conversation with him. M. Colettis sent for me to support him in a sitting posture; but his powers had already left him. Taking the King's hand, 'Sire,' he said, 'there is much I would say to your Majesty, but I am not equal to it; perhaps God will give me the necessary strength to-morrow.'

"'You also, my friend,' he said to me, after the King's departure, 'I had many things to tell you; but it is impossible. Thank your King and Queen for the attentions with which they have honoured me. Speak of me to my friends in France. Make my adieux to M. Guizot, M. de Broglie, and M. Eynard. To the last moment, as much as I could, I have followed their advice; they ought to be satisfied with me. The King has just told me, that enemies as well as friends are interested for me. This is gratifying. But I leave my country very ill. My work is not completed. Why would not the King know me twelve years ago? To-day I should die tranquil. Lay me down—I wish to sleep.'

"Subsequently, moments of ease and suffocation succeeded each other rapidly. In short intervals of

delirium, he was heard to repeat the songs of his youth."

M. Colettis died on the 12th of September, 1847: "His immovable firmness and self-possession, in itself a power," M. Piscatory wrote to me, "were not conquered for a single instant by the most acute pain, or the profoundest patriotic regret. Exposed for twenty-four hours, his body received, according to custom, the last farewell of an entire population, who followed him to the brink of his grave. A storm gathered, and the noise of thunder mingled with the discharge of artillery. 'God thinks with us!' exclaimed the Queen; 'He knows the worth of the man we have lost!'"

The next day King Otho published the following decree:—

"Having learnt, with profound regret, the death of the president of our council, the minister of our royal household, and of foreign affairs, M. John Colettis, of that great citizen who, after having gloriously fought for the country, rendered the most eminent services to our throne, we decree that all civil and military functionaries shall wear mourning for five days."

This royal order, countersigned by the six ministers, colleagues of M. Colettis, amongst whom were two of the most glorious names of the war of independence, Tzavellas and Colocotroni, was universally and scrupulously obeyed.

King and people were just and clear-sighted in their regrets and homage. Greece lost, in M. Colettis,

the most glorious amongst the surviving warriors who had conquered her independence: the only one who became an eminent politician. King Otho had found in him a minister firmly monarchical, and ardently attached to his country. Greek patriotism, the deliverance, independence, and greatness of the Greek race, was the sole passion of Colettis. No personal interest, desire, or gratification, mingled in him with that single aspiration; in no country, or time, did there ever exist a patriot more thoroughly divested of vain or sensual egotism. M. Colettis wanted nothing but the success of his country. His life was as simple and unostentatious, as his soul was lofty and devoted. As minister of a tottering King, he carried into government a profound sentiment of the dignity of power, and the steady intention of making it respected in the prince he served, as also in the political assemblies of his country. The constitutional system was, with him, a means rather than an end: for he had much more at heart the great national future of Greece, than the regular development of her internal and individual liberties. The expectation, the desire, the hope of the regeneration of the whole Greek nation, were the constant preoccupation of his thought, even when he admitted their immediate impossibility, and when his strong sense rejected the somewhat chimerical impulses of his imagination. What would he have done, what would he have attempted, at least, for that great cause, if he had lived longer in possession of power in the little Greek State, and in presence of the complications and struggles which sprang up

amongst the great European powers? No one can determine. He is amongst those who died without demonstrating, in the course of a life—great and glorious nevertheless—all that they had within them, and all that they were capable of accomplishing.

Three months after the death of M. Colettis, King Louis-Philippe, at my suggestion, recalled M. Piscatory from Athens, where French policy ceased to be actively on the stage, and appointed him ambassador at Madrid, where our recent success in the question of the Spanish marriages had given us a position more important, and also more difficult, to maintain.

CHAPTER V.

LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION.—THE JESUITS AND THE COURT OF ROME.

IN WHAT LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION CONSISTS.—RESOLUTION OF THE CABINET OF THE 29TH OF OCTOBER, 1840, TO MAINTAIN, IN THAT QUESTION, THE PROMISE OF THE CHARTER OF 1830.—VARIOUS BILLS PRESENTED BY MM. VILLEMAIN AND SALVANDY.—CHARACTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FRANCE, A BODY ESSENTIALLY LAICAL AND NATIONAL. —LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION CAN AND OUGHT TO EXIST AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE UNIVERSITY.—PERMANENT SUCCESS OF THE UNIVERSITY.—DIFFICULTY OF ITS SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.—LEGITIMACY AND NECESSITY OF LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION.—CONTEST BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND A PORTION OF THE CLERGY—BY WHAT UNFORTUNATE COMBINATION THE JESUITS BECAME THE PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES OF LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION.—OF THE PRIMITIVE AND HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE CONGREGATION OF JESUITS.—PUBLIC MISTRUST AND IRRITATION AGAINST IT.—IT IS DEMANDED THAT THE LAWS OF THE STATE AGAINST THE JESUITS SHOULD BE PUT IN EXECUTION.—I PROPOSE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE JESUITS SHOULD BE FIRST CARRIED TO ROME, BEFORE THE SPIRITUAL POWER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.—THE KING AND COUNCIL ADOPT MY PROPOSITION.—M. ROSSI IS APPOINTED ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY, PER INTERIM, AT ROME.—REASONS FOR THIS SELECTION.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COURT OF ROME FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONGREGATION OF JESUITS IN FRANCE, WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE CIVIL POWER.—EMBARRASSMENT AND HESITATION OF THE COURT OF ROME. — GREGORY XVI. AND CARDINAL LAMBRUSCHINI.—SUCCESS OF M. ROSSI.—THE HOLY SEE PERSUADES THE SOCIETY OF JESUS TO DISSOLVE ITSELF IN FRANCE.—EFFECT OF THIS RESULT OF

THE NEGOTIATION.—EFFORTS TO RETARD OR ELUDE ITS EXECUTION.—THESE EFFORTS FAIL, AND THE MEASURES AGREED ON CONTINUE TO BE EXECUTED, BUT SLOWLY.—ILLNESS OF POPE GREGORY XVI.—TROUBLES IN ROMAGNA.—M. ROSSI IS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR IN ORDINARY FROM FRANCE TO ROME.—DEATH OF GREGORY XVI.—ANTICIPATIONS RESPECTING THE CONCLAVE.

(1840—1846.)

LIBERTY of instruction was, in 1830, one of the formal promises of the charter.

Liberty of instruction is the free establishment and co-operation of schools, masters, and methods. It excludes all monopoly and privilege, avowed or disguised. If previous guarantees are required from men who devote themselves to teaching, as is the practice with those who select the bar or medicine, they ought to be the same for all.

Liberty of instruction does not deprive the State of its place and part in teaching, nor of its right over the establishments and masters dedicated to education. The State can have its own establishments and masters. Public power is free to act equally with private industry. To public power belongs the right of determining the previous guarantees which are to be required from all establishments and all masters. The right of inspection over all educational establishments, equally belongs to it, in the interest of order and public morality.

Wherever the principle of liberty of instruction is admitted, it ought to be loyally exercised, without any attempt or subterfuge to give and withhold at the same time. In an epoch of publicity and discus-

sion nothing injures governments more than deceitful promises and false words.

The cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, was seriously desirous of fulfilling the promise of the charter in the question of liberty of instruction. No one was more engaged and decided in it than I was. By the bill of the 28th of June, 1833, which I had introduced and carried, liberty of instruction was founded in primary education. I have already said in previous *Mémoires* how I endeavoured to found it in secondary education also, and through what causes the bill I introduced with that view failed. In 1841 and 1842 M. Villemain proposed two others, more complicated than mine, and which, without entirely settling the question, advanced considerably the principle of liberty. They met with animated opposition, and led to no result. In 1847, M. de Salvandy, who had become Minister of Public Instruction after the resignation which illness imposed on M. Villemain, presented two fresh bills to the Chambers, which were not more efficacious. In the various debates which sprang up on this subject in the Chamber of Deputies, amongst others on the 31st of January, 1846, I endeavoured to place in light the two ideas which governed, and were calculated to solve, this question :—"In the matter of public instruction," I said, "all rights do not belong to the State; there are some, I will not say superior, but anterior to, and co-existing with them. There are, in the first instance, rights of family. Children belong to the family, before they belong to the State. The State has the right of distributing instruction, of directing

it in its own establishments, and of superintending it everywhere; it has not the right of imposing it arbitrarily and exclusively on families without their consent, and perhaps against their will. The system of the Imperial University did not allow this primitive and inviolable right of families.

"Neither did it allow, at least in sufficient degree, another order of rights, the rights of religious creeds. Napoleon well comprehended the grandeur and power of religion; but he did not equally estimate its dignity and liberty. He frequently forgot the right which men charged with the trust of religious creeds possess of maintaining and transmitting them from generation to generation, by education and instruction. This is not an exclusive privilege of the Catholic religion; the right applies to all creeds and all religious societies; Catholics or Protestants, Christians or non-Christians, it is the right of parents to educate their children in their faith, by the ministers of their faith. Napoleon, in the organization of the University, did not consider the right of families or the right of religious creeds. The principle of liberty of instruction, the only guarantee of these rights, had no share in the University system.

"It is to the charter, and to the government of 1830, that the honour belongs of having placed this principle in light, and of following up its application. It is not only the engagement and duty of constitutional monarchy, but also its interest, to keep effectively this promise. However distant, at their origin, may have been the great creations of the Empire from the principles of liberty, such, at least,

as are really conformable with the genius of our society may admit those principles, and derive from them additional strength. Liberty may enter into the powerful machines created for the re-establishment and defence of power. What can be more strongly conceived in the interest of power than our administrative system, the prefectures, the councils of prefecture, and the State council? We have, nevertheless, introduced into this system the principles and instruments of liberty: general elected councils, municipal elected councils, mayors necessarily taken from the municipal elected councils;—all these most actual and living institutions, which, from day to day, will develop themselves and act an increasingly important part in our society, have recently adapted themselves to the administrative system which we derived from the Empire. The same thing may be effected for the great institution of the University, and power will find its advantage there equally with liberty. To render power, to-day, firm and lasting, liberty must come to its aid. In a public and responsible government, in face of the deputies of the country seated on these benches, at the foot of this tribune, under the fire of our debates, monopoly is too heavy a burden, no matter what shoulders may bear it. No force, no responsibility, can suffice for it; government must be relieved from a portion of this weight, society must exercise its liberty in the service of public affairs, and be itself responsible for the good or bad use it makes of it."

I alter nothing to-day in the language I thus held in 1846. Better than any other of the imperial

creations, the University could accept the system of liberty, and the competition of all the rivals which liberty could excite, for of all the institutions of that time, it was perhaps the best adapted both to its own special object and to the general state of modern society. In the midst of the conflicting prejudices of many minds, Napoleon comprehended that public instruction ought not to be given over entirely to private industry; also, that it could not be directed, like the finances or domains of the State, by an ordinary administration, and that it contained moral facts which called for a totally opposite organization. To give the men charged with public instruction a situation on a level with their mission, to secure to those social grades, so simple, so weak, and so dispersed, the consideration and confidence in themselves which they require, to enable them to feel pride and satisfaction in their modest condition, they must be united to a great body which can communicate to them its force, and cover them with its greatness. When creating this body under the name of the University, Napoleon understood, at the same time, that it was necessary it should differ essentially from the old religious and educational corporations. By their origin and plan of existence those corporations were strangers to civil society and its government; they had no active participation in social life, no interests coincident with those of the mass of the citizens. These were the results of celibacy, of the absence of individual property, and of other causes besides. The religious corporations were, at the same time, strangers to the civil power which governed them not,

and only exercised over them an indirect and disputed influence. The laical character and spirit dominate essentially in modern society; to comprehend this society thoroughly, and to be accepted by it with confidence, the educating body ought also to be laical, associated with all the interests of civil life, of family ties, of property, of public activity; while fulfilling its special mission, it is necessary that it should be intimately united with the great and common public. It must also be united to the State, and hold from the State its powers and general impulse. Thus was the University conceived in the idea of Napoleon; thus it came forth from the hand of that powerful constructor; a body, distinct without being isolated, capable of allying dignity to discipline, and of living in natural harmony with society and its government.

Facts have realized and justified these ideas. For more than half a century the University of France has passed through great events and undergone varied trials; it has been exposed alternately to the blows and seductions of revolutions. Some false movements, some instances of enthusiasm or weakness, have manifested themselves in its ranks; but, altogether, it has faithfully accomplished its mission, and worthily preserved its character. It has continued in harmony with the spirit, the ideas, the laical and honestly liberal habits of our society. It has constantly applied itself to raise up or exalt the level of studies and minds. It has employed the strength it received from the State, in the service of progress, and for the honour of literature and science. And

success has proved, and continues daily to prove, the merit of its labours. From its schools have issued, and continue to issue, a host of distinguished men, who carry into all careers in life, activity of thought and respect for truth, with the disinterested love of studying, and the skilful art of applying it. It is the University which, in the midst of the development and empire of material interests, has formed, and still forms, men of letters, philosophers, professors, authors, and profound scholars. It is now, amongst us, the most active centre of intellectual life, and the most effective in diffusing throughout society its light and heat.

On one point only, but on one of the most important objects of education—on religious culture—the situation of the University was necessarily, from its origin, delicate and difficult. Liberty of conscience, and the incompetence of the civil power in matters of religion, are amongst the most precious conquests and fundamental principles of our society. The University, the delegated and representative body of the laical State, could not itself undertake the charge of religious instruction, and was bound scrupulously to respect its liberty. All that it could or ought to do was, to open to the men invested with that mission in the various creeds, the gates of its establishments, and to invite them to bring the instruction which they only had a right to introduce. But this simple admission of religious teaching into establishments where religious authority was otherwise unknown, this assimilation of the study of religion with other secondary studies, which have only their special and

limited hours, could not entirely satisfy the families devoted to religious faiths, nor the men entrusted with their preservation and transmission. Religion, seriously accepted, and practised, holds too important a place in the life of the man not to require equal prominence in the education of the child. I say education, and not instruction alone. The University is, above all things, a great establishment of instruction. The portion of education which children receive in its schools is that which relates to discipline and public life amongst equals: an education most necessary and salutary, but insufficient for moral development and the internal regulation of the mind. It is pre-eminently in the family bosom, and in the atmosphere of religious influences, that moral education is given and received, with all its requirements and scruples. There is something of excessive timidity in the anxieties impressed by the internal system of our establishments of public and laical instruction, on persons who preoccupy themselves especially with the moral culture of souls. These anxieties are, however, not without serious motives, and in all circumstances are entitled to much respect.

Another consideration, more urgent still, weighs for nearly half a century on the spirit of believers—whether laical or clerical. The Christian religion is evidently exposed to a new crisis of war—of war philosophic, historic, and political, all followed up in the midst of a public, overflowing at the same time with indifference and curiosity. The attack is equally free and ardent. The defence ought to be free also. Who will be astonished that it should be fore-

casting? Who will blame Christians, Catholic or Protestant, for their utmost efforts to protect rising generations from blows directed against the Christian faith? They will encounter and feel blows soon enough in the world and in life; let them, at least, be armed a little in advance to resist them; let them have received those first impressions, those faithful traditions, those familiar notions, which even troubles of the mind do not efface from the inmost soul, and which prepare repentance when unable to prevent aberration. Nothing, then, can be more natural or legitimate than the ardour of the Church and its faithful followers for liberty of instruction; it was as much their duty to reclaim, as their right to obtain it. Liberty of instruction is the necessary consequence of the incompetence of the State in the question of religion; for it can only inspire believing Christians with full security, while placing them in a position to found establishments in which the Christian faith shall be the basis of education, while uniting itself to a system of instruction capable of entering into competition with that of the schools of the State.

The University, as regarded studies, had nothing to fear from this competition. It was protected with all the arms necessary to support it with advantage; and as to moral education, the liberty of the religious establishments gave to the University a point of support from which to resist of itself the breezes of fanatical or frivolous incredulity, at the same time disengaging it, in that respect, from all exclusive responsibility. It could say to those who did not

consider it sufficiently confined within its incompetence in religious matters, "How can I abstain from a warm interest in the question of religion when I have by my side establishments which draw from thence a great moral force?" And to others, who found it too little Christian and Catholic, "Nothing compels you to confide your children to me; free establishments devoted to your faith are open to you." In this double result of liberty of instruction, the University found ample compensation for the loss of the privileged supremacy ascribed to it by its founder.

But when an obstacle to improvement is not presented in things themselves, the passions of men are not slow in supplying it. While extending and exciting itself, the struggle for liberty of instruction soon changed its character. It was not only elevated, and generous spirits, such as M. de Montalembert and Father Lacordaire, who eloquently demanded it as their right and duty as citizens and Christians; it had also blind and coarse champions, who attacked the University violently; at one time, forgetting the services it had rendered to moral and religious education as well as to instruction; at another, imputing to it maxims and institutions it did not maintain; and also holding it responsible for the extravagances of some of its members, who were no more the image of the teaching body, than certain ecclesiastics who had fallen into grievous errors, were the image of the clergy itself. Pamphlets full of acrimony, insult, and calumny, were published with a loud flourish, and obtained from some bishops an approbation as imprudent in itself as

unjust towards the University. Many other judicious bishops and priests blamed those controversial violences, and would willingly have treated the University with enlightened equity; but, in the Church as in the State, it is the evil of our time and of many times, that when extreme opinions display themselves, moderate views are intimidated and silenced. The most fiery enemies of the University retained possession of the arena, and the question of liberty of instruction became, between the University and the Church, or rather between the State and the Church, a war without quarter.

It did not even stop there. It soon assumed a position most compromising for the Church; it fell on the head of the Jesuits. The Jesuits were, in the eyes of the public, the representatives of liberty of instruction.

More than once, in the course of my public life, at the Sorbonne and in the Chambers, I have expressed, without reserve, my opinion of the Jesuits, of their original character, their historical influence, and actual position in our society. I am anxious to-day to repeat what I said, amongst other occasions, in the Chamber of Peers, on the 9th of May, 1844, in one of our great debates on liberty of instruction. Not only have I nothing to alter in my words, but they explain the resolution I formed, and the conduct I adopted at that epoch, in the midst of the attacks and perils of which the Society of Jesus was the object.

"When the Jesuits were instituted," I then said, "they were instituted to sustain, against the movement of the sixteenth century, absolute power in spiritual, and a certain degree of power in temporal order. I

cannot comprehend how any doubt could be raised, to-day, on that point. It would be an insult to the memory of the founder of the Jesuits; and I am convinced that if Ignatius de Loyola, who had a lofty mind and character, could hear the explanations and apologies now attempted to be offered for his work, he would exclaim against them with indignation. Yes, it was to protect faith from examination, authority from control, that the Jesuits were instituted. At the moment of their origin there were strong reasons for undertaking that great task, and I can understand how, in the sixteenth century, great minds proposed it to themselves. A very doubtful problem was then laid down; the empire of liberty in the world of thought, the aspirations of society to exercise an active and effectual control over all the powers existing in its bosom, was at that time an immense enterprise; great dangers were attached to it; there might, and did, in fact, result from it, great trials for humanity. It was therefore extremely natural for great minds and souls to endeavour to resist a movement so vast, so violent, so obscure. The Jesuits devoted themselves courageously and ably to that difficult task. Well. They deceived themselves in their judgment and their work; they thought that from the movement then commencing, nothing could emanate in intellectual order but licence, in political order but anarchy. They were mistaken. There arose from it great, strong, glorious, regular associations, which have done more, perhaps, for the development, the happiness, and glory of humanity, than any that had preceded them. England, Holland, Prussia, Germany,

the United States of America, Catholic France itself, are societies which, by various roads and in unequal degrees, have followed the impulse of the sixteenth century;—here are great nations and governments engendered by this mighty movement. Evidently this fact has falsified the previsions of the founder of the Jesuits and his congregation; and because they deceived themselves they have been beaten; beaten not only in the countries in which the movement they opposed speedily prevailed, but even in the countries where the system they sustained long continued to exist. Spain, Portugal, and Italy have declined in their hands, under their influence; and in those very States the Jesuits have wound up by losing their credit and the dominion of the future.

"To-day, when these facts are not opinions, but evident results of experience, for all the world, to-day at least does the Society of Jesus acknowledge experience? Does it admit that free inquiry can exist by the side of power? That public control can exercise itself over an authority which continues strong and regular? If the Jesuits admit this fact, if they are enlightened by this experience, let them take their place amongst us, free and obedient to the free competition of all citizens. But the public believes, and has strong reasons for believing, that the Jesuits have not sufficiently profited by the progressive experience of three centuries, that they have not completely renounced the first thought of their origin, that the idea of a struggle against free inquiry and the free control of public power is not yet eradicated from their minds. If this is so, if the Jesuits persist

in disavowing the results of experience, they will learn that they deceive themselves now, as they did three centuries ago, and they will be beaten in our days, as they have been beaten before."

I feel this conviction now as strongly as I did twenty years ago; as regarded the history and destiny of the Jesuits it was a just appreciation of the past, and a correct presentiment of the future; but in the Chambers, as with the public, amongst the friends of the cabinet, as with the opposition, minds were neither so calm nor equitable. They were more disturbed than I was by the power of the Jesuits, and less confident in that of society and liberty. They enumerated the houses already possessed by the Jesuits in France, the oratories in which they officiated, the property they had acquired, the children and youths they brought up, the followers they assembled around them. They demanded against them the execution of the laws, of which, under the old system, the Empire, and even the Restoration, unauthorized religious congregations were the object. These laws were incontestably in vigour, and, without rashness, it may be affirmed that if the question had been brought before them, the tribunals would not have hesitated in their application.

I did not consider such prosecutions either necessary, opportune, or effective. The struggles of civil power against religious influences easily assume the appearance, and often lead to the reality, of persecution. Of this, the history of our old Parliaments furnishes striking examples. We should pre-eminently have incurred this risk, had we engaged in

such a struggle precisely on a question of liberty, of that liberty of instruction promised by the Charter, and demanded, not only for a religious congregation, but for the Church itself. It was, for the State as for the Church, the misfortune of the situation that the Jesuits were, on this occasion, the advanced guard, and, in a certain degree, the representatives of the whole Catholic Church; the prosecutions and sentences which might have struck them would have seriously embittered a quarrel already greater than their own, and a considerable portion of the French clergy would have imbibed therefrom an animated irritation. Very often, moreover, and in many States, the Jesuits have been prosecuted and condemned without being destroyed; they have always sprung up again; their existence has had deeper roots than the blows aimed against them; and it does not belong to laws and sentences, but to the general state of society and minds, to combat and reduce their action within just limits. I proposed to the King and council not to abandon the laws in vigour against religious congregations not legalized, but to postpone their employment, and to carry the question of the dissolution of the Society of Jesus in France to its supreme and uncontested chief, to the Pope himself. The civil French power did not thus renounce the legal arms with which it was provided; but, in the interest of religious peace, as also of religious influence and liberty in France, it invited the spiritual power of the Catholic Church to relieve it from its exercise. The King and council adopted my proposition.

By whom could I present and support it at Rome with solid chances of success? It would surely meet with strong opposition there, for we called upon the Court of Rome to acknowledge unpleasant facts, and to inflict a check on some of its most devoted servants. Our ambassador at that time to Pope Gregory XVI., Count Septimus de Latour-Maubourg, was a thoroughly honourable man, but ill, inactive, and enjoying at Rome more personal esteem than influence. We wanted a new agent, well known to the European public, and whose name alone should be a signal indication of the character and importance of his mission. I gave M. de Latour-Maubourg the leave of absence he required on account of his health, and the King, at my suggestion, appointed M. Rossi his envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Rome *per interim*. What appeared a little extraordinary in this choice was, in my eyes, its first recommendation. An Italian avowedly liberal, and a refugee from Italy, on account of his liberal opinions, the embassy of M. Rossi could not fail to startle, I will even say to alarm, the Court of Rome; but there are salutary alarms, and I knew M. Rossi to be extremely well adapted to calm those he might inspire, and at the same time to turn them to account for the success of his mission. His liberal convictions were deeply rooted, but expanded, and untainted by any spirit of system or party; his mind was extremely free, though not fluctuating, and no one was more capable of seeing persons and things in their true light, and of restraining his daily action within the limits of what was

practicable, without ceasing the constant pursuit of his object. Bold within bounds, patient, persevering, and insinuating without servility, he had the art of humouring and pleasing, while giving to those with whom he treated the idea that in the end he would succeed in his enterprises and gain the point in dispute. In his political and diplomatic life, he was one of those who do not carry by assault and by a bold stroke the places they besiege, but who invest and press them so closely that they lead them to a surrender without too much heat and as if by an accepted necessity.

He set out for Rome towards the end of 1844, visited, before establishing himself there officially, several places in Italy where he was anxious to converse with some former friends, and on the 2nd of March, 1845, I forwarded his instructions to him, couched in the following terms:—

"Sir,—The lamentable state of Count de Latour-Maubourg's health having compelled him to ask the leave of absence which has been granted to him, the King has given you a testimony of exalted confidence in selecting you to conduct, *per interim*, his embassy at Rome, in quality of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

"You know the character of harmony and intimacy which presides over our relations with the Holy See. You know that the Sovereign Pontiff declares himself animated by the most affectionate sentiments for France and the King, and that he renders full justice to the enlightened solicitude of the King and his government for the advantage of reli-

gion, as also to their sincere desire of seconding the just influence, and of co-operating in the prosperity and brilliancy, of the Church of France.

" The King, on his part, has much satisfaction in relying on the kind friendship of the Holy Father, and on the spirit of prudence and conciliation which he continues to introduce in the appreciation of affairs, often delicate, which the two courts have to negotiate together. He hopes that the co-operation of the head of the Church will not be wanting in circumstances which may require a conciliation of the rights and duties of temporal with those of spiritual power, and a necessity of placing the moderate demands of policy in harmony with the true interests of religion.

" A serious occasion presents itself at present for requiring this friendly co-operation of the Sovereign Pontiff; and this is the first, as also the most important object of the temporary mission with which you are entrusted.

" The Society of Jesuits, in opposition to the edicts which have specially abolished it in France, and to the laws which prohibit religious congregations not recognized by the State, has laboured for some time to repossess an avowed and established existence. The Jesuits openly announce themselves; they speak and act as Jesuits; they possess, in the kingdom, and to the knowledge of the public, novitiate establishments, chapels, and a separate organization. They form in these a distinct corporation of secular clergy, observing particular rules, a special mode of living, and obeying a foreign chief who resides out of France.

"There is here, on the one hand, an evident violation of the laws of the State and of those which constitute the discipline of the Gallican Church; on the other, a pressing and serious danger for the State and for religion itself.

"The Jesuits have never been popular in France. The Restoration, after lengthened toleration, was obliged to deal severely with them by the decrees of the 12th of June, 1828. An almost universal cry sprang up against them from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the measure which closed their colleges and excluded them from public instruction was hailed with joy and gratitude.

"To-day the same complaints exhibit themselves, even more numerously and ardently. The public is moved, disturbed, and irritated by the idea of the active and inveterate hostility of the Jesuits towards our institutions. They accuse them of perpetual interference in policy, and of association with the projects and intrigues of the factions still in agitation around us. They attribute to them the most violent and objectionable attacks to which the University has been exposed in recent times. They are apprehensive that the ordinary clergy may be led or intimidated by their influence. The great bodies of the State, the Chambers, the magistracy, share these dispositions and fears. And this condition of minds is so general, so pressing, and might become so serious, that the King's government considers it an imperious duty to take the facts which cause it into the most profound consideration, and to apply an effectual remedy.

"It would suffice, to satisfy the public feeling, to put in strict execution the existing laws against the Jesuits in particular, and generally against all unauthorized religious congregations throughout the kingdom. These laws are in vigour; they secure to the government all the necessary means of action, and the Chambers would be much more disposed to strengthen than to curtail them. But the King's government, faithful to the spirit of moderation which regulates its entire conduct, filled with respect for the Church, and careful to save it from all critical position or extreme contest, prefers, and sincerely wishes to attain, by an amicable understanding with the Holy See, and by means of a loyal co-operation on its part, the end which it is its duty to pursue.

"This, sir, is what you have to announce and demand of the Holy See, urging it to use, without delay, its influence and power to compel the Jesuits to close their novitiate houses and other establishments in France, to cease to form a body there, and if they wish to continue to reside in that country, to live henceforward in the condition of simple priests, like other members of the inferior clergy, under the jurisdiction of the bishops and ministers. The Court of Rome, in acting thus, will never make a more opportune use of the supreme pontifical authority, or one more provident and conformable with the spirit of that elevated and tutelary mission which calls the successor of Saint Peter to unravel, by the intervention of his wisdom, or to extirpate, by the ascendancy of his spiritual power, the serious difficulties which,

in moments of crisis or urgency, might become, for the ecclesiastical order, formidable dangers.

"You are too well acquainted, sir, with the question now at issue; you are too deeply penetrated with the high considerations to which it is essential to direct the most serious attention of the Sovereign Pontiff, for me to dwell on them further, and for the King's government not to confide entirely in the ability with which you will know how to give them their full value. We should much regret if the Holy See, by a refusal of co-operation, or by an inertness which I can with difficulty suppose, should place us under the obligation of taking ourselves the measures which the public sentiment of France and State necessity would absolutely demand."

After having, on the 11th of April, 1845, presented his letters of credence to Gregory XVI., who received him with gentle benignity, and who, despite his secret solicitude, took some pleasure in conversing in Italian with the ambassador of France, M. Rossi maintained, for two months, an attitude of inactive observation, applying himself solely to a complete knowledge of facts and men, and to the excitement of a curiosity as to the object of his mission, which he made no attempts to gratify. He gave me an account, on the 27th of April, of his observations, of the reasons for his apparent immobility, and of the results he expected.

"Two men," he wrote to me, "were exclusively in the confidence of the Holy Father—Cardinal Lambruschini, secretary of state, and Cardinal Tosti,

treasurer. The rivalry supposed to exist between them was not real; they had, on the contrary, a common cause, and common enemies. Only, the situation of affairs afforded more opportunity for attacking Cardinal Tosti; against him, at first, all efforts were combined. He fell. At this moment Lambruschini is the hostile object. I do not think he will be overthrown. He is infinitely more able than Tosti, and more strongly established with the Pope. But, naturally aware of these underhand dealings, he carefully avoids all that might compromise him or excite the clamours of the extreme party. To prevent a fall, he abstains from obtruding himself. I am convinced by my own observations that he thinks he is menaced, for everybody knows that, with that feeling, he is always speaking of his ill health, of the necessity of repose, &c. I saw him within the last four days, and he did not fail to mention it.

"This relates to the general situation. Cardinal Lambruschini is at the head of the Genoese party. The reaction against that party, which, a few months ago, was only a wish not followed up, has since become organized; it is strong at this moment, and chiefly composed of cardinals of the Roman country (*Statisti*), in opposition to those who are called foreign cardinals, although Italians. The forces seem to vibrate. These are skirmishes which prelude the battle of the conclave.

"So much for persons. Things are in a deplorable state, and at this moment there is no amelioration to be expected. Far from dreaming of secularizing the

civil administration, the Pope does not choose to employ, even amongst the prelates, any but those who have made themselves priests. To this is added the absence of all apprenticeship or regular course. A prelate is fit for everything. The *president of arms* was an auditor of accounts. This is as if we were to take a judge of appeal and confide to him the ministry of war. As to the finances, they are a sore, the importance of which every one acknowledges. At present they are kept in motion by an expedient. The government purchased the appanage which Prince Eugene de Beauharnois possessed in the Marches. They immediately resold it to a company composed of Roman princes and men of business. The buyers will pour the price into the pontifical treasury in several payments, long before the epoch when the pontifical government is bound to pay Bavaria. This is the expedient. Finally, it will prove a very expensive loan.

"This situation is complicated by the Jesuits. Here they intermeddle in everything; they are within the boundaries of every camp; they are objects of fear or hope with all. Superficial observers may easily be deceived by them, for the *Society of Jesus* includes three classes of men entirely distinct. It has men purely of letters and science, who perhaps guess the plots of their company, but are not connected with, and may with good faith affirm that they know nothing of them. The second class is composed of pious and somewhat credulous men, sincerely convinced of the perfect innocence and abnegation of their order, and who see, in the attacks upon the

Jesuits, nothing but horrible calumnies. The first attract people of talent, the second draw the religious. Under these two beds lies concealed Jesuitism properly so called, more than ever active and ardent, bent on what the Jesuits have always sought, counter revolution and theocracy; and convinced that in a few years they will be the masters. One of their ablest partizans said to me yesterday: 'You will see that, in four or five years, it will be established, even in France, that the instruction of youth shall solely belong to the clergy.' He said this without any provocation on my part; entirely from the exuberance of their sentiments at this moment, they believe that millions of men would be ready to do for them, in Europe, what the Lucernese have effected in Switzerland.

"This is a mere dream: it is true, on the contrary, that every day, opinion is more formidably raised against them, even in Italy; but it is equally certain that their means are considerable; they dispose of millions, and their funds continually increase; their affiliated societies are numerous in the high classes in Italy; they have found them especially in Rome, in Modena, and in Milan. In Milan, enormous sums are placed at their disposal, ready for the moment when they can establish themselves there, and employ them. I know the hands in which they are. Here, the Jesuits are absolute masters of a portion of the high nobility, who have consigned their children to them.

"The important consideration for us is, that it is certain, and to some extent notorious, that their efforts

at this moment are directed to two points—France, and the future conclave. In fact, these two points are confounded together, for it is always with an eye to France that they wish a Pope more enfeoffed to them than the present Pontiff.

"I am convinced that the Holy Father has no suspicion of all their plots and projects. I go even further; I think the same of their own general, Father Roothaan. I am not acquainted with him; but, from all I hear, he is like the doge of Venice in the last ages; the power and great secrets rest not with him; they belong exclusively to the Council of Ten.

"Such is here the general situation. I now come to ours. Your Excellency will permit me to speak with entire frankness; it is important not to deceive ourselves on a state of things which may become urgent from one moment to another.

"The Holy Father and the pontifical government are penetrated with sincere admiration of the King, of his elevated ideas, and of the political system he has established. Without thoroughly understanding all the dangers there were to conquer, all the difficulties to surmount, they have a confused sentiment that they were on the brink of an abyss, and that they owe their safety to the policy of the King's government. Their gratitude is real, but they are neither satisfied nor enlightened. Because the spirit of revolution and disorder has been arrested, they feel convinced that more can be effected, and the past revived. All that has been done for them they take on account. Ignorant even of the facts most notorious to us, see-

ing France and Europe only through the medium of three or four ill-disposed journals, receiving no detailed information but from one side—for sensible and moderate men dare not say all for fear of being suspected and annihilated—the heads of the pontifical government indulge, in fact, to a certain extent, in the hopes of fanatics; only, they have not the same ardour and impatience; they reckon on time, on events, on their own inaction; they flatter themselves that they may win without the risk of playing. They will do nothing against the King, his dynasty, or his government; but they would also be delighted to do nothing that would displease the enemies of the King, of France, or of our institutions. All they possess of light, of reason, of political prudence, is with us and for us; their antecedents, their prejudices, their reminiscences, their habits, are against us. When we reflect that we have to deal with old monks, we can comprehend how difficult it is to make them understand the necessities of modern times and of constitutional governments. We speak only of things obscure and disagreeable to them—our adversaries encourage the thoughts they have always nourished; we oppose their remembrances and inclinations—our enemies revive and cherish them.

"In this state of things, it is not by a few official interviews, at distant intervals, with the Cardinal Secretary of State and the Prefect of the Propaganda, that we can negotiate here with success the King's affairs. There is neither a court nor a government such as we see and conceive elsewhere. There is an

ensemble, very complicated and *sui generis*. The mode of action here cannot be as it is in all other places.

"Without doubt, and strictly speaking, thanks to the moral authority of the King, and the political importance of France, it would not be impossible to carry a question here at the point of the sword. If we were to leave them absolutely no choice but to yield or embroil themselves with France, they would submit. But this violent measure could only be adopted in an extreme case, and exceptions do not form the rules of conduct.

"As a rule of conduct, we must not forget that nothing is done or obtained here except by indirect and varied influences. Here, opinions, convictions, determinations, do not descend from high to low, but mount from low to high. He who, for some reason or other, pleases the subordinates, is not slow in satisfying the masters. He who pleases only the masters soon finds himself isolated and powerless.

"The subordinate and all-powerful influences are of three kinds—the clergy, the bar, and the men of business, which last include bankers, and certain accountants, a particular class in Rome, who exercise the more influence as they alone know and transact the affairs of all the world. Let a truth reciprocally establish itself in the vestries, the law-chambers, and the *computisterie* (the offices of the accountants),—nothing can resist it.

"Your Excellency will now see the work to be undertaken, if we really desire to place ourselves in a position to transact the affairs of the King and of

France, without violence, shock, or noise. I am bound to say, candidly, that this work has not even been commenced. I found the entire embassy absolutely without relations, except with the saloons of the nobility, who are, as I have already had the honour to apprise you, utterly ignorant of public affairs, and without the slightest influence. I frequent them also, and I see clearly how the case stands. A political drawing-room exists not in Rome.

"This state of things seems to me untoward, and might become dangerous. The friends of France ask themselves with anxiety what would be her influence here if, unfortunately, a conclave should be opened. In truth, the health of the Holy Father seems to me good; he has conversed with me in detail, and the lively tone of the conversation confirmed the words of his Holiness. It is not less true that there are persons here alarmed, or feigning to be so; they go about saying that the swelling of his legs augments, that moral courage alone sustains his shattered physical powers, which may fail at any moment. Once more, these alarms appear to me false or premature. When speaking of his legs, the Pope said to me himself, that; still very good for walking, they were rather stiff for genuflexions, which fatigued him a little. At his age, nothing is more natural, without being the announcement of the end. Be that as it may, the near approach of a conclave is not impossible or to be lost sight of. In the existing state of things, we should be without the means of knowing what would pass there; our influence would be null.

"It is thus, that before thinking of the particular

instructions your Excellency has given to me, I considered it my duty to apply myself with great care to modify our position here. Otherwise, it would be impossible for any one to serve effectually the King and France. My antecedents, my studies, my knowledge of the language and habits, render this particular task less difficult to me than to any other person; even the clamours of certain fanatics against my mission—and it is well to know this—have been favourable to me; for the spirit of the Romans tends towards reaction; they do not like to have opinions positively imposed on them as to men; curiosity has been excited on my account, and the movement is favourable to me. One of the first priests in Rome said yesterday, in full vestry, '*Di quei diavoli là vorrei che ne avessimo molti.*' I wish we had a good many of those devils."

The attitude and quiet labour of M. Rossi soon produced their fruits. He wrote to me on the 8th of May: "The state of isolation and passiveness in which the French embassy was living is already sensibly modified. I have found, in this particular, more ways open, and greater facilities than I at first expected. The *curia* (our word *bar* does not fully convey the idea I wish to express), the *curia*, I repeat, declares openly on our side. The Italian clergy are surprised and flattered at seeing relations cultivated which had been completely neglected. Far from shunning, they evince eagerness and gratitude. Men of consideration, from their intimacy in high places, have caused it to be insinuated to me that they were led into error on my account, and that

they know now what reliance to place on the fables and slanders of a certain saloon in which the French assistant-general of the Jesuits reigns as a master.

"So much for persons. As to things, this is my plan. I am doing exactly the contrary of what all the world expected to see me do. Everybody believed that I came armed at all points to demand I know not how many concessions, and to thrust the sword into the loins of the pontifical government. As it is easy to believe, they put on their armour to resist; and the enemies of France congratulated themselves, in their nightly assemblies, on the checks we were about to encounter. I have demanded nothing, I have said nothing, I have done nothing; I have not even sought, in my interviews with official personages, to raise an opportunity of touching on certain matters. This silence, this apparent inaction, caused surprise at first, and inquietude afterwards. It was easy to foresee what would result. Simple ecclesiastics, then bishops, then cardinals, came to me, and tried to penetrate my intentions, without being able to conceal from me their anxiety. In this particular, the debates in the Chamber of Peers, and the interpellations announced by M. Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies, have served us wonderfully. I reply to all very coldly, and in a tone the more natural as my answer is the exact truth. I say, that I see, in all that passes and is preparing, nothing either surprising or unexpected; things turn out precisely as I took the liberty of declaring they would to the Holy Father, and to Cardinal Lambruschini, during my short visit to Rome in October

last. It would have been easy to prevent the attack, which appeared imminent; but it was not my fault, if, instead of paying attention to the words of a servant of the King, who ought to know France, and had no interest in deceiving the Holy See, they preferred the counsels of certain blunderers and fanatics. To impose the Jesuits on the France of 1789 and 1830, was an idea so absurd, that it was not easy to discuss it seriously. If the Jesuits were angels, there was no power that could re-establish them in the public opinion of France; true or false, you could not take it out of the head of any one, that they are enemies to our institutions. After all, Jesuitism is only a form, which the Church dispensed with for fifteen centuries; and for myself, a humble laic, I am incapable of comprehending how, from infatuation for a form which public opinion rejects, they can venture to compromise the most substantial interests of religion and of the Church. I left to the enlightened conscience of the Holy Father to judge whether through love for the Jesuits he ought to provoke a reaction, which, like all reactions, might so easily exceed its object, and strike what is to us all so dear and sacred.

"These ideas developed, turned and re-turned in a thousand forms, begin to make their way, and to mount from the base to the summit. This is the road to follow here. Alarm is in their minds, and I know positively that it has reached the Holy Father. My words have been all the more efficacious, that they have been unaccompanied by any step. The Holy Father deplores the prejudices of France with

regard to the Jesuits; but until now, he confines himself to repeating what the heads of the Company of Jesus have decided on quite recently, after a long deliberation on their affairs in France. They have determined that, in any case, they ought not to give their friends the chagrin and humiliation of a voluntary retreat, and that it would be better for them to be struck than to retire. I know that they have conveyed this resolution to the knowledge of the Pope, and I have reasons for thinking that Cardinal Lambruschini does not disapprove of it.

"But, on the other hand, the opinion that it is absurd to sacrifice to the Jesuits the interests of Rome, in a country like France, assumes every day more weight and consistence in the vestries, in the prelacy, and in the sacred college. I know, in particular, of three cardinals, two of whom are influential men, and more in the habit of frank conversation with the Holy Father than any of the rest; I know, I repeat, that they do not modify their words on this subject, and that without circumlocution they accuse the pontifical government of incapacity.

"I have requested an audience of the Holy Father. Not with the object of taking the initiative with him; I wish only that he should not be able to say that, in a moment he looks upon as critical, he has not seen me. If he does not introduce the question himself, I shall leave to the tide of the opinion we have created and developed, time to rise higher and to become more urgent. The debates in the Chamber of Deputies will, perhaps, assist us. What we require, as I think, is, that the pontifical government

should come to us, instead of receiving us as suppliants. This is the object of the plan I have thought it right to follow. It is also the idea which begins to expand itself here. Yesterday evening, in a numerous and select society of ecclesiastics, they said loudly, 'We know nothing of France; we do not comprehend the action of that machine; we shall only commit errors. Why not consult the King's minister? M. Rossi knows France and Rome; he is an active member of one of the Chambers. We can explain ourselves with him. With him his Holiness does not require an interpreter.'

"Alas! they spoke more truly, perhaps, than they thought; for your Excellency would probably place little faith in my words if I told you the extent of their ignorance on all that concerns France and the play of her institutions. Your Excellency will find it difficult to believe that men of consequence have taken the questions announced by M. Thiers as a bill which the Chamber of Deputies has, perhaps, voted at this moment against the Jesuits; and they asked me seriously what, in my opinion, would be the division of votes at the ballot, and if the Chamber of Peers would adopt this bill. To dissipate these mistakes by degrees, and to render France comprehensible, is not one of the least important amongst the tasks which the King's representatives at Rome have to impose on themselves."

I understood and approved the patient reserve of M. Rossi. "I do not press you," I wrote to him, on the 17th of April, 1845; "take the time you require and the road that suits you. I desire only to apprise

you that the question here grows warmer. Let them be convinced, round you, that it is serious. When we are a government, we do not sleep as much as we wish or when we wish."

The interpellations of M. Thiers would have awakened me on the 2nd of May, if I had been asleep. Not that they were violent, or embarrassing for the cabinet; the opposition did not blame our attempt to settle the question of the Jesuits by concert with the Court of Rome; but it insisted strongly that if that result were not soon obtained, the laws of the State should be placed in full execution. It hoped that the negotiation would fail, and draw upon the cabinet a serious check. The majority, on the contrary, earnestly desired our success, and was anxious to give us strength by evincing at the same time its confidence and firm resolution to appeal to the temporal French power, if the Roman spiritual power did not prevent that necessity. After a debate of two days, the Chamber declared, by an almost unanimous vote, "that, while leaving to the government the care of executing the laws of the State, it passed to the order of the day."

I wrote to M. Rossi, on the 19th of May, 1845:— "The King does not disapprove your inaction since your arrival; he comprehends the necessity of your preparatory labour, and leaves to you the choice of the opportune moment for our initiative. Meanwhile, he is a little surprised and troubled at this inert attitude, when every one knows that you went to Rome on a special mission, and what it was. He fears we may lose something of our dignity and authority

there. He is astonished that Cardinal Lambruschini should have recently absented himself from Rome, and finds in his absence a degree of inconsistency and much timidity. He asks himself whether, even to obtain success, we should not be rather more pressing, more haughty, and impress more strongly on the Court of Rome what it owes to us, and that on its own account it ought to take what we wish into serious and prompt consideration.

"Do not see, in what I now tell you, more than is textually implied. Do nothing more than what appears to you, after sound reflection, judicious and effectual. I transmit to you the King's impression, such as it is, neither more nor less, with his mixed feelings and doubts. One circumstance has a little confirmed him in his own views. The nuncio Fornari came to Neuilly the evening before yesterday, evidently with his crest up by design, assuming the grumbler and braggart, complaining of the debate in the Chamber, of the attitude of the government, expressing surprise that we accepted what he called a defeat, and giving us to understand that the Pope would never consent to take his part in it. The King received him very sharply. 'You call that a defeat! In fact, at other times, it might, perhaps, have been one; to-day it is a success, thanks to the errors of the clergy and of your Court. We are glad to have extricated ourselves on such good terms. Do you know what will happen if you let people march, and continue to march yourselves in the path you are now following? Your emember Saint Germain l'Auxerrois, the archbishop's palace sacked, the church closed for

several years. You will see that repeated with more than one palace and one church. They tell me there is an archbishop who has declared that he would receive the Jesuits in his palace if their houses were closed. That will revive the commotion. I shall be grieved at it. It will be a great mischief and embarrassment for me and my government. But do not deceive yourselves; I shall not risk my crown for the Jesuits; it covers greater interests than theirs. Your Court neither understands this country, nor the true ways of serving religion. They are continually telling me of the confidence and affection which his Holiness feels towards me, and I am extremely grateful for them. Let his Holiness manifest them to me when the occasion is worth the trouble; let him do his duty as I do mine. Repeat to him what I now tell you, M. Nuncio, and as I tell you. I wish, at least, that they should thoroughly understand at Rome what I think, for I will not be responsible for the ignorance in which you all live, and its consequences.'

"The nuncio, much disturbed, completely changed his tone, and promised to write all that the King had said to him, and in such a manner as to create an impression. The King sees, in his visit and attitude, coupled with the absence of Cardinal Lambruschini soon after your arrival, a little plot conceived in the hope of intimidating us, and of extricating themselves from the embarrassments of the question by inducing us to let it linger at first, and then fall through. I think the King's conjecture sound, and I am very glad that he struck rather hard. They must not be

suffered to believe in Rome that by procrastination and sloth they can elude a question serious in itself, and which must be seriously dealt with."

Before this letter reached him, and of his own impulse, M. Rossi had felt that the moment for action had arrived. He wrote to me, on the 28th of May, 1845 :—"I am busy in drawing up a *Memorandum* containing a summary of what I said yesterday in an interview of nearly two hours with Cardinal Lambruschini. This *memento* is necessary for him, for the Pope, and for the cardinals whom the Holy Father will consult. I have now to tell you, that to the indirect labour with which I am more and more satisfied, I added yesterday, for the first time, direct negotiation. On his return from Sabina, I left the Cardinal in tranquillity during the ceremonies of the Corpus Christi and the consecrations of bishops, at which he had to be present a few days since. Meanwhile, I received from him public and studied tokens of consideration and courtesy. This was saying to the numerous prelates and diplomatists who surrounded us :—'You see this : I am in the best possible relations with the minister of France.' These preliminaries were not falsified by our interview of yesterday ; I recognized none of those manœuvres I am so familiar with, and which are, in him, the certain index of resistance and of a divided opinion. While deploring the *prejudices* of France with respect to the Jesuits, he lamented equally their imprudence and rashness. What impressed him most forcibly, was a parallel I drew between the question of the Jesuits and that of the right of search. And when I said to

him, as in confidence, that England, that great country and government, had comprehended that it was impossible and dangerous to struggle against a general opinion, and consented, in the affair of the right of search, to the demands of France, he could not restrain his sentiments. Evidently he was gratified at finding a result useful to the King's government, and an example which, in the councils of his Holiness, it would be difficult to resist. This first interview was only, as I may say, an exposition; he was bound to reserve himself, as he did, until he had submitted all to the Holy Father; but the impression he left on me was of a nature to confirm my hopes.

"I learn from another quarter, for I am well served, that our indirect labour bears its fruits. In the *curia*, in the bank, in the prelacy, emotion propagates; eminent persons have conveyed to the Pope, counsels of moderation and prudence. In short, our army becomes daily more numerous, more active, and more strong. I have not time to-day to enter into details, but I am content.

"On their side, the Jesuits give themselves no rest; their general has an advantage I do not possess—the power of seing the Pope without ceremony, and as often as he pleases. He does not fail in this. It is not less true that the question, as I have laid it down in my conversations, and as it is repeated, embarrasses and compromises him, for my theme is: 'Dissolve the congregation of Jesuits to save the rest.' I know that on hearing this repeated, he exclaimed: 'Let us rather all perish together!' But that senti-

ment has not carried the day here. He could have said nothing more profitable to us.

"In conclusion, I cannot yet affirm anything; but I hope, and my friends partake my hopes. You see my plan. At first, unofficial and preparatory labour; this has been done, and continues. Then, official and oral discussion. I have commenced it yesterday with the Secretary of State; I shall follow it up energetically with him, with the Pope, and with the most influential cardinals. They are well prepared and expect me. While delivering a verbal communication, I shall leave them to anticipate, in case of need, an official note. I may deceive myself, but, supposing that it is expected, I do not think they can resent this last stroke.

"*Postscript.*—A courier has this moment delivered to me your private letter of the 19th of May. Nothing could have been better, more àpropos, and more effective, than the King's speech to the nuncio. It aids us powerfully. The nuncio reflected Rome. Here, they were, at first, equally haughty and angry; now they have changed tone and aspect; as I have told you, they evince towards us studied courtesy. Be assured that we have lost nothing here either in dignity or authority. My apparent inertness had, on the contrary, very much excited and agitated them. Our action is, at this moment, the more effective as we fall on them weakened by an explosion without result."

Five days had scarcely passed over, when, on the 2nd of June, 1845, M. Rossi sent me a copy of the *Memorandum* he had transmitted to Cardinal Lam-

bruschini. "When I took this document to him myself yesterday," he told me, "I had with him a second very close and pressing conversation; not, to speak truly, in reply to his objections, for he scarcely raised any, but to make him feel the necessity of a prompt and vigorous resolution. I found in him no traces of the anger he was said to feel, or of the speeches attributed to him during his sojourn at Sabina. Perhaps it has been with him, as with the Holy Father, and with more than one cardinal and prelate: the first impulse was one of ill-humour, and this may have been accompanied by a few intemperate words which the party of the Jesuits has collected and exaggerated. By allowing these first moments to pass by in apparent inaction, we have escaped the danger of a precipitate and negative answer, behind which they would subsequently have entrenched themselves, in the name of conscience. To-day reflection takes the lead, under the influence of the general opinion, which declares itself more and more on our side.

"In conclusion, Cardinal Lambruschini confined himself to telling me that what we demanded, and what appeared to us so simple, *was much for a Pope*, and that the matter was the more serious as M. Odilon Barrot had declared in the Chamber that it would be only a commencement. The answer was too easy. I gave it, and the cardinal, instead of persisting, assured me with eagerness and interest that the affair should be submitted without delay to the Pope and his council. 'You may be perfectly tranquil,' he said, on parting; 'independently of the *Memo-*

randum, none of the facts you have made known to me, the information you have furnished, the arguments you have employed, shall be neglected in my report. All will be placed under the eyes of the Holy Father and his council.'"

The *Memorandum* was drawn up in the following terms:—

"The Society of the Jesuits, contrary to the laws of the State and the edicts by which it has been specially abolished in France, has endeavoured again to penetrate and establish itself in the kingdom. Dissolved, under the Empire, by the decree of the 22nd of June, 1804, condemned, under the Restoration, by the sentences of supreme courts, the deliberations of the Chambers and the measures of the administration, it has nevertheless thought to diffuse itself in France after the Revolution of 1830.

"Its beginnings were timid and little known; but, in a few years, abusing a tolerance which ought to have been attributed solely to the modest and prudent obscurity of their first establishments, the Jesuits have laboured to reassume a public existence. They loudly declare themselves; they speak and act as Jesuits; they possess in the kingdom, to the knowledge of all the world, novitiate houses, chapels, and a complete organization. They form a numerous corporation, distinct from the regular clergy. These facts are no longer in dispute; the public has found startling and complete proof of them in the debates on a criminal process.

"Another fact equally patent is, that public opinion, in accordance with the laws of the country, the reso-

lutions of the Chambers, and the sentences of the magistracy, invincibly rejects all establishment of the Jesuits in the kingdom.

"It is not to-day that the Jesuits encounter in France a general repugnance; the repugnance might in some degree be called historical. The Restoration itself acknowledged this, when, in 1828, it suppressed what it had previously tolerated.

"The complaints which were then raised are renewed to-day with more unanimity and force. The public is moved, excited, and irritated by the idea, just or not, of the hostility of the Jesuits towards our institutions. This opinion may be rejected and treated as prejudice; it is not the less a real, pressing, and most serious fact, which must be appreciated in its full extent.

"The Jesuits are accused of incessantly intermeddling in politics; they are suspected of associating themselves with the secret intrigues of factions; to them are attributed the most violent and unseasonable attacks to which, in late times, the greatest institutions of the State have been exposed. The influence they might exercise over the ordinary clergy is dreaded; and it must not be forgotten that the great public powers, the Chambers and the magistracy, partake these opinions and fears.

"In this state of minds, the King's government has considered it an imperious duty to take into the fullest consideration the facts which have alone led to it, and to provide a remedy.

"A new fact of the utmost importance has recently added itself to those with which the government was

previously acquainted, and which had already made it feel the necessity of ending a tolerance which had become impossible.

"The existence of the corporation of Jesuits in France, which had already occupied the Chamber of Peers, was referred by the mode of interpellations to the Chamber of Deputies. The *Moniteur* has published to Europe the details and issue of the memorable debate which ensued. It is known that after explicitly recognizing, with the Government,—

"1. That the laws against the establishment of any congregation of Jesuits in France are in full vigour;

"2. That the moment has arrived for applying those laws;

"The Chamber has adopted, almost unanimously, an order of the day, to the effect that *it leaves to the government the care of executing the laws of the State.*

"This result calls for profound meditation, for the conservative party agreed in it with the opposition; and this concurrence, properly understood, can only be considered as a proof of the value the Chamber attaches to the maintenance of friendly relations between the spiritual and temporal power.

"It is notorious, in fact, that religious questions have for several years assumed new vigour in France. The King and his government have found in this progress a happy recompense for their efforts to advance the prosperity and credit of the Church of France. Minds humbled themselves, before the altars, to the Word of God, as they bowed, in the world, to the discipline of the law, and to respect for national institutions. Order and peace, those incomparable

benefits due to the elevated wisdom of the King, seconded at the same time the progressive development of public liberties and of religious sentiments; and religion, in turn, by its legitimate influence, fortified order, and all the tutelary principles of civil society. Nothing then disturbed this desirable harmony between the Church and the State.

"It is equally notorious that this visible progress has found itself suddenly interrupted. On the day when the congregation of Jesuits, tearing off, with inexplicable confidence, the veil which concealed it from the eyes of the public, determined that its name should mingle with the discussion of the affairs of the country—on that day alarm succeeded security, complaints displaced harmony, and violent debates superseded peace. Religious zeal, heightened up to fanaticism and enthusiasm with some, became with others proportionately chilled. The presence of the Jesuits disturbs minds, envenoms and falsifies questions. In their presence the advancement of the public welfare has become difficult, almost impossible. Is it, then, surprising that the Chamber of Deputies should demand the immediate dissolution of a body which, far from being a help—a means of influence to religion, to the Church, or the State—is only a fetter and an obstacle?

"It is, at the same time, evident to every impartial observer that the sentiment of the French Chambers is equally moderate and firm. The congregation of the Jesuits is the only religious community which has excited debate; the only one which has called for dissolution. Filled with devotion for religion and

the Church, France is disposed to give to the clergy, in respect and protection, what will be withdrawn from the Jesuits in influence and power. And with regard to the Jesuits themselves, while the dissolution of the society, of their houses and novitiates, is called for, no one dreams of expelling or molesting the individuals, who, whatever may be in other respects their personal condition, shall not unite together in any manner prohibited by the laws.

"The question, therefore, at present, is extremely simple; it only requires that the terms should be distinctly laid down.

"The congregation of Jesuits cannot exist in the kingdom; it must be dissolved without delay. The King's government has admitted that prolonged tolerance would lead to disorder and peril; it has found itself in accord with the Chamber of Deputies; it is bound now to carry out completely, loyally, the engagement into which it has entered in face of the country. The mode of execution remains to be selected.

"There are two modes, very different from each other, especially as regards the Church and its relations with the State and with France—dissolution by the intervention of the spiritual power, or dissolution by the action of the civil power.

"The preference of the King's government for the first of these modes has been clearly indicated. Undoubtedly it would have sufficed for it, to satisfy the public mind, to have executed strictly the laws against all religious congregations not authorized in the kingdom. These laws, the existence and strength

of which have been recently and formally recognized, secure to it all the necessary means of action; but, faithful to the spirit of moderation which regulates its entire conduct, filled with respect for the Church, and careful to remove from it every critical situation and extreme contest, it has felt anxious to attain, by an amicable understanding with the Holy See, and by means of a loyal co-operation on its part, the object which it is its duty to pursue.

"In addressing itself to the Court of Rome, in requiring it to forestall by its intervention the action of the civil power, the King's government feels an inward conviction that it is rendering a signal service to the Church in general, and to the French clergy in particular. The dispersion of the congregation of Jesuits, effected by the authority of the Holy See, will at once satisfy and calm all minds; the cause of the clergy will be separated from the cause of the Jesuits; all questions will find themselves restored to their natural state; prejudices will dissipate themselves, fears will disappear, and the relations of the Church and State will become easy; for grateful France will be filled with confidence in the wisdom, prudence, and moderation of the Holy See.

"The highly enlightened conscience of the Holy Father cannot hesitate to issue an order which the Jesuits, if really animated, as their friends wish to believe, by a sincere and disinterested love of religion, ought themselves to implore. They can no longer be anything in France, but the occasion of disorders, violences, and impiety, of all the extravagances to which agitated and irritated spirits so readily sur-

render themselves; and since the dissolution of their houses, their novitiates, and their body, is inevitable, they ought to prefer to a dissolution operated by the hand of the civil power, a peaceable dispersion, in obedience to an order from their supreme and absolute chief, the Sovereign Pontiff.

"If the kind co-operation of the Sovereign Pontiff should be withheld from the King on this urgent and most important occasion, the laws of the State would necessarily take their full and free course. The prefects, the attorneys-general, would receive orders to put them in execution. The report and echo would be equally great. Imprudences would be possible, and the government, engaged unwillingly in a path it was anxious to avoid, would find itself compelled to meet all the necessities of the situation; for it has sacred rights to defend, and many more interests to protect than those of a few congregations which, after all, do not constitute the clergy, the Church, and Catholicism.

"France, aware of the recourse which the King's government addresses to the Holy Father, and applauding this step—France, grievously surprised at not seeing it adopted, would perhaps establish between the cause of Rome, of the Church, of the clergy, and the cause of the Jesuits, a confusion much to be regretted, which has no existence at this moment. It is easy to form an idea of the deplorable consequences of such an error.

"By warding off, through its own legitimate and recognized authority, the complications of an unfortunate execution; by anticipating, through wise inter-

vention, acts which might materially alter the good relations between the State and the Church, and strike a blow more or less serious against the interests of such of the clergy as might imprudently associate themselves with the Jesuits, the spiritual power will render an immense service to religion, and will cause it to regain, in a single day, the ground it has visibly lost.

"It is important to dwell on this point. To permit that a contempt for public opinion in France, confounding the cause of the Church and that of the Jesuits, should seem to unite the clergy and that congregation under the same flag, would be to inflict on religion the greatest injury it has sustained since the worst days of the Revolution.

"The close harmony and intimacy which preside over the relations of France with the Holy See, the affectionate sentiments constantly manifested by the Sovereign Pontiff for France and the King, the spirit of prudence and conciliation which the Holy Father carries into his appreciation of public affairs, are guarantees that his august co-operation will not be withheld from the King in a circumstance which involves the reconcilement of the rights and duties of civil power with those of spiritual authority, and the placing the moderate necessities of policy in accordance with the true interests of religion."

The substance and form of this *Memorandum*, these positive declarations and precise conclusions, threw the Court of Rome for three weeks into a state of the most lively perplexity. Equally disturbed, the Pope and Cardinal Lambruschini rejected, as a bitter cup—

one, the responsibility of the decision he had to take; the other, that of the advice he had to give. Convoked on the 8th of June to deliberate on the question, a congregation of cardinals was, at first, adjourned; when it reassembled some days later, nine cardinals were present, and the majority seemed inclined to the course of inaction. "I have seen Cardinal Lambruschini again, the day before yesterday, and this morning," M. Rossi wrote to me, on the 18th of June. At the first of these interviews he was most amiable and caressing: 'The Pope,' he said, 'has not yet formed his decision; he is in real distress; I comprehend you, I put myself in your place; but be equitable, put yourself also a little in ours.' I need not tell you my answer. In short, he escaped by redoubling his compliments to me; by speaking with enthusiasm of the King and his policy. You also, notwithstanding your heresy, came in for a large share of his praises, and he congratulated me on having two such stanch friends as you and the Duke de Broglie. Your treaty with England on the right of search has deeply impressed him; I told him that I strongly hoped that great example would not be lost upon the Court of Rome. He returned, while smiling, a slight token of assent. I could extract nothing more. This morning, having received information of some speeches of the Jesuits, I went to the cardinal's residence; I told him dryly, and without preamble, that my courier was on the point of departure, and that I required to know what I should write to my government on the affair of the Jesuits. He replied that the examination of the question was not yet concluded; that he

requested me to have patience, not to disturb myself, and entreated me to be tranquil. 'I should not hurry myself too much, your Eminence,' I replied, 'although the affair is urgent, were it not that certain rumours have reached me. I fear some fatal illusions here. It would be a deception to believe that disorders would not result from all these follies, and also to think that the Holy See would not be held responsible for them in the eyes of France and the whole world. The Jesuits are its men, its militia; by their vows they devote to it a blind and immediate obedience. All they do, and all they do not, all the mischief that may result therefrom, the Holy See must answer for.' Then he once more assured me that the affair should be maturely investigated; it is, he said, before the Pope's council, and, if necessary, the council will be augmented: this, it appears to me, meant to say—we shall contrive a majority for you. He concluded by adding: 'You are well acquainted with our sentiments and conduct as regards the King, his dynasty, and France. Be assured that everything possible shall be done to prevent any change in the good relations between the two governments.' 'Your Eminence, I shall be the more delighted if that relieves me from passing from a simple *Memorandum* to an official note.' 'An official note!' he replied, in a very gentle tone; 'but I have not yet given you an answer on the *Memorandum*.' 'I am aware of that, and I ask no better than to have nothing more than thanks to address to your Eminence.'".

It was evident that what gave the greatest pain to

Pope Gregory XVI. was to strike, by an act of the spiritual power, the congregation of the Jesuits feared and rejected in France from motives essentially temporal and political. Through consideration for the Church and the Catholic clergy, from respect for religious liberty even towards a society interdicted by the civil laws, we postponed the execution of those laws, and invited the supreme power of the Church to act so that the supreme power of the State should not be compelled to use arms harsh and compromising for religion itself. This was a new situation for the Pope and his Minister, and, either from religious scruple or political timidity, they recoiled before the responsibility which our liberal moderation imposed on them. M. Rossi soon unravelled this sentiment, and with skilful equity turned it into a means of success. "I saw Cardinal Lambruschini again this morning on the occasion of the festival," he wrote to me, on the 24th of June, 1845; "he entered on the subject himself. The conversation was more than ever amicable, familiar, and confidential. I am sure now that he comprehends the necessities of our political situation, the imprudences of the Jesuits, of the clergy, and of their friends, and therefore works sincerely to reconcile the accomplishment of our desires with the circumspection demanded by the repugnance of the Holy Father to any act which might signally strike a religious congregation. As we attach more importance *to the fact* than to the effect, I allowed the cardinal to perceive, with a view to hasten the issue of the negotiation, that, provided the fact is accomplished, I should raise no cavil on the choice of the mode. What would it

signify to us, in fine, whether the congregation of the Jesuits disappeared by an order, by an advice, by an insinuation, or even by an apparently voluntary retreat? The grand essential for us is, that it must disappear, and relieve us from the application of the laws. But whatever course may be adopted, the retirement or dissolution of this society will be of itself a fact sufficiently considerable and imposing to dispense with a sort of manifesto. The most incredulous will be unable to misconstrue either the importance of a result obtained despite the most powerful opposition, or the full deference that result implies to the wishes of the King and his government."

On the second day after forwarding the foregoing account of his last step, on the 23rd of June, 1845, M. Rossi despatched to me the first secretary to the French embassy at Rome, M. de la Rosière, bearing an official communication thus couched :—

"After a mature investigation on the part of the Holy Father and his council, the object of our negotiation is obtained. His Eminence Cardinal Lambruschini has given me that assurance this morning.

"The congregation of Jesuits will disperse itself. Its novitiates will be dissolved, and it will only leave in its houses a few ecclesiastics to take charge of them, living otherwise as ordinary priests.

"The Holy See, moved by sentiments it is as easy to comprehend as natural to respect, wishes evidently to leave to the Jesuits the merit of this prudent resolution of voluntary acquiescence. We have no interest in depriving them of it; but it is not less just that the King's government should learn that the

Holy See and its cabinet have acquired, in this important question, new claims on the gratitude of France.

"The spirit of equity which animates the counsels of the King, and of your Excellency in particular, assures me that in the accomplishment of a resolution which is not unattended by material difficulties, there will not be required from the Jesuits a degree of haste which would be painful to the Holy See. It appears to me that the interest of all is concerned in the execution of the measure loyally, but with dignity.

"I am happy to have it thus in my power to announce to your Excellency the conclusion of this delicate affair, in which the modified necessities of our policy had to reconcile themselves with the sentiments of an order so elevated and worthy of our respect."

To this official despatch was added a private letter:—

"The day's work has been laborious; the weather is overpowering; but, although fatigued, I wish to add a few details to my despatch, and to what M. de la Rosière will tell you verbally.

"Before the interview of this morning, I had attentively studied the confidential reports of the prefects and attorneys-general which the Chancellor had communicated to me. This study convinced me how opportune it was, in the interest of public order, especially in certain departments, that the measure should meet with no resistance on the part of the Jesuits. Thus, while assuming the air of resigning myself to the mode proposed, I accepted it, I confess to you, with perfect satisfaction.

"Believe me, it has not been a trifling matter to bring over, on one side the Pope, on the other the

supreme council of the Jesuits. We owe much, very much, to Cardinal Lambruschini and to four other cardinals. The Pope, who has, with the chiefs of the Jesuits, very intimate relations, excited himself to such a point, that one day he had a real scene with Lambruschini—a scene which the latter did not relate to me, but of which, nevertheless, I obtained knowledge. With time, patience, and perseverance, all these oppositions have been vanquished. The Pope is to-day quite another man. One of his confidants came this morning to tell me how much the Holy Father was satisfied with the arrangement I had concluded; satisfied with the negotiator, &c. &c.

"As to Lambruschini, I cannot sufficiently commend him. He did not wish to entangle himself in the midst of so many rocks; but, when once he had formed his opinion, he became active, able, sincere. He has confessed to me that my *Memorandum* of the 2nd of June placed him in an embarrassment. 'There are things there,' he said to me, 'that you were obliged to say, but respecting which we, the Holy See, were also compelled to make some observations and objections.' 'How,' I replied; 'do you wish us to enter into a controversy in writing? The *Memorandum* is only a help to your memory, which you asked from me; if your memory does not require it, there it ends.' 'What then?' he returned. 'Do you desire that I should consider it as not having been delivered?' 'Yes; but on one condition, that we wind up the affair satisfactorily. Let us conclude: you will then return the *Memorandum* from hand to hand, and all is finished.' 'Come on Monday,' he

said; 'choose your own hour.' 'All hours are alike to me in the King's service.' 'Well, then, on Monday at noon.'

"This morning we have, in fact, concluded. He returned the *Memorandum* to me; and as I was anxious there should be no misunderstanding, I do not conceal from you that I read to him twice the copy of the despatch I had prepared, in the hope we should terminate. He remarked on some expressions; he wished me to leave more to the Jesuits, and to place the Holy See, to a certain extent, out of the question: 'I could not do that, your Eminence, but by betraying truth and the interests of the Holy See itself. All I can do is to write to M. Guizot, and beg him, if he has occasion to enter into explanations on the question, to give the Jesuits their full due, and which I have no wish to disallow.' As you see, I keep my promise, and I draw your attention to it. The cardinal yielded. 'Thus we are agreed, your Eminence?' 'Perfectly; the general of the Jesuits must have written already.' Then followed a host of mutual civilities and congratulations. We almost embraced each other."

On the 6th of July, the *Moniteur* contained the following official notice:—"The King's government has received intelligence from Rome. The negotiation with which M. Rossi was entrusted has accomplished its object. The congregation of Jesuits will cease to exist in France, and is on the point of dispersing of itself; its houses will be closed and its novitiates dissolved."

The public effect was great, for the success was

unexpected. It had been repeatedly said that the Court of Rome, and much more the Jesuits themselves, would never consent to this tranquil dissolution of the society. Nevertheless, the fact was accomplished. The French clergy would no longer have to submit to a compromising ferment or a troublesome yoke. Those of its members who had ardently declared themselves in favour of the Jesuits were alone affected by the check. The preponderating influence returned to the moderate and clear-sighted bishops and priests. The question of liberty of instruction was disengaged from the principal obstacle which impeded its settlement; the Jesuits were no longer its first and most apparent representatives. In the absence of a formal and peremptory order from the Holy See, they attempted to delay or even to evade the execution of the promise made at Rome in their name; several of their houses, whether educational establishments or novitiates, were closed; others remained open under various pretexts. In some, they left, when closing them, many more keepers than the care of the property required; into others, less known or suspected by the surrounding population, they transplanted the members of the congregation withdrawn from elsewhere. I had foreseen these difficulties, and took some precautionary steps to surmount them. On the day following that on which the *Moniteur* announced the result of the negotiation, I sent back M. de la Rosière to Rome, with the two subjoined letters to M. Rossi—one official, the other private:[1]—

[1] Dated the 6th and 7th of July, 1845.

"Sir,—The Holy See has appreciated, with the lofty wisdom which it has displayed for so many ages, the demand you were instructed to make, in the name of the King's government, and the powerful considerations on which it was based. His Eminence Cardinal Lambruschini has declared to you that the congregation of the Jesuits in France was going to disperse of itself, that its novitiates should be closed, that no persons should remain in its houses except those strictly necessary for their care, and that those persons should live there in the state of ordinary priests.

"The King's government has learnt, with lively satisfaction, a resolution so conformable with its wishes, with the just expectation of public opinion in France, and with the acknowledged interests of the Church. I am happy to congratulate you on this important success of your efforts. The King's government feels sincerely and profoundly grateful to the Holy Father, and to the wise counsellors, whose enlightened prudence has exercised, in the settlement of this affair, such salutary influence.

"You inform me that the Holy See, from a sentiment we respect, wishes to leave to the Jesuits the merit of a voluntary acquiescence in the resolution which concerns them. We find no difficulty in consenting to this. The Court of Rome may also rely on our perfect disposition to reconcile the execution of the measure in question with suitable moderation and respect. On its side, the King's government has full confidence that the engagements contracted in presence of the authority, and

under the guarantee of the Holy See, will be carried out with equal loyalty.

"You will therefore communicate this despatch to his Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, and I authorize you to transmit to him a copy."

My private letter ran thus:—

"It is desirable that we should have from Rome a written document in which the conclusion of the affair, as you announce it to me in your despatch of the 23rd of June, may be duly attested. You read that despatch twice over to Cardinal Lambruschini. You were quite right in so doing. He approved of it after discussion. This is excellent. But it may happen that, either in the course of debates in the Chambers, or in the execution of the measure, we may require the power of producing a text emanating from Rome herself. We have no wish to make Rome say or do more than she has said or done, or to make her appear more than she wishes to appear. We require only to have in our hands, acknowledged and attested by her, the fact which you communicated to me on the 23rd of June. You will easily find a method of reaching this end. After reading to Cardinal Lambruschini my official despatch of yesterday in reply to yours of the 23rd of June, you will transmit to him officially a copy, and he will officially acknowledge its receipt. This simple acknowledgment of reception by the Cardinal, without remark or objection, will comprise an admission of the fact and of the negotiation which has produced the fact. This is what we require.

"With this object, I have used in my despatch the word *transmit*, instead of *leave a copy*.

"You could also ask the Cardinal in writing whether he has informed the nuncio in Paris of the resolution taken by the general of the Jesuits, and of the orders that have been given to assure its execution. If the Cardinal has done this, he will tell you so, and you might endeavour to obtain communication of his despatch. If he has not done this, you will request him to do it, and to instruct the nuncio to second, with the Jesuits in France, as also with the bishops, the loyal execution of the measure in the degree of intervention appertaining to him. By communicating either to me directly through the nuncio, or to you at Rome, the entire contents and substance of these informations and directions, the Holy See would establish between itself and us that open and friendly interchange of aid and concurrence which will operate powerfully on the interests of the Church as also on those of the State.

"But I leave to you the choice of the mode you may consider the best. I confine myself to pointing out the end."

M. Rossi comprehended and executed my instructions with his accustomed precision and tact. He wrote on the 26th of July, 1845: "In conformity with the instructions of your Excellency, I immediately transmitted a copy of your despatch of the 6th of July to his Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, accompanied by the subjoined letter. On the 18th his Eminence acknowledged its receipt, a trans-

lation of which I have equally the honour of transmitting to your Excellency.

"As I announced from the beginning, and conformably with the understanding previously established, Cardinal Lambruschini perseveres, in this acknowledgment of receipt, in leaving to the Jesuits the honour of voluntary acquiescence. But, in other respects, as your Excellency will remark, the Secretary of State raises no discussion or objection on the signification or terms of the despatch. He accepts the thanks of the King's government. He applies to the Holy See, while congratulating himself on it, the satisfaction which the French cabinet seems to feel at the conduct of the Jesuits. He establishes the reality of the communication he has made to me. He destroys all supposition of a refusal of anterior intervention, while marking the limits within which that intervention was called on to exercise itself. He holds himself guarantee for its execution, in the name of the spirit of prudence and wisdom of the superior general of the Jesuits. He stipulates for them, and recommends them to the consideration of the King's government, in a certain degree under the condition of their fidelity in the accomplishment of the engagements taken. Finally, in all and for all, he acknowledges and records the direct negotiation between the King's minister and the Holy See, the only one which has ever been established, and the only one which could have been established with dignity."

Despite his somewhat embarrassed reserve, the text of Cardinal Lambruschini's answer proved that M. Rossi, in his commentary, had not exaggerated its

bearing: "It is with the most lively interest," the Secretary of State said to him, "that I have received knowledge of the despatch which his Excellency the Minister of State, M. Guizot, addressed to you on the 6th, and which your Excellency has communicated to me by your letter of the 14th instant. The courtesy of the expressions which the noble minister has used is a proof of the amicable dispositions of his Majesty the King of the French, and of his government, towards us. These dispositions cannot fail to excite our gratitude, and we are much pleased to remark that the government of his Majesty declares itself satisfied with the manner in which the Jesuits have resolved to conduct themselves under existing circumstances. By taking spontaneously and of their own accord the discreet measures of prudence which I have named to your Excellency, they have desired to smooth the difficulties which had occurred for the King's government, while the Holy Father could only interfere in conformity with the canonical rules and duties of his apostolic ministry.

"I hope that this pacific and moderate conduct of the Jesuits, guaranteed by the prudence and wisdom of their superior general, will permit the King's government to employ more liberally towards them the considerations we find promised in the despatch of the minister addressed to your Excellency, in conformity with the preceding declarations of your Excellency yourself."

We kept faith scrupulously; we gave the Jesuits, for the execution of their engagement, all the delays and facilities compatible with the engagement itself.

I could have found, had I wished to lay hold of them, many occasions and reasons for complaining, at Rome, of their equivocal denials, of their indefinite procrastinations, of their subtle efforts to make it appear that Rome had not promised, in their name, all that was required of them. The report made of their check in the hostile journals placed them in an unpleasant and irritating position, in the trouble and vexation of which the Holy See at last participated. I was careful not to enter into this subordinate and confused arena; nothing injures great affairs so much as petty squabbles. I confined myself, on the one hand, to informing M. Rossi exactly of the delays and subterfuges by which the engagements contracted were sought to be evaded; and, on the other, to inculcating strongly on him our firm resolution of accomplishing by ourselves, if compelled to do so, what had been promised. "I shall not yield," I wrote to him, on the 14th of October, 1845, "to the spirit of party or to a stupid hostility. No attack on personal liberty; no obligations to quit France, to sell property, &c.; no meddling intervention in functions purely and individually religious: but the dispersion of the society, the closing of the houses in which it lived united, the dissolution of the novitiates, have all been promised and are indispensable. Say distinctly around you that the wind of the session is beginning to rise; that it is futile for us to be patient and moderate; that the moment approaches when we must speak of what we have done: and the more moderate we have been, the more will Rome be to blame for having made vain promises, and we the

more in the right and necessity of telling all that has passed, and of doing, by other means, what may have been left undone."

M. Rossi preserved an attitude and conduct at Rome in perfect harmony with ours; calm and cold, while at the same time vigilant, careful to show himself thoroughly acquainted with all that was passing or said in France against the contracted engagement, but complaining of nothing, tranquilly resting on our right, and letting it be understood that he did not even admit the idea that it could be forgotten. He did not, however, deceive himself for a moment as to the weaknesses and difficulties with which he had to deal, and took pains to let me know them accurately. "Do not forget," he wrote,[1] "that the Holy Father is an old man of eighty-two, emerged from a cloister, at once timid and irascible, suspicious, wishing to decide affairs by his own judgment, above all in religious matters, and over whom the Jesuits have used, for fifteen years, an influence as yet unopposed. He has fixed ideas which no one can induce him to abandon. Are you aware that for two years his ministers, the neighbouring governments, and his most intimate dependants, have fruitlessly solicited his permission, his simple authorization, for a railroad? They do not ask a penny of money from him. He will not consent. Think what this must be in religious questions, in which not only as Pope, but as theologian, he believes himself the most competent of men. We must be prepared for some game of seesaw; if the Jesuits had carried the day, the Pope,

[1] On the 1st and 18th of August, 1845.

to pacify us, would have practised I know not what extent of courteousness. Success being with us, he will lean to the other side; he wishes to obtain pardon from the *Catholics*, the bishops, &c. I can now sift the business to the bottom. Ever from that invincible timidity of which you have already had so many proofs, the general of the Jesuits has not yet been made acquainted with the text of the resolutions agreed upon between Cardinal Lambruschini and me; they have satisfied themselves with one something near it—with terms a little vague; it was a bitter potion, which they durst not make him swallow at a gulp. Quite naturally, the general has confined himself to the *minimum*, while saying, at the end of his letter to the Jesuits in France, that it was for them who were on the spot to estimate the necessity, and that the essential part was to restrain themselves. You comprehend the singular position which the pontifical government has made for itself. The general of the Jesuits, being informed of the truth by a person known to me, became furious, and wished to suspend everything. He has been given to understand the consequences of this madness for the Jesuits themselves and for the Holy See. Thus the serious execution is about to commence. Without renouncing the moderation promised, you will hold your ground in Paris; I shall do the same in Rome. I am going again, by an unofficial work, to prepare minds for the day when we shall officially demand, if necessary, the complete and loyal execution of the measures agreed on. I did not, and I do not wish to tire your Excellency with all the details of my pro-

ceedings; but I repeat that nothing is more vexatious here than the necessity of originating everything. We must prepare all from a distance, little by little, man by man. It is only when they find themselves numerous in the same view that they take any courage in their own opinions. The other day I said to a cardinal: "There are excellent intentions at Rome, open minds and great loyalty." "We are then perfect," he replied, with a smile. "Not quite, your Eminence; Rome wants a consciousness of her strength, and the courage to use it." He was unable to deny this. This comprises the principal theme of my conversations. I am quite aware that I shall not alter the nature of these old men whom fifty years of revolutions and sudden changes have intimidated; but we must combat patiently and constantly one intimidation by another; we must alarm them for their personal interests, for their future, for the future of the Church, which their excessive timidity compromises and sacrifices to the declamations of a handful of madmen. While speaking thus, we are in the true path, and if we do not obtain all, we gain at least what is strictly necessary."

M. Rossi in this, uttered the true and closing word of the situation. Routine, pusillanimity, internal and personal embarrassments, the absence of all profound and persistent appreciation of the political and moral state of France, did not permit us to obtain from the Court of Rome in this delicate affair all that would have been desirable and efficacious in the interest of religion and civil society, of the Church and the State. But we gained what was stringently necessary; and,

despite deaf opposition, subtle contentions, and prolonged delays, what we had obtained was executed, and received, at every fresh attempt at resistance, fresh confirmation. In the midst of his perplexities, the Pope seized with eagerness every opportunity of manifesting his friendly relations with the French government, with the French minister, and his desire to maintain them. On the 25th of August, 1845, the festival of Saint Louis was celebrated at Rome with unusual brilliancy. "At half-past nine," M. Rossi informed me, on the 28th of August, "I went with all the persons who compose the King's embassy to our national church. The director of the Academy, with the boarders, were also there. Eighteen cardinals, comprising nearly all the members of the Sacred College at Rome, were present at the mass. This number is the greatest that any assembly of cardinals, invited to this solemnity, has ever reached, and the register of ceremonies preserved at the embassy indicates that it has generally been much lower. At five o'clock in the afternoon, I returned to the church, accompanied, as in the morning, by the secretaries and attachés of the embassy. At twenty minutes past six, his Holiness arrived. An intense curiosity, easy to comprehend under the existing circumstances, had assembled on the steps of the church, and in the square, a considerable crowd of spectators. It was the first public meeting of the Holy Father with the King's minister since our negotiation and its success. According to the established ceremonial, I went to open the door of his Holiness's carriage, who, penetrated, as everybody else was,

by the importance of all his motions on that solemn occasion, took my hand affectionately in descending from the carriage, kept it inclosed in his own while mounting the steps; and in reply to my thanks for the honour he had deigned to confer on our national church by coming there to pray for the King, the royal family, and France, the Pope answered, with a voice sufficiently loud to be heard by the crowd who surrounded us, "It is a duty I have always a real pleasure in performing; do not fail to transmit to the King this expression of my sentiments." The ceremony over, I reconducted his Holiness to his carriage, the door of which I closed. At his departure, as on his arrival, the Holy Father, in manner and words, was prodigal in his testimonies of good-will. The effect of this visit and of its character has been general and profound, upon our friends and enemies. All eyes saw, all consciences felt, that in the accomplishment of this august and pious courtesy, the Holy Father was filled with affection for us, and wished to exhibit it. During the evening of the 25th and the morning of the following day, the details I have enumerated were the subject of conversation and commentary throughout the city. Our friends have found therein the sanction, our enemies the condemnation of their efforts, and the undecided the signal manifestation of the truth they had endeavoured to darken."

A more direct fact soon confirmed the sense and effect of these public manifestations. As a consequence of the doubts which had been raised as to the measures determined on, a fresh conference of cardinals most influential in this affair took place at the

palace of Cardinal Lambruschini. "There," M. Rossi wrote to me, on the 28th of August, 1845, "all was placed in full light, and one of the members of the conference who disapproved the accomplished facts, acknowledged loyally that, in the state of things, nothing remained but to execute what had been promised. This was unanimously agreed to. A cardinal then called on the general of the Jesuits to acquaint him with this decision, when Father Roothaan replied that he was ready to conform to it, and that he was going to transmit to the Jesuits in France the necessary instructions for its prompt execution in accordance with the stipulated conditions."

Whether the instructions of Father Roothaan were or were not as formal as M. Rossi expected, they produced little change in the state and course of the affair. They did not restrain the French Jesuits, on several points of the kingdom, from continuing their attempts at delay, and even resistance. M. Rossi was compelled, at several intervals, to renew with the Pope and Cardinal Lambruschini his urgent demands, and alarming predictions if the counsels of the Holy See were not more effectually attended to. The measures agreed on were not executed generally and clearly; but from month to month, at every fresh remonstrance of the minister of France, that execution made a step in advance. The Pope grew impatient with the Jesuits, and the vexation they caused him. "We monks are all alike," he said, one day, with a mixture of irony and ill-humour. Cardinal Lambruschini, in his conversations with the French ecclesiastics who came to Rome, spoke daily with increasing energy.

On the 27th of November, 1845, he received a visit from the Bishop of Poitiers. "I know," he said to him, "that with regard to the measures agreed on respecting the Jesuits, you talk of suicide. No, my lord: to cut off an arm, when that is necessary to save life, is courage and prudence; it is not suicide. Are the Jesuits popular in France?" The bishop was obliged to confess they were not. "Well then," returned the Cardinal; "do you wish to compromise the cause of religion rather than disperse the Jesuits? Do you wish to provoke legislative measures?" The bishop alleged the liberties guaranteed by the charter. "I also know France," replied the Cardinal; "I have passed six years of my life there, and I know what all these generalities are worth against a popular opinion. Take my advice; return home, by the way of the school; see the Jesuits, see the bishops; tell the first to obey, and the second to keep quiet." Such was finally, in minds, the progress of the sentiment of the necessity, that the assistant of France in the congregation of Jesus, Father Rozaven, a Breton equally obstinate and sincere, who had never ceased to encourage the Jesuits in their resistance, at last attained a full comprehension of the situation. "We must," he said one day, in March, 1846, to a friendly priest, "give credit to constitutional kings and ministers for the difficulties of their position. They have before them the Chambers, the electors, the magistrates, the press; we cannot expect impossibilities from them. I thoroughly understand all this, and I have written it to France."

I had, therefore, no uneasiness as to the definitive

result of the negotiation; it was evidently enough for the King's government to hold its ground at Paris, and M. Rossi, in its name, at Rome, to prevent a struggle bursting out in France between the State and the Church, and to enable us to resume, without resting it on the head of the Jesuits, that question of liberty of instruction with which minds continued to be strongly preoccupied, and which, in the common interest of the State and the Church, I was most anxious to settle loyally. But we were then beginning to have in prospect at Rome questions much more important than those of the Jesuits and liberty of instruction. Towards the end of September, 1845, serious troubles broke out in Romagna; the sedition was so general and animated that the courier who brought the news to Rome was obliged to make a wide circuit before he could arrive there. "I did not wish," M. Rossi immediately wrote to me, on the 28th of September, 1845, "that the Cardinal should have it in his power to say that, in a critical moment, he had not seen the minister of France. I repaired to the Quirinal. 'Your Eminence,' I said to him, 'I have heard bad news; I hope they are exaggerated; be that as it may, I did not like to let the morning pass without expressing to you the warm and sincere interest which the King's government takes in all that affects the safety of the Holy See and the pontifical government.' When thanking me, the Cardinal said that this disorder would be promptly repressed—that it was excited by madmen, who were forcing the government to treat them with extreme military severity. The object of my visit being attained, I rose, to make him

thoroughly understand that I was not disposed to treat the other subject verbally. The Cardinal seemed much disheartened. I comprehended him. Undoubtedly they have already repressed, and will entirely put down, the risings of the Romagnese, which are deplorable absurdities. But must they not feel alarm at the basis of the position? The discontent of the Legations and Marches is general and deeply rooted. Every one, even to the ecclesiastics in those districts, avows it. Without the Swiss regiments the government would be overthrown in the twinkling of an eye. But these regiments are, at the same time, an enormous burden on the pontifical treasury. The circle is vicious, and the situation too straitened.

"Is there a remedy? Yes; and a very available one, with a little intelligence and courage. I have observed and studied. If you could only know how easy it would be to satisfy those provinces, without overthrow or alteration, without the introduction of anything incompatible with what it is essential to maintain! All the healthy and respectable portion of the populations demand nothing beyond a little order and judgment in the administration. Let them govern reasonably, and in an instant the demagogues will be, here, as elsewhere, isolated and impotent.

"But what would be easy in itself is almost impossible with such men and things as we have to deal with at Rome. The moment of advice will come. It has not yet arrived. It will not do to offer it; we must wait to be asked. Meanwhile, let us endeavour to make them understand that they have no friend so sure and disinterested as France—that we shall not

suffer the Pope to become an Austrian patriarch—that we comprehend the necessities of the pontificate, &c. &c. I have always laboured, and I still labour, in this sense; and on this point my words have perhaps more weight than those of any other person. They are convinced, and they do not deceive themselves, that I should not like to see Italy lose the only great thing which remains to her—the papacy."

I immediately replied to M. Rossi:[1] "You did extremely well in signifying to Cardinal Lambruschini our entire interest on the occasion of the disturbances at Rimini. Establish strongly your position and ours in this sense. Allow no opportunity to escape of rendering good offices, political and personal, to the Roman government. This is suitable for France, and will certainly turn to the advantage of Italy. You are quite right; what there is of grandeur in Italy is the Pope. Let the Pope take his place in the midst of the Catholic world, and adapt himself to it; Italy will preserve what she still has of greatness, and will one day gain the rest."

When informing me of the renewed disturbances in the Roman States, M. Rossi announced at the same time that, notwithstanding contrary assurances, the health of Gregory XVI. declined—that his surgeon saw him every day, and that we should be prepared for the chance of an approaching conclave.

With this intelligence, I formed my resolution. I had fully convinced myself that to carry on at Rome our policy, at once liberal and anti-revolution-

[1] On the 7th of October, 1845.

ary, M. Rossi was the most able, the safest, and most effective ambassador. I had several times mentioned this to the King, who soon adopted the same view. Some reports were spread that, in fact, the Minister of France at Rome, *per interim*, would soon be appointed permanent ambassador. On the 18th of March, 1846, M. Rossi wrote to me: "My temporary position here is henceforward decidedly false. All our friends feel this, and tell me so. A month ago, the news having spread, I know not how, that my new credentials had arrived, cardinals, bishops, and nobility, all overwhelmed me with compliments I could not accept. The Pope's representative came four times to ask if I had received them. To-day they are all surprised, and every one explains the fact in his own way. But while friends are embarrassed, the ill-disposed have a good game. They even go so far as to suppose an intention of refusing me any visible mark of approbation for what I have done. All this is absurd, but is not the less repeated and hawked about. Whence do I derive my strength? From the King's favour and your friendship. Let these be placed in doubt, and I become powerless.

"The Pope has said openly, more than once, that he would be glad to see me ambassador here. The cardinals most familiar with him were the first to congratulate me on this false intelligence. Cardinal Franzoni, the intimate friend of Lambruschini, says to all who wish to hear him, that they can desire nothing better. In fine, if I am well informed, it would be easy for you to assure yourself, even in Paris, of their sentiments regarding me; if, how-

ever, the nuncio Fornari dares to fulfil his trust and reply.

"You have said it, my dear friend; if I am to remain in Rome, I require to be rooted and increased. How would it be if the Pope were speedily removed before we had consolidated and aggrandized our position? Be well assured, that a great effort is preparing to elect a pope opposed to us. We may carry the day; but, to do so, we should be able to speak and declare ourselves with confidence. All this is impossible with a man who is but a bird fluttering on a branch, and in a secondary position."

I replied without delay, on the 7th of April, 1846: "Your appointment as ambassador is nearly settled, and will take place soon after Easter. But there are two points only which preoccupy—one the King and me, the other the King only. Reply without delay to both.

"It has always been considered impossible for France, the first Catholic power, to have an ambassador at Rome whose wife was a Protestant. This single consideration has several times caused the rejection of particular candidates; for example, the Duke of Montebello. You will recollect we spoke of this with reference to *yourself*, when you were appointed minister, and it was settled that you should go alone to Rome. The King expects that you will continue in the same situation. This is also the opinion of the Duke de Broglie. Leave of absence and short visits will perhaps diminish the annoyances of this arrangement. But tell me whether

you are still, in this respect, of the same mind and intention.

"The King thinks, besides, that he ought to give you the title of *Count;* that it would be useful to you at Rome, and that it sounds better to be called *Signor Conte* than *Signor Commendatore.* On this, I have no opinion of my own. Tell me yours. I shall speak in the sense you indicate.

"*Postscript.*—Half-past four. The King saw the nuncio yesterday, who mentioned some things to him, regarding you, which I must clear up. I have asked him to call on me. Quite officially. Speak to no one of what concerns yourself. I cannot now, for want of time, enter into any detail. I shall write again as soon as I have talked with the nuncio."

The courier of the 30th of April carried to M. Rossi the information he expected: "I return," I wrote to him, "to where I left you on the 7th of April. The evening before, the King saw the nuncio, and spoke with him of you, of his speedy intention to appoint you ambassador, and of his hope that the Pope would have much pleasure in seeing you near him permanently, under that title. The nuncio said this had been thought of at Rome, and that he could not avoid raising some objections on the point; that he had received orders from Cardinal Lambruschini—that he had even a letter in which these objections were specified, and he offered to show it to the King. The King declined, and referred him to me as to the letter, engaging him at the same time to make no official use of it, expressing his surprise and displea-

sure, and speaking of you in suitable terms. The nuncio also spoke extremely well of you, but returned to your past political life, to your quality of refugee, &c. The King, during the conversation, said that Madame Rossi would not go to Rome. This seemed to impress the nuncio, who repeated it to himself.

"I need not tell you what I said to the King when he related to me this interview. All ended in this: 'Here is a political and Jesuitical intrigue, which we must baffle. The King agrees. The council agrees. They are all convinced that no one can transact our affairs at Rome so well as you.' But the King pauses before the act of imposing abruptly and by force an ambassador on the Pope; he requires time, and that we here, and you at Rome, should do what we can to attain our end.

"I sent for the nuncio. I warmly expressed my surprise. 'Neither the Pope nor his minister, I feel assured,' I said to him, 'wish to be accomplices, either through connivance or weakness, in an intrigue of the enemies of the King's government. This is, however, the case, as it would be, or at least as it would appear.' I placed before him the serious consequences for Rome, in France, of such a situation and opinion. I repeated the general state of Catholic questions with us—all those which very speedily we should have to determine—the Chambers, the University, liberty of instruction, &c. Figure to yourself my conversation. The nuncio agreed with me; he protested against my suppositions, my predictions, and took from his pocket the Cardinal's letter. I consented to read it *unofficially;* we agreed that he has

not shown it to me. It is dated on the 24th of February last. An order, in fact, to object to your appointment as ambassador. Allusions to your antecedents as a refugee. Nothing expressly stated on that point. Madame Rossi being a Protestant is the avowed, fundamental objection. There are at Rome, for ambassadresses, rights, traditions, habits, which Rome wishes to maintain, and are impossible with a Protestant. In 1842-6, the Court of Austria desired to appoint as its ambassador at Rome, Count de Lebzeltern, who had espoused a Greek schismatic, a Princess Troubetzkoï. The Court of Rome declared that it would not receive her—that it was impossible. They gave up the point at Vienna. Rome could not act otherwise to-day. This is all that the letter contains. The other objections are only distantly hinted at. In this they entrench themselves.

"I maintained my ground. I repeated that Madame Rossi had no intention of going to Rome. The nuncio neither accepted nor refused this open door. He enlarged on all I had stated of the testimonies of esteem, good-will, and confidence, bestowed on you by his Holiness and his Secretary of State, repeating that all they desired was to keep you as minister. I ended by saying that the special mission with which you were entrusted by the King was not terminated, that it was necessary that what had been promised should be fulfilled, that that fulfilment was indispensable, &c. We thus separated; the nuncio anxious and disturbed, I cold and silent.

"I resumed the conversation with the King. I discoursed thoroughly with the Duke de Broglie.

We are agreed in opinion. Be tranquil as to the definitive result; either you will remain at Rome as it becomes you to remain, or you will return here with credit, to take a place in the cabinet. The King is entirely with you, believing that he requires your services, and is determined to support you for his own interest. 'But how,' says he, 'can we treat the Pope worse than other Courts, on which we do not force an ambassador?' Assist me, then, my dear friend, as I shall assist you; make them comprehend, at Rome, that you are the most desirable, useful, and effective ambassador they can have, and that if they had judgment, they would ask for you; I repeat that, as far as you are concerned, we shall attain one of the two results which are worthy of you."

Neither the action of M. Rossi at Rome nor his reply to Paris were long in suspense. On the 5th of May he wrote thus: "I shall not tell you, my dear friend, that we have won another battle; the word would be ambitious and far above the worth of what is, after all, nothing more than a weakness, a monachal trifle. They will never be cured of such; but it concerns our credit to make them feel at once the absurdity and impotence of these wretched shifts.

"This is what I have done. As the matter concerned myself, I requested the Abbé d'Isoard, whose friendly disposition and zeal you are acquainted with, to see Cardinal Lambruschini, and if necessary the Pope. This, on my part, was a reserve and a trifling malice. Apprised, though I confess I did not believe it, of the letter from the cardinal to the nuncio, I had, at the time, mentioned it to Isoard, who took an oppor-

tunity of speaking on the subject to Lambruschini; the latter, while saying that the presence of a Protestant ambassadress at Rome created a difficulty, had nevertheless affirmed that he had not written this to the nuncio. 'You did well,' replied Isoard, 'for I know that Madame Rossi has no idea of residing in Rome, and thus the objection falls to the ground.'

"I therefore requested the Abbé d'Isoard to tell them that he had found me much surprised, and even more than surprised, at the objections of the nuncio; that, if they had taken up the idea of keeping me in Rome as simply minister, and of thus aiding the cause of those who affected to look upon the French embassy as merely *a legation*, they had indulged in a dream, with which neither my government nor myself would participate in the slightest degree. The Cardinal was greatly embarrassed, but as, faithful to your instructions, I did not tell him you had read his letter, he could readily fall on the nuncio: he said that Fornari had gone too far; that there was no personal objection to me; that, as he had made me feel a thousand times, they were delighted to have me and keep me; that the sole difficulty was the presence at Rome of a Protestant ambassadress; that, if the nuncio had said anything else, it had undoubtedly been suggested by his friends in Paris. Finally, *more solito*, he laid the affair to the account of the Pope.

"The Abbé d'Isoard went on the same day to the Pope. The Pope told him he was sorry to hear this had caused me some pain; that such was certainly not his intention; that everybody knew the great esteem

and affection he entertained for me, and how much he was gratified by transacting affairs with me: 'I can explain myself with him directly,' he said, 'and I am always pleased to acknowledge openly his prudence, moderation, and loyalty. But what do you require? I was told that I could not avoid making the observation with regard to a Protestant ambassadress; I have done so, and no more; my part is finished. I have not said that I would not receive M. Rossi as ambassador, although the husband of a Protestant lady. I shall receive him, and always with the same favour.' 'Does your Holiness authorize me to say so to him?' 'Undoubtedly.'

"'M. Rossi,' resumed the Abbé d'Isoard, 'will be much affected by the goodness of your Holiness, but as the question touches him personally, he would not—he could not——' 'I understand,' said the Pope; 'you are quite right; but what can be done? I cannot give myself the lie.' 'That is not at all necessary; an explanatory letter to the nuncio would suffice, repeating what your Holiness has now done me the honour of saying to me.' 'Well; speak to the Cardinal about it, and tell him to bring me a copy of a letter at the audience of to-morrow. I wish to do all that is consistently possible. Tell this to M. Rossi.'

"In short, the letter was signed yesterday, and I am assured it has been forwarded. It was read to M. d'Isoard, and runs thus:

"That at the time of my appointment as minister, certain journals had spread abroad many reports concerning me;

"That, notwithstanding, I have been received at Rome with all the respect due to a representative of the King;

"That subsequently I had, under the circumstances; been received by the Holy Father with all the loving friendship (*amorevolezza*) I had known how to deserve by the manner in which I had fulfilled my mission and negotiated affairs;

"That having heard I was going to be appointed ambassador, it was impossible not to signify that it would be unpleasant to have at Rome a Protestant ambassadress, towards whom could not be testified the respect which usage had consecrated;

"But that, nevertheless, if I was appointed, I should meet the reception from the Holy Father which his Holiness will always accord to the representative of a King for whom he professes the most lively affections, &c. &c.

"The letter, therefore, bears solely on the presence of the ambassadress. It is made for the purpose of saying:—As there will be no ambassadress there is no objection.

"Thus, you see, the whole affair reduces itself to a trifle. They know this, and have had it reported to me again this morning, that they feel assured the answer will be my appointment."

It was impossible to defeat more politely such a timid manœuvre: so timid, that we might ask ourselves whether it was not an empty complaisance to the adversaries of M. Rossi, rather than a serious attempt to impede his appointment as ambassador. Be that as it might, my answer was immediate. I

wrote on the 17th of May to M. Rossi: "Your appointment as ambassador is signed; your letters of credence are preparing. You will receive them by the next packet. I have seen the nuncio; he had just received the letters of which you apprised me, and declared to me that he had no further objection or observation to make, nothing more to say." The courier of the 27th of May carried to M. Rossi his credentials: "You are now definitively established," I said to him, "in the situation and in the midst of the affairs in which I have long wished to see you. There are immense services to be rendered at Rome to this country and government, and to the sound policy of Europe. You will render them. No one is better adapted to the task than you. When our session is over, the elections settled, and I find myself in repose for a few weeks at Val Richer, I will write to you from thence in detail what I think of the attitude and conduct suitable to modern Catholic France, in Europe and in the East."

M. Rossi had not received this letter when he wrote to me, on the 1st of June, 1846: "The Holy See is vacant; Rome is in stupefaction; such a sudden end was not expected. All conjecture on the conclave would be at this moment premature. No candidate presents himself strongly recommended; none of those names which all the world has on its lips. If you ask who will be the *cardinali papeggianti*, the cardinals considered eligible for the popedom, everybody names seven or eight, the greater number of little note and absent from Rome. Everybody knows what he does not, but not what he does wish."

There was no longer question as to the Jesuits, or to liberty of instruction. When obtaining, on this point, all that was important to us, we had furnished an example of the influence that might be exercised on the Holy See, even in opposition to its own inclinations, if at the same time it was inspired with full confidence that on all occasions its rights and position in the world were and would continue to be scrupulously respected. We were on the eve of other problems and perils very different in their importance and weight. The whole Catholic world, State and Church, was on the point of falling into ferment and question. I foresaw the immensity and darkness of this future. Whatever the events might be, we were fully resolved to conduct ourselves in them according to the liberal and anti-revolutionary policy which we had everywhere raised as our standard, and I congratulated myself on having established at Rome an ambassador capable of supporting it skilfully and honourably. I was far, indeed, from foreseeing the fate and glory that awaited him.

THE END.

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. : NEW-STREET SQUARE, LONDON

00032436

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018